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Abstract
Relative Performance Evaluation "RPE" is a performance evaluation and reward scheme 
which have been receiving a growing attention from academic and professionals 
(Holmstrom 1982, Frederickson 1992, Conyon and Gregg 1994, and Defond & Park 1999). 
Under RPE rewards for managers and executives are set upon their performance compared 
to that of their peers. Holmstrom (1982) introduced the basic model of RPE founded on 
agent-principal assumptions. In that model, the peers’ performance was seen to provide 
information about the agent’s unobservable effort. Fredrickson (1992) suggested that RPE 
could satisfy economic and psychological needs of employee. In this study, an attempt is 
made to depart from the universal agency perspective and to adopt a contingent 
framework. The research arguments were developed from an identification of the 
discrepancies and gaps in the literature of RPE, overlooked complications and issues in the 
UK practice, relating the debate about RPE to the wider accounting literature of 
performance measurements and evaluation (Emmanuel et.al. 1990, Kaplan & Atkinson 
1998). The aim of this research was to explore the content and context of RPE therefore, 
the arguments focused on: whether RPE is motivating, the impacts of difficulty of peer 
group, non financial measures, market measures and varying the form of the rewards on 
RPE.
Case study approach was adopted to examine the research arguments. Data were collected 
from three companies in Egypt and one company in England. Access was partially 
accidental but turned to provide four different cases. Three cases were developed in Egypt 
including: Trade (a public company), Dairy (private company) and Steel (joint venture) 
and the English company was United Utilities (private company). Data were collected by 
questionnaire, interviews and other documentary sources of the companies.
The research findings suggest associations between RPE and target’s difficulty, using non 
financial but not varying rewards. Competition and type of ownership and the 
organisational culture were influential on RPE.
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Introduction
Research Background
This study about Relative Performance Evaluation "RPE" started from agency theory. 
Recently there has been a growing literature about this technique (Holmstrom 1982, 
Kunckel and Magee 1986, Dye 1992, Frederickson 1992, Conyon and Gregg 1994, 
Dopuch and Gupta 1997 and DeFond & Park (1999). RPE is a mode of benchmarking 
which refers to building rewards for managers and executives on comparative 
performance (Dye 1992, Janakirman et. al., 1992, DeFond & Park 1999). In his basic 
model of RPE, Holmstrom (1982) focused on the incremental value of information that 
peers’ performance would hold in inducing an agent's effort. Fredrickson (1992) 
suggested that RPE could satisfy economic and psychological needs of the employee. 
Academics [e.g. Kaplan 1984 (a)] criticised performance management practices for 
neglecting the psychological aspects of the performance measures and evaluation 
processes. They also suggest that management accounting should broaden its scope and 
type of consideration regarding performance management. Those authors, who write 
about RPE, make different assumptions about the technique, and its relationship to 
improvements in performance. In these studies, remuneration packages have been 
analysed via different variables and using different theoretical perspectives. These 
perspectives were drawn from economic, industrial relations, social theories and 
management (Holmstrom 1982, Green and Stocky 1983, Gibbons and Murphy 1990, 
Janakirman et. al 1992, Lambert et. al. 1993, Fredrickson 1992, Shore et. al 1987, Ferris 
and Mitchell 1987, Young 1985). This diverse set of researches and writings offer a 
range of theoretical and empirical studies which open a debate and raise important issues 
regarding performance systems such as RPE.
The importance of this research rests on academic and practical reasons. Academically, 
RPE has been capturing the attention of researchers over, the past twenty years 
(Holmstrom 1982, Kunckel and Magee 1986, Maher 1987, Chow and Haddad 1991, 
Gibbons and Murphy 1990, Dye 1992, Frederickson 1992, Janakirman et. al 1992, 
Lambert et. al 1993, Conyon and Gregg 1994, Dopuch and Gupta 1997 and DeFond & 
Park 1999). Fredrickson’s experimental study (1992) was awarded the American 
Accounting Association’s award for the best article in 1992. This attention has called for
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more research to enrich our understanding of RPE, its mechanism and role in 
organisations. Particularly, questions arisen about: how can accounting contribute to the 
complex process of measuring, evaluating and rewarding performance? The complexity 
stems from the fact that many variables affect this process. Some of these variables refer 
to the measurement system itself (i.e. the attributes of the measurements, scope, 
representativeness ...etc) some belong to the organisation (e.g. its strategy, leadership, 
type of activities...etc) others relate to the environment (competition, market 
influences...etc) and the individuals’ attributes (e.g. motivation, values, attitudes ...etc).
The discussion in the literature regarding RPE, has been primarily based on agency 
theory and included assumptions: (a) RPE is a universal technique; therefore it was noted 
that no attempt had been made to question what design would allow RPE to function 
effectively, for whom or in what circumstances, (b) The existing literature has also 
accepted -unquestioningly- the assumption that RPE would motivate employees and 
hence leads to improvements in performance. Also it was accepted that RPE and 
motivating employees constitute a linear, increasing function and the literature endeavors 
to examine - using different measures, samples and methods- whether or not this shape 
exists (see chapter two and three).
Professionally, independent committees such as the Cadbury Code of Best Practice 
(1992), the Greenbury Committee (1995) and institutions like London Securities 
Exchange, encouraged companies to develop and adopt remuneration packages, which 
builds rewards on comparative performance (which is the core of RPE). These 
professional bodies also urged companies to disclose the amounts and bases for such 
rewards in the company’s reports. It should be mentioned that, since the Greenbury 
report, there have been an increasing number of UK companies which apply this 
technique among which are: National Westminster Bank, Reuters, Dixons, Lucas, Boots 
and others (see chapter four). A fact that should not be neglected in this research is that; 
reward under RPE scheme is only one item in the remuneration package in practice and 
in theory. This distinguishes the arguments about RPE from any debate about basic 
salary or any other items in the pay package. However, in order to clarify the importance 
of this scheme in terms of costs to companies, in 1998, Reuters paid £1.7 m to five 
executives under the long-term incentives (RPE scheme), whereas Lucas paid £1.3m to 
four executives and Dixons paid £1.2m. Given that this is an expense item, any
unjustifiable increase in it would have a negative impact on product prices (which affect 
customers), profits (which affect the dividends to shareholders) and taxes as well.
In this research, RPE was examined as a control system with a special emphasis on 
investigating the motivational role proposed by Fredrickson (1992) and the social 
comparisons’ theorists (Ferris and Mitchell 1987) but a different set of arguments were 
raised. In this research the concern was to examine the proposed motivational function 
of RPE. That is, how employees perceive RPE, whether or not they would be motivated 
by RPE, if they were, by which design (i.e. which comparison group, performance 
measures, rewards) and in what circumstances.
Otley (1984) argues that three questions should be asked about any control system: what 
standards of performance should be set, what dimensions of performance should be 
measured and how performance should be rewarded. The accounting literature contains 
a huge and ongoing stream of research about these three themes. However, this research 
differs from the work of Otley (1980), Brownell (1982), Brownell et. al. 1986 and 1991) 
in that it does not depend on statistical analysis of data for two reasons: (1) In this 
research the type of questions are exploratory. (2) It is aimed to obtain an in-depth 
picture about the technique, its application and outcomes. (3) The evidence in this 
research will not be generated using statistical analyses because they were criticised for 
being constrained by sample techniques, the choice of measures, producing weak 
correlation with no link to reality.
Thus, the line of enquiry adopted in this research has deliberately shifted the debate 
about RPE from economic perspective -represented in agency theory- to accounting 
perspective. This shift took the debate inside the organisation and this leads to 
developing arguments which have not been raised in agency perspective.
Motives behind the study
The motives behind conducting this study stem from the need to understand the 
contribution of RPE into the complex process of performance. It was apparent that there 
was a growing literature on different uses of benchmarking. As Dopuch and Gupta 
(1997) state, benchmarking has been suggested for use in a variety of areas: strategic
planning, finance, investigating competitiveness, productivity, cost and quality and 
performance.
Some of the benchmarking literature studies have been oriented towards investigating 
performance and rewards through techniques such as RPE. However, a number of gaps 
and contradictions in the research on RPE have been identified (chapter three). Covering 
some of the gaps in the literature of RPE was the prime reason for this study (chapter 
four). The second motive is to analyse RPE as a control system as it implies the three 
components of a/the control as described by Otley (1987): setting targets, measuring, 
evaluating and rewarding performance. This involves linking the debate about RPE as a 
control system to the existing accounting literature about control system.
A third motive was to respond to the call of academic bodies “The Academy of 
Management” when it called (in 1996) for using in depth, “unconventional’ and cross­
culture investigation in the area of pay and firm’s performance. A fifth motive was to 
elucidate the research issues in the environment of the Egyptian companies, which is 
rarely presented to the international academic circles. Exploring Egyptian practices along 
with UK practices is expected to show economic and cultural differences, which would 
enhance the investigation.
The research Method
In this research, case study approach (chapter five) was adopted to examine the research 
arguments. Data were collected from three companies in Egypt and one company in 
England. Access was partially accidental but turned to provide four different cases. 
Three cases were developed in Egypt including trade (a public company), Dairy (private 
company) and Steel (joint venture) and the English company was United Utilities (private 
company). This variety allowed to draw a picture about the broad aspects of control 
systems and performance management in these companies, then focused more on the 
specific practice of RPE, how used, why, what experience, rationale, what factors affect.
The data collection tools included 98 questionnaire and 16 semi- structured interviews 
(data presented and analysed in chapter six). The basic idea behind the integration of the 
two instruments was that, the limitation of one instrument would be compensated for by
the strength of the other (Berry et. al. 1991). The field study was undertaken in two 
parts. Part one; collecting data from Egyptian companies where three firms were 
investigated (chapter six). Part two; collecting data from UK companies where a multi­
utility group was investigated (chapter seven). The data collection was planned to start 
with the Egyptian part so that the researcher could gain some experience/ familiarity with 
the research in the environment to which she belongs. Furthermore, it helped to test and 
hence improve the questionnaire and the interviews before conducting the second part of 
the field work in a certainly more complex environment where the UK company that 
would be investigated is an international group of multi utilities (made up of four 
companies).
Organisation of this study
This thesis is organised into three parts. Following this introduction, part I provides an 
overview of the literature related to the theory and practice of performance management. 
The aim here is to develop a theoretical framework within which the relationship 
between performance measurements system and employees’ motivation can be analysed. 
This framework has been structured on insights from three themes: the accounting 
literature of performance, the RPE literature and the UK practice of RPE. Thus, chapter 
one traces and reviews main and diverse accounting streams in handling the performance 
phenomenon from different perspectives and in different aspects: planning, measuring, 
evaluating and rewarding performance. Chapter two includes a review and summary of 
the particular evaluation and rewarding technique which is one concern in this research: 
RPE. Chapter three progresses towards developing the research arguments by a critical 
evaluation of the RPE literature. This includes both the theoretical and empirical 
implications of these researches.
Part II is designed to focus on the research problems. Chapter four concentrates on the 
research arguments, depending not only on the critical review of the RPE literature 
provided in chapter three, but also on analysing some studies, reports and publications 
about the current practices of RPE. Chapter five includes the research design and 
methodology.
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Part III is devoted to the fieldwork and the case studies in Egypt and England. This part 
is divided into three chapters, chapters six and seven about the Egyptian data and chapter 
eight about the English data. Chapter six presents and comments on the data collected by 
the questionnaire, interviews and documentary sources for the individual companies in 
Egypt. Chapter seven includes a presentation of all the questionnaire data of the three 
Egyptian companies all together, a comparison between these data in terms of sectors 
(the public companies and private companies) and in terms of attitudes towards RPE. 
Chapter eight reports and analyses the data of United Utilities company from England. 
Chapter nine includes the major findings, reasons behind using/ not using RPE in the 
different companies, how implemented, what variables affect it and how employees 
interpret it. This discussion is conducted in the light of each company’s circumstances, 
other control practices, employees’ attitudes and cultural implications. Chapter ten 
summaries the findings, contribution, limitations and indicates some areas and extensions 
for future work.
The major findings of this research show that shifting the focus from the economic to the 
accounting domain provided many insights into RPE. Primarily, RPE is the least used 
and favoured among the evaluation techniques and mainly, it is not as the previous 
literature of RPE assumed: if RPE is used, then performance will improve due to 
motivating employees by money and esteem. Instead, the findings suggest that variables 
like the perceived difficulty of the peer group and using both financial and non financial 
measures, condition the relationship between RPE and improvements in performance. 
Also, the type of ownership (private/ public) and competition are other influential 
variables.
More specifically, the results suggest that, when employees respond to RPE, they seek to 
obtain money rather than esteem. Performance measures are the most influential item in 
RPE followed by peers. Regarding the performance measures, the evidence suggests that 
using both financial and non-financial measures would enhance RPE whereas, peers 
should be chosen so that they constitute challenging but attainable targets otherwise, 
RPE would be an ineffective motivational mechanism. In the Egyptian sample, RPE was 
found to be used in Dairy company which belongs to the private sector and in United 
Utilities which is a privatised multi- utility group in the UK. In both companies, RPE was 
confined to rewarding top management only as a response to market and strategic
influences. In contrast to the existing literature of RPE, the evidence suggests that the 
internal comparisons between divisions are another version of RPE. One major finding of 
the study is that RPE is consistent with the environment of the private sector -but not the 
public sector- in Egypt. The former environment aims to enhance market share and 
respond to competition by encouraging employees’initiatives and creativity. RPE did not 
exist in the motivational mechanism of the public sector, which is governed by law. This 
law does not include performance comparisons initially nor does it encourage 
competition due to elements of social and economic policy embedded in that law. In 
terms of national culture, RPE was found to be used in UK more than in Egypt due to 
less tendency to avoid uncertainty in the UK than in Egypt. However, caution should be 
practiced concerning this point, as it is likely that no one reason is behind adopting RPE 
(or not) in any environment.
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Chapter One
The Accounting handling of the “Performance” Phenomenon
The aim of this chapter is to navigate in the accounting literature to explore and identify 
what dimensions about the "performance" phenomenon have been discussed in that 
literature. The idea behind this endeavour is to link the debate about "Relative 
Performance Evaluation" with the wider accounting domain of control and performance 
measurements. This attempt is also believed to be consistent with the orientation adopted 
in this research where RPE is analysed as a control system and the/ components of this 
system are recognised and addressed. It this chapter, it is intended to review the 
accounting literature about performance. Also, it is planned to trace the dimensions of a 
control system (planning, measuring, evaluating and rewarding performance) and what 
aspects relate to each dimension, what factors have been suggested to impact on every 
aspect. An attempt will be made to accommodate RPE into this accounting context; this 
line of inquiry in intended to be followed throughout this research.
(1.0) Introduction: What is RPE:
RPE has been introduced within agency theory framework as a technique that can play 
many roles. It implies comparing manager’s performance with that of his/ her peers and 
building rewards accordingly (Holmstrom 1982, Kunckel and Magee 1984, Fredrickson 
1992, Conyon and Gregg 1994).
The existing literature suggests many roles for RPE, among them; a motivational 
mechanism, monitoring technique, planning tool and risk filter. The main concern of this 
research is to investigate the motivational role of RPE. In this respect, it will be 
considered that the “objective” of RPE is to improve performance. The mechanism by 
which this improvement is achieved is “motivation” and the tools which might affect this 
mechanism, involve the content of RPE (i.e. the peer group, the performance measures, 
and the reward) and the context within which it operates.
Many disciplines such as economics, management, psychology and industrial relations 
and others have contributed to the development of RPE. The aim of this research is to 
investigate RPE within the accounting domain of performance. Therefore, this chapter 
reviews the accounting literature of performance, performance measurements, 
competitiveness and motivation. This review is the foundation for studying RPE in this 
research. Firstly, it is worthwhile to identify whether RPE is a mode of responsibility 
accounting, a performance measurements system or a control system. Although the 
interrelation between the three concepts is not denied, identifying what RPE can be 
regarded as a crucial point to draw a framework to address RPE, select the dimensions to be 
investigated and the literature to relate to.
(1.0.1) Is RPE a mode of responsibility accounting?
Ferris and Mitchell (1987) and Young (1985) discuss the roots of RPE in the psychology 
literature. RPE is based on the social comparison theory whereby the existence of 
“others” is expected to exert some pressure on the individual to affect his behaviour and 
performance. Wilson (1993) argues that responsibility accounting focuses on allocating 
responsibility for achieving goals. In this sense, it could be argued that the central point 
in RPE is the performance comparisons. The role that RPE plays here is motivation
through these comparisons rather than tracing employees’ responsibility about competing 
with peers. Choudhury (1987) argues that relative performance evaluation introduces an 
element of risk into manager's performance which implies a violation of the 
controllability principle. Furthermore, labeling RPE by the responsibility mode, would 
limit the aspects which it contains (i.e. the motivational element, the performance 
measures and rewards).
(1.0.2) Is RPE a performance measurement system?
Tatikonda et. al. (1998) argue that performance measurement system forms an integral 
part of management control system. Performance measurements system reflects the 
culture and philosophy of an organisation and describes how well work is done in terms 
of cost, time and quality. It helps set targets, track progress, motivate, communicate 
organisation strategic intent and influence behaviour. The researcher argues that this 
implies that a performance measurement system includes how to measure performance, 
for whom, when, what is included, what excluded and links to other contingents. In that 
sense, ABC and the Balanced Scorecard represent performance systems. When looking 
at RPE in these terms, it would appear that it is wider than a performance measurement 
system. RPE does not suggest “how performance” should be “measured”, rather, it is 
concerned with “how performance” can be “enhanced”. This line of thinking about RPE 
is distinctively followed throughout this research.
(1.0.3) Is RPE a control system?
Lyne (1995) considers a control system to be concerned with ensuring that what was 
intended actually occurs. Part of the concept of control is therefore, “motivation” and 
another part is “the measurement of performance”. Motivation and control are very 
broad concepts that extend beyond accounting controls. However, accounting control is 
the focus of attention in this research. Otley and Berry (1980) emphasize that for an 
accounting control system to operate effectively there must be the following items:
• Clear quantified objectives
• Measured output
• A predictive model to revise objectives and comparable to the conditions within 
which the output result
• Corrective actions
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Lyne (1995) classified this is as a feedback control system where the objective must be 
set ex ante in a specific and measurable form such that comparison can be made ex post 
and remedial action can be taken. This feedback model is static and backward looking. 
Businesses would prefer to take action to prevent unfavorable results through a feed­
forward predictive approach. Without the ability to predict what will happen under 
changing circumstances, the basic accounting control models will not operate. A 
predictive model is not a purely technical procedure. To set revised objectives, requires 
an understanding of the behavior of the individuals involved. The most important feature 
for this purpose is to know what motivates individuals to perform to the best of their 
ability and how to encourage a better level of performance. Management accounting 
writers have used various motivation theories to construct a predictive model as part of 
an accounting control system.
When examining RPE in the light of this concept of control system, it would appear that 
RPE fits comfortably within this definition and structure. RPE can be viewed as a set of 
procedures that aim at motivating employees to improve performance through competing 
with peers. This implies setting a target (i.e. selecting the peer group to compete with); 
measuring output, evaluating and rewarding this output. The mechanism by which RPE 
is suggested to motivate employees rests on the theory of social comparisons (Ferris and 
Mitchell, 1987). This theory predicts that an individual would change his behaviour in 
order to be viewed as a hardworking person. These desires to gain social esteem and 
reward under RPE schemes are expected to raise the individual’s concern to compete 
with others. The theory of social comparisons draws expectation about behaviour. In this 
research, it is argued that the social comparison theory represents the “predictive model” 
in RPE. This element of RPE will be discussed in detail in chapter two of this thesis. The 
procedural part of RPE (i.e. the tools” by which this motivation would be achieved) 
represents a “performance measurement system” in itself. This system includes setting a 
target (i.e. choosing a comparison group), measuring, evaluating and rewarding 
performance. RPE could result in showing how employees are performing relative to 
their competitors. If the result of the comparison is not what the company favours, 
corrective actions might be considered. However, deciding what actions to be taken is 
the job of a further investigation beyond the scope of RPE.
This leads to the conclusion that: RPE can be seen as a control system and this view will 
be the basis of analysis in this research. This system is believed to impact on the
“performance phenomenon” through affecting its “measurements”. Therefore, in this 
research, a special emphasis will be placed on the performance measurement system 
along with a theoretical and empirical investigation for RPE. One reason behind this -as 
discussed later in this chapter and argued by Brownell and Hirst (1986), Merchant and 
Manzoni (1989), Brownell and Dunck (1991), Otley et.al. (1995)- is that the 
components of the measurements system could affect the phenomenon (i.e the 
performance). Another reason is, a control system -as explained earlier- implies setting 
targets, measuring, evaluating and rewarding performance and is a predictive model (in 
the case of RPE; motivation's theory). Therefore, this chapter reviews the accounting 
literature as related to what these aspects expect from the motivation theory. This will be 
discussed in parallel to the motivation theory of RPE in chapter three. The distinction 
between the phenomenon and its measurement will be maintained in this review.
(1.1) Part One: Variables affect Performance
The following review of the accounting literature tries to identify different variables in 
relation to their effects on "performance". It should be mentioned here that, this review 
does not include the issue of the impact of target setting on performance, pay or rewards 
as each will be discussed in a separate section latter in this chapter because of their 
important implications for the research topic. Figure (1-1) presents variables which the 
researcher identified from the accounting literature as being influential on the 
performance and the performance measures:
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Figure 0-1") The variables of the performance and its measurement in the accounting literature:
Outside the company
Uncertainty
Competition
Market
Inside The company
-strategy -ownership
-task complexity -competition
-technology/ automation -uncertainty
-interdependencies -standardisation
control system
-issues relate to budget -target’s difficulty
-participation -commitment
-rewards -motivation
-leadership -benchmarking
-evaluating system
accounting information system
-measurements of performance 
-style of using the accounting numbers 
-degree of depending on financial terms 
-type of responsibility centre
Performance measures: The relationship between the phenomenon and its
measurements:
Studying the role of accounting as a measuring and evaluating system of employees’ 
performance has lasted a long time and extended to many dimensions. Kren et. al., 
(1988) traced various aspects of this debate. Kren et. al., (1988) review Hopwood’s 
argument (1972) that accounting performance measures may not include all the relevant 
dimensions of performance because accounting tends to focus on short term results and 
serve many purposes besides performance evaluation. Furthermore, accounting measures 
are concerned with outcomes. For optimal evaluation, the quality of the subordinate’s 
decision is also an important feature of performance. In those settings whereby the 
outcome does not adequately measure the quality of input by the subordinate, focusing 
on outcomes does not provide effective performance evaluation (Tiessen and
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Waterhouse 1983). In the following part, some influences on performance (e.g. level of 
budget, style of budget, participation uncertainty,...etc) are discussed.
Level o f Budget
Ezzamel and Hart (1987, p 353) reviewed the experimental study of Stedry (1960) on 
the relationship between performance, aspiration levels and budget levels. The results 
indicated that budget level influences performance. The implicit budget group (i.e. no 
specific budget standard was defined) performed best, followed by the medium, high and 
low budget groups respectively. It was also found that those who performed best, are 
those who set their aspiration levels after receiving their budget. Ronen and Livingstone 
(1975) interpret Stedry’s results by the expectancy theory of motivation. They argue that 
an individual will select the aspiration level which maximises his motivation to work. If 
the targets are set too high, aspiration level will lag behind because the expectancy that 
the target will be attained is likely to be negatively correlated with the perceived 
difficulty of attaining targets.
Style o f Budget
One aspect related to the accounting system is the style of accountability. Hopwood 
(1972) found support for the argument that subordinate evaluated under the budget 
constrained style (i.e. a high level of reliance on accounting measures) rather than profit 
conscious style and non-accounting style, would be more likely to experience job tension 
and more likely to engage in dysfunctional decision-making.
Otley (1978) replicated Hopwood’s study but he was not able to confirm an increase in 
job tension under a budget constrained evaluation style. Furthermore, high reliance on 
accounting measures was found to improve performance rather than impair it. 
Researchers attempted to reconcile the contradictory results of Hopwood and Otley by 
adopting a contingency perspective and searching for situational differences. Variables 
such as uncertainty, participation,...etc have been introduced in the literature as 
explanatory variables as demonstrated below.
Task uncertainty
Hirst (1981) suggests that task uncertainty might affect the accounting numbers. As task 
uncertainty increases, accounting numbers increasingly lose their ability to accurately tell
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the whole story in relation to performance evaluation. Therefore, more reliance on 
accounting leads to more dysfunctional behaviour. Using this foundation to explain the 
results of Hopwood and Otley, Hirst suggests that Hopwood was studying units more 
exposed to uncertainty than those in Otley’s study.
Hirst (1983) empirically tested his previous proposition. The results he obtained, 
indicated that when high task uncertainty was combined with a performance evaluation 
style that relies primarily on accounting numbers, significant job tension exists and vice 
versa. In his study, Brownell (1985) reported that reducing reliance on accounting 
measures is more appropriate to subordinates who face high levels of environmental 
uncertainty. The interactive effect of uncertainty with other factors such as participation 
is reviewed latter in the section.
Participation
Among the factors that have been the focus of attention in the accounting literature is 
participation. Employees' participation in budget setting has been introduced to moderate 
the relationship between accounting measures and performance. The positive effect of 
participation on performance has been supported by many studies but empirical testing of 
these arguments led to inconsistent results (Brownell 1982). Researchers attempted to 
find contingency explanations and many variables were studied.
Brownell (1982) found budget focused leadership affects performance when participation 
is high. Govindarajan (1984) provided evidence that participation contributed to 
performance when uncertainty was high but not when it was low. Brownell and Hirst
(1986) found that the compatible combination of participation and budget emphasis 
(high/ high and low/ low) was more effective in reducing job tension in low but not in 
high task uncertainty. Kren et. al. (1988), suspect that participation might affect 
performance through moderating variables and required more tests for that and how it 
happens. Hirst and Lowy (1990) concluded that goals and feedback interact to affect 
performance, while independently, goals and feedback have no effect on performance.
Brownell and Mclnnes (1986) tested participation and motivation. The main hypothesis 
in that study was that: participation leads to improvement in work- goal accomplishment 
has been rejected. Meanwhile, the rest of the hypotheses like; participation improves
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goal-directed behaviour, work-goal accomplishment and rewards, have been supported. 
Therefore, the study failed to prove that participation impacts on performance through 
motivation.
In 1991, Brownell and Dunck addressed the impact of combined factors; task uncertainty 
and participation on performance. They argued that Brownell and Hirst’s (1986) findings 
were subject to: (1) the measure of task uncertainty and
(2) sampling procedures.
They introduced task uncertainty to reflect the ability to specify input/ output relations. 
The easily traceable and more objective this specification is, the lower the difficulty of 
the task is. Their findings show that when task difficulty is low, participation leads to 
improvements in performance.
Uncertainty and Leadership style
Otley and Pierce’s (1995) explored uncertainty as a moderating variable for the impact 
of leadership style on the occurrence of dysfunctional behaviour in auditing firms. Otley 
and Pierce’s (1995) started from prior research of the problem of dysfunctional reactions 
to control systems. Studies applied to the auditing firms revealed a high level of budget 
pressure leading to a variety of dysfunctional behaviour patterns which might be difficult 
to control.
Otley and Pierce’s (1995) study examines how subordinates’ reaction to control systems 
is influenced by the leadership behaviour of supervisors. Two forms of dysfunctional 
behaviour were tested under reporting of time and reduction in quality of doing the 
work.
The leadership style was characterised by: initiation of structure (democratic or 
autocratic) and consideration. Uncertainty was recognised as a moderating variable. The 
study concludes that:
-high structure leadership (more autocratic) and low consideration leads to high 
dysfunctional behaviour.
-low structure leadership (i.e. less autocratic) with high consideration leads to low 
dysfunctional behaviour.
-Perceived Environmental Uncertainty moderates these relationships.
-when uncertainty increases, the strength of the previous relationships increases.
-the impact of uncertainty on (leadership- audit quality) relationship is stronger than 
this impact on (leadership- under reporting of time).
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Degree o f automation and standardisation 
Brownell and Merchant (1990) studied the relationship between standardisation and 
automation on the one hand and the relevant type of budget and performance on the 
other. Standardisation was expected to affect the realisation of input/ output 
relationship and automation would affect the cost of input. They draw the following 
hypotheses:
standardisation and automation affect budget and performance.
This was subdivided into the following aspects:
-when standardisation increases, flexible budget is more appropriate.
-high automation has a positive and strong relationship with flexible budget and 
performance.
-static budget could be related to low automation.
In this study, Brownell et al., used a regression model for self-reported data to trace 
these relationships. Their results were mixed. They found that low standardisation and 
high participation were related to static budget and more performance whereas 
automation was not found to relate to flexible budget or more performance as it was 
expected in the hypotheses. This was explained as; either this relationship is 
unimportant or poorly measured.
While the previous part reviewed the studies about "performance", this part is allocated 
for the literature about "performance measuring" based on Otley’s (1987) outline. Otley
(1987) argues that any control system should answer three basic questions that can be 
seen as the building blocks of a performance measurement system:
(1) What dimensions of performance to be measured
(2) What are appropriate standards to be set
(3) What rewards are to be associated to achievement 
Following these three themes will be explored in part two below.
(1.2) Part Two; Measuring Performance
Ezzamel (1992) set criteria for evaluating performance index. This would imply 
attending to the needs of both internal and external users in relation to three main areas: 
monitoring, assessing and guiding performance. He also argued that monitoring
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managerial performance would require that the performance indicator should engender 
corporate- optimal behaviour, promote divisional independence and maintain the 
controllability principle. The latter is particularly important for responsibility accounting. 
Furthermore, assessment of divisional and corporate profitability requires that the 
performance index best approximates the ’ideal’ income measures if the latter can be 
identified. Ezzamel (1992) states that ideal indices of performance are theoretical 
constructs which are developed to serve as a guide against which workable measures can 
be assessed. They also serve as a motivating force in guiding efforts to develop more 
complete measures of performance. For example, if the main objective of the firm is to 
maximise profit, then the "ideal" income concept can be maximising discounted cash flow 
while maximising the value of the firm is the maximisation of the present value of future 
net receipts.
Evidence on this impact of firm objectives on selecting performance measures, could 
be found in the study of Govindarajan and Gupta (1985). They investigated the 
proposition that business unit strategy might affect the choice of accounting measures in 
performance evaluation. The evidence of this study suggests that following a build 
strategy (i.e. increase market share) requires improvements in long term performance, 
then accounting measures which are short- term oriented, would be inappropriate. 
Alternately, measures for new product development, sales growth or personal 
development will be more effective. In contrast, under a harvest strategy (i.e. maximising 
cash flow), reliance on accounting measures (such as cost control, profit margins and 
cash flow) would be more effective. Ittner and Larker (1995) examined the association 
between the use of Total Quality Management (TQM) and the use of non-traditional 
(non-financial) performance measures and rewards. The results indicate that, with more 
TQM, greater emphasis is placed on team and non-financial performance measures, more 
frequent provision of quality information to all levels and greater use of "bottom up" data 
gathering. Besides, with more TQM, external benchmarking on products, processes and 
services is more frequent and strategic information is broadly more frequent.
Daniel et al., (1991) were concerned with differences between the US and Japan, 
regarding quality strategies, control and reward systems. The results indicate a greater 
connection between quality strategy and control systems in the USA than Japan. The 
data show a stronger connection between quality goal setting and feedback in Japan. On
the one hand, goal setting was linked to the expected rewards in Japan, on the other; 
feedback and rewards were significantly linked to the manager’s expectation of rewards 
from achieving quality goal.
A Review of Performance Measuring Practice
Al Bahimani (1993, 1994) surveyed how investors, lenders and various managerial levels 
perceive performance measures. A primary finding was that, users were dissatisfied with 
the traditional cost measurements and financial measurements in the environment of new 
technology. The respondents expressed the need to measure new aspects like the 
efficiency of delivery, ability to respond to change in the environment. This need is 
characterised by huge amounts of investment in the new technologies. The shop floor 
workers reported that the non-financial measures (e.g. production rate, rejected units, 
meeting schedules and time of delivery) are more meaningful in handling day-to-day 
operations. Still, these measures are comparable with other companies (as currently used 
by the Japanese companies). In order to indicate managerial performance, financial return 
and working capital measures (rather than capital market and lender security) were 
widely used while suppliers’ performance was of great importance.
The survey shows that, companies developed different measures for different users 
internally and externally. Internally, more measures were sent to the executives than to 
the board of directors. On the other hand, measures like return on investment, working 
capital, measures of demand, customer satisfaction, labour and production are reported 
to the board of directors more than those concerned with lender security, supplier 
performance and innovation. Also, value-added measures were found to be used as an 
alternative to sales and profit measures. Different measurements were used for outsiders 
(non-banks) such as annual accounts, capital market and financial measures but this does 
not include measures for innovation, customer, supply and labour. For banks, summary 
of accounts, working capital, financial return and lender security (asset cover, gearing, 
and interest cover) are usually used. It is noticeable that the measurements for outsiders, 
forms a reduced subset of the internal set of measures.
In Al Bahimani (1994), it was observed that the participants used both financial and 
non-financial measures. Profitability and growth measures were more important to 
indicate the performance of the higher levels of employees whereas non-financial
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measures (non-monetary e.g. the produced units, breakdowns, quality...etc.) were used 
more with the lower levels. Cash management was one of the major indicators of 
concern. A common practice was matching production, sales and breakdown against the 
budget.
The survey raises two issues: First; new manufacturing techniques such as JIT & TQM 
imposed the need of novel measures [e.g. material management and delivery]. Second; 
the need to measure various aspects in each activity, and third; to consider alterations in 
response to the dynamics of the market (competitive price, quality). However, the survey 
shows that performance was not seen as an effort only but a reaction to the market as 
well and non-financial measures are commonly and increasingly used.
(1.3) Part Three: Rewarding Performance
Ezzamel and Willmott (1998) discuss the role of accounting in setting remuneration 
systems through quantifying performance and by applying the reward metric to levels of 
performance, thus accounting can minimise judgement and conflicts. In their view, the 
ability of accounting to convert human performance into a set of calculations helps make 
individual performance more visible. Such visibility makes it easier to compare and 
contrast the performance of one individual against that of another or against a 
predetermined target for example through performance- related- pay.
The final link in the management control cycle presented in detail by Emmanuel et.al. 
(1990) is to link the achievement of results with incentives for managers, in order for 
them to get motivated to achieve the targets that are set. However, there are a variety of 
possible rewards, both financial and non-financial and the link can be made with both 
short -term performance measures and longer term evaluations of overall managerial 
performance. Coates et.al. (1995) argue that incentives can play many roles on behaviour 
and both incentives and performance measures can influence behaviour. For example, in 
Germany, incentives are long -term oriented and are used to broaden the role of 
performance measures whereas in the UK and the US, no specific roles could be 
recognised. It was also observed that incentives are short- term oriented in the UK and 
the US.
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(1.3.1) Forms o f rewards
Emmanuel et.al. (1990) review many forms of rewards which include, any item that 
mangers value such as shares, post retirement benefits, car, medical service, and 
promotion opportunities. The mix of desires mangers have is likely to be -on average- 
different from those of production line workers. For example, managers’ psychological 
and safety requirements are largely assured. Employees might perceive the size of the 
monetary rewards they receive as a standard by which their self-esteem is judged. 
Ezzamel and Willmott (1998) argue that the traditional monetary focus in shop floor 
remuneration schemes is increasingly de-emphasised in comparison to non-financial 
elements (e.g. training, health and safety and the prospect of greater job security). 
Consequently, they call for an inter-disciplinary examination for these emerging reward 
systems. Scott and Tiessen (1999) record the accounting concern regarding the valuation 
of the non-monetary items of rewards. Therefore, the FASB issued some guidelines 
about valuation and presentation of these items in the annual accounts especially those, 
which extend beyond one year (e.g. the post retirement’s benefits).
(1.3.2) The Link between rewards and results
Any of the reward forms can be linked with any performance measure or combination of 
measures that can be used to distinguish good from mediocre or poor performance. In 
most organisations, the link between rewards and financial results defined as a linear 
function (Merchant and Manzonil989). The linear function is the simplest to 
communicate and administer as presented in figure (1-2) below.
rewards
results
Figure (1-2) Results and rewards as in Merchant and Manzoni (1989)
The function has lower and upper cut off and it is linear in shape between these cut off 
extremes. Merchant found that 9 out of the 12 firms he studied set a lower cut off in 
their short- term incentive compensation contract. Below some significant fraction of 
targeted annual performance (typically the budget), these corporations promise no
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incentives. The lower cut- off is set because corporations do not want to pay any 
bonuses for performance they consider “mediocre”. Companies might also define an 
upper cut off level where no extra rewards are provided for results above this level. 
These levels are usually set at a percentage of the annual profit target. There are various 
reasons for which upper cut off is set. For example, a fear that the high bonuses that 
would be paid might not be deserved, either because of windfall gain, faulty plan design 
or behaviour that increase current period’s profit at the expense of the long term.
(1.3.3) Size and implications o f performance dependent rewards 
Emmanuel et.al. (1990) argue that in the UK, the Incomes Data Service reported that, in 
June 1988, 50% of manufacturing organisations and 40% of service organisation had 
some form of performance- related pay scheme. However, many of these schemes were 
applied at the most senior levels only, and others were only applied to shop floor 
employees. Consequently, the proportion of middle managers paid in this way is probably 
still quite small, but the movement is towards more use of schemes of this sort for middle 
management. In particular, the financial services sector has been at the forefront of 
introducing performance- pay schemes as a response to an increasing competitive 
environment. These schemes become increasingly important in the public sector, 
including the civil service and local government.
In spite of this growing importance, Emmanuel et.al., (1990) suspect that some reasons 
might reduce expectations of real motivational effects of performance -related pay. 
Firstly, not all of these performance- related rewards are at risk. Although it sounds 
illogical to consider all of the annual bonuses at risk, Merchant and Manzoni (1989) 
argue that the extent to which performance- related reward is at risk depends on the 
extent to which the target is attainable. Secondly, some firms' performance evaluation 
processes are not effective in discriminating between above and below average 
performers, and superiors are reluctant to make sharp differentiation between rewards.
Thirdly, the factor that might limit the motivational impact of some performance- 
dependent reward is the controllability over performance measures according to which, 
rewards are assigned. Although the profit centres managers had virtually no control over 
the performance of the corporation or the entity as a whole.
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Another aspect of value in this debate is the valuation of non-cash items in these 
schemes. Sometimes the value of non-cash rewards (such as share options) is difficult 
although it could represent a large portion of the remuneration packages (Appendix A-l 
provides a summary of a survey of pay- for -performance schemes in the UK in 1994).
Recent publications about Companies Reporting included the different practices of pay 
and performance and showed many implications in response to The Company’s Act of 
1985 and the recommendations of professional bodies such as, Cadbury Report of 1992 
and Greenbury Report of 1993. Both committees devised Code of Best Practice of pay 
and performance. The orientation of these committees was that “ shareholders are 
entitled to a full and clear statement of directors’ present and future benefits and of how 
they have been determined".
In practice, companies differ in the way and reasons for which they carry out this 
recommendation and the reasons behind it. For example, in 1999 Dixons PLC disclosed 
in its Annual Report (page 34) that "it is important that directors' remuneration should 
include a significant element which is performance based. This element should be 
designed to develop a longer-term alignment between the interests of the company's 
shareholders and its senior management". In National Westminster Annual Report of 
1999 (page 66), it was stated that in 1994 that "the group established a plan for 
employees' shares ownership for directors who are best placed to maximise shareholder 
value". Bass group has the same reason for applying RPE as in Dixons. Moreover, Bass 
informs in 1999 Annual Report (page 18) that such schemes are designed to encourage 
continuing improvements in the group's performance over the longer term.
Greenbury committee recommended that “separate figures should be given for salary and 
performance- related elements and the basis on which performance is measured should be 
explained”. This supplements the Companies’ Act 1985 which requires only total 
directors' remuneration to be split between services as "a director" and service of 
"others" in connection with the management of the company.. The company reporting 
showed that only 27% of companies separately identified bonuses as a component of 
directors’ remuneration. Disclosure of this information was unheard of prior to Cadbury.
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Merchant and Manzoni (1989) found that when profit centre managers are struggling to 
meet budget targets, the concern to avoid missing the targets and then receive penalties 
(e.g. loss of autonomy, loss of ability to have their own ideas funded, loss of promotion 
possibilities or even loss of their job).
(1.4) Part Four: Goal setting; Motivational Perspective
Because the peer group constitutes the target in RPE, it is aimed to study how 
employees perceive target in terms of difficulty as well as their reaction to that difficulty. 
Therefore, this section reviews the issue of target difficulty in the accounting literature. 
Merchant and Manzoni (1989) presented a survey of the impact of target attainability on 
employees’ performance both in the accounting and the psychological stance. They state 
that most textbooks and articles suggest that for maximum motivation budget, targets 
should be “tight” but “achievable”. Many authors agree (Homgren 1987, Otley (1987) 
who notes that “the budget level which motivates the best performance is one that is 
somewhat more demanding than the level of performance that will actually be achieved.
Berry et.al. (1995, p: 88-89) reviewed some of the literature of motivation and target 
difficulty. Their survey shows that, a difficult target tends to motivate higher 
performance. However, if a target is so high as to be perceived as unattainable (and is 
not accepted by the individual who is responsible for achieving it), results are likely to be 
worse than if a lower, but acceptable goal was set. On the other hand, a difference has 
been reported between using targets for planning and using them for motivating. The 
discussion about target difficulty in this chapter and this thesis is confined to the 
motivational aspect only. This distinction is taken into consideration while discussing the 
impacts of target difficulty in this chapter and this thesis. Merchant and Manzoni (1989) 
define target difficulty as the difference between the current performance level and the 
targeted level. Therefore, Merchant concluded that there is an apparent conflict with 
predominant textbook theory suggests the need for further investigation.
Merchant and Manzoni (1989) study: Background
Chow (1983) suggested that the relation between achievability and performance is 
contingent on the financial incentives associated with performance. These findings are
24
important because profit centre managers typically operate under conditions of high 
uncertainty and high complexity and their performance measures are affected by many 
exogenous factors. They also face reward systems with both piece- rate and all- or- 
nothing characteristics. Thus it could be concluded that no specific evidence exists with 
regard to a motivational impact of target attainability on performance.
Simons (1987) found budget tightness to be positively associated with the use of 
monitoring and reporting controls and formula- based remuneration. He also reported a 
relation between strategy and budget -target achievability: budget targets of “defenders” 
were -on average- more achievable than those of “prospectors”. Several studies (e.g. 
Merchant 1985) found uncertainty, information asymmetry and profitability to be 
positively associated with the creation of budgetary slack which, in turn, was related to 
budget- target achievability. Hopwood (1974) point out that no one single target can 
serve all budget purposes (e.g., planning, motivating, evaluating) optimally. Hopwood 
(1974) also suggests that for motivational purposes the target should be challenging, 
whereas for planning purposes, budgets are most useful if they “reflect management’s 
best estimates of revenues and expenses... what is most probable”
Merchant and Manzoni (1989) study: findings
The evidence in Merchant’s study suggests that a large majority of profit centres budget 
targets are highly achievable. It was tempting to call these budgets “easy”, but almost all 
the profit managers objected and defended that each day is a struggle for them. In the 
light of these circumstances, these targets can best be described as challenging but very 
likely to be achieved by the management team if they exert a consistently high level o f 
effort.
Merchant and Manzoni's study reveals that highly achievable targets have occurred 
because profit centre managers' aimed to increase expected bonus, protect their 
creditability, autonomy and enhance chances to gain esteem. It would also mean 
increasing operating flexibility and protection against over consumption. In that study, 
top managers have reasons to allow achievable targets e.g. to increase predictability or 
corporate earnings, protect against over consumption, reduce risk of lack of 
commitment, reduce control and intervention and ensure a competitive compensation 
package.
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(1.4.1) The influences of goal setting and compensation on performance
When discussing the impacts of participation and power on setting targets, Ezzamel and 
Hart (1987) argue that pecuniary and non- pecuniary rewards can be used to resolve part 
of the existing goal conflict. More specifically, they raise a point that goals may 
deliberately be made vague so that participants may feel that such goals are not 
inconsistent with their diverse demands.
Demski and Feltham (1978) notice that performance standards and compensation 
schemes can have interactive effects on performance and the question is: which 
combination of performance standards and compensation scheme (e.g., tight standard/ 
low compensation or the vice versa) can induce the highest performance. Chow (1983) 
experimentally tested the impact of standards tightness and compensation schemes - 
individually and jointly- on performance. Chow (1983) started from Lock et.al. (1981) 
debate that specific and challenging standards induce higher performance than easy 
standards and; performance contingent rewards (especially the financial ones) appear to 
have an independent motivating effect on performance.
Therefore, Chow (1983) draw the following hypotheses:
(a) job standard tightness and type of compensation affect performance individually and 
interactively
(b) individuals’ selecting within the pay- performance schemes is based on their skills
(c) individuals’ risk preference moderates the process of selecting among pay- 
performance schemes.
Chow (1983) uses the term “pay fairness” to describe employees’ perception of pay 
schemes. He argues that if employees are not rewarded “fairly” and can not do anything 
to change that, their performance will decline. Chow (1983) found that (1) Job standards' 
tightness and the type of compensation affect performance individually but not 
interactively (2) Individuals' choose compensation according to their skills (3) Risk 
attitude did not affect the choice process. Chow et. al (1983) suggest testing these 
hypotheses on different managerial tasks (management, production), cross sectional...etc. 
and with non-financial motivations (e.g., social esteem).
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(1.4.2) Target’s achievability as a part of the control system
Baiman (1982) suggested that when rewards are contingent on performance, trade-offs 
have to be made between the motivational properties of the reward structure and the risk 
that managers have to bear and highly achievable targets. Merchant and Manzoni (1989) 
debate this view of Baiman on the ground that this trade-off implies that some motivation 
is lost when highly achievable targets are set and this might not be true. Allowing hard­
working managers to “win” nearly every year seems to have positive motivational effects 
by preserving an upbeat emotional spirit and thereby, inducing managers to raise their 
aspiration level for the following year. Managers who feel good about themselves and 
their organisations seem to be more likely to be highly energised and willing to take 
prudent risks.
It could be argued that there are two related points in this debate:
(1) motivating “the best performer”
(2) having a continuous challenge
With regard to the first point, Allan (1995) predicts that the best performers can always 
have their own challenge. This could be new and motivating challenges such as, 
creativity, controlling costs more and innovation or more generally “competing with 
themselves” to maintain setting on the top and make it difficult for anyone else to beat 
them.
Regarding the second point, the researcher argues that organisations need to set a new 
contest from time to time to employees to trigger them by new challenge. Any target 
might lose its ability to challenge employees after a while, so there is always a need for 
new fuel for aspiration. This can be provided through some evaluation techniques when 
the criterion is based on competition with peers, colleagues or other counterparts in the 
field. For the best performers, this might mean competing with rivals internationally. The 
respondents in Merchant and Manzoni’s study report that they always need a new 
challenge, without having challenging goals, the sense of arousal and competition is 
reduced. However, the strength of this desire varies significantly across individuals. 
Merchant and Manzoni concluded that people who work in marketing and sales on 
average are more likely to submit to aggressive targets than people with functional 
backgrounds.
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(1.5) Part Five
The 1990’s developments in management accounting and performance
measurements
The 1980’s and the 1990’s have witnessed a number of major developments in 
Management Accounting research generally and performance measurements specifically. 
Atkinson (1998) argues that in the 1980’s, global competition increased pressures on 
organisations. Organisations recognised that cost accounting and accounting information 
could play an important role in identifying opportunities for efficiency improvements 
(e.g. developing measures for quality, time market and supply chain management, 
enhancing the role of non-financial information). This orientation continued during the 
1990’s, and the need to articulate the strategic choices which contribute to the 
organisation’s success has strongly emerged.
The review of the 1990’s literature led to recognising three main streams:
I: Developments in Management Accounting generally
II: Developments in Performance Measurements (e.g. ABC and Balanced Scorecard)
III: Strategic orientation
These streams will be reviewed briefly in this section.
(1.5.1) Developments in Management Accounting Generally
Recent literature (Kaplan 1994 (a), Scapens 1994, Ashton, Hooper and Scapens 1995 
and Allan 1997) identified some major trends in the 1990’ research of accounting 
management. This included developments in the research framework (Scapens 1994), the 
structure and environment of the contemporary organisations (Otley 1994) and 
management accounting practices (Kaplan (1994,1996).
In terms of research framework, Scapens (1994) called for a shift from neoclassical 
theory and alternatively the adoption of institutional economic approaches. The 
institutional framework views accounting practices as institutionalised routines that 
enable organisations to reproduce and legitimate behavior and to achieve organisational 
cohesion. Accounting is a set of rules and procedures, which enables decision-making in 
a complex and uncertain world. The institutional framework allows a better
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understanding of management accounting practices in organisations when examined 
within its market and social context.
Otley (1994) shares Scapens (1994) the concern about studying the context of 
accounting practices and invite researchers to widen the framework of analysis. Otley 
(1994) argues that the traditional Management Control is based on the 1960’s 
assumptions of organisation with an emphasis on accounting based controls. The 
contemporary organisation has different characteristics in terms of more rapid and 
increased changes, difference in size, concentration and alliance and the decline of 
manufacturing. These issues emphasise strategic planning and operational control, 
flexibility and the integration of financial and non- financial controls such as the 
“Balanced Score Card”. Besides, intense competition has led to the formation of 
“Cartels” where organisations cooperate to keep stability in the market and encouraged 
practices such as target costing and benchmarking where companies seek to compare 
their performance to that of their competitors or to the best practice in any sector. In this 
setting, performance management system which traditionally encourages conservatism, 
has to change so as to encourage managers to define areas of experimentation and risk 
taking. This is important because the “learning organisation” should respond to changes 
in the environment.
Ashton, Hopper and Scapens (1995) are consistent with Scapens' (1994) invitation to 
investigate behavioral and cultural differences in management accounting practices. For 
example Lyne (1995) discusses the importance of behavioral research in accounting 
which receives an increased concern in Japan and provides more complex models than 
economic ones.
(1.5.2) The Balanced Score Card
Kaplan and Norton (1992) introduced the balanced score card to complement financial 
measures with operational measures on customer satisfaction, internal processes and 
innovation. This combines and creates a link between corporation strategy, internal 
processes and external environment. This measuring system measures the future value of 
the company (Kaplan, 1994, 1996) and stresses that there is no single measure for 
targets which create future value and that business objectives extend beyond the financial
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figures to include: quality, employee’s satisfaction and/or customer loyalty. Otley (1994) 
argues that BSC represents a tool of measuring “what the business attempt to achieve 
and how?” by defining key factors of success and developing a set of performance 
measures accordingly. This requires going outside the company to measure, for example, 
success in delivering goods and services. TatiKonda (1998) recognises that BSC starts 
with identifying a vision and strategic goals then progressing to linking strategies to 
performance measurement and rewards. However, Smith (1998) debates that the 
integration of quantitative and qualitative measures to indicate relative organisational 
effectiveness remains a challenge for BSC.
(1.5.3) Strategic Management Accounting
Atkinson (1998) describes the 1980’s as the period of seeking competitiveness and 
defines the role of management accounting in achieving it. The 1990’s are featured by 
strategic orientation, which has led to developing a growing literature about strategic 
management accounting and strategic performance measurement system. Strategic 
Management Accounting aims to focus on external products and service markets and on 
the company’s position relative to its key competitors (Simmonds 1981, Simons 1987 & 
Moon and Bates 1993). Moon and Bates (1993) state that the major role of Strategic 
Management Accounting is to provide information about competitive advantages. This 
implies measuring the key success factors and assessing them against competitors. 
Atkinson (1998) adds as a final step in strategic performance measurement, to tie 
incentive pay to the results identified. This should meet all the criteria for effective 
compensation. First, pay would be tied to a performance level which the individual 
accepts and understands. Second, the performance is oriental toward promoting the 
organisation’s objectives. Third, the compensation structure provides for developing 
information that can suggest better ways of identifying what is required and the causes of 
successful performance. Otley (1997) stressed that benchmarking can also provide a set 
of techniques for setting targets that are related to competitive success and acceptable to 
those who will attain them.
Final Remark on the developments in management accounting in the 1990’s:
The discussion in this chapter leads to the argument that with the comparison element, 
RPE could be seen as a tool of strategic management accounting. That tool could serve
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in motivating employees to improve performance and enhance the company’s competitive 
position against competitors. In a case study on RPE in some US companies, Maher 
(1987) found that peer company analysis was designed more to provide information 
about how to improve future performance. One reason for that was to develop strategies 
for moving into new product lines. It was also used in strategic planning at functional 
levels in the organisation to re-assess financial measures compared to competitors. That 
was consistent with top management’s incentive compensation, which then relied more 
on corporate return on investment than it had in the past.
Summary
The chapter reviewed the accounting literature of performance and of performance 
measures as the wider domain to which the RPE technique belongs. First, a distinction 
has been made between the "performance" as a phenomenon and the factors that could 
affect it and the "accounting handling of that phenomenon" which includes planning, 
measuring, evaluating and rewarding that performance.
Many variables have been recognised in the accounting literature to affect performance 
as a phenomenon such as performance measurements, participation, motivation, style of 
accountability, uncertainty, leadership and dysfunctional behaviour. Variables such as 
divisional independence, controllability and strategy are among the variables which affect 
the performance measures. Surveys show that in practice, non- financial measures are 
increasingly used. With regard to the rewards, the chapter discussed the form, size and 
motivation of reward. Professional and academic boards encourage the disclosure of 
more information about employees’ remuneration, the bases of calculating them and 
handling the non-monetary rewards. The issue of goal’s achievability and its motivational 
impacts has been discussed in detail in this chapter where literature supports that target 
should be difficult enough to challenge employees but should also be attainable, 
otherwise, it will de-motivate them. This aspect is thought to be particularly important 
when discussing the element of peers -as a target- in RPE. The chapter included a review 
of trends in management accounting literature in the 1990’s. That review reveals that 
competitiveness and strategic choices are among the major streams where RPE could be 
seen as one of the strategic management accounting tools.
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In this chapter an attempt was made to answer the question about what is RPE? Three 
assumptions were discussed; whether RPE is a mode of responsibility accounting, a 
performance measurement system or a control system. The investigation led to regarding 
RPE as a control system and this implied analysis the following aspects in RPE: the 
target, the performance measuring, evaluating and rewarding in addition to the 
predictability of the model. Moreover, investigating RPE from this perspective, suggest 
that RPE might affect "performance" as a phenomenon through the motivation 
mechanism and through its components as a control system (i.e. target, performance 
measures and rewards). Chapter two will provide a presentation of the previous studies 
of RPE in terms of research questions, framework, method, data, analysis and findings.
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Chapter Two
A Review Study of the Literature of the Relative Performance
Evaluation
Chapter one reviewed the accounting literature about performance as a phenomenon 
and the accounting handling of that performance. The chapter traced some variables 
which were suggested in the literature to affect performance and split the accounting 
handling of performance into research about setting targets for performance, measuring, 
assessing and rewarding that performance. With regard to target, attainability was seen 
as a crucial feature, controllability and including non-financial measures were important 
in measuring performance and suitability of reward to the managerial level along with the 
level of basic salary comparing to incentives. Chapter one also included a review of the 
major trends in management accounting in the 1990’s where competitiveness was a 
remarkable feature and RPE was recognised as a control system. This framed the 
elements to be studied in the technique of RPE to be the target, the measurements, the 
reward and the motivation’s mechanism of RPE.
The purpose of this chapter is to review the core studies of Relative Performance 
Evaluation in order to obtain a close view of this technique, its definition, roots, 
elements, patterns and measurements. It will be of special interest in this exploration to 
trace the previous studies in terms of the research question/s, hypotheses, assumptions, 
method, data, limitations and findings. This presentation of the studies of RPE will 
include a commentary on each study. However, to be consistent with the research 
objectives, it is intended to provide a detailed critical analysis for this literature in the 
next chapter with links to the accounting literature of performance.
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(2.0) Introduction
Over the last fifteen years, research in the area of relative performance evaluation has 
attempted to study various theoretical and empirical issues (as demonstrated in this 
chapter). The studies focusing on conceptual issues have been devoted to aspects such as 
the assumptions, implications, and economic and behavioural interpretations of RPE. The 
studies concerned with practical aspects examined the extent to which RPE is used to 
reward managers, the measurements and the components of that remuneration package. It 
is worth mentioning that the scope of enquiry in this research is to investigate RPE within 
the accounting domain and to focus on its impact on performance. Therefore, this study 
will not extend to issues such as RPE and filtering risk (Green and Stoky 1983), the 
solutions of RPE contract as a type of multi- person game (Knoeber and Thurman 1994), 
RPE contracts and the equilibrium in labour market under a defined degrees of 
competition (Furnas 1992) or RPE and promotion decisions (Lambert, Larker and 
Weigelt (1993).
The following discussion provides a summary of that literature. Tables (2-1), (2-2) and 
(2-3) at the end of this chapter, provide comparisons between these studies in terms of 
research methods, questions, data, measurements and findings. The presentation in this 
chapter will not follow a chronological order; instead, a complementary thread (i.e. how a 
study has filled in a gap in the previous studies) will be pursued.
(2.1) Ilolmstrom’s (1982) Theoretical Model of Relative Performance Evaluation
Holmstrom (1982) presented the basic model of the relative performance evaluation 
“RPE” based on the agency theory. He started with a risk- neutral principal who hires a 
number of “n” agents indexed by “i” to take actions a=l,2,...,n. Agent “i” selects an 
independent and non-collusive action (a)i and possesses an additively separable utility 
function expresses an amount of wealth received. Each agent is assumed to be risk and 
effort-averse. Within a state of nature (s) and an action (a), there will be an outcome (x) 
which is assumed to be mutually observable. The principal must choose sharing rules to 
maximise expected net profit subject to two sets of constraints. The first set ensures that 
each agent receives an expected utility at least as great as the opportunity cost of 
accepting employing for the principal. The second set of constraints ensures that each 
agent’s action is the best response to the other agents’ actions given the sharing rule. The
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second constraints explore the role of the peer group, because it is the comparison with 
peers that will help the principal to find out whether the agent’s action is the “best 
response” or not. Hence, the optimal sharing role will be a function not only in the 
agent’s outcome but his peers’ as well if and only if these outcomes are independent. 
Given that (s) is that state of nature, (a) is agent's action and (x) is the outcome, 
Holmstrom proved that if a signal (y) provides information about (a) or (s) over that 
provided by (x) alone, thus the pair of signals (x,y) would be less noisy about (a) than (x) 
alone. Therefore, (y) would be valuable for building contracts and compensation 
schemes. The signal (y) will represent the agent’s performance compared to that of his 
peers. Such a plan is expected to improve risk sharing and provide the agent with an 
incentive to exert effort. The informational value of the peer group or any other signal 
which can help the principal to separate the agent's effort from random fluctuations of 
output, was expected to improve contracting.
Holmstrom anticipated that RPE could induce competition among agents by tying their 
rewards to each other’s performance. Letting an agent know that he would be 
compensated according to RPE in a feedback process suggests that he would compete 
against others in an appropriate behaviour and that he would pay more attention to the 
comparison group that he is competing with. Holmstrom’s model implies assumptions 
such as: individual agent, no existence of technology effects or investment
Holmstrom’s argument rises questions about mutual effects between competition and 
RPE. Competition can be viewed as an independent variable which might affect the 
efficiency of RPE. The performance measure of a peer group is assumed to play an 
informative role for economic and behavioural considerations. The study of Fredrickson 
(1992) -which will be presented next- has examined that assumption.
(2.2) Fredrickson’s Experimental Study for Behavioural and Economic 
Consideration (1992)
The aim of the study was to explore behavioural and economic effects of RPE contracts 
along with the effect of uncertainty on effort. Fredrickson (1992) conducted laboratory 
experiment -requiring MBA students as subjects- to act as managers and to take 
production decisions for a hypothetical company. Half of the subjects worked under a
35
profit-sharing scheme according to which, their compensation was solely based on their 
absolute performance. The remaining subjects worked under an RPE contract that based 
compensation on both absolute and relative performance. There were three levels of 
common uncertainty. The risk and the effort preferences of the subjects were induced 
experimentally.
The variables under investigation were: uncertainty expressed in different accepted 
quality of units of production, effort measured by total units produced and compensation 
calculated for each participant on the basis that each produced unit was converted into 
monetary reward.
The experimental findings provided evidence for Fredrickson’s proposition that RPE 
should be interpreted according to economic and behavioural factors. The economic 
factor referred to the agent’s desire to obtain a high reward through competing with the 
others whereas the behavioural factors denoted the agent’s desire to be viewed as a hard­
working individual by colleagues and employers. It was also found that subject’s' effort' 
levels were generally higher under RPE contracts than under non-RPE contracts. This 
result also manifested itself when the degree of common uncertainty increased.
Whilst Fredrickson conducted an experiment to investigate the implications of RPE and 
the influence of uncertainty on it, Gibbons and Murphy (1990) depicted another influence 
of uncertainty on RPE in relation to some aspects of the reference group as follows.
(2.3) The Empirical Study of Gibbons and Murphy (1990)
Gibbons and Murphy's (1990) study -based on field data- attempted to explore the extent 
to which chief executive officers “CEO” were rewarded on the basis of RPE according to 
different reference groups (industry, market) and different compensation packages. One 
of the argumentative aspects of this study was the cost and benefits of RPE suggest that 
filtering common risk could be removed more effectively in some situations than in 
others. Improving risk sharing and motivating effort represent benefits, whereas costs 
include that cost of observing the reference group’s performance and those of potential 
distortion (e.g. sabotage, collusion, affecting the choice of the reference group or 
affecting its performance). Although it was the first time that costs and benefits of RPE
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be mentioned, Gibbons and Murphy (1990) did not operationalise these items or discuss 
how they could be involved in the analysis. Gibbons and Murphy (1990) expected the 
relationship between the agent and the reference group could negatively impact on the 
effectiveness of RPE. For instance, if there was any kind of sabotage, collusion or 
influence on choosing peers or affecting their performance, the potential impact of RPE 
on employee’s motives will be distorted.
It could be argued here that, those factors- if they exist- might discourage the use of 
RPE and not only the vice versa. Another point is that it might be difficult to expect such 
actions from an individual agent working in a huge industry or market due to 
communication difficulties between a large number of agents who would necessarily have 
different interests and different ambitions. Even when the agent is a group, they are 
expected to co-operate with each other and work as a team while competing with other 
group(s). Concerning the size of the group, Gibbons and Murphy (1990) argue that the 
tendency to sabotage or collude with others is more important when the number of co­
workers is small. Therefore, RPE is expected to be less effective for small groups than 
for large ones. The impact of the size of the comparison group on RPE, is a repeated 
point in the literature [Dye (1992) and Holmstrom (1982)]. Therefore, RPE might be 
more effective when the employee does not have an influence on the choice of his peers 
or their output.
The study of Gibbons and Murphy (1990) used the CEO’s compensation as listed in 
Forbes from 1974 to 1986 for 2214 executives in 1295 firms. The compensation package 
was measured firstly with exclusion of stock holdings and stock options and secondly 
was measured on total compensation including those items. Performance measurements 
of the firms were the change in shareholders’ wealth, which was regarded as the 
continuously accrued rate of return. The industry index was used once as the reference 
group measured by accrued return on the value-weight portfolio of all firms in the same 
industry and another time as the same measure for all firms listed in the Compustat 
database. The data was adjusted for inflation.
In order to infer the use of RPE, the researchers used a regression model. Their idea was 
to trace the change in salary and bonus on the one hand and three variables for firm 
performance in the other. These variables were: the firm’s return on common stock, the
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firm’s return on common stock compared to that of the industry and the firm’s return on 
common stock compared to that of the market.
The research outcomes advocated the hypothesis that RPE partially filtered out 
uncertainty shared with other firms in the industry from the CEO’s compensation. It was 
found that board of directors made some industry adjustments for industry trends when 
determining executives’ rewards. Besides, market risk was filtered out but compensation 
was found to be more closely related to market-related returns than to industry relative 
return. When the analysis included both industry and market returns, CEO's were found 
to be rewarded not only on the basis of market- relative performance but also on an 
absolute performance. The industry coefficient was no longer statistically significant after 
controlling market movements; however, it was still negative although RPE did not 
identify whether industry or market was the more important source of risk. Nevertheless, 
this study was the first to yield different results because of using different reference 
groups but this issue has not been explained.
It is worth noting that RPE’s ability to remove the impact of random events from 
performance measures is a controversial point in the literature. While Gibbons and 
Murphy ascertain the ability of RPE to perform that role, there is another stream in the 
literature (Lambert 1993, Feltham et.al., 1994, Green et. al., 1983) which does not. The 
latter stream adopted the view that the “noise” or the effects of the uncontrollable events 
should be separated from the performance indicators in order to measure performance, 
evaluate it or build an optimal contract.
In addition to that, the regression revealed that for total compensation (salary, bonus, 
restricted stock, savings...etc.) and industry and market performance measurements (as 
well as absolute firm measurements), there were negative and statistically significant 
associations (more significant with market return). This means that broadening the 
measure of compensation did not affect the use of RPE.
Concerning the impact of the performance measures and workforce retention, the 
evidence showed that the probability of continuing work for the same firm in the 
following year was positively and significantly associated to the firm’s performance.
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However, that probability was negatively and significantly associated to industry and 
market indicators, but no explanation was given.
Gibbons and Murphy (1990) drew some limitations to their analysis. First, no attempt 
was made to distinguish between the incentives and learning versions of RPE. Second, in 
spite of finding evidence that proved the role of RPE in motivating performance in terms 
of “current shareholders return” but not in terms of “change in shareholders wealth”, the 
difference between the two measurements was not expanded any further.
It could be argued that while the first point might be valid for the literature of RPE. 
That is because there was no work on the impact of learning and RPE. Nevertheless, 
there is no evidence on the second point. Because, Kunkel and Magee (1984) have 
already investigated whether there was a relationship between RPE and “the change" 
in return on common shareholders equity as a measure of the agent’s performance.
The following section is a review of Kunckel and Magee's research and results.
(2.4) The Empirical Study by Kunkel & Magee (1984) for RPE and the Executive’s 
compensation:
Kunkel and Magee (1984) state that the aim of their study was to examine the use of 
relative performance measures and how a reward scheme can be built on it within the 
agency theory. Their idea was to establish an association between employees’ 
compensation and firm (or industry’s) performance. The study used the following 
variables: (1) individual performance measure for each firm measured in terms of the 
accounting measure for the return on common shareholder's equity (the operating income 
divided by the end-of-year shareholders’ equity). (2) industry index was the average 
change in the accounting return on common shareholders’ equity of the firm in that 
industry. The net income and common shareholders’ equity figures for each firm were 
retrieved of the period from 1976 to 1986. The dependent variable in the analysis was the 
percentage for the change in salary and bonus from one period to the next for the chief 
executive officers of each firm (which means that it does not include stock options and so 
it is not a total compensation). The data is collected from the “Forbes” survey of 
executive compensation for the year 1970-1980.
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Kunkel and Magee emphasised that in order to enhance RPE, all the firms in the industry 
should be direct competitors exposed to the same economic forces. The survey included 7 
industries (11 firms from paper industry, 8 textile, 10 rubber, 11 steel, 11 pharmaceutical, 
8 in air transport and 17 banks).
In order to test the use of RPE, the researchers estimated the following two functions 
for the compensation using the ordinary least squares:
1) PCt = a + bl DROEt + et
2) PCt = a + bl DROEt + b2 ADROEt + et
Where PCt is the percentage change in salary and bonus in period t, DROEt is the
change in individual firm’s return on equity in period t (the individual performance
measure). ADROEt is the industry average change return on equity in period t (the 
relative performance “benchmarking”). All variables are expressed as changes because 
the level of all variables exhibited significant serial correlation.
Kunckel and Magee expected that if RPE was used, the introduction of the ADROEt 
variable in the second equation should result in a significant increase in explanatory 
power (R square) over the first equation.
The model estimated a percentage change in salary and bonus during the period of 
concern according to a constant, the change in the firm’s return on equity and the 
industry’s average change in return on equity for the same period (as a benchmark).
The findings prove -to some extent- the idea that compensation is related positively to 
firm’s performance in most of the other firms in the sample reflecting a consistent use of 
the firm measurements in building agents’ rewards. The results about industry measures 
are not that consistent. There has been evidence that industry index is used in some 
industries as a reference measure while this has not been the case in other industries. In 8 
industries out of 11 the coefficients were negative between compensation and company's 
performance compared to industry’s performance. This led the researchers to predict an 
inverse relationship between industry’s performance and agents' rewards as anticipated 
by RPE. This general conclusion was not consistent across industries. For example, the 
majority of coefficients in three industries (paper, banking, and insurance) were negative 
while only half coefficients were negative in the other industries. Moreover, the results
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regarding the strength of the relationship were mixed. The model performed much better 
for the paper and steel industries than for the rest of industries. Hence, there is a lack of 
overall significance of the impact of industry measures on rewarding managers. 
However, in spite of being considered one of the objectives of the study, no 
interpretation of these results has been given. It is also worth noting that the 
characteristics of certain industries which encouraged the use of RPE, have not been 
illustrated either.
Maher has explored some features that could encourage the use of the RPE in some 
industries and in some companies in an industry using a case study. Maher’s study 
contains companies with different activities, sizes and characteristics as detailed below.
(2.5) The Case Study of Maher about the implications of applying the RPE (1987):
The purpose of the research was to investigate whether and how companies use RPE to 
appraise divisional performance and if so, how it is pursued. The main questions of the 
study were (a) how the comparison groups of firms which face the environment is 
determined? (b) What characteristics of firms and contracts give rise to RPE? and (c) 
Can RPE be used with various managerial divisions or is it limited to the top 
management?
In order to study the characteristics of firms that adopt RPE, Maher investigated five 
firms. He justified his choice on the basis that these firms shared certain characteristics: 
they were relatively large, publicly traded and manufacturing- dominated firms. There 
was an important difference in diversity of operations (they were operating in insurance, 
telecommunications equipment, and automobile components).
The research provided mixed results. First, different practices of RPE were reported.
In firms with diverse activities, there were no explicit comparisons between competitors 
but an implicit comparison with the economy as a whole. Top management was 
evaluated according to explicit short-term financial targets. With regard to division 
managers, RPE was used with much emphasis on financial measures (e.g. divisional 
profit) as a basis for evaluation. In Honeywell, which was a company with massive
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diverse production and acquisitions, RPE was currently used, primarily for strategic 
purposes but it was not explicitly used in managerial incentive contracts. The study 
found that a division manager keeps his division in line with top competitors as a factor 
in evaluating him/her. The findings showed that; first, meeting explicit financial targets 
increased risk concerning rewards and reduced the tendency to adopt RPE. This finding 
contrasts with Fredrickson’s (1992) who reports that an increase in uncertainty 
increases effort and encourages the use of RPE. Nevertheless,, it could be argued that 
rewarding agents on the basis of RPE could be safer than tying their pay to the result of 
matching their performance to rigid targeted figures (e.g. budget, plans...etc). 
Comparing the agent’s work to his peers is a more realistic evaluation because it implies 
a consideration of the actual circumstances within which this performance occurred. 
Besides, a comparison with peers sharing the same environment and exposed to the 
same market forces and the same uncertainty might provide a realistic signal about the 
manager’s effort.
Secondly, Maher found that, in less diverse companies, division manager’s work was 
compared to other managers’ in terms of how well they carried out the orders of top 
management, as quality, efficiency and production schedules. These indicators were more 
important to the firm than filtering the impact of the environment because of the 
inclination to secure production integration. There were no interfirm financial 
comparisons for top management. Third, although no explanation was given, the 
diversity in activities might discourage the use of RPE.
Finally, a company in the survey was found to use a comparison with its competitors in 
order to secure its long-term strategy. In doing so, the company had a council of peers 
against whom, manager’s performance was matched. For top management, the 
comparison not only included short-term financial measures but also the progress in the 
field of developing new products and innovation as well.
While Maher explored the practices of RPE in 5 companies, the characteristics of those 
companies and the impacts of these characteristics on using RPE, Conyon and Gregg 
(1994) focused on studying specific issues in the company's environment, such as take­
over operations, union presence and using RPE. The details of that study are discussed in 
the following part of this chapter.
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(2.6) Conyon & Gregg (1994) study of the sensitivity of Top Directors’ pay to 
company specific operating environment
Conyon and Gregg (1994) assessed the importance of changes in the company’s specific 
operating environment, which Conyon & Gregg called “Company Chock” in shaping 
executives’ compensation. The researchers addressed two related issues:
1. To what extent was the compensation package of executives justified by the 
performance of their companies?
2. How important the company specific information available to shareholders (company 
specific shocks) in conditioning executives pay.
Conyon & Gregg used a data set of 558 companies extracted from Datastream 
International and EXSTAT data basis. The companies belonged to all industries except 
banking and insurance. The sample mainly consisted of larger publicly quoted companies. 
Top director's pay was the total of the annual remuneration package of the highest paid 
director of the company. This included salary and bonuses but not share options. 
Company performance was measured by shareholder returns and sales growth. The data 
covered the period between 1985 and 1990.
The empirical analysis suggested that relative performance evaluation was taken into 
account when determining pay. This was applicable when performance was measured by 
sales growth but not by shareholder returns. Also, reduced union presence resulted in 
higher pay for top executives. What surprised Conyon & Gregg was that lower cash 
holdings relative to current liabilities raises pay, as does expansion through take-overs. 
The researchers concluded that the rise in executives pay in the 1980’s more than the rise 
in companies' performance, might imply that either managerial skills were becoming 
increasingly valued by shareholders or that top executives were increasingly able to 
influence their own pay level.
Whilst Conyon and Gregg (1994) addressed issues related to the company’s 
environment and RPE, Antle and Smith (1986) shared the concern about the implications 
of this environment on RPE. The implication of environment which Antle and Smith 
(1986) looked at was the environment’s indication of the company’s performance as 
represented in stock market- based measures. Antle and Smith (1986) investigated the
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impact of using accounting and market-led indicators for performance on benchmarking 
managers’ output.
(2.7) The Empirical Study of Antle and Smith (1986) for the use of RPE and the 
Industry and Market Fluctuations:
The objective of the paper was to empirically investigate, whether top corporate 
executives were compensated as if their performance was evaluated relative to the 
current average profitability of the firms in the same industry. Their investigation was 
based on the assumption that, tying executive’s pay to the firm’s performance helps in 
aligning the goals of the executives with the goals of the firm’s owners. This could be 
addressed by focusing on the association between executive compensation and specific 
performance fluctuations as opposed to industry fluctuations. In addition to that, it was 
aimed to examine the role of accounting data in filtering the risk faced by corporate 
executives.
The hypotheses of the research were examined through time series regression for 
compensation of 39 firms in three industries: chemical, aerospace and electronics, for the 
period from 1947 to 1977.
The study used the following measurements: return on common stock and accounting 
return on assets. The first was used because it was generally agreed that returns provide 
information about changes in the firm’s financial conditions that reflect both current and 
anticipated actions and events. Furthermore, most of the executives’ wealth is tied to 
stock returns directly through ownership of shares in their employers’ companies. The 
writers have selected this measure rather than other measures, because it is explicitly tied 
to incentive plans and because there is generally a high correlation between it and other 
accounting measures.
The compensation was estimated from the current income of the highest paid executives 
in the sample. The current income includes the amounts of after-tax compensation 
package. The term compensation package is used broadly to include the after- tax salary, 
short term bonuses, deferred-to retirement bonus, stock holdings, stock bonus, stock 
options, dividends units, pension benefits...etc.
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The results of the study were mixed regarding links between executive’s pay, his/her 
absolute performance and the industry’s performance. The most significant evidence for 
using RPE was collected by a non- linear regression. The model examined the association 
between employee’s compensation and RPE built on accounting measures (return on 
assets ROA). The results proved that each compensation variable was more closely 
associated with the “relative” return on assets than with the “absolute” return on assets. 
Meanwhile, the results were inconsistent with regard to evaluating executives on the 
basis of market measures such as return on common stock (RET) relative to that of 
competitors’. The RET included the stock price information relevant for valuing the firm 
but not necessarily for evaluating management. A non-market measure ROA might have 
an advantage in motivating. The theory was that an executive’s ability to encircle the risk 
imposed on him/her through a compensation plan based on accounting measures was 
likely to be less than when a market measure is issued. Also, return on common stock 
partially filtered the common industry risk out of executives’ evaluation. Another result 
was that a more comprehensive compensation variable reflects change in individual’s 
total wealth, provides stronger support for the relative evaluation than the less 
comprehensive variable.
Antle and Smith (1986) findings suggested an effective role of different performance 
measurements on using RPE still to be questioned. That is, when Antle and Smith (1986) 
tested the existence of RPE using certain measures of activities, they found evidence that 
it existed with some performance measures but not with others. However, no explanation 
was provided. In addition, different measures were found to have a different capacity to 
filter risk, without indicating the reasons behind that. It could also be noted that studying 
the change in (rather than the absolute) shareholders’ wealth did not make a difference in 
supporting and encouraging the use of RPE. The results of Antel & Smith (1986) were 
consistent with Gibbons & Murphy (1990) that there was no impact of using more 
comprehensive compensation on RPE.
The role of RPE in compensating agents was not the only issue that was demonstrated 
in the literature. The impact of RPE on agent’s investment decisions was analysed from 
different points of view and including some influencing factors as in the study of Chow & 
Haddad (1991) and Dye (1992). These studies are respectively reviewed.
45
(2.8) Chow & Haddad’s Experimental Study for the Effect of RPE on Investments
Decisions under Uncertainty (1991)
Chow and Haddad (1991) tried to trace the effect of RPE on risk aversion in delegated 
investment decisions. The study hypothesised that under a standard- based pay contract, 
the risk aversion of an agent when making decisions about resource allocation would be 
jointly determined by the level of environmental uncertainty and the use of a relative (as 
opposed to absolute) performance standard.
The study examined two independent variables: degree of uncertainty (low vs. high) and 
performance standard (relative vs. absolute). The participants were assigned to an 
absolute and relative performance standard with a certain managerial pay contract. They 
were asked to make their investment decisions and calculate the realised income. The 
researchers informed the subjects about their pay and the median performance of each 
peer group.
The study concluded that there was an interactive effect between environmental 
uncertainty and the type of performance standard. This conclusion suggested that 
uncertainty affected performance when performance was evaluated in absolute terms. 
This was consistent with the literature (for example, Otley 1984 and Kren et.al., 1988). 
However, the finding also included that uncertainty could affect performance when 
evaluated on a relative basis. This was consistent with the conclusions reached by 
Fredrickson (1992) and Kunckel and Magee (1984).
In addition, the study found that if rewarded under RPE, subjects tend to select 
projects with equal risks regardless of degree of uncertainty. By contrast, subjects who 
were rewarded according to their absolute performance measures tended to select 
significantly lower-risk projects when environmental uncertainty was high. These results 
suggested that RPE might reduce managers’ reluctance to adopt risky investments 
especially in firms operating in high-risk environment.
A question arises here concerning the reason(s) behind this result and the extent to which 
the economic and behavioural interpretations which Fredrickson (1992) introduced, 
could support the impact of RPE on projects selection.
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(2.9) Dye’s Empirical Study of RPE and Projects’ selection (1992)
Dye hypothesised that the effect of RPE on project’s selection would depend on the 
number of industries or projects to which the agent has access. It was expected that when 
an agent has limited discretion in project choice, RPE would lead to improvements in 
contracting. If the agent’s and the rivals’ talents across projects were statistically 
independent and identically distributed, then the agent was likely to be relatively most 
talented in a project which he/she was also most absolutely talented, if the number of 
projects was sufficiently large. The existence of pre-decision private information could 
permit the agent to tailor his effort level to available production conditions. This supports 
the idea that private information could increase moral hazard (which assumes that there is 
a relationship between the two control problems within agency theory). But it could be 
argued that the opposite might be true as well, the existence of private information could 
increase the agent’s ability to tailor his effort on the light of his job’s requirements. This 
debate was basically founded on the notion of the distinction in the information acquired 
by the agent and the principal. Presumably, the agent’s larger involvement in the work 
gives him a chance to capture more information than what the principal could get. Given 
that the agent is assumed to be self-interest, he would not be expected to share 
information with the principal. An interaction between the two types of information 
asymmetry (regarding effort and regarding action) was expected in the literature 
(Jaworski 1992, Loeb 1994, and Kirby 1991).
The sequence of the study was that each manager received a contract from his 
employer and information about his and his rivals’ talents in all projects. Also each rival 
was informed about his talent and that of the others’. Given this information, the agent 
chose a project and exerted some unobservable effort which statistically affected his 
firm's earnings. Finally, earnings were realised and agents were paid according to the 
terms of their contracts.
Under tournaments incentives contracts, managers preferred to operate in industries 
where their relative talent was the greatest whereas their principals preferred them to 
operate in industries where their absolute talents were the greatest. That is because the 
principal considered that they consumed the agent’s actual not relative outputs.
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Nevertheless, fixed compensation was not an assumption in RPE and being the best 
does not mean less adoption of RPE, even the best performers might set higher goals and 
adopt RPE. Allan D, (1995) argued that the leader of a market might give considerable 
thought to how to make it difficult for others to follow him. The experience he might be 
keen to learn would stem from his own practice. This does not rule out benchmarking. 
What it does is replacing objectively verifiable measurements with subjectively 
judgmental assessments. Leaders establish their own benchmark which might be in the 
form of future strategy, product development etc. However, Dye (1992) considered that 
the existence of agent discretion in project selection could reduce using RPE when 
agents have private information about their own and their rivals’ talents in alternative 
projects. The usefulness of RPE was related to the thinness of the market in which an 
agent operated. When there were many agents in the same industry, mapping between an 
agent’s output and his effort is probably well understood because of the bigger data 
sample which generates an estimation about the average performance of an agent in the 
industry.
In his case studies, Maher (1987) argued that RPE could reduce manager’s incentives to 
make strategic moves into new industries. Filtering risk might serve manager’s interest to 
continue to operate in a poorly performing industry where his division performs well 
compared to the competition. This decision might be of appeal more than moving into a 
more profitable industry in which the manager’s division would be a better performer in 
absolute terms but a worse performer in relative terms. This argument of Maher's (1987) 
contradicts with Dye’s (1992). Dye’s (1992) considered that the best in absolute 
performance will be the best in comparison and RPE is still valid.
Dye (1992) regarded production technology to be among the factors that affect the 
evaluation process. First, because of the homogeneity required for different projects 
exposed to identical common stock. Second, because technology affects project’s 
outcome and production’s inputs. Output is a combination of talent-action and stochastic 
component. Increases in talent leads to increases in output and increases in effort leads to 
increases in output. Therefor, effort and talent are complementary.
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In spite of that debate, Dye (1992) observed technology as having a special impact on 
choosing effort because when an agent accepts a priiicipal’s contract, he starts to take 
actions and choose an effort level to carry out those actions whether this relates to a 
decision, project...etc. When choosing an effort, an agent takes into account the 
environmental and organisational factors that influence him/her and one of those factors is 
production technology. Hence, it is already included in the agent’s decision.
One question relates to Dye study (1992) is: how to measure the influence of technology. 
Another point is: in what terms technology will be differentiated? Is it new advanced 
production facilities? The amount of money invested in assets? The resources differ from 
one company to another so how will similarity be secured? It could be argued that 
technology should be taken into consideration by using a performance indicator such as, 
return on assets, which reflects employee’s performance in proportion to his/her 
company’s resources.
While Dye (1992) studied the impact of RPE on agents’ taking investment decisions 
relative to competition, DeFond and Park (1992) examined the impact of competitive 
environment on using RPE and the role of RPE in employees’ dismissal decisions, as will 
be reviewed below.
(2.10) The Study of DeFond & Park (1999) of RPE in competitive environments
DeFond & Park (1999) tested the hypothesis that RPE is useful in CEO dismissal 
decisions and that RPE is more useful for firms in more competitive industries. 
According to Dye (1992), in more competitive environments, CEOs are more likely to be 
subject to similar uncertainties, have more peers and any given CEOs’ actions are 
unlikely to affect other CEOs’ out put. The role of RPE in CEO turnover was at the core 
of the emphasis in that study. If competitive environments are more conducive to the use 
of RPE, then boards of directors might use RPE to identify and replace poorly 
performing CEOs.
DeFond & Park (1999) also debated that performance measures that gauge output 
relative to a peer group benchmark, are more useful in highly competitive environments. 
By contrast, firm-specific performance targets not relying on comparisons across firms,
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should be relatively more useful in less competitive environments. Therefore, DeFond & 
Park hypothesised that RPE based (firms specific) accounting measures have a stronger 
association with CEO turnover in high (low) competition industries. Industry 
competition was measured using the Herfindahl- Hirshman Index.
DeFond & Park identified a sample of CEO changes by performing key-word searches 
for CEOs dismissal in the Lexis/Nexis and Compustate databases for 1988-1992. A 
control group consisted of firms that did not change CEOs over the same period thereby 
they got a sample of 301 CEO turnovers and a control sample of 621 firms. Performance 
was measured by “market-adjusted stock return” which was calculated as the stock 
return minus the return on the equal-weighted portfolio of all sample firms. The 
accounting measure of performance was return on assets. Data were processed on a 
multivariate analysis. The analysis revealed that the frequency of CEO's turnover is 
greater in high-competition industries. The Researchers interpret that result as one that 
could have resulted from managers dealing with stress of competition. However Canyon 
& Gregg considered that this association only presented indirect evidence on the use of 
RPE.
It was also found that an RPE accounting based (comparing to firm specific measures) 
was significantly associated with CEO turnover, in high (low) competitive industries. 
This suggested that RPE could help in CEO dismissal decisions. The study contributed to 
the literature of RPE in several ways. Firstly, finding that RPE was used in CEO- 
termination decisions in high-competition industries suggests that the mixed results on 
RPE in prior research maybe due to the omission of factors related to competition. The 
study pointed to some issues for future research such as examining whether low 
competition industries would base RPE on company-specific measures (run RPE inside 
the firm) and whether divisional turnover would be affected by compensation.
Choudhury (1986) studied RPE while investigating the relevance of the controllability 
concept in management accounting. Choudhury (1986) argued that inter-divisional or 
incentives based on inter-firm comparisons imply a violation of the controllability 
principle. Emphasising relative performance introduces uncertainty into a risk-averse 
manager’s performance. However, some of the advantages of performance comparison, 
exists in the additional information about manager’s effort and isolating the effects of 
common uncertainty (i.e. the uncertainty effects that are correlated). Another benefit of
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RPE is that, it enables the manager’s reward to adjust automatically to changes in 
economic environment. This is unlike the fixed formula incentives which would allow the 
executive a reward for a 5% rise in the company’s net income when the industry achieved 
a 25% rise and the executive should be penalised. Choudhury (1986) concluded that RPE 
would cause some risk to managers in the form of variable income. Meanwhile, it would 
provide a better indication of managerial effort only where group cohesiveness was low. 
Villadsen (1995) also concluded that a contract that utilise the agent’s co-operative 
behaviour dictates less RPE than does a non-co-operative contract or a contract that 
ensures that employees do not co-operate.
Summary
This chapter included a review of the literature of RPE. Since Holmstrom (1982) 
introduced the basic model of RPE, a series of studies have followed, marked by 
economic orientation and framed within the agency theory. The main inquiry in these 
studies was whether employees' (especially top management) rewards were built upon 
comparing their performance to that of their peers. The investigation was -mainly- based 
on statistical analysis of published data about company's performance and director' 
remuneration with few exceptions, Fredrickson (1992) and Chow and Haddad (1990) 
conducted experiment studies and Maher (1987) used case study research. Various 
measures have been used, most commonly was return on shareholder's equity and 
rewards plus shares options.
The chapter revealed that the studies about RPE came to divergent conclusions regarding 
any impact of RPE on performance. At one extreme, Gibbons and Murphy (1990) and 
Fredrickson (1992) found strong evidence that RPE motivated executives to exert effort. 
At the another extreme, Chow and Haddad (1991) reluctantly suggest a contribution by 
RPE in motivating employees because of the weak evidence they found. Between the 
two extremes, Kunckel and Magee (1984) found evidence in some industries and with 
specific measures but not with others and in overall, they had inconsistent results that can 
not be used to generalise a specific trend of RPE's potential. Maher's (1987) case study 
researched the actual practices of RPE in five organisations belong to different industries. 
The study added to the literature of RPE an exploration of issues such as for which 
managerial level RPE was used, for what purposes, in which organisational environment 
(central, decentralised, diverse, less diverse.... etc).
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It is worth stating here that there is no intention in this research to analyse, interpret or 
investigate reasons behind these contrasting results nor will there be a replication of any 
of these studies. Alternatively, the critical analysis of these studies -in the next chapter- 
wili be used (along with a review of the accounting handling of the performance 
phenomenon done in chapter one) as the foundation for developing the research’s own 
arguments, methodology and research design. The following chapter will provide a critical 
review of the studies which have been introduced in this chapter. This critical review will 
be one of the foundations of developing the research’s arguments.
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Table (2-1)
Comparison among the studies of the RPE according to the research method and 
questions
The Study Research 
Method
Basic Question Points of concern
Holmstorm Theoretical • Are the agents paid
1982 presentation according to their
comparative performance
Kunckel & Empirical • Holmstrom’s
Magee • What are the
1984 aspects of the peer group
in the comparison?
• Are there differences 
among industries in 
practising the RPE.
Antle & Empirical • Holmstrom’s
Smith • Who are the peers
1986 (industry or market)?
• How RPE is implemented?
Fredrickson Experimental • Holmstrom’s
1992 • What are the effects of the
degree of uncertainty?
Maher Field study • Is and how RPE
1987 implemented ?
• How organisation’s 
characteristics affects 
that?
Pay and benchmark 
Role of competing, 
filtering uncertainty
Holmstrom’s 
Nature and power of the 
relationship with peers.
•  Holmstorm’s
• Differences between 
industry
and market benchmark.
• Accounting measures
• Total compensation
• Behavior and economic 
interpretations.
• Uncertainty and effort
• Differences as to 
managerial
levels, measurements.
Chow &
Haddad
1991
Dye
1992
Experimental
Empirical
• What is the influence of 
RPE on selecting projects 
and on under different 
degrees of uncertainty
• What is the influence on 
selecting projects and 
on the principal’s utility
• Risk aversion and resource 
allocation
Agents’ and peers’ 
information about 
performance and 
investment.
Gibbons & Empirical • Holmstrom’s
Murphy • What influence can peers
1992 have?
• Does RPE affect agents 
turnover?
Correlation with peers
Industry and market
benchmark
RPE and total
compensation
Costs and benefits of RPE
9. Conyon & Empirical • To what extent executive
Gregg (1994) compensation is justified
by company’s 
  performance._________
Use of RPE
Role of signals like debt 
holding, acquisitive 
behavior and union
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10. DeFond & Empirical 
Park (1999)
• What was the importance 
of company specific 
information available to 
shareholders in 
conditioning executives 
pay
• Whether RPE is useful in 
CEO dismissal decisions
in
more competitive 
industries.
• RPE based on accounting 
measures (Compared to 
company specific 
measures) have stronger 
association with CEO 
turnover in high 
(comparing to low) 
competition industries.
presence in revealing the 
extent to which corporate 
performance in due to 
managerial effort.
• RPE’s ability to improve 
boards of director’s ability 
to identify unfit CEOs .
• Impact of competition on 
the usefulness of RPE.
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Table (2-2)
Comparison among the studies of the RPE according to the data and measurements:
Tlie Study Data Measures of firm’s 
performance
Measures of 
peers 
performance
Compensationn
1. Kunkel & 
Magee
2. Antle & 
Smith
86 firms in 7
industries
(1970-1980)
39 firms in 
industries
3. Fredrickson 36 participants
4. Maher 5 big firms in 
various industries
Change in return 
on equity
Return on 
common stock 
and return on 
assets
Number of the 
units produced
Mixed, 
Financial 
Targets, 
production and 
sales volume
Average measure 
of firms
Average measure 
of firms
Average measure 
of participants
Mixed
Change in salary 
and bonus 
without stock 
options
Total salary, 
bonus, stock 
holdings and 
benefits
Scores for units 
produced 
converted into 
money
Not mentioned
5.
7.
Chow & 
Haddad
Gibbons & 
Murphy
Conyon &
Gregg
(1994)
8. DeFond & 
Park (1999)
47 participants
1047 firms 
(1975-1986)
558 firms in 
various industries 
( 1985-1990)
301 firms in 
various industries 
(1988-1992)
Projects outcomes 
(given)
Change in rate of 
return on stock
• Change in sales 
growth
• Change in 
shareholder 
return
Return on assets 
and market -  
adjusted stock 
return
Average of 
individuals
Rate of return 
weighted by 
value of portfolio
Average of 
measures of 
firms
Median of firms 
measure.
Project’s outcome 
converted into 
money
Basic and total 
compensation
Change in total 
pay including 
bonuses but not 
share options
Not measured, 
instead data 
about CEO’s 
turnover 
Were collected
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Table (2-3)
Comparison among the studies of the RPE according to their findings:
The Study Kind of support Findings 
to the RPE
Unanswered questions
1. Holmstrom Strong support
2. Frederickson Strong support
3. Maher Strong in some 
firms
4. Gibbons & Strong support 
Murphy
5. Antle & Inconsistent
Smith results
6. Chow & Qualified result 
Haddad
7. Kunkel & 
Magee
Inconsistent
result
• Optimal sharing rule 
depends on agent’s action 
and his peers’.
• Peers group filter risk from 
agent’s performance
• Effort increases under RPE 
as uncertainty increases
• Filtering risk
• How to be tested
• Why effort increases as 
uncertainty increases.
• What is (type) of 
correlation between firm 
and peers?
• What is the influence of 
competition on RPE
• Why meeting financial
targets increase risk and 
reduce RPE
• Why diversity, 
centralisation and etc 
encourages the use of
RPE 
in some firms.
• What is the influence 
competition
• Executive are paid (in basic • How cost and benefits of
In general, there is a support 
for the RPE but with 
differences in interfim, 
intrafirm, measures, 
characteristic and uses
or total) as to their 
performance and that of 
their peers.
• RPE filters risk.
• RPE’s costs benefits affect 
its has.
• RPE affects turnover of 
employees.
• Some relation between 
industry (not market) 
performance and employees’ 
performance.
• Filtering risk.
If supported by other studies, 
RPE could encourage agents 
to invest in risky projects 
under high uncertainty
In some firms there was a 
relation between rewarding 
and industry performance 
varying in nature and power.
RPE can be measured. 
How they affect RPE 
Why and how agents can 
affect peers
• Why different measures 
lead to different results.
• Why RPE is inconsistent 
between industry and 
market.
Testing hypotheses on real 
data.
What factors encourage the 
use of RPE in industries and 
not in others
8. Dye Inconsistent RPE could encourage agents • How the characteristics of
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results
9. Conyon & Strong 
Gregg 
(1994)
10. Defond & Strong 
Park (1999)
to invest in projects where 
their relative performance is 
higher as to their information 
about investments, number of 
projects, competitors and 
talents.
the firm, market, dealers 
and strategies could 
affect the use of RPE.
• What if  the firm or the 
manager invest in many 
industries.
• RPE was taken into account 
in executives pay.
• The previous relationship 
existed with growth in sales 
but not with shareholder 
return.
• Lower cash holdings, 
reduced union presence and 
take over discussions were 
related to high pay for 
executives
• Why there is an 
association between RPE 
& growth in sales 
(accounting management) 
but not shareholder return 
(market measure)?
• Are there any company 
specific characteristics 
which riser the use of 
RPE?
• Are the take-over (and 
other managerial)
decision 
used to achieve top 
management goals or 
shareholders goals?
• Frequency of CEO turnover 
is greater in highly 
competitive industries.
• RPE-based accounting 
management (compare to 
firm specific) accounting 
management are more 
closely associated to CEO 
turnover in high
competition
industries.
• Would low competition 
companies base RPE on 
company-specific 
measure.
• Divisional turnover and 
compensation.
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Chapter Three
A Critical Review for the Literature of Relative Performance
Evaluation
Chapter two included a presentation of the studies of RPE. Holmstrom (1982) 
introduced the basic model of RPE framed by agency theory and focused on the 
informational value of the peers’ performance indicator in detecting the effort of the 
employees and a series of studies followed. These studies used different measures for 
performance and for rewards, the majority of them used statistical analysis of published 
data and reached contradictory results. Gibbons and Murphy (1990) and Frerickson
(1992) found strong evidence that RPE enhanced performance. Kunckel and Magee 
(1984) found some evidence on that in some industries but not in others while Antle and 
Smith (1986) found it with specific measures but others. Chow and Haddad (1991) 
stated that if their results could be supported by other research, then they could suggest 
that RPE impacted managers when making investment decisions, the same argument was 
strongly supported by Dye (1992).
While the previous chapter provides a wide review of the literature of RPE, the aim of 
this chapter is to identify gaps, contradictions or omitted factors in that literature, which 
might affect the potential of RPE as a basis for developing the research’s arguments. In 
order to fulfil this basic objective, is chapter provides a critical review of the previous 
studies of RPE that have been contributed by different disciplines such as economics, 
behavioural sciences and accounting. The orientation adopted in this chapter is to expose 
both the theoretical and operational elements of each study to refutation. 
Methodologically, the theoretical assumption behind each study, the questions and the 
gaps left will be reviewed. Operationally, the choice of the research tools in terms of the 
research mode (survey, case study or analysis of published data), the choice of the 
variables; measurements, sample, time span and data analysis are examined. It should be 
mentioned that, it is not the objective of this critical study to investigate reasons behind 
contradictions in the literature nor to reconcile the divergent results but rather to develop 
this research’s arguments.
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(3.0) Introduction
As mentioned in chapter two, different studies reached different results concerning 
relative performance evaluation. Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to provide a critical 
analysis of these studies in terms of theoretical and empirical aspects. The line of enquiry 
which will be followed, depends on Janakirman et. al., (1992). Janakirman et.al. (1992) 
referred the failure in supporting the main hypothesis of a study to one or more of the 
following reasons:
1- The hypothesis is wrong.
2- The hypothesis is correct but it has been tested by a wrong or irrelevant model.
3- The hypothesis and the model are correct but the measures used are wrong or 
irrelevant.
4-The analysis is influenced by omitted factors.
Following this reasoning, the discrepancies in the research findings of RPE could stem 
from one or more of the following:
1- Using different theoretical backgrounds as framework for the analysis.
2- The hypothesis that allowing rewards on the performance could have a motivational 
role is wrong.
3- Research method is wrong.
4- The regression model adopted for testing a hypothesis is irrelevant.
5- Measures of performance are wrong or irrelevant.
6-Measures of managerial compensation are wrong or irrelevant.
7- There are omitted factors in the analysis.
These elements will be respectively discussed in the following sections.
(3.1) The Theoretical Backgrounds of the literature of Relative Performance 
Evaluation:
The studies of relative performance evaluation were presented within the framework of 
agency theory based on the neo-classical economic theory. The theory assumes that the 
economic behaviour of individuals and firms, aim at maximising economic utility. It also 
assumes perfect markets as well as complete and certain information. This behaviour of 
the decision-maker is facilitated by the personality characteristic of complete rationality. 
The individual so described is entirely motivated by economic forces and will not work 
except in response to sufficient economic incentives. This assumes that the individual
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was essentially “lazy” and rather preferred to minimise his work effort (Scapens 1984). 
Caplan (1978) stated that information systems should motivate individuals to join and 
contribute to the accomplishment of the company’s goals so that the personal objectives 
would be satisfied. The personal goals include social, psychological as well as economic 
considerations. Thus, the neo-classical economic theory presents a normative and 
descriptive view for modelling economic behaviour.
The assumptions of the neo-classical economists have been subject to a long and 
continuous debate in the literature. The following section will offer a discussion about 
the consistency of the assumptions of neo-classical economic theory with relative 
performance evaluation.
(1) -The Assumption o f Rationality o f Economic Behaviour
The notion of rationality has been widely discussed in the literature. Simon (1979) 
considered that rationality allows the predicting of human behaviour to maximise utility. 
Nevertheless, determining the “maximum” is a problem. Mathematical models were 
proposed to solve this problem. In doing so, these models simplified reality by dropping 
some of its characteristics. The neo-classicalists who considered any deviation from 
reality as “irrationality”, do not accept some aspects of reality in mathematical models. 
Thus, it is a cyclical argument. What is “rational”? It is the “maximum”. How can it be 
measured? By oversimplifying reality. But this is “irrational”. Thus, Simon suggested 
unattainable optimisation to be sacrificed for an attainable satisfaction in practice. Instead 
of abstracted, optimal, global goals, tangible sub-goals should be replaced so that the 
achievement can be observed and measured. Thus Simon (1979) introduced the concept 
of “ bounded rationality”. This idea implies a search for decision alternatives, a 
replacement of optimisation by satisfying goals, and a mechanism for learning and 
adaptation. Caplan (1978) argued that under uncertainty, rational behaviour is 
questionable and economic models could lead to inconsistent or inadequate handling 
because of changes over time.
It could be argued that when examining RPE in the light of the idea of rationality (the 
behaviour of “maximising”), a major contradiction could emerge. The mechanism of RPE 
leads to rewarding managers according to their “actual” performance compared with the
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“actual” performance of their peers. Therefore, the basis of compensation is the real, 
actual and measurable outcome; it is neither an optimal nor a maximum outcome. If RPE 
were introduced within the neo-classical background, there would be a contrast in the 
components of the control system. The philosophy upon which the system is based 
would be “maximisation”. This would be inconsistent with the technique which handles 
“actualities”, whereas a technique is supposed to carry out the system’s philosophy.
Thus, the notion of “maximising” is inconsistent with RPE. Alternatively, the idea of 
“satisfying” seems more relevant and consistent with RPE when it is used either in 
setting targets or in evaluating performance. The criterion for satisfaction would be the 
performance of the peers, which is a determined, measurable and likely attainable 
yardstick.
(2) The assumption o f economic utility as a sole objective for behaviour
As discussed above, by contrast with neo-classical economics, the economic utility 
might not be the sole drive for employees’ behaviour. Making profit might not be the 
sole drive for the firm as well. Kaplan (1994, b), debated that companies have different 
goals (e.g. customer satisfaction, higher quality or satisfied employees). Such objectives 
should be specified and should be reflected through the performance measurement 
system.
Otley (1995) argued that performance is multifaceted and can not be reduced to simple 
and quantitative measures (often accounting based). Such weaknesses create an inherent 
unfairness in these systems. These systems are dominated by short-run and narrowly 
based measures therefore; they become less valid over time and in competitive 
environments. Kaplan (1984, b) emphasised the importance of non-financial measures in 
addition to the financial ones. He argues that even granting that the objective of a 
division should be to maximise long-term profits, this does not imply that an annual 
profit is the best short-term profit indicator of how well the division is proceeding along 
a long term -profit maximising path. Other measures, such as product innovation, 
product leadership, employee skills or customer loyalty may be much better indicators of 
future profitability than annual profits. It is unlikely that any single measure can both 
summarise the economic events affecting a company or a division during a period of time 
and serve as a basis for motivating and evaluating managers. Therefore, multiple
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performance indicators may improve the motivation and evaluation of divisional 
performance. The idea that profit is a natural by- product of doing something well and 
not an end itself is also almost universal. There is rarely a single objective that subsumes 
all others. Even profitability has to be assessed in terms of its short and long term 
components and in relation with growth, capital structure and liquidity. Once some 
overall objectives have been established, they have to be broken down into subsidiary 
goals that relate to different matters such as product range, quality, market segmentation, 
customer service and so on. Although some aspects of good performance can be 
quantified, many other aspects can not. Even if performance is well quantified, the means 
by which it is achieved may not be clearly understood.
Therefore, it could be concluded that managers’ accountability and rewards should be 
based on measures for different aspects of performance.
(3) The behavioural assumption o f individuals’ attitude toward work
Ezzamel and Hart (1987) considered it to be the classical view of control to assert that 
man is naturally lazy and wasteful and that appropriate behaviour can be bought by 
money. The formal reward structure is an essential element of the classic control 
package. This presumption forms the basis of the economic analysis of agency theory. 
On the other hand, the focus of the richer social and psychological aspects of 
organisations that Ezzamel and Hart (1987) discuss, has been the hallmark of neo­
classical organisational researchers. Thus, principles of specialisation, hierarchy and 
impersonality are held to frustrate individual needs for autonomy, responsibility and self- 
actualisation. Effective performance could be obtained only when tasks are made 
intrinsically stimulating and rewarding. Caplan (1978) suggested that information 
systems should help in motivating individuals to join and contribute to the 
accomplishment of organisation’s objectives. This should be done through satisfying the 
individuals’ personal goals. These personal goals include social and psychological, as 
well as economic considerations.
RPE technique contradicts with that assumption. RPE is built on the theories of social 
comparison, which argues that the presence of others may trigger a variety of activities 
related to behaviour. Ferris & Mitchell (1987) elaborated that the more important the 
other(s) are to an individual, the more likely he/she is to engage in cognitive activity and
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information processing. Young (1985) stated that the mechanism of social pressure in 
motivation depends on dissatisfaction that a subordinate is likely to feel; if his or her 
superior views him/her as a shirking member in the organisation. Rather, this assumes 
that the employee finds some utility in being viewed as a hard working individual and is 
therefore willing to exchange some distasteful effort to gain that utility.
Hence, the assumption of work aversion is inconsistent with the normative theory of 
RPE which was framed by agency theory.
(4) The assumption o f efficient market and perfect information
Caplan (1978) considered that the efficiency and effectiveness of human behaviour and 
decision-making is limited by the following constraints: (1) the inability to concentrate on 
more than a few things at a time. (2) Limited awareness of the environment (3) limited 
knowledge of alternative courses of action and their consequence (4) limited reasoning 
ability and (5) incomplete and inconsistent preference systems. As a result of these limits 
on human rationality, individual and organisational behaviour is usually directed at 
attempts to find satisfactory - rather than optimal- solutions.
In addition to the impracticality of the notions of “perfect market” and “perfect 
information”, there are much evidence that they do not apply to RPE. For instance, the 
employer has limited knowledge of his employee’s effort, actions and decisions but he 
expects to deduce it through comparison with peers. The employee also does not know 
how his/her peers will act, competitively or co-operatively and how much their output 
may be. Therefore, the assumption under RPE is that he/she would do his/her best to 
outperform peers and attain the reward. This is different from the assumptions of the 
efficient market. Under RPE, the employees’ perception and acceptance of the peers is 
expected to affect his/her performance, regardless of who those peers are and how many 
of them there. The peers are -usually- a limited number of rivals in the market chosen by 
the designers of RPE system.
(3.2) The Main Hypothesis in the Studies of RPE
The basic hypothesis for the studies of RPE is built on the idea of “benchmarking” 
which predicts that comparing employee’s performance to that of his/her peers’ could
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motivate him or her to improve his/her performance and rewards are set accordingly. 
Benchmarking has received a lot of attention and continuous debate in the literature. So 
reviewing the debate of linking pay to performance (either absolute or relative) will be 
the starting point in the discussion.
Emmanuel et.al., (1990, p: 375) considered that performance targets could be effective 
only to the extent that managers perceive desirable rewards flowing from achievement 
(or penalties from lack of achievement). These mechanisms can range from the 
encouragement of cohesive peer groups (characteristics of the Japanese style of 
management) to explicit linking of substantial monetary rewards to targets attainment 
(most prevalent in the USA, but also inherent in all types of incentives payment 
schemes). It should be noted that using performance-related pay systems seems to be 
most easily accomplished at the top and the bottom organisational levels, through share- 
option plans at the top or profit-sharing schemes at the bottom. Difficulties in 
implementing it at middle management levels referred to difficulties in establishing 
suitable targets in an objective and reliable manner.
Kaplan (1984 (b), p: 578) specified a possible defect of pay-performance schemes is that 
general business conditions or specific industry factors could cause earnings to expand or 
to contract for reasons not controllable by company executives. This could mean either 
“windfall” gains or losses for executives. One way to reduce the impact of non 
controllable factors is to compare a company’s performance to that of others in the same 
industry. Nevertheless, firms have become increasingly diversified; so that it may not 
always be easy to define the “ industry” to which the firm belongs and consequently it is 
difficult to identify a comparable group for the benchmarking. In that case, even a 
comparison with a national average of corporate earnings or with a sample of industries 
would provide a better comparison of relative firm performance than simple, absolute 
year-to-year comparisons of the firm with itself.
In a survey by Vancil (1979) annual bonuses were received by 90% of the managers 
based on current financial performance. From a total of 282 profit centre managers, 30% 
believed that the bonus was determined solely by financial performance and a further 
35% believed that it to be partly determined in that way. The annual bonus also seemed 
to comprise a significant part of the managers’ income, about 25% of the annual salary.
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Emmanuel et.al., (1990), considered that a limited empirical evidence was available 
about the importance of financial performance measures in structuring rewards of 
divisional managers in the USA and less well documented evidence in the UK.
Unlike Emmanuel, Murlis (1988, p: 268) reported that during the late 1980s, the UK 
witnessed an increasing trend to include a performance-related element into the 
remuneration package of middle managers. In June 1988 the Income Data Service in the 
UK reported that 50% of manufacturing organisations and 40% of service organisations 
had some form of performance-related pay scheme.
In addition to the practical evidence from the USA and the UK, Merchant et al., (1990) 
in his case study in the Italian cars company "Fiat", found performance- based incentives 
constitute an important part of the company’s restructuring process. Fiat offers managers 
three types of monetary performance based rewards: salary increases, annual bonuses 
awarded through a formal Management-By-Objectives programme (the most significant 
part of the performance-based incentives system) and occasional bonuses awarded on a 
discretionary basis.
It could be concluded from the previous discussion that:
There is academic and practical support for a link between management pay and 
performance. However, further investigation to explore companies’ actual practices and 
factors affect, is needed. Among the factors that can be examined are, type of industry, 
managerial levels, organisational goals and consequences upon employees’ satisfaction, 
effort and turnover.
Hence, the basic assumption of the previous studies of RPE was that it could motivate 
employees to improve their performance. That assumption has been founded on 
theoretical and practical grounds to justify it. Hence, the basic hypothesis of RPE seems 
appropriate. However, the hypothesis about motivational role has not been explicitly and 
directly tested in the previous studies. The aim in this research is to examine the 
motivational role of RPE, to what extent money and esteem are complementary (or 
competitive) drives behind the response to RPE, in that circumstances and at what 
managerial level/s.
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(3.3) The Research Methods Used in the Studies of RPE
According to Brown (1995, p: 26), an experimental study deliberately divorces a 
phenomenon from its context so that attention can be focused on a few variables, 
controlled by a laboratory environment. Surveys attempt to deal with both the 
phenomenon and its context. However, because of their practical method, they have 
limited ability to investigate the context. A case study is an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context. This occurs when 
the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident and multiple 
sources of evidence are used.
In chapter two, the review of the studies of RPE showed that almost all the research 
was conducted by empirical studies on published data. They attempted to investigate 
whether managers were rewarded according to their performance compared to their 
peers and what could affect it. The way they tested it was to infer a relationship between 
managers’ remuneration and their performance and their peers’ through detecting a 
relationship between the variables using a regression model.
In spite of using the same research method (empirical study) different studies ended up 
with different conclusions. Magee and Kunckel (1984), Antle and Smith (1986), Lambert 
et.al. (1993), Gibbons and Murphy (1990), Conyon and Gregg (1994), and DeFond and 
Park (1999), all used empirical studies but only Gibbons and Murphy (1990), Conyon 
and Gregg (1994), and Lambert et. al., (1993) found support for using RPE in setting 
rewards. The rest could not come to a reliable result. Gibbons and Murphy (1990) results 
were criticised by Janakirman et. al., (1992) for testing a weak assumption of RPE which 
supposes a linear relationship between pay and relative performance. Lambert et. al.,
(1993) tested a certain role of RPE in taking promotion decisions. Conyon and Gregg
(1994) found a relationship between executives' pay and relative performance when it is 
measured by sales growth but not by stock returns.
Among the researchers who studied RPE, only Maher (1987) used a field study. He 
found strong evidence for implementing RPE in many, large, multi-activities companies 
belonged to many industries. He also recognised some organisational and environmental 
factors that influence RPE as detailed in chapter two. Dye (1992) used a numerical
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example to test the role of RPE in project’s selection, so his results should be considered 
carefully and need further examination on real data.
Fredrickson (1992) and Chow et. al., (1991) ran experimental studies, but the former 
found a strong relationship between RPE and performance while the latter gives a very 
reluctant suggestion about a role of RPE in promoting performance. Here there are 
contradictory results although Fredrickson (1992) studied RPE's motivational role when 
taking production decisions and under different degrees of uncertainty. On the other 
hand, Chow et. al., (1991) examined the role of RPE on investment decisions in risky 
projects. Thus, the same research “experimental” method led to different results.
According to Brown (1995), if the aim of the study is to explore the phenomenon and its 
context, the empirical study (that is, using actual data to test arguments by mathematical 
models) looks stronger than the experimental and weaker than the field study. If the 
purpose of the enquiry is to research the reality of a phenomenon and its practice, the 
field study can be used for that purpose. Such a study can detect whether and how firms 
implement RPE, what requirements are needed, what factors affect and what 
consequences result. In such cases where, a new formulation or hypothesis is to be 
tested, with the sensitivity of the model to certain variables or a new factor in the 
analysis, empirical studies seem more suitable.
As the aim of this research is to test whether there is a motivational role for RPE, for 
impacts of financial and non-financial measures, different peers and reward then 
exploring the actual practices of performance and rewards, either survey or case study 
can be regarded as suitable research methods. It is suggested that many contingent 
factors could be tested such as: uncertainty, competition, diversity of products and 
markets of work, managerial levels ...etc.
(3.4) The Models Used in the Literature of Relative Performance Evaluation
As chapter two and the earlier discussion in this chapter revealed, all empirical studies 
tested RPE via correlation and regression models. They attempted to infer a relationship 
between managerial remuneration and firm and peers’ performances and predict its 
shape. The use of correlation and regression models in those studies seems to fit their
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objectives. Finding a statistical correlation between the variables was suitable to conclude 
that there was a link between pay and recognition of peers’ performance. The statistics 
textbooks explain that regression provides an estimation of the relationship between the 
variables (e.g. between compensation and relative performance). It allows the including 
of more than one independent variables (e.g. relative performance measure and absolute 
performance measure in Kunckel and Magee (1984) and relative performance and 
employees turn over in Gibbons and Murphy (1990) study or market measure and 
accounting measure in Antle and Smith (1986). Here, regression parameters indicate an 
overall influence which the set of independent variables (e.g. both the relative and the 
absolute performance measure or different group of peers) practise on the dependent 
variables (employees’ remuneration). Regression parameters can also show the 
contribution of each individual variable (e.g. within the set of performance measures: 
how much the relative performance individually affects RPE) in the set of independent 
variables in the change in the dependent variable. Also results from the regression, the 
determination coefficient which describes the percentage of variability in the dependent 
variable due to one unit change in the independent variable. The regression model also 
estimates the probable error involved. These tests can be conducted at various 
significance intervals, which makes the results reliable. Thus, correlation and regression 
models were appropriate.
(3.5) The Used Data in the Studies of the RPE
In addition to adopting different research methods, the studies of RPE depended on 
data which differ in content, size, and the time-span that they cover as shown in the 
following table:
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Table (3-1) Comparison between the studies of RPE
The Study The Size of 
the Sample
Research
Method
Time
Span
Source of 
Information
Research Findings
1- Kuncel & 
Magee 1984
86 firms in 7 
industries
empirical 1970-
1980
published
data
Inconsistent, RPE is used in 
some companies, with some 
measures but not in others
2-Antle& 
Smith 1986
39 firms in 3 
industries
empirical 1947-
1977
published
data
Inconsistent, as Kunckel ad 
Magee
3-Gibbons& 
Murphy 1990
1049 firms empirical 1974-
1986
published
data
Executives pay depends on 
relative performance
4-Fredrickson
1992
36
participant
experimental RPE determines pay under 
high uncertainty
5-Chow & 
Haddad 1991
47
participant
experimental Reluctant, RPE might 
encourage taking risky 
investment decisions
6-Maher 1987 5 firms case study the documents 
of the firms 
and interviews
Mixed results, RPE used in 
some, for top and middle 
management, for planning 
and rewarding, in less 
diverse companies.
7-Conyon et.al., 
1994
107 firms empirical 1985-
1990
Data
Stream
International
RPE is used, with specific 
measures but not others
8-Lambert 
et.al., 1993
303 firms empirical 1982-
1984
published
data
RPE shapes CEOs 
remuneration and promotion 
decisions
9-Janakirman 
et.al., 1992
609 firms empirical 1970-
1988
relative support
10- DeFond & 
Park 1999
301 firms empirical 1988-
1992
published
data
RPE is more useful in 
competitive environment
There are two elements which will be discussed concerning the data: first the size of the 
sample used, second the length of the time-span (studies of the same research method 
will be reviewed together). As appears in the table, with the empirical study (and also the 
experimental), the bigger the sample, the more support for the use of the RPE is 
reported. This is consistent with Holmstrom (1982) and Dye (1992) that RPE is suitable 
for a competitive environment where a large number of peers is available and where the 
actions of an agent are not likely to affect the actions of other agents. Maher’s (1987) 
case study on 5 big firms operating in many industries, presents strong justified support 
for using RPE.
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The second element concerning the data is the span of time that it covers. The time span, 
which the studies depended on, ranged from 3 to 30 years. Surprisingly, the study of 3 
years found strong support, the 5 years led to fair support but the medium serials of time 
reported a contradiction in their results. The study of Antle & Smith (1986) pursued pay 
and performance over 30 year and provided the most puzzling outcome where no 
consistent result could be reached.
From the previous discussion, it could be concluded that the time-span of data was not 
an influential factor in mapping the use of RPE. From another point of view, data over a 
long span of time might have distorted the analysis. Over time, many economic, social 
and political factors might interfere to shape pay plans. For example, in their case study 
on "Fiat" company, Merchant et.al., (1990, p:285) noticed that in few years, the 
managers’ salaries have increased at an annual rate of 10-13% because of the terms of 
the national labour union and the government’s procedures in facing inflation. Therefore, 
it could be concluded that the time-span of data could be neglected in analysing 
remuneration and performance because no specific span of time was related to a specific 
finding.
(3.6) The Measures of Managerial Rewards
Vancil (1979, pp: 93-94) distinguished three categories of reward which managers 
receive. First, managers derive pleasure from managing an entity of their own. Second, 
they enjoy the power and status that accompanies their position. Third, they earn 
monetary rewards. These rewards can come in multiple forms, salary, bonus, share 
options and promotions that yield to higher rewards in the future. Organisations can 
drive some motivational value from their contracts if they link promises of any of these 
rewards to measures of performance. For example, corporate managers can threaten to 
reduce the pleasure of managing entities by refusing to fund ideas for expenditures where 
performance is not good. They grant managers additional power and increase their status 
within the firm by publicising their good results. Also they grant additional pecuniary 
reward in the form of cash, delayed payments of cash and shares.
Emmanuel et. al., (1990) argue that organisations attempt to promise rewards that 
provide the most cost effective motivational effect, but this is not easy to do because the
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effects of each of the various reward forms vary depending on the manager’s personal 
preference and circumstances. Some managers are greatly interested in increasing their 
retirement benefits, expanding their autonomy or improving their promotion possibilities. 
For example, lower -level managers- compared with top executives- are probably more 
interested in improving their promotion possibilities and less interested in stability in the 
short term as long as their basic salary is assured. However, tailoring reward packages to 
managers’ preferences can not be easily achieved and the motivational role of those 
packages is a controversial matter.
When reviewing the literature of RPE, it was observed that the comprehensiveness of the 
remuneration package and not its suitability to the managerial level was the issue which 
has been examined in the previous studies. That is because almost all the previous studies 
confined the analysis and discussion to the same managerial level, that is, top 
management or corporate executives.
Maher (1987) did not specify an impact on the remuneration package in his field study. 
In the empirical studies, Kunckel and Magee (1984) used change in salary and bonus 
excluding stock option as a package for compensating agents and obtain inconsistent 
evidence about the impact of RPE on performance. Similarly Antle and Smith (1986) 
who used a more comprehensive package containing total salary, bonus, stock holdings 
and benefits, got inconsistent evidence. Gibbons and Murphy (1990) had a strong 
support for RPE both when basic elements of the compensation package and when a 
comprehensive one were used. The result of Lambert et. al (1993) agreed with Gibbons 
and Murphy (1990) in supporting RPE using a total package consisting of base salary, 
annual bonus, stock options, sharing plans and restricted stock. Conyon and Gregg
(1994) used salary and bonuses but not share options and found fair support for RPE 
when sales growth (not shareholders’ return) described managers’ performance. So it 
can be concluded that components of a reward package are not found to have an 
influence on encouraging the use of RPE.
The next element in the discussion of the difference in research findings of the RPE is 
the performance measures used.
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(3.7) The Performance Measures in the studies of RPE
One of the central issues in the accounting debate about performance measures, is the 
necessity of measuring both financial and non-financial aspects of performance (Kapan 
1984 (a) and (b), 1994, Ezzamel and Hart 1987, Emmanuel et. al., 1990). Emmanuel 
et.al., (1990) argue that financial performance measures provide quantitative and 
common indicators of the achievement of the individual divisional managers. 
Conventionally, it is assumed that they reflect accurately the decision-making capabilities 
of the divisional managers. Besides, an accurate measurement of actual performance is 
important if this form of feedback control is to be effective. This assumes that accounting 
performance measures can help detect inefficiencies and requires managers to be held 
accountable for them. So top management’s use of accounting information may reduce 
the incentives for opportunistic behaviour by divisional managers.
Emmanuel et.al., (1990) also debate that top management may mistakenly accept 
accounting measures as accurate indicators of efficiency and may also attempt to instruct 
lower level managers to seek optimal solutions. In the face of environmental uncertainty, 
information asymmetry and lack of clear objectives, optimality is an ephemeral concept. 
Not only could these measures be mistaken, but also even if they are correct, they are not 
enough to reflect the activities of employees. Objective measures in terms of staff 
turnover, productivity, customer satisfaction and complaints as well as other non- 
financial statistics should be reported. Even the costs and revenues associated with a 
special order will probably be embedded in aggregate data. The timing of the report at 
the end of the month may make tentative judgements about the relationship between the 
special order and the financial results difficult to interpret because the events that it refers 
to, are over and done with.
As chapter two and the earlier discussion of this chapter showed, different measures 
were used in the studies of RPE and different results were reached. Four observations 
regarding the performance measures in the studies of RPE can be made. Firstly, the 
studies were dominated solely by financial measures (e.g. Gibbons and Murphy (1990) 
and Kunckel and Magee (1984) used the change in return on stock, Antle and Smith 
(1986) and Lambert et. al., (1993) depended on the return on common stock and return 
on assets. That was the practice, despite the defects realised in these measures in the 
literature (Kaplan and Atkinson 1998). A specific feature of incentives based on financial
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measures mentioned by (Kaplan and Atkinson 1998, p: 676) is that they motivate short­
term orientation. Therefore, financial measures should be complemented by non-financial 
measures such as product quality, customer satisfaction and innovation, which are the 
drives of future performance.
Secondly, the studies examined RPE using market measures and accounting measures 
(e.g. Gibbons and Murphy (1990) and Kunckel and Magee (1984) used the change in 
return on stock and Antle and Smith (1986). Kapan and Atkinson (1998, p: 679) argue 
that the problem with market measures is the lack of a direct causal relationship between 
executive actions and stock market performance. Non-controllable random events such 
as general business conditions, competitors’ actions, government actions, unexpected 
material, energy, or labour shortages, and international developments may overwhelm 
the best (or worst) efforts of management.
Thirdly, issues such as competition and uncertainty (although examined with relation to 
RPE itself, see Furnas et.al. 1994 and Fredrickson 1992), have been overlooked when 
handling performance measures in RPE debate. Hirst (1981) argues that when 
uncertainty increases, accounting numbers increasingly lose their ability to accurately tell 
the whole story of performance evaluation.
Therefore, it is suggested in this research that the use of different measures will reflect 
different aspects of the work and could enhance employees' response to RPE.
Summary
Building upon the presentation of the literature of RPE in the previous chapter, this 
chapter presents a critical review of the literature of RPE. It identifies many 
contradictions between the assumptions of agency theory and those of RPE. For 
example, the individual who could be motivated by RPE, is not self motivated and does 
not seek to maximise profit, or seeks economic utility only via rational behaviour.
It has also been recognised that the dominating question in the debate around RPE is 
whether it exists or not in rewarding managers, without questioning its elements, 
potential, limitations and the organisational, environmental and individual context within 
which it works.
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Regarding the research methods, the dominant instruments are correlation and regression 
models. They were used to analyse published data of performance and employees 
remuneration (with two exceptions: the case study method in Maher 1987 and the 
experiments of Chow et. al. 1990 and Fredrickson 1992). Some reservation have been 
raised about the impact of the size of samples (which ranged from three years to thirty 
years) and the time-span of data. Long series of data might contain influences from many 
factors over time. The measurements -although varied- have been solely in financial 
terms and some were market based. Market measures were criticised in the literature 
because incentives do not have a direct relationship with the change in stock price and 
employees lack controllability over these changes. It is also argued that variables such as 
uncertainty and competition should be considered in the debate about RPE. The 
following chapter will use this critical review along with other sources to develop the 
research’s arguments.
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Chapter Four
New Arguments in Relative Performance Evaluation:
Links to the Accounting Literature and RPE Practices
Chapter three critically examined the studies of RPE in terms of the research questions, 
methodology, method, data and findings in order to provide a foundation for developing 
the arguments to be investigated in this research. It identified many contradictions 
between agency theory (which was the framework of studying RPE in the previous 
literature) and the assumptions of RPE. This raises questions about the relevance of 
agency as a framework of this research and provides an early clue that an alternative 
framework should be considered. Chapter three also recognised some gaps in the 
literature such as not questioning the elements of RPE or the motivational assumption of 
it. This fuel the need to a direct examination for these arguments, the mechanism by 
which it achieves that, which components and in which context.
The objective of this chapter is to raise further issues about RPE as a basis for focusing 
the arguments to be examined in this research. There would be three sources for 
developing these arguments. The first source was the critical review of the literature of 
RPE and the recognised gaps and contradictions (chapter three). Second the review of 
the accounting handling of the "performance" phenomenon (chapter one). Third, the UK 
practice of RPE as found in the publications of different companies. The arguments were 
organised into three categories. One category focused on arguments about the 
motivational mechanism of RPE, another about the components of RPE (the peer group, 
performance measures and reward) and the third category was for the contingents of 
RPE. It should be clarified here that, the intention in this chapter was to discuss the 
arguments on which the research’s own questions would be focused and examined. This 
implied that not all the arguments raised here would be addressed in this study. Chapter 
five would be allocated for the research design and paradigm.
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(4.0) Introduction
The previous studies of RPE have been based on neo- classical economics and agency 
theory as a methodological framework. This has limited the scope of enquiry, the 
questions and arguments that have been considered. It has also restricted the examination 
of the factors, variables and aspects that could affect the technique and its outcomes. 
Consequently, little knowledge has been acquired about the content of the technique 
(e.g. its items, capabilities, effects) or its context (the environment in which it functions). 
A review of the literature of RPE revealed discrepancies in results, although they used 
the same research method, measurements, methodology and the same technique in 
analysing the data. This suggests the need for an in- depth study for the content and 
context of RPE in order to explore: its components, consequences and environment. 
While gaps and discrepancies are the noticeable features in the literature of RPE, 
complications and variety of patterns and factors are the marked features of the UK 
practice of RPE. These complications in applying the technique have been overlooked by 
the literature. Given that there are substantial investments in these packages every year, it 
is essential to justify the money invested in them through a close study of the package, its 
design, implementation and consequences.
From a professional stance, different committees (such as Cadbury Code of Best 
Practice 1992 and Greenbury Committee’ report 1995) have invited companies to adopt 
reward schemes which base compensation on comparative performance (the essence of 
RPE). They have also kept on disclosing information about the amount and bases of 
entitlement to these rewards. In the UK, there is a tendency among the major companies 
to adopt these techniques as long-term reward schemes for top management (as detailed 
in Appendix A-2). Also there is a noticeable increase in the amount of details released 
about employee's remuneration in general and the remuneration of senior management in 
particular. The Institute of Management and Labour Relations in the USA has provided 
the academic orientation in this debate in its special forum about Managerial 
Compensation and Firm Performance in 1996.
The purpose of this chapter involves a wider investigation of RPE as a control system. 
It attempts to open a discussion about the content of this reward scheme. This chapter is 
organised into three parts: the first discusses the sources of developing the new
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arguments. The second presents further arguments about RPE. The last part provides a 
review of pay practices in UK companies.
(4.1) Part one: Sources for further arguments in RPE
The arguments introduced in this chapter stemmed from various sources. The first 
concerns the discrepancies in the literature of RPE. The second refers the complications 
in the practice of RPE that have not been addressed in the literature of RPE. The third is 
the invitations by The Academy of Management regarding the research methods and 
methodology in pay and performance. The fourth is the attitude whereby the relevance/ 
ability/ consequences of handling RPE within an economic framework is questioned and 
finally the desire to discuss the link between RPE and the accounting literature of 
performance. These sources will be discussed respectively in the next section.
(4.1.1) The discrepancies in the literature o f RPE:
Holmstrom (1982) investigated whether agents are paid upon their performance 
compared to their peers or not. He used a theoretical framework derived from agency 
theory and focused on the value of information which the peers’ performance item will 
held. Apparently Holmstrom focused on the monitoring role of RPE but he did not test 
his argument empirically.
Knuckel and Magee (1984) used an empirical study and the statistical correlation proved 
there was a correlation between the pay and comparative performance in some industries 
but not in others (in total no consistent result). Knuckel and Magee (1984) did not 
explain this result. Using the same research method, the same sources of data and models 
of Knuckel and Magee (1984) -but different measures- Antle and Smith (1986) 
addressed the same question. They found a relationship between industry performance 
and employees' performance and not when market measure was used. While Gibbons & 
Murphy (1990) found RPE was considered in directors' pay and it was a cost- efficient 
system but with no effect on the employees turnover. The examples and the details in 
chapters two and three raise the following question: why did different measures lead to 
different results?
77
Maher (1987) was the only one who approached the debate by a case study research. In 
general, he found support for RPE in the companies. Some interesting questions arose 
from his findings, e.g. why meeting the financial targets increased risk and decreased the 
chance of applying RPE, why diversity and centralisation ...etc encourage the use of 
RPE, what is the influence of competition on RPE.
Chow and Haddad (1991) conducted an experiment to test the influence of RPE on 
selecting investment projects under different levels of uncertainty. Chow and Haddad
(1991) "reluctantly" reported -if supported by other research- their conclusion was: RPE 
could encourage managers’ to invest in risky projects. Given that there is an increasing 
number of companies applying RPE, there is a need to test this argument in real 
situations. Similar to Chow and Haddad (1991) Fredrickson (1992) conducted an 
experiment to test the same debate with 36 participants. He reported that effort increases 
under RPE contract as uncertainty increases. The question is why effort increases, in 
which environment and whose effort?
The conclusion from this brief review is that, the dominant research method has been 
based on empirical tests using published data with two exceptions (2 experiments and 1 
case study). No inquiries have been directed to the employees who are rewarded by these 
schemes or to the designers of these packages. The model of analysing data has been 
confined to statistical correlation (and sometimes regression). The scope of inquiry has 
been limited to mainly investigating whether RPE is used or not, the proposed 
motivational role of RPE has been taken for granted. Also, the anticipated drives behind 
the change in behaviour due to RPE (i.e. money and esteem suggested by Fredrickson) 
have not been tested, to what extent they will continue to affect behaviour and whether 
they work on a complementary or competitive basis. Adopting an economic perspective 
in the previous research has limited the scope of investigation as discussed in the 
following section.
(4.1.2) Limitation o f the economic perspective when handling RPE:
The basic model of RPE by Holmstrom 1982 and the following studies have been 
framed -explicitly or implicitly- by agency theory (Kunckel and Magee 1986, Antle and 
Smith 1987, Gibbons and Murphy 1990, Maher 1987, Dye 1992, Janakirman et.al. 
1992 and Conyon and Gregg 1994). In spite of this dominance, agency theory has been
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criticised for its limitations (e.g., Scapens 1984) such as, focusing on single-period, 
assuming utility maximising behaviour and economic rationality. Merchant (1986) 
records that agency models cover some factors such as attitudes towards risk, degree 
of asymmetry and ignores differences in organisation strategy, structure, technology, 
culture and leadership style and innovation as well (Kaplan 1984).
In addition to these limitations (discussed in chapter three, p: 59-62) a question is raised 
about whether the assumptions of agency theory contradict those of RPE. In RPE, a 
manager is expected to be interested in gaining social esteem and hence it does not seem 
to be his/her sole objective (nor it is to his/her company) to gain profit. His/her 
performance will not be matched to the "maximum" unmeasurable level. Under RPE, an 
employee will be reviewed according to realistic and measurable yardstick. Both financial 
and non-financial goals and measures are involved, for him/her and for their company. 
These issues have been discussed in detail in chapter three of this thesis.
(4.1.3) The complications in using RPE in UK companies
Table (1) below summarises a sample of the major UK companies that had RPE schemes 
as extracted from the Company Reporting Publications (1993-1999) and the companies’ 
annual reports (details of this practice and a comparison is provided in Appendix A-2). 
Discussion and observations are developed below building upon that data.
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Table (4-1) A  Comparison among the UK companies about RPE
(Source: Company Reporting Publications 1993- 1999)
company type of 
target
who to
compare
with
comparison
criteria
performance
measures
forms of pay
United
Utilities
scale FTSE 100 to be among 
top 25, top 50 
or below 50
total
shareholder’s
return
cash and shares
Pearson one
level
FTSE 100 outperform 
average FTSE 
100
total
shareholder's
return
shares
Community
hospitals
one
level
FTSE 500 
non
financial
equal or exceed 
FTSE 500 non 
financial
growth in share 
price
Not mentioned
Bass scale of 
targets
10 selected 
competitors
ranking,
positioning
total
shareholder's
return
Not mentioned
Lucas one
level
Retail price 
index
at least exceeds 
10%
the growth in 
FTSE 100 
index over 3 
years
earnings per 
share
shares
Nat West one
level
FTSE 100 compare 
movements in 
share 
price
movements in 
share price
Not mentioned
Reuters scale FTSE 100 all shares if 
among top 40, 
nothing if last 
25, a scale in 
between
total
shareholder's
return
shares
BOC one
level
FTSE 100 
index
outperform 
FTSE 100
share price shares
Dixons scale 17 leading
retail
companies
specific 
amount of 
shares if  
Dixons 1,2 or 3 
rank reduced to 
the 1/10 if  12 
and nothing if  
below 12
total
shareholder's
return
shares
A review of the company reporting publications over the period 1994- 1999, show that 
17 companies belonging to 15 industries are found to adopt the relative performance 
evaluation. Table (4-2) provides names, type of activity and the year in which RPE was 
applied in these companies.
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Table (4-2) List of some UK companies that implement RPE:
Company’s name Type of activity Year RPE 
scheme began
1 The British Petroleum Oil & its integrated products 1996
2 Yorkshire Electricity* Electricity 1995
3 Dixons Retail and chain stores 1994
4 British Telecommunications T elecommunications 1995
5 National Westminster Financial services 1994,1995
6 Lucas Industries Technology systems and car parts 1995
7 Rank Organisation Holidays and Leisure 1996
8 The Berkeley Group Construction 1996
9 Pearson Group Publishing 1994,1996
10 Cookson Group Industrial Products 1996
11 Glaxo Pharmaceuticals Research 1994,1995
12 Community Hospitals Group Health Care 1994
13 United Utilities Electricity Supply, gas, water, 
communications
1995
14 Royal Insurance insurance and financial 
transactions
1994
15 Bass Group Hotels and restaurants 1996
16 The BOC Group Chemicals and health care 1995
17 Courtaulds chemicals 1994
18 Reuters Holdings Media and financial transactions 1994,1995
* Yorkshire Electricity stopped using RPE schemes after it was taken over by American company in 1997 as 
detailed in the research design- chapter 5, page 128 in this thesis).
The table above shows how various companies from different industries have different 
period of experiences with the technique. The importance of this is that it provides a 
chance to trace certain consequences of RPE over time, such as the continuity of the 
motivational role of RPE, any learning from experience, what elements encourage or 
discourage companies to adopt or abandon RPE.
Cadbury Code of Best Practice (1992) recommended that the factors included in 
calculating pay as “ the basis on which performance is measured should be explained”. 
Many companies explain bonus payments by their chosen factors. Asda, Tate& Lyle and 
Trafalgar House disclose that bonus is dependent on results. Tate & Lyle disclose that 
“bonus is directly related to the results of the group”. While Asda is more specific in 
disclosing that bonuses “are based on the Group’s sales performance”. The huge variety
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of practices in the objectives behind using RPE, the measurements, peers, rewards, 
outcomes and experiences have not been examined before in the literature of RPE.
(4.1.4) Academic invitations to apply non-conventional research methods in this area. 
When reviewing the literature of RPE, it is noticeable that the dominant research 
method the USA (Kunckel and Magee 1984, Antle and Smithl986, Gibbons &Murphy 
1990, Dye 1992) and the UK (Conyon and Gregg 1994) has been the statistical analysis 
based on published data of performance and rewards. The test has largely rested on 
statistical correlation of the association between pay and performance. This narrowness 
in the research tools in the area of pay and performance in general and RPE in particular 
has been criticised by The Academy of Management Journal (published by the Institute 
of Management and Labour relations). This was disclosed in "The institute’s Special 
Research Forum for Managerial Compensation and Firm Performance" in 1996 (as it 
appears in its "Call For Papers" published in the Academy of Management Journal, 1995; 
38; 5, page 1497). The institute sought to improve understanding of what determines 
managerial pay and how it interacts with internal and external forces to impact on 
performance. In particular, this forum encouraged novel empirical approaches to the 
study of managerial pay and firm performance. The main themes of the forum have been 
stated to be:
(a) International: because almost all previous studies of managerial pay use US data, the 
forum welcomed “in- depth” studies of individual countries or cross- countries.
(b) Interdisciplinary: because the determinants of managerial pay and its effect on firm 
performance may be better understood by linking variables and models from different 
disciplines. As a whole, most of the extant research originated in economics and finance. 
The forum invited submissions which can bridge two or more disciplines in the debate of 
compensation and performance.
(c) Innovative methodologies: The institute states that -with few exceptions- 
investigators examining the antecedents and consequences of managerial pay tend to rely 
on archival data available in Compustat, Disclosure and other similar sources. One 
problem with the use of these databases is that researchers are constrained by the 
information available there (e.g. data is reported for the top five executives only). 
Therefore the institute encouraged submissions that use unconventional data sources and 
novel methodologies.
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(4.1.5) Linking RPE to the accounting literature o f performance.
RPE is a reward system which -procedurally- consists of selecting peers, measuring, 
evaluating and rewarding performance. These items are consistent with the dimensions of 
performance studied in the accounting literature over decades (as discussed in chapter 
one). The intention in this research is to bridge the components of RPE and the 
dimensions of performance in the accounting literature. This will sustain the line of 
enquiry adopted in this research where RPE is analysed as a control system with its 
various parts: setting targets, measuring output, including a predictive model. In this 
case, the predictive model would be the motivational theory behind RPE. The final 
results of the study should indicate some areas where the system might improve.
This section highlighted the main sources for developing further arguments in the debate 
about RPE. These sources cover various theoretical, practical, academic and professional 
stances. The following section demonstrates the arguments which emerged from them.
(4.2) Part Two: Further Arguments about RPE
This part presents the new arguments classified into three types: (1) the motivational 
mechanism of RPE, (2) the components of RPE system and (3) contingency theory and 
case study as research methodology and methods for studying RPE.
(4.2.1) Arguments about the motivational mechanism of RPE: The predictive part 
of RPE as a control system
As demonstrated in chapter one, Lyne (1995) discussed the component of control system 
and reported Otley and Berry (1980) argument that a control system consists of setting 
targets, measuring output, having a predictive model and corrective actions. Lyne (1995) 
debated that the most important feature of a predictive control model is to know what 
motivates individuals to perform at their best and what conditions will encourage high 
levels of performance. Management accounting writers have used various motivation 
theories in order to construct a predictive model as part of an accounting control system. 
The aim of this section is to explore the predictive part of RPE, i.e. the motivational 
theory behind RPE. This includes two main points: first, discussing whether RPE should 
be interpreted solely on the theory of social comparisons which the psychological
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literature provided (Shore et.al. 1992 and Ferris and Mitchell 1987) and accounting 
writers adopted (e.g. Fredrickson 1992) or whether it can be accommodated within other 
motivation theories. The second point focuses directly on the predictive ability of RPE. 
In this point, a discussion raises about the different types of potential behaviour which 
employees might adopt and whether RPE can interfere to adjust this behaviour to a 
favourable one.
Fredrickson’s study (1992) focused on the behavioural interpretation of RPE. He 
discussed behavioural theories of the social influences of evaluation, which suggest that 
fear of others induces effects on employee’s behaviour. The theory of social comparison 
argues that the presence of others may trigger a variety of activities that are related to 
behaviour (Shore, et.al. 1992). Ferris & Mitchell (1987) consider the more important the 
others are the more likely the employees are to engage in cognitive activity and 
information processing. This behavioural effect of RPE is influenced by job similarity and 
observability as well as the individual’s attitude toward the view of the others in his 
work. Young (1985) states that social pressure can be used to motivate the subordinate 
to work harder, but the mechanism of this effect depends on the degree of the 
dissatisfaction that a subordinate is likely to feel about being viewed as a shirker by his or 
her superior or co- workers. This theory implies that the subordinate finds some utility in 
being viewed as a hard-working individual and therefore he/she is willing to exchange 
some distasteful effort for that utility. It should be noted that this is not the only version 
of social comparisons' theory, as Ezzamel and Watson (1998) reported Festinger's 
(1957) version of that theory to address market comparisons in setting executives’ pay in 
the UK. According to the theory of social comparison processes developed by Festinger 
(1957), social actors and decision-makers of all kinds have to rely upon a whole range of 
social comparisons to secure equity in setting rewards. Festinger noted that individuals 
have a need to evaluate their abilities. By choosing to compare to those who are 
perceived to have similar abilities or slightly better expert, they fulfil this need. 
Festinger's (1957) version differs from that developed by Ferris & Mitchell (1987) in aim, 
method and potential. In Festinger's, the aim of the social comparison is to secure equity, 
while in Ferris & Mitchell it is motivation. Festinger states that the domain of comparison 
is "abilities" as measured by compensation while compensation is how it is appreciated by 
the owners. Ferris & Mitchell compare "performance" which in one way is the indicator 
of "how abilities are used rather than what they are". Festinger uses social comparison to
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satisfy employees’ feeling of fairness while Ferris & Mitchell state that social comparisons 
could provide both rewards and esteem for employees. Festinger -procedurally- 
compares pay to set subsequent pay, Ferris & Mitchell compare performances to set 
rewards, which in turn affect subsequent performance.
Ivancevich et.al., (1983) argue that unsatisfied needs lead to frustration which an 
individual may attempt to reduce. In so doing, his behaviour could be a constructive, 
defensive, aggressive or projective. The chosen behaviour depends on the strength of 
needs and the level of aspiration. The behaviour of an employee that has been described 
in the literature of RPE could be constructed as constructive behaviour, where one 
endeavours to cope with the norms and values of a group. But it could be argued that it 
might turn to manipulative behaviour if employees used RPE to secure gains without 
providing a true contribution to the firm’s wealth, a situation which is likely to happen if 
employees involve in some dysfunctional behaviour or information manipulation. 
Gibbons & Murphy (1990) consider such behaviour as a source of some costs of using 
RPE in addition to the explicit cost of observing the average output of the workers who 
share the same uncertainty. The other set of costs includes a potential distortion in 
incentives that might occur if the worker could affect the output of the reference group. 
According to Gibbons & Murphy (1990) this can happen in many ways, such as 
sabotage, collusion, affecting the choice of the reference group or its performance. It 
could be argued here that one of Holmstrom's basic assumptions about RPE is that 
agents’ actions are independent and non-collusive. Antle and Smith (1986) repeated the 
same assumption. Thus, the arguments of Gibbons & Murphy (1990) about possible 
collusion and sabotage under RPE contradict the basic assumptions of RPE by 
Holmstrom (1982) and other writers.
Therefore, it can be concluded that the dominant assumption in the literature of RPE 
suggests that constructive behaviour in response to social pressure can not be always the 
case.
However, social comparisons and Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, are not the only 
theories that can explain the prospect of RPE. There are also the theory X and theory Y 
by McGregor. Theory X assumes -generally- that people are lazy, with lack of ambition 
and they work to avoid penalties or to gain money only so money is the only motive for 
their behaviour. Such an implication leads to the development of tight impersonal
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controls (Emmanuel et.al., 1990). These assumptions appear not to fit RPE where 
employees search for more challenge and compete with others and take the risk of being 
rewarded accordingly. An alternative set of assumptions was provided by theory Y. It 
suggests that people enjoy work, wish to do well, are self-motivated and self- 
developmental. Here control is achieved by tapping people’s enthusiasm and giving them 
tasks that use their talents. Such assumptions seem to be consistent with RPE because 
these characteristics appear to describe the employees who are motivated by it. Basically, 
in RPE, an employee seeks -in addition to money- to gain social esteem and to be viewed 
as a hard-working person. He does not work to avoid punishment but looks towards 
competing with others and outperforming them. Emmanuel et.al. (1990) discuss other 
theories of behaviour such as the equity theory. The equity theory seems to start from 
another dimension in social comparisons. According to this theory, when people 
compare each other’s work and pay, they either feel satisfied or not and as a result, they 
react by reducing effort or not. The study about market comparison earnings and 
executive compensation pay in the UK by Ezzamel and Watson (1998) could be viewed 
as following the line of equity theory. The arguments that were examined in that study 
were that executives should be paid at least at the going rate and the deviations from that 
rate would influence subsequent pay. They argue that for motivational, recruitment and 
retention reasons, senior executives has to be paid at least the going rate. Here the 
implicit assumption is that pay comparisons would lead to either satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction and this could de/motivate executives and this might affect consequent 
pay and performance.
In RPE, rewards are based on comparisons of performance and informing the employee 
that his/her work (and reward) will be subject to comparison with others, which leads to 
motivate him/her to exert more effort and he/she is rewarded accordingly.
So social comparison is a motive for better performance in RPE as illustrated below:
In Social comparison theory: performance —> comparison —> reward 
In equity theory: effort —» performance —> reward —> social comparisont 1
 satisfaction (or dissatisfaction)
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Here, the mechanism of equity theory when people are paid, they -presumably- become 
involved in pay comparisons. So comparisons start after collecting pay and are related to 
it rather than to performance. Apparently, this is different from what is proposed in RPE 
where employees know they would be compared to others, before they work and before 
they are paid. This is expected to motivate them and affect their performance.
Among the theories of motivation, is the two-factor theory of Herzberg who introduced 
two sets of factors: dissatisfiers and satisfiers factors. The dissatisfiers set consists of 
supervision, administration policy, work conditions and money. The satisfiers set of 
factors represents achievement, recognition, responsibility and advancement. 
Consequently, money, promotion, power and social prestige are different motives for 
different persons and for the same person at different times. Emmanuel et.al., (1990, p: 
76) argue that people are motivated in different ways and by different incentives. Hence, 
if gaining recognition is the motivating factor behind RPE, but is not the only factor, then 
there is no guarantee that it will motivate different employees, nor do so permanently for 
an employee. Emmanuel et.al. (1990, P: 78) also argue that work is tiring and pleasure 
from working hard can not be a response to the need to gain social esteem for a long 
time.
Another theory of motivation is the expectancy theory which views motivation as a 
process which governs an individual’s choices. Therefore, behaviour is a goal -oriented 
process. If RPE is interpreted within this theory, earning money and social esteem would 
be the goals of the employees, competing with peers and exerting effort are selected 
choices and this represents a constructive behaviour chosen to carry out that choice.
The previous discussion suggests that RPE can motivate employees to work hard in 
response to social pressure to gain both money and social esteem. Given that RPE is 
addressed as a control system with a motivational role, it could be argued that the 
"competition with peers" might be planted as an element of the corporate culture and 
could be used for motivation. Ezzamel (1992) states that the values and beliefs which 
constitute a corporate culture, are subject of social and political influence within the 
organisation. However, corporate culture can become a forceful control tool in the hands 
of top management to motivate the performance of lower managers in the desired 
direction. The potential divergences between corporate goals and those of its participants
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can frequently be minimised, as they become internalised in the widely accepted culture; 
hence opportunistic behaviour can be limited.
However, there is a need to examine -in reality- what type of employees would respond -  
as expected- to RPE. In addition to considering whether money and esteem are the 
drives behind this response or there are other drives, whether money and esteem work in 
a complementary way or competitive way to generate that response to RPE. Also which 
type of behaviour is triggered by RPE, to what extent and under what circumstances 
need to be tested.
(4.2.2) Arguments about the Components of RPE package:
This section will discuss the performance measures which were used in RPE literature 
and in actual practice in the UK environment as reported in A1 Bahimani surveys (1993, 
1994). In addition to performance measures, form of rewards will be reviewed as 
suggested in the literature. The aim of this discussion is to examine the performance 
measures and reward forms as used in RPE schemes.
Performance Measures:
Kaplan [(1984 (b)] argues that top management have mistakenly accepted accounting 
measures as accurate indicators of efficiency and attempt to instruct lower level 
managers to seek optimal solutions. In the face of environmental uncertainty, information 
asymmetry and lack of clear objectives, bounded rationality is a temporary "an 
ephemeral" concept. Not only could these measures be mistaken, but also even if they 
are correct, they are not enough to reflect the activities of employees. Ezzamel (1992) 
states that the traditional accounting measures share certain limitations; being short­
term, sub optimal and lacking future orientation. Then, objective measures in terms of 
staff turnover, productivity, customer satisfaction and complaints and other non-financial 
statistics should be reported (Emmanuel et.al., 1990 p: 365). Customer satisfaction and 
labour productivity will not be shown in the accounts, even the costs and revenues 
associated with a special order will probably be embedded in aggregate data. The timing 
of the report at the end of the month may make tentative judgements about the 
relationship between the special order and the financial results could be difficult to 
interpret because the events which they refer to are over and done with.
Burns and Ezzamel (1999) provide an empirical piece of evidence in their survey for 
management accounting changes in the UK. They report that UK managers today are 
more ’commercially oriented’ and this means that profits are important but put into a 
broader context and attention is given to the underlying factors which generate profits in 
the longer term. Such commercial orientation usually emphasises the key performance 
indicators’ linked to the strategic consideration, expressed in financial and non-financial 
terms. This growing emphasis on non-financial measures implies recognition that 
financial information gives only a partial picture -a snapshot- which may not indicate 
longer-term profitability. Therefore, additional elements could be included in the 
management accounts to give a fuller picture, e.g. using ABC and other new techniques.
McKenzie et.el., (1998) argue that the Balanced Scorecard is an approach of integrating 
financial and non-financial measures of performance that can be used for measuring and 
rewarding performance. For incentive design purposes, the Balanced Scorecard 
emphases not only on financial measures, but also on such measures as new products 
development, market share, acquisitions, safety and pollution reduction. Using measures 
that are difficult to quantify makes it difficult to base compensation on them. For 
example, customer satisfaction is an important measure for any business. However, if it is 
measured through surveys, opinion boxes or informal pools, often dissatisfied customers 
are captured while, satisfied customers may not offer valuable and positive feedback. 
Alternative measures might provide deeper insights as for instance measures of product 
defects, customer return or repeat business which can track customer satisfaction 
indicator.
Ezzamel (1992) calls for complementing the financial controls by involving the 
quantitative and qualitative measures of a non-financial type. Ezzamel argues that many 
of the financial indicators are highly sophisticated and are particularly effective when 
used as part of a control package because exclusive focus on financial measures has two 
limitations. Firstly, it ignores the important role that other quantitative, non-financial 
controls can play in guiding the performance of managers. Secondly, by implication it 
understates the extent to which qualitative controls bring about organisational coherence 
and reduce the potential for opportunistic behaviour.
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Thus, one main objective of this research is to test the performance measurements within 
RPE schemes. Three aspects are thought to have a specific importance in relation to 
RPE, (a) including non-financial measures in addition to the financial (b) the impact of 
the measurement’s ability to reflect controllable actions on employees' response to RPE 
and (c) different measures needed for different managerial levels.
Rewards
Emmanuel et.al. (1990, pp: 276) predict that observing the Organisations practices of 
rewards does not easily provide definitive clues as to which reward is more effective in a 
motivational sense. This is because some choices of reward forms are affected by 
elements such as taxes, employee retention, and the influence of competitors' choices. 
Long-term incentive awards reduce turnover through the provision of a form of “silver 
handcuffs”.
Any of the rewards mentioned above (Emmanuel et.al 1990) could be linked with any 
performance measure(s) that can be used to distinguish good and poor performance. In 
contrast to Emmanuel’s expectation, Murlis (1988) reported that there has been an 
increasing trend in the UK during the late 1980’s to include a performance -related 
element into the remuneration package of middle managers.
When reviewing rewards within the literature of RPE, it was found that Kunckel and 
Magee (1984) used change in salary and bonus excluding stock option as a package for 
compensating agents and got inconsistent evidence about RPE. Antel and Smith (1986) 
used a more comprehensive package containing total salary, bonus, stock holdings and 
benefits. Gibbons and Murphy (1990) found evidence that directors' remuneration was 
built on RPE, when both basic compensation and a comprehensive compensation 
package were examined. The results of Lambert et.al. (1993) were consistent with those 
of Gibbons and Murphy about RPE although the former used a total package of base 
salary, annual bonus, stock options, sharing plans and restricted stock. Conyon and 
Gregg (1994) used salary and bonuses but not share options and found support for RPE 
when sales growth not shareholders’ return described the performance of the managers. 
The point which this review raises is that different studies had different conclusions about 
RPE when different remuneration packages were used. This suggests that RPE could be 
sensitive to the type of compensation package examined. This prompts -in this research-
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the question as to whether in reality, different managerial levels have different 
preferences to pay items, if so, what, why and how this would enhance the response to 
RPE. The following sections put forward some arguments about time span of measures, 
dysfunctional behaviour and the national culture in relation to RPE.
(4.2.3) Other Contingents of RPE
(a) Impact of the Span of Time on the Efficiency of the RPE
The time span of a decision or action can be an influential variable on RPE. This point 
relates to measuring performance and accounting measures have been criticised for being 
short-term oriented (Kaplan and Atkinson 1998). Otley (1995) argued that even if 
profitability is taken as a major objective, there are still questions about long-term and 
short-term indicators of its relationship to growth, liquidity, and share price 
consideration. In his survey, Vancil (1979) found that over a third of profit centre 
managers recognised profit measure as incomplete and certainly not an all-inclusive 
reflection of long-term potentials. Kaplan (1984 (b), P: 409) criticised managers in the 
U.S.A as being excessively concerned with short- term measures at the expense of 
longer-term consideration, unlike their counterparts in Japan who regard such 
considerations to have more importance. Executives see the current trend towards 
rewards based on immediate year’s performance rather than long-range growth is a 
serious disincentive to management objectivity. Ittner et.al (1997) found that less than 
2% of the organisations in the sample used non-financial measures designed to assess 
short-run drivers of long-run financial measures. The study found that short-run 
performance measures seemed to be chosen strategically in the sense that, organisations 
competing on innovation were more likely to use non-financial measures to reward 
performance than organisations competing on cost.
Kaplan (1984 (b), p: 413) continues his debate that annual profit as a short-term 
measure is not necessarily the best indicator for proceeding in a long-term profit path. 
Other non-financial measures such as product innovation, product leadership, employee 
skill development and customer loyalty may be much better indicators of future 
profitability than annual profit. It is unlikely that any single measure can both summarise 
the economic events affecting a firm or a division during a period of time and serve as a 
basis for motivating and evaluating managers. Therefore, multiple indicators may
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improve the motivation and evaluation of performance. Kaplan and Atkinson (1998) 
argue that short-run performance measures are usually financial measures such as profit 
or cost, but it could be a non-financial measure such as quality or on-time delivery. When 
a performance measure is non-financial, it is usually chosen because it is felt to be a 
driver of long-term financial performance that is controllable by the person being 
rewarded.
Ezzamel (1992) argues that most accounting- based measurements of performance or 
profitability are short-term oriented. Coats et.al. (1990, p: 140) raise another point in this 
debate. They argue that while a large proportion of investment is likely to be of a long­
term nature, the appropriate performance measure should logically be a long-term 
measure. Profitability indices such as return on investment and residual income are 
potentially capable of reflecting long-term performance of past decisions but not recent 
or current decisions. The measures are designed for a particular period but not for the 
future. Therefore, they are effective short-term measures but could lead to dysfunctional 
behaviour in the longer term.
Coates et.al. (1990) argue that the average return on investment and other profitability 
indices for a number of years were suggested as a surrogate for long-term profitability. 
Coates et.al. (1990) expected this to be impractical or misleading. For example, is a new 
manager to be held responsible for the decisions of his predecessor? What if a manager 
expects to have a particular post for only 2 or 3 years before being promoted or leaving 
for another job? How will the consequences of his decisions over that period be shaped 
and measured? Should managers be rewarded according to the ultimate result of their 
decisions? Can this be practical? What are the effects of the timing of rewards on 
motivation and on the response at every managerial level? Production workers might 
prefer an immediate bonus after meeting a target while their divisional managers might 
find an incentive scheme tied to the outcome of the whole project, which entitles to 
rewards after a period of time, is more acceptable. Among the questions which are raised 
related to the time: Can measures like cost effectiveness, matching scheduled plans, 
quality in similar situations, be used to benchmark managers’ performance in on-going 
projects? In other words, should reward be based on the outcome of a decision or the 
quality of taking that decision? These issues were subjects of discussions in the literature 
(Kren and Liao, 1988 and Kren and Munter 1995). Kren and Munter (1995) predicts that
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in practice some managers seem willing to see their hard effort recognised when 
evaluating performance. They found evidence about this prediction in their study when a 
manger explained that while his performance was not as good as others, but it has 
improved over the previous year and with regard to the chaotic environment in which 
they worked, that was outstanding!
In the studies of RPE, this problem was thought to be overcome by using the change in 
performance measures. For example, [e.g. Kunckel and Magee (1984) used the change in 
accounting return on common shareholders’ equity, Gibbons and Murphy (1986) used 
the change in shareholders’ return) or the A shareholders’ return (current -  last period)] 
as a performance measure of the company. In this case, all the arguments raised by 
Coates et.al. (1990) above will apply. Spencer et.al., (1977, P: 284-287) proposed the 
following long-term measures for growth:
Stockholders’ purchasing power: This is an indicator of the position of stockholders’ 
purchasing power in the industrial economy. Thus, a company’s success can be measured 
in terms of “ the growth of dividends per share” where dividends are the source which 
generates a stream of purchasing power to shareholders.
Market appraisal measure: - This is a presentation for a historical relationship 
between the market price of its equity shares and a broad average of the price of the 
stock to the value of the stock index. The latter might be the Dow - Jones Industrial 
Average or any other index. This approach can also be applied to earning or dividends.
Capital- attracting standard: - This measures the company's ability to acquire funds. 
It can be used as a reflection of the company’s status in the investment community. Since 
there is some cost related to obtaining capital, so the company’s ability to get funds 
should be evaluated in terms of dilution of stockholders’ equity.
In spite of being useful, these measures have a major defect. It is that they reflect 
“company’s44 performance as a whole but not a division's performance or a “manager’s” 
performance. Meanwhile, RPE is a technique for evaluating and consequently rewarding 
the manager’s performance not company’s one. Evaluating employees according to their 
controllable performance, is a basic requirement for any appraisal process. In addition to
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this, the company’s outcome is a joint product of many activities: production, 
purchasing, marketing ...etc., and is not a result of an individual effort of a manager or a 
function. The company’s deficiency or remarkable efficiency can result from one or more 
of these activities.
(b) The influence of dysfunctional behaviour:
Gibbons & Murphy (1990, p: 33-35) stated that RPE can be a source of dysfunctional 
behaviour in many ways. A worker’s action can possibly take many forms. For example, 
it can be sabotage (in which he takes unproductive actions to diminish the measured 
performance of another worker in the reference group). It might also be collusion (where 
workers in the same reference group collude). Other forms might include; the choice of a 
reference group (an employee chooses which of several groups to be compared with) and 
production externalities (where productive actions of one worker affect the output of 
other workers).
It could be debated that while dysfunctional behaviour might not be a feature attached to 
RPE, it might occur because of one or more of its components. The main form of 
dysfunctional behaviour which might affect RPE, is the employees' tendency to 
manipulate the information about their performance in order to influence the rewards 
they receive. Such behaviour has been discussed in the literature by Jaworski et.al.
(1992). Jaworski et.al. (1992) anticipate the role-conflict to be a reason for this 
behaviour. Emmanuel (1990, p: 77) identified another possible source for this behaviour, 
it is holding the employee responsible for actions or events that are beyond his control. In 
such case, he/she might react by a defensive behaviour which might influence the process 
of monitoring his work. Another source can be focusing on short-term measures 
(financial mainly) or on general irrelevant measures that do not satisfactorily express his 
work. Ezzamel and Hart (1987, p: 367) argued that personnel goals could be a possible 
drive for dysfunctional behaviour. He found in a survey that, a division manager -when 
taking an action- was interested in the impact of that action on his promotion. He was 
not interested in the long-term consequences of his decision because dealing with them 
would be the responsibility of the person who was then in charge!
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Kaplan [1984 (a)] proposed some remedy via the use of non-financial and long-term 
measures to evaluate and reward managers. A more valid and reliable periodic measures 
for divisions could be obtained if there were measures for market prices, development of 
new products, improvement in processes, R&D experiments, developing employees skills 
and morals, flexible and high -quality manufacturing operations, efficient distribution and 
customer loyalty. Kaplan’s [1984 (a)] suggested that improvements in measuring 
performance might be helpful to relieve the negative impact of dysfunctional behaviour 
(or corruption). It can be argued that the mechanism of RPE -especially the comparison 
process- can sustain detecting such behaviour. As the comparison group is an 
independent element in that mechanism, and unlikely to influence it, the comparison 
process could be useful in revealing any deficiency or corruption. The choice of the 
reference group that shares the same environment, task similarity, observability, ...etc. 
are among the features that constitute the merits of the reference group’s help.
The argument about RPE and dysfunctional behaviour are divided into two sub­
arguments: RPE and competition on the one hand and RPE and dysfunctional behaviour 
on the other. Regarding RPE and competition, there is firstly a need to identify which 
type of competition the argument relates to and secondly to trace the direction of the 
relationship with RPE. Three types of competition can be recognised: competition in the 
market, competition among peers in different companies and competition among 
colleagues in the same company. The relationship between RPE and each of them is 
illustrated in the figure below:
causes competition among peers (Holmstrom 1982, Walker 1989)
RPE__________
a ^  Increases competition among co-workers (Villadsen 1995)
I is affected by the competition in the market (DeFond and Park 1999, Dye 1992)
The figure shows that Holmstrom (1982) assumed that under RPE contract, agents 
would compete with each other. The resulting competition is supposed to be the basis 
behind the whole motivational role of RPE. The definition of RPE given by many writers 
[Holmstrom (1982), DeFond and Park (1999), Dye (1992), Fredrickson (1992), Kunckel 
and Magee (1984), Conyon and Gregg (1994), ...etc] emphasises that the reference 
group belongs to other companies and not to the same company. This implies that, RPE 
is an external benchmarking and in addition to its impact on competition among peers
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from competitive companies, ViUadsen (1995) argued that RPE might affect the co­
operation/competition among employees in the same company. Villadsen (1995) 
predicted that a contract that utilises the agents’ co-operative behaviour dictates less 
relative performance evaluation than does a non-cooperative contract or a contract that 
ensures the employees do not co-operate. Villadsen (1995) explained that if the positive 
aspects of collusion (sharing information, work or risk) are taken into account, the 
organisation might benefit from co-operative behaviour, more than from preventing 
collusion.
DeFond and Park (1999), Dye (1992) and Furnas (1992) argue that RPE’s usefulness 
increases when the competition in the market increases. This is due to the following 
reasons; RPE would identify and replace the poor management [DeFond and Park 
(1999)], RPE relates to strategic advantages (Furnas, 1992) and would encourage 
investment in risky decisions (Dye 1992). This discussion indicates that RPE causes 
competition among co-workers in the same company and among peers in different 
companies but becomes affected by the competition in the market. The usefulness of 
RPE increases when the competition increases.
Regarding the argument about RPE and dysfunctional behaviour, Holmstrom (1982) 
drew a condition for RPE model, it is that any agent’s action or outcome is "independent 
and non-collusive". This suggests that it would not affect other agents’ actions or 
outcomes. Walker (1989) considered that this part of Holmstrom's condition makes an 
"if and only i f  proposition. It is not only the independence of peers performance which 
has been stressed in the literature but also the scope of comparison as well. Dye (1992) 
supported this condition by stating that, the usefulness of RPE relates to the thinness of 
the market in which an agent operates. The larger the number of competitors is, the more 
the comparison reflects relative performance. Furthermore, peers independence, large 
number of competitors and Holmstrom's assumption that they would compete in "an 
appropriate" behaviour, all constitute the basis for minimising the chances for 
dysfunctional behaviour from RPE.
Another point equally important in this discussion could be the impact of national and 
organisational culture on the use and efficiency of RPE. This will be underlined below.
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(c) An Influence of National and Organisational Culture on the use of RPE
In an experimental study by Chow et. al., (1994) on national culture and preferences of 
management controls in Japan and the USA, the researchers tested the attitude of the 
Japanese and the American towards applying the relative performance evaluation. They 
found that the Japanese tend to prefer RPE more than the Americans. Furthermore, the 
Japanese viewed RPE as a controllability filter that can be used to adjust or eliminate the 
effects of uncontrollable factors from an employee’s performance appraisal. However, 
RPE was not found to appeal to the Japanese as a motivating technique for individuals 
that induced competition among employees. The reason for this was that a competition 
emerging from RPE was seen to be inconsistent with the Japanese preference to work in 
teams in contrast to the Americans who have high individualism. So the Japanese culture 
tends to adopt the attitude of encouraging group ambition in the work rather than 
individual ambition.
Chow et.al. (1994) did not find a direct distinction between the Japanese and the 
Americans with regard to preferring RPE. Chow et.al. (1994) used Hofstede's (1984) 
four dimensions of national culture (i.e uncertainty avoidance, masculinity, individualism 
and power distance) to deduce a difference between Japan and the US related to rewards 
and RPE. According to Hofstede's (1984) Japan scores more than the US in uncertainty 
avoidance, masculinity but less in individualism. Chow et.al. (1994) argued that the 
higher tendency to avoid risk in Japan than US, was one of the reasons which 
encouraged the Japanese to use RPE as a controllability filter. The Japanese did not 
accept RPE as a motivational tool because it feeds competition among individuals, which 
the highly collectivist culture denies. Alternatively, the Japanese participants regarded 
RPE as a competition between teams not individuals. High masculinity in Japan leads to 
a greater preference to performance-related pay of which RPE is a mode.
There are two points that arise from Chow et.al. (1994) study: the first is that group 
orientation can not only be a matter of national culture but also a matter of 
organisational culture. Some organisations are interested in developing and enhancing 
competition among employees and between employees and their rivals in the other 
organisations whereas others are not. The second point that can be detected from the 
Japanese response to RPE is the type of the reference group. A question of “With whom
97
the employee is expected to compete and who is the employee, an individual or a group”. 
The literature of RPE (Dye 1992, Janakirman et.al. 1992, Dopuch and Gupta 1997) 
defined RPE to mean: rewards on comparing performance with peers in other 
companies. The peer group -by definition- does not refer to co-workers or colleagues 
(who are supposed to co-operate) to compete with external peers. Although the 
literature of RPE, has defined and tested RPE assuming it is applied to individuals not 
groups, the Japanese pattern -explored by Chow et.al. (1994)- suggested that applying 
RPE to groups, was not excluded. In such a case, considerations like the nature of peers 
(who should be similar work teams) might be addressed along with possible interactions 
among members of group(s), which might affect the analysis.
Chow et.al. (1994) was the first study to explore different patterns, interpretations and 
implications of national culture on RPE. It showed the importance of studying 
differences in national cultures regarding control systems generally and RPE specifically. 
With the increasing globalisation in the 1990's, it is one of the aims of this research to 
explore the implications, differences and interpretations about RPE in different cultures.
Summary
In this chapter, four sources for developing the arguments of the research about RPE 
have been identified. The first source was the discrepancies in the literature of RPE 
(raised in chapter three). Secondly, it was the limitations of economic perspective when 
handling RPE. The third source was the overlooked complications in RPE practice in 
UK. The fourth source was the lack of links between studying RPE and the wider 
accounting domain of performance and the invitations of academic bodies to adopt 
innovative research methods in studying pay and performance.
This orientation led to raising arguments firstly about; the motivational role of RPE and 
interpreting this role in the light of motivation theories. Secondly, the debate about 
components of RPE, impact of span of time, dysfunctional behaviour and national culture 
on RPE has also been discussed. It should be mentioned that this chapter and the 
arguments that it offered, are the bases for focusing the research's arguments and 
questions. It would also form the basis for planning the research design. Chapter five will 
focus the arguments that will be empirically examined in this research and will draw the 
research design.
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Chapter Five
The Research Questions and Methodology
Chapter four established a wide underpinning for developing the research 
arguments. The limitations of the economic perspective of agency theory suggest a 
need to consider an alternative framework which could fit for studying the research 
arguments. The disregarded complications of UK patterns of RPE such as why in 
practice RPE is applied on multi levels of targets and rewards and why was it used 
for top management only, to what extent it is relevant for other managerial levels. 
Furthermore, given that RPE is a reward scheme which compares the performance 
of the individual to that of his/her peers, suggests a need to link the debate with the 
huge accounting literature about performance, measurements, rewards and 
motivation. All these points suggest a need to study the content and context of 
RPE. The academic invitations to depart the conventional methods of studying the 
topic of pay and performance, triggers the search for a method of study that could 
provide a rich and direct evidence rather than statistical analysis of archival data 
that the previous studies adopted.
The line of enquiry adopted in this research was fixed to regard RPE as a control 
system, this orientation will be followed in this research and the arguments will be 
focused within Otley’s (1987) framework of control system’s design. This 
framework suggested three questions regarding any control system: what 
dimensions of performance should be measured, what standards are to be set and 
what rewards are to be associated with it. In addition, this chapter outlines the 
research methodology and selects a research design from alternative research plans. 
Detailed study of the research instruments, organisations and subjects of the 
fieldwork are presented in this chapter. Furthermore, potential contribution and 
limitations will be highlighted.
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(5.1) Part One: Focusing the research arguments
As discussed in chapter one of this thesis (pp: 10-12) RPE can be analysed as a control 
system. In order to focus this study’s arguments about RPE, Otley’s questions (1987) 
about a control system will be traced in RPE. Otley (1987, p:5) suggests that in the 
design of a control system, there were three basic questions that need to be answered:
(1) What dimensions of "good" performance that the organisation is seeking to 
encourage?
(2) How are appropriate standards of performance to be set?
(3) What rewards are to be associated with the achievement of targets?
This chapter will apply these questions to RPE, that is, within RPE system, how 
performance should be measured (and what dimensions should be examined) before a 
comparison with peers and rewards are set. Also, the appropriate peer group should be 
selected (from the point of view of the organisations and the individuals) and what 
rewards employees would be entitled to under RPE system and why. While adopting this 
framework is a new endeavour in researching RPE, the debate will also investigate what 
"features" of targets, measures and rewards influence the effect of accepting RPE.
(5.1.1) The peers group as a performance yardstick:
Regarding Otley’s question, what standards should be set, in RPE the standard is the 
peer group, so the question is what peer group should be used, why and how this will 
affect the system. Both academic studies (Kunckel and Magee 1987, Gibbons and 
Murphy 1990, Antle and Smith 1986, Conyon and Gregg 1994, ...etc) and practice1 
reported the use of different reference groups e.g. industry index, market index, a 
selected group of competitors or the top 100 companies in the national economy. It is 
argued in this research that the performance of the various peer groups represent the 
target which the employees are expected to achieve. UK companies such as Cookson, 
Abby National, Berkeley Group and Chill adopt this understanding. Those companies - 
explicitly- state it in their disclosure about RPE plans in their annual reports, specific 
terms to award the incentives. These terms usually relate to a desired position the 
company seeks to achieve relative to the comparison group and calls it a "predetermined
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target" (e.g. the 1998 reports of Berkeley- page 28, Cookson- page 29, Abby National- 
page 47 and Chill- page 39).
Because RPE is a reward scheme, it is argued in this research that, the employees’ 
perception of these targets in terms of difficulty might affect their response to the reward 
package. Therefore, this is one of the key questions which this research aims to examine.
Merchant and Manzoni (1989) presented a survey of the impact of the target’s 
attainability on employees’ performance both in accounting and psychological 
perspectives. They state that most textbooks and articles suggest that for maximum 
motivation budget, targets should be “difficult” but “attainable”. Target’s difficulty was 
defined as the difference between the current performance and the performance level of 
the target.
(Tosi et.al., 1994), argued that very high levels of monitoring may constrain managerial 
decisions in ways that may counteract the potential benefits of additional monitoring and 
motivating. This pattern can be explained by the employees' desire to protect themselves 
from higher degrees of uncertainty. The same pattern can be expected with RPE. 
Employees might perceive rewarding on relative performance as if, it ties their 
performance to “unfair” standards which they can not meet. As this can have a negative 
influence on their income, such a situation may not only de-motivate employees but may 
lead to dysfunctional behaviour as well (Hirst 1983). They may be so cautious in their 
strategic decisions that attractive business opportunities are missed. They also may not 
be willing to engage in behaviour that risks substantial decline in performance because 
doing so might negatively affect their pay and increase their employment risk. However, 
Fredrickson (1992) argues that employees would respond to RPE to gain money and 
social esteem. It is argued in this study that Fredrickson’s point is feasible as long as 
employees perceive the peer group as an attainable target. "Achievablity" is the 
influential feature of targets on the employees' response to RPE.
No attempt has been made before in the literature to include the notion of target's 
difficulty when analysing the implications of RPE. One of the basic enquiries of this 
research is to test that argument.
1 as presented by some reports such as: After Greenbury and Company reporting.
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(5.1.2) Measuring performance:
According to Otley (1987) the question about how performance should be measured is a 
key one that should be examined in any control system. It is worth noting here that 
previous studies of RPE did not address any aspects regarding the performance measures 
in RPE schemes with the exception of Antle and Smith (1986). Although some studies 
(e.g. DeFond ad Park 1999, Conyon and Gregg 1994 and Antle and Smith 1986) have 
been built on more than one measure for performance, no assumptions have been made 
about why different measures were used. Neither was there investigation to what the 
features of different measures are and how that would/affect RPE.
In this research, two points about the performance measures are debated, first; what/is 
the impact of using non- financial measures in addition to the financial ones on the 
response to RPE package? Second, the impact of accounting vs. market measures on 
RPE. These points will be addressed respectively in the following section.
a: Financial only vs. financial and non-financial measures
Both theory and practice have addressed the system using various performance 
measures in RPE schemes. Ezzamel (1992) for example, states that performance index 
should engender corporate- optimal behaviour, promote divisional independence and 
maintain the controllability. A1 Bahimani (1993, 1994) found dissatisfaction among 
British manufacturers regarding the current financial measures of performance and 
willingness for more use of non-financial measures. Kaplan [1984 (a)] also argues that 
undue focus of management accounting on financial performance have contributed to the 
poor international competitiveness of US corporations (compared to their Japanese 
counterparts). However, McKenzie et.al. (1998) reported that accounting measures were 
used in incentives programmes in 100% of the companies which they investigated using 
Wall Street data bases. 72% included non-financial measures and 10% depended on 
economic value added (company’s performance relative to the cost of capital). 
Measurements such as net income, earnings per share, return on equity/capital employed 
and return on assets were still used in the majority of corporate incentive programmes. 
Ittner et. al., (1997) found that the use of non-financial measures was an increasing 
function of the noise in financial performance measures. This result was consistent with 
the theoretical work on performance evaluation using multiple signals (Feltham and Xie 
1994) where financial measures alone are expected not to provide the most efficient
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means to motivate managers to act in the manner desired by the firm’s owners. 
Therefore, bonus contracts should place non-zero weight on any performance measure 
that provides incremental information content about the dimensions of managerial action 
that the owner wishes to motivate.
With regard to behavioural implications, Ezzamel (1992) draws attention to Hopwood’s 
(1972, 1974) studies which offer some important insights relating to the non-accounting 
style of performance evaluation. For example, in contrast to the budget-constrained style, 
the use of non-accounting style was associated with lower job tension and lower 
manipulation of accounting reports. It was also associated with better relations with 
superiors, colleagues and peers. In the case of peers, this was manifest in better peer- 
supportiveness, achievement and affiliation; better peer agreement and helpfulness. 
Furthermore, the use of the non-accounting style which included non-financial data, for 
performance evaluation was also found linked to better job satisfaction and feelings of 
fairness of evaluation.
As argued earlier in this thesis (in chapter one, p: 34), RPE is a tool of strategic 
management accounting which involves benchmarking performance to competitors and 
states rewards accordingly, it would be particularly important that RPE avoids the 
defects mentioned by Kaplan. By including both financial and non-financial measures, 
RPE would be reflecting more aspects of performance and would avoid focusing on the 
short-term outcomes that link to using financial measures alone. This could be 
particularly important because RPE is a reward system. This debate suggests that 
"representativeness" is the influential feature in the performance measurements in RPE 
schemes. The representativess means that performance measures are able to indicate 
various aspects of employees' work and also associate them with corporate strategy. The 
intention in this research is to explore the features of the financial and non-financial 
measures. That is, how participants see each type of measures in terms of accuracy, 
comprehensiveness, time- relating, and controllability, will be examined.
b: Accounting vs. market measures
The second argument comes within the financial group of measures about the impact of 
market measures and accounting measures on the response to RPE. The UK practice of 
RPE reveals that, the most commonly used measure for performance of top management
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is earnings per share and return on shareholdings, both are financial and market-based. 
Share price was used just once in the sample of 20 companies [although it is criticised in 
the literature (Antle and Smith 1987) for non-controllability]. Kaplan and Atkinson 
(1998) argue that accounting- based performance measures may be preferable to stock 
incentives because they are related to activities that are more under the control of top 
executives. On the downside, they might be too controllable to the extent that they might 
be manipulated, accounting measures might hold imperfect association with the long 
term economic well-being of the firm. Executives can take many actions that increase the 
reported income and hence increase their compensation. Baber et.al., (1996, p: 299-301) 
agree on the latter point. They consider that agency theory supported by empirical 
evidence could infer management’s unobservable actions. This could occur by contracts 
based on observable performance indicators presumed to be correlated to management’s 
actions. These contracts can be build up on market-based measures or accounting-based 
measures. The argument for accounting-based plans is that, because market measures 
(e.g security prices) are affected by factors beyond management’s control, accounting 
information can be more informative with respect to management actions. On the other 
hand, management enjoys an element of discretion in choosing among financial reporting 
alternatives, and therefore, accounting numbers can be manipulated. Moreover, arbitrary 
accounting rules can distort accounting profits as meaningful indicators of economic 
returns and in extreme cases, discourage positive net present value investments (e.g . 
eliminate research and development spending). On the other hand, market measures 
because they anticipate future cash flows, reflect economic consequences of management 
actions. Hence, management actions -regardless of their short or long run consequences- 
are reflected in market measures. This discussion points at performance measurements’ 
"controllability" as an influential feature of measures. Hence, the question here is, what/is 
the impact of including financial and non-financial measures on the employees’ response 
to RPE?
(5.1.3) The influence o f reward form:
The third question that Otley (1987) asks regarding any control system is what rewards 
should associate to achieve the targets. Murlis (1988) reported an increasing trend in the 
UK during the late 1980’s to include a performance-related item into the remuneration 
package of middle managers. Other professional recommendations such as the Cadbury 
Committee Code of Best Practice (1992) and the Greenbury Report (1995) invited
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companies to adopt that attitude. Coopers - Lybrand consultancy firms surveyed 
practices after the issuance of the Greenbury report (After the Greenbury Report 1996) 
and they document an increasing trend among firms to respond to the professional 
recommendations and use incentive schemes which are built on comparative 
performance. Nevertheless, Emmanuel et.al., (1990) argue that the motivational impact 
of performance-related pay will depend upon the size of the controllable, at-risk 
(performance -dependent) rewards that managers are promised. Merchant and Manzoni 
(1989) found that shop floor workers prefer cash rewards whereas their managers 
preferred shares with future income. Furthermore, Ezzamel and Willmott (1998) found in 
case studies that non-financial incentives such as: empowerment, providing training, 
better health service, job enlargement and rotation were used to motivate shop floor 
workers.
The debate about the rewards above suggests "different rewards for different people 
and for different levels of performance". Chapter two and three show that the previous 
studies of RPE, used various compensation packages ranging from a basic salary to 
comprehensive packages (with shares, post retirement benefits, deferred pay ...etc). 
These studies did not question the relevance of these packages to the investigated 
managerial level. This is one of the core questions in this research: which rewards to 
whom? Why? The feature which is debated here is the "suitability" of rewards to 
different managerial levels.
The section above focused the research arguments about RPE as a control system. The 
research arguments, which will be examined in this investigation are:
• Whether RPE can motivate employees to work harder
• Whether/ How the difficulty of peer group would affect the response to RPE
• Whether/ How measuring performance by financial only or financial and non 
financial measures would affect the response to RPE
• Whether/ How measuring performance by accounting measures vs. market measures 
would affect the response to RPE
• Whether/ How varying the form of reward would affect the response to RPE
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After focusing the research questions, the following section examines the research 
epistemological stance, research methodology, methods and design within which the 
research arguments will be examined.
(5.2) Part Two: Epistemology, methodology and method
This part of the chapter describes the research epistemology. This includes a review of 
the different stances and a justification of the adopted stance. The choice will stem from 
the research objectives and nature of the investigation and will highlight the research 
methodology and method which will be followed in consistency with the research 
epistemology.
(5.2.1) Research epistemology
(a) Ontology
Burrell and Morgan (1979) argue that when studying a social phenomenon, assumptions 
should be made about social reality, social science (and researching tools) and 
individuals. First: Ontology is concerned with the nature of social reality, the essence of 
the phenomenon under investigation. This implies questions as such: Does reality exist 
externally to and independent of individuals? Can it be known, studied, changed? On the 
one hand, the social world can be regarded as having an empirical, external concrete 
existence, independent of and prior to the cognition of any individual; this is the realism 
view. At the other extreme, the nominalist view assumes that the social world is external 
to the individual’s cognition and is made up of nothing more than names, concepts and 
labels which are used to structure reality.
Exploring these issues in the phenomenon under investigation - which is performance and 
reward management and RPE - would reveal that the phenomenon had an empirical, 
external existence prior to and independent of individuals. Reviewing the Company 
reports’ publications has shown that 21 UK companies (e.g Reuters, Boots, Westminster 
Bank, Dixons,...etc) use RPE schemes. The performance and rewards phenomenon is 
knowable/ researchable and changeable.
Conclusion and Choice: This research’s ontology is: Realism
(b) Epistemology:
Epistemology is concerned with the nature of knowledge and there are two streams as 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) introduced: positivistic and anti- positivistic. The positivistic
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epistemology seeks to explain and predict what happens in the social world by searching 
for regularities and casual relationships between its elements. According to this 
epistemology, regularities can be verified or falsified by an adequate research 
programme. According to the anti- positivistic epistemology, social world is essentially 
relative and can only be understood from the point of view of individuals who are 
directly involved in the activities under study.
Otley and Berry (1994) argue that in the social sciences, the observations that are 
sought, the phenomena that are perceived and the interpretation that is put upon them 
are all influenced by the theoretical presuppositions of the observer. This argument is 
applicable to the current body of knowledge about RPE (e.g., Antle and Smith 1984, 
Dye 1992, Fredrickson 1992, Doupch and Guptal997, DeFond and Park 1999,...). It is 
affected by the assumptions, measures, samples and research methods about RPE which 
developed. Different streams of these studies produced “different knowledge” about the 
same phenomenon. Some of these studies (e.g. Fredrickson 1992, DeFond and Park 
1999) conclude that relative performance is taken into account when rewards are set, 
other studies (e.g. Antle and Smith 1986, Dye 1992, ...etc) could not find an evidence 
on that. Here, different research tools, lenses, produced different knowledge about the 
phenomenon that exists separately from the researcher. This shows that current literature 
did assume or approve that regularities in RPE debate can be falsified by a research 
programme nor did it trace casual relationship between RPE and performance which 
predicts that the prior studies in RPE were not positivistic in orientation.
In this research, one of the aims is to gain insights into RPE rationale, practice and 
experience by asking the individuals who design and implement these packages and those 
who are rewarded by these packages. Also in this research, RPE is analysed within a 
contingency framework unlike the previous studies which have been framed by agency 
theory. This will have implications on the analysis and the knowledge developed (details 
in chapter four, p: 64-67, e.g. no prior assumptions about the parties involved in the 
debate, no assumption about economic utility as a sole driver of behaviour, no 
assumption about maximisation behaviour).
Alternatively, contingency theory is adopted as a framework and this allows an 
exploration of the context within which RPE works and the features of the individuals 
and the environment which enhance the use of RPE. Under the contingency framework, 
no universal control system exists for all organisations in all situations, instead, control 
systems should be tailored in the light of the characteristics of the organisation and its 
environment (Otley 1995). This implies that the knowledge that will be gained about 
RPE in this research will depend on which organisations will be examined, with what 
technology, capital, markets, culture,...etc. Here RPE as a social phenomenon will be
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"relative" and understanding it will depend on the observations which the individuals 
(appraisees and appraisers) provide about it. Therefore, this research will be based on an 
anti-positivistic type of epistemology.
(c) Research paradigms:
Burrell and Morgan (1979) integrated the dimensions about the nature of reality, 
knowledge and human nature into two major dimensions: the subjectivity/ objectivity 
dimension and stability (regulation)/ change and developed their four research 
paradigms: functionalism, interpretative, radical humanist and radical structuralism. 
Hopper and Powell (1985) classified and analysed many research approaches in 
accounting under the previous paradigms. It is not the aim of this research to analyse or 
evaluate these paradigms, but to identify this research’s standpoint. The following 
section reviews briefly these paradigms.
1: Functionalist
The functionalist approach is based upon a real ontology where the social world has an 
external existence distant from the researcher. This paradigm is rooted in positivism and 
aims to address regularities through devices borrowed from natural science and oriented 
-pragmatically- to solve problems.
2: Interpretative
The interpretative approach assumes that social reality is a network of assumptions and 
intersubjectively shared meanings which has existence outside any individual’s 
consciousness. This paradigm aims to understand the basis and sources of social realities. 
However, this paradigm perceives the world as it is and explains it within the individual’s 
consciousness and attempts to understand the subjectively oriented worlds.
3: Radical humanist
The radical humanist shifts the concern from devices (in interpretative) to individuals. 
This paradigm is anti- functionalist, anti- organisation and concerned with the alienation 
problem. Developing the sociology of radical change from a subjectivist standpoint 
concerns the radical humanist paradigm. This paradigm overthrows limitations of existing 
social arrangement and argues that the consciousness of man is dominated by ideological 
superstructures with which man interacts.
4: Radical Structuralism
Radical structuralism focuses on radical change, emancipation and potentiality when 
analysing a social phenomenon and it addresses structural conflict, modes of 
domination, contradiction and deprivation in the phenomenon. This paradigm tends to 
be realist, positivist and determinist and assumes that contemporary society is
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characterised by conflicts, which generate radical change through political and economic 
crises.
This research shares the positivist functionalist orientation with the previous literature of 
RPE. In this research, this type of orientation appears to assume that RPE is a 
phenomenon which exists externally and independently of the research, it is not assumed 
that RPE can be objectively observed and studied, as is the case with the phenomenon in 
natural science. The earlier examples of the contradictory results in the RPE literature, 
provide evidence about this. Gill and Johnson (1991) and Blaikie (1995) considered this a 
"self- contradiction" in positivist because it excludes from what is taken to be knowledge, 
the metaphysical that is to say the intangible, and the subjective or abstract. But in 
rejecting the metaphysical, it rejects as meaningless the very knowledge of subject/object 
relationships on which any epistemology, including its own is ultimately grounded.
This debate is applicable to this research and more specifically to the research design. 
The research design was planned to cover a gap in the literature of RPE by exploring the 
individuals’perception (appraisers and appraises) of RPE. These data will be "interpreted" 
by the researcher which means that subjects will affect the produced knowledge which 
deviates from the functionalism and represents an interpretative element. Furthermore, in 
this research, contingency theory and case study (a move from agency and analysing 
published data as in the previous studies) are adopted and expected to affect the 
developed knowledge about RPE. This is another "interpretative" feature of this research.
This discussion leads to a conclusion that both functionalism and interpretivism should 
be used in this research. This also predicts that this research does not depend on a radical 
humanist approach since RPE is not analysed or studied as a matter of social change, nor 
does this research disregard the notion of social arrangement. Instead, issues like the 
impacts of "organisational" and the national culture which represent social arrangements, 
are targeted in this enquiry. Regarding the radical structure paradigm, although the 
research shares a positivist line with this paradigm, it is not intended to investigate RPE 
as a matter of "conflict" in the organisation. Furthermore, it would not be the perspective 
to recognise the different parties involved in this scheme (e.g. the company, the designers 
of this schemes or the employees who are evaluated and rewarded according to it) as 
"different social forces in a conflict” that might lead to radical change.
While the above discussion leads to a conclusion that both functionalism and 
interpretivism are used in this research, this opens a debate about the possibility that a 
piece of research can depend more than on one paradigm which is known as "Pluralism". 
Before discussing this point, it should be mentioned that in addition to the four 
paradigms described by Burrell and Morgan (1979), Laughlin (1995) introduced "The
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middle range thinking", where it is assumed that there is a fifth paradigm at the core of 
the four paradigms of Burrell and Morgan. However, Hopper and Powell (1985) 
concluded that when accounting research is grouped according to its social science 
assumptions, functionalist reigns virtually absolute.
Pluralism:
Gill and Johnson (1991, page 134) discuss the argument that the pluralism position 
suggests that not only are different methodologies suitable for different kind of problems 
but also complement one another in a variety of ways. They also conclude (page 156) 
that all research approaches may have something to offer and that there is no 
independent form of evaluating different research strategies in any absolute terms. Any 
evaluation will be done from the stance of one of the paradigms, to refute the others 
hence there is no independent stance for assessment. However, multi-method strategies 
require not only a convergence of findings derived from a diversity of methods, but also 
clarification of the contribution of each research approach used. The case study of 
control in the Financial Services Company by Berry, Loughton and Otley (1991) is an 
example of using plural paradigms where both functionalist and interpretative paradigms 
were adopted.
Where the pluralism came from: The Shift from Economic to Accounting
Holmstrom (1982) assumes that in RPE, peers’performance represents a signal from the 
market which holds that "additional informational value" that would help in detecting 
managerial effort. The whole RPE literature since Holmstrom has pursued the same line 
explicitly or implicitly. In this research, there is a shift in the domain of analysis from 
economic implications of "the market" to the "organisation" due to gaps recognised in 
the literature and issues raised from the UK practice of RPE (as detailed in chapter four 
in this thesis). Shifting the scope of enquiry to organisations implies a shift in the stress 
to be placed on the organisation, policies, strategies, the individuals and relationships. 
On the one hand, this would fulfil one of the basic objectives of this research which is to 
explore the views of both the designers of RPE and the individuals who are rewarded by 
these schemes, the rationales behind it, expectations and experience with it. It is 
anticipated that the interpretivism paradigm would help with this. On the other hand, 
accounting as the financial representation of performance in the organisations, has been 
involved in a huge and continuous literature for a variety of aspects of "the 
performance" phenomenon. Among these aspects are: setting targets, participation, 
motivation, type of measurements, impacts of strategy, technology, using various bases 
of evaluation ...etc (Kern and Liao 1988, Brownell 1982, Brownell et.al.,1986 (b), 
1990, Otley 1995, Ezzamel and Hart 1987). This move to the accounting domain
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allows studying these aspects and exploring the views of the individuals involved in RPE
(this is the interpretative element in this research).
(5.2.2) The research methodology; Agency vs. Contingency:
When exploring a framework for organisational control, Ezzamel and Hart (1987) state 
that any formal approach will inevitably be incomplete. The researcher would argue that 
it is not only for organisational control but probably for any topic in management 
accounting that statement is valid. From this stance, the researcher will examine -in this 
section- the relevance or irrelevance of agency theory (the dominating framework in the 
previous research about RPE) and of contingency theory (the proposed framework for 
this research) for addressing the research arguments.
Agency Theory as a framework for studying RPE
Nearly all the studies of the RPE were proposed within the agency theory. This theory 
has been subject to a long debate in the literature. Many advantages have been observed 
for agency theory, for example (Baiman 1982, Namazi 1985), it recognised the 
behavioural issues that influence the quantitative and economic based research. Also it 
emphasised the importance of sharing risk and information, in the design of accounting 
systems via motivating managers (Tiessen 1983, Kaplan 1984, Baiman 1982, Namazi 
1985). This section examines the suitability of agency theory or contingency theory as a 
framework for studying RPE.
Scapens (1984, p: 66- 67) discusses many limitations of agency theory. First, the model 
focuses on single- period behaviour while multi - period consequences are intended to be 
addressed in RPE schemes. In addition to this, Ashton (1991) pointed to the complexity 
and the difficulty in computing equilibrium solutions in more than one agent or more than 
one period settings and lack of clarity about how equilibrium emerged. Agency theory 
misses including non-financial measurements for performance [Kaplan 1984 (a) and (b)] 
and assumes a utility-maximising behaviour (Scapens 1984). The RPE assumes both the 
firm and the employee to have financial and non-financial objectives. The employee is 
interested in social esteem and economic utility as well, the firm has a variety of long and 
short-term goals, financial and non-financial, that should be included in the analysis when 
implementing the RPE. Third, (Merchant and Simon 1986) argued that agency theory 
has low specification of organisational variables, only a small set of conditions are 
considered for examples, attitudes toward risk, range of possible actions of the agent or
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the principal, and asymmetry of information. However, the theory neglects organisational 
strategy, structure, technology, culture and leadership style and Ogden (1993) adds it 
ignores power relations. Finally, Scapens (1984) regarded agency models to represent 
highly simplified organisational settings, so care should be exercised in generalising their 
results. With RPE, many environmental and organisational factors are involved.
Walker (1989) recognised that there is a difficulty in structuring the multi and 
complicated relationships in the real world, determining who is the agent, who is the 
principal, can be extremely difficult. Also agency theory as a normative model tends to 
show how managers "ought to " or "should" behave so economic reality or actual facts 
may be easily rejected and facts sustaining human behaviour are reduced to a priori and 
an abstract. It also has a narrow assumption of profit maximisation and ignores other 
norms or objectives that individuals might be committed to, such as loyalty.
Walker (1989) examined the empirical testability of agency theory with a particular 
concern to Holmstrom (1982) model of RPE. Some problems have been identified. One 
is the possibility that some other unobservable variables may be driving the results (in 
case of RPE, competition, managerial levels, type of industry, type of market, ownership, 
organisational culture etc). Also, there is a problem related to devising proxies for the 
real world counterparts of the variables represented by the model along with the 
difficulty in observing the features of that real world which are needed for testing the 
agency theory.
When examining the suitability of agency theory as a framework to RPE, major 
contradictions can be recognised. Firstly, one of the aims of this research is to explore 
the characteristics of the employee who is motivated by RPE and the company which 
uses RPE and agency theory pre-describes a non- differentiated set of characteristics for 
the agent and the principal. Hence, using agency theory as a framework will not serve the 
purpose of this research. Secondly, the assumptions of agency theory about the agent 
and principal do not match the assumptions of RPE about the employee and the 
employer (as explained in chapter three of thesis p. 59- 63). Thirdly, agency models 
ignore variables related to the organisation and variables related to the environment 
within which it operates (e.g. organisational and national culture). These factors could be 
influential on RPE (as Maher 1987 and Chow et. al. 1994), and sought to be investigated
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in this research. Fourthly, being a normative model, would not allow the exploration of 
the actual practice of RPE in reality, rationale behind it, how it was implemented and 
what experience resulted.
For these reasons, it is proposed that contingency theory to be used as a framework for 
studying RPE. Within contingency theory, (Otley 1984,1995) the factors of the 
environment shape the structure of the organisation and the control system. This sees the 
organisation as an organic entity in the environment, influenced by uncertainty, 
competition, and technology.
Contingency theory as a framework for studying RPE
As in the large and on-going stream in the accounting literature (e.g. Hopwood 1972, 
1974, Otley 1984, 1994, 1995, Brownell 1985, Brownell and Dunk 1991, ...etc), 
contingency theory is deemed a methodological framework for addressing RPE in this 
research. This section discusses the relevance of contingency for this study and the 
expected outcomes. Contingency theory could allow variables such as motivations, 
attitudes, incentive structure, performance measures, uncertainty, competition, peers’ 
performance, organisation goals, managerial levels, types of business activities to be 
addressed. The outcomes of RPE as a control system would be a reflection of the 
environment.
Otley (1984, p: 127) suggested that the structure of an organisation is importantly 
affected by the characteristics of its external environment and by features of its internal 
technology with some scope for the exercise of managerial choice. Hence, contingency 
theory is suggested as a framework of variables, which affect organisational structure, 
which in turn affect the type of accounting information system utilised.
Also Otley (1995) argued that the fundamental basis of contingency theory is that there 
is no universally best answer to the three questions which relate to a control system (i.e. 
what performance measures, standards and rewards should bet set and how). Rather, the 
management control systems needs to be tailored to the specific circumstances of the 
organisation for which it is intended.
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Otley (1995) also debates that "the design of any planning and control system is 
situationaUy specific. When designing a system, a distinction is made between 
controllable and non-controllable factors. The controllable factors in the organisation are 
not considered to be contingent variables, but rather part of the package of 
organisational controls selected for use. The organisation is expected to adapt to the 
contingency it faces by arranging the factors it can control into an appropriate 
configuration that it hopes will lead to effective performance. Interdependencies between 
accounting information systems and components of contingency elements are still 
possible".
Merchant et.,al., (1986, p: 191) considered that the contingency theory approach to 
organisational design found that the effectiveness of an organisation is positively related 
to the goodness-of-fit between structure (of which control systems are a key component) 
and contextual variables such as the work performed and the environment. An interaction 
is proposed such that the interactive effect of independent variables (e.g. technological 
uncertainty, control system structure) is functionally related to a dependent variable of 
firm effectiveness. Merchant et.,al., (1986) debated that, while contingency research 
incorporates in sophisticated measures of organisational context, it has been a possibility 
of the respondent’s bias since most of this research is conducted by analysing 
questionnaire data. It could be criticised that organisational context is often a construct 
of the researcher rather than a description of perceived reality in the terms used by the 
organisations under study. Thus, such defects could be overcome by the use of a case 
study research. In consistency with that Berry et.al.,(1995, p: 22) considered that 
"contingency theory provides a picture for the organisation through its environment. 
Environment is more active in shaping the organisation and the survival of the 
organisation depends on its fitness for the changing environment." The relevance and 
consistency of contingency theory for this research stems from the research questions 
and orientation. The main concern in this research is to examine the components of RPE 
(i.e. peer group, performance measures and rewards), its potential (i.e. motivational 
ability) and its context.
Limitations of Contingency Theory
While the previous discussion shows the strengths of contingency theory and its 
relevance for this research, some limitations and restrictions of contingency theory have
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been highlighted in the literature. Otley (1980) noticed firstly, the conceptualisation, 
definition and measurements of key variables require greater theoretical and empirical 
attention. Secondly, the prescriptions from contingency theory are based on weak 
grounds e.g. correlations are often small, inconsistent, and rarely related to any 
effectiveness criteria and thirdly, ignoring the context of controls.
Ezzamel and Hart (1987) identify some other reservations to contingency. (1) lack of 
precision in defining contingency factors (2) mis-specification of model parameters and 
using perceptual measures as proxies for organisational characteristics (3) lack of 
consideration to the multiple effect of the contingencies (4) frequent use of defective 
sampling techniques (5) use of cross- sectional approaches to measure dimensions that 
can only meaningfully measured by employing longitudinal approaches. (6) causality 
often assumed to be linear to avoid complexity of non- linearity assumption.
The reservations of Ezzamel and Hart (1987) could be defects in applying contingency 
theory rather than being genuine defects in contingency as a framework. Given that 
contingency analysis -technically- states any research problem as:
subject to: moderating variables
if  X _______________________ ^  then Y
and intervening variables
then, the problems with the model is more in the number of the moderating variable and 
the intervening variables, the difficulty to collect the amount of data required to measure 
these variables and also -as Ezzamel and Hart (1987) stated- the impact of the 
interaction between those variables on the model. These complications were thought to 
be remedied by simplifying the model and setting boundaries for any research. While 
simplification would help in keeping the model under control, too simplification might 
hold the risk of over abstraction. The last two points of using defective sampling and 
cross sectional rather than longitudinal approaches, sound to seek improvements in the 
instruments used within contingency framework and this seems consistent with this 
research’s orientation to apply case studies approach rather than a survey.
115
In this research, contingency was used as a bridge for the case studies rather than being 
used in the positivistic tone suggested in the literature. In that sense, contingency used 
perceptual measures for target difficulty and approval of performance measures but that 
was consistent with the research aims to explore the view of the appraisers and the 
appraisees. Causality depended not only on correlation, but also on the qualitative 
evidence which the interview data provided.
Hopper and Powell (1985) record that contingency theory is criticised for paying 
insufficient attention to the discretion possessed by the key decision- makers and how 
values, beliefs and ideologies may influence choices. Furthermore, contingency appears 
to describe and measure practices and then establish normative models. Thus it slips into 
"what should be" and "what might be" is not addressed. By emphasising technological 
determinism and neglecting how control systems may be a product of social cultures, 
ideologies and power struggles, attention is deflected from alternatives based on different 
values.
The researcher would argue that the first and the last critiques of Hopper and Powell 
(1985) might not be a feature fixed to contingency, rather, it could be deficiency of the 
pieces of work under contingency. That is, contingency theory as a framework does not 
preclude issues like values and beliefs or the social culture from being addressed and 
included in the analyses. The second point raised by Hopper and Powell (1985) that 
contingency studies practices and then draw normative models seems to contradict with 
the definitions and conceptualisation of contingency given by Merchant et. al., (1986), 
Otley (1984 and 1995) and Berry et. al., (1995). That is, those writers define 
contingency theory as a framework which looks for the best fit for the control system 
and its contextual variables (i.e., organisation’s circumstances, environment and 
technology,...etc). Using this framework leads to a suggestion of the control system 
which suites an organisation with specific features in specific environment and context. 
This does not necessarily imply normative models built on practice, but recommend 
practical models to suite specific organisations in specific context. Placing such 
importance on environment, context and the organisation’s circumstances would make 
the resulted models and their outcome in each context "relative" rather than "normative".
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(5.2.3) Research Method: Case study approach
This section discusses the case study as the suggested research method, what it is, what 
it can offer, what types are available and how to choose between them, how it can be 
implemented, its relationship to research methodologies and finally difficulties with case 
studies.
Alternative research designs
Brown (1995) argues that while the survey and historical analysis answer "who" "what" 
or "where" questions, the experiment and the case study will answer "how" and "why" 
questions. Because the questions in this research are centred around how employees 
perceive and react to RPE and which circumstances would enhance the use of RPE, it is 
thought that there might be two alternative research strategies to choose from; a survey 
on published data or a case study. Each approach is expected to have its own potentials, 
requirements and limitations. The following is an assessment of the prospects of each 
strategy.
I: Using case studies
A case study would have many advantages. It can sustain the potential contribution of 
the research, fit in with the research objectives and framework where points of view of 
both appraisees and appraisers can be explored. It can also provide an opportunity for 
identifying other variables which might be influential on the phenomenon but not 
considered by the researcher. Nevertheless, a case study might have some 
disadvantages, such as the difficulty in collecting the amount of data required to provide 
convincing evidence for such studies. If a case study is decided, it would require more 
than one company which practises RPE on a scale of targets (e.g. Nat West, Reuters, 
United Utilities) and use financial and non-financial measures (e.g. United Utilities) and 
pays reward in different forms. Access could be the main determinant on the size of the 
sample to be used.
II. Testing the arguments on published data:
If a survey is considered for use in examining the research arguments about RPE, it 
would provide many advantages. First, data could be easily accessed in data bases (such 
as Data Stream International). Second, any type of choices can be made with regard to 
the type of industry, size, number of employees, time-span of data, range of experience 
with RPE. However, this technique might imply many disadvantages as well, for 
example, some data are unlikely to be available such as the non-financial measures of 
performance which are needed to test one of the research arguments. This method has 
been used in almost all the previous studies in RPE and using it in this research will
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reduce any claim to innovation in the research method although the research arguments 
are still genuine. It does not help in investigating many arguments of concern, for 
example it does not provide the points of view of the appraisees and the appraisers, nor 
the different appeal of RPE to different managerial levels, employees’ attitudes and 
preferences....etc. The available data on databases are prepared at corporate level not at 
divisional levels whereas most of the research arguments are run at an individual level. 
Not much data about the reasons behind the practice is expected from this method. On 
the other hand, in the case study and the questionnaire, the practitioners are expected to 
enrich our understanding about RPE and its surroundings, implications ...etc.
However, if published data are considered, the first argument in this research which is 
the impact of target difficulty could be traced by using a set of peer group including: the 
top 100 companies, top 250 companies, a group of regional peers and similar peers in 
the same industry. As for the argument about market measures vs. accounting measures, 
representative of these types of measures could be selected from what is available in the 
data bases, for the argument about varying rewards, different components of pay 
packages could be used. The only problem might be in finding the non-financial 
measures in the database, as databases (such as Data Stream International) contain only 
financial data.
Because of these limitations of the survey, and because it is expected that some research 
environments can not provide these data on a data-base, it was decided to adopt a case 
study method where data will be collected by interviews and questionnaire from 
companies in Egypt and England.
(5.3) Part Three: The research Design 
Case Study as a proposed method for this research
Therefore, the following section will provide a discussion about case study research, 
types, potentials, relevance and outline.
(5.3.1) What is a case study
Yin (198l,p: 59) identifies a case study as a research strategy that attempts to examine a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident and multiple sources of 
evidence can be used. Brown (1995) states that Yin's definition allows for the 
distinguishing of the case strategy from other research strategies. For instance, an 
experiment deliberately divorces the phenomenon from its context, so that attention can
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be focused on a few variables, controlled by the laboratory environment. While surveys 
attempt to deal with both phenomenon and context, because of their particular method, 
they have limited ability to investigate the context.
Eisenhardt (1989, p: 534) considers the case study a research strategy which focuses on 
understanding the dynamics present within single settings. Eisenhardt (1991) stresses that 
the difference between case study research and "storytelling", lays in the methodological 
rigor and multiple-case comparative logic. Therefore, within case study research, there is 
a need to identify research questions, develop well-designed instruments such as 
interview schedules and questionnaires and to consider theoretical sampling and controls 
and so forth. Some writers consider case study as a method rather than a methodology 
(Scapens, 1990 P: 47). It is one of the possible means of gathering data that has its own 
strengths and weaknesses. Whether it is appropriate in a given situation or whether it is 
to be preferred to alternative methods, will depend on the methodological position of the 
researcher.
In this research, the enquiry started from a specific theoretical stance with a specific set 
of questions which are centred around: How RPE is used in practice, why, by which 
design and where. According to Yin (1994) and Brown (1995) these types of questions 
are better answered by case studies. The other observation is that, among the objectives 
of this research is to investigate the context of RPE. That is, in which environment this 
technique operates, at what managerial level, which organisational climate, culture and 
under which circumstances. As explained earlier in this chapter, that is one of the motives 
behind adopting the contingency theory as a framework for the study. This goal has been 
set for this study to cover a gap in the literature where the context of RPE has not been 
examined before.
Eisenhardt (1989) indicates that case studies can be used to achieve various aims; to 
provide description, test theory or generate theory. Also Otley and Berry (1994) stress 
case studies are likely to be particularly valuable where existing theories are inadequate, 
incomplete or explain only a sub-set of the phenomenon of interest. However, Yin
(1994) proposes that it is the theory-building that the case study is "for" and the case 
study can be based on any mix of quantitative and qualitative evidence. Scapens (1990) 
argues that case studies offer us the possibility of understanding the nature of
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management accounting in practice both in terms of the techniques, procedures, systems 
etc. which are used and the way in which they are used. However, Yin (1994) and Otley 
and Berry (1994) discussed various roles for the various types of case studies. These 
types will be discussed in the following section in order to decide which type will be 
adopted in this research.
(5.3.2) Types of Case Studies
Yin (1994) classifies case studies into explanatory, descriptive and exploratory, Otley 
and Berry (1994) add the illustrative and critical case studies Scapens (1990, p: 265) 
considers that the distinction between these different types of case studies are not 
necessarily clear-cut. Following is a discussion of these types.
Descriptive case studies
Scapens (1990) identifies the descriptive case studies which describe accounting systems, 
techniques and procedures currently used in practice. A number of companies may be 
selected as cases to illustrate different accounting practices or the similarities in the 
practices of different companies. The research objective of these studies is to provide a 
description of accounting practice.
Illustrative case studies
According to Scapens (1990), these are case studies which attempt to illustrate new and 
possibly innovative practices developed by particular companies. Such case studies 
provide an illustration of what has been achieved in practice. However, there is an 
implied assumption that the practices of "innovative" companies are superior to the 
practices of other companies. The case study itself can not provide a justification for 
such as assumption. Otley and Berry (1994) suggest that an illustrative case study begins 
from a clearly expounded theoretical standpoint and provides a description of a real- 
world situation which is interpreted in the light of the theoretical standpoint adopted 
where existing theories are used as means of explaining observations. Otley and Berry 
(1994, p: 47) debate that the purpose which such case serves not always clear. It might 
provide an increased belief in the adequacy of the theory or might become exploratory or 
critical and cause a theory to be modified.
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Experimental case studie
The experimental case as recognised by Scapens (1990), can be used to examine the 
difficulties of implementing the new proposals made by accounting researchers to help 
practitioners and to evaluate the benefits to be derived.
Exploratory case studies
Scapens (1990) defines the exploratory case study as that case which is used to explore 
reasons for particular accounting practices. As such, this case represents a preliminary 
investigation which is intended to generate ideas and hypotheses for rigorous empirical 
testing at a later stage. The objective is to produce generalisations about the reasons for 
accounting practices. The exploratory case study is a first step in such a project. Otley 
and Berry (1994, p: 46) consider that the central role of case studies appears to be that 
of exploration where an exploratory case goes beyond that of mere description towards 
explanation. Brown (1995) argues that for an exploration research, case study is the 
most appropriate research strategy to investigate the phenomenon and its context.
Explanatory case studies
Scapens (1990, p: 265) discusses this type of cases as they attempt to explain reasons for 
accounting practices when the focus of the research is on the specific case. In such cases, 
theory is used to understand and explain the specific, rather than to produce 
generalisations. If available theories do not provide convincing explanations, it may be 
necessary to modify them.
Critical case studies
Otley and Berry (1994, p: 46) suggest the critical case to be used to falsify theory by 
providing an example of a set of phenomena which are inconsistent with a set of 
theoretical statements. Here the observed data may indicate that a theory is incorrect or 
inadequate in a specific set of circumstances and thus requires modification. This case 
may be able to suggest how the theoretical statements might be changed.
In order to select the type of case study that would be used in this research, Brown
(1995) provides some guidance that considers defining the research question as the most 
important step to be undertaken because it provides the necessary information regarding 
the appropriate research vehicle to use. Scapens (1990, p: 272) approves this line of
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reasoning and states that where there is a well-formulated theory and the major research 
issues are clearly defined, it may be possible to select a "critical case" which directly 
addresses those issues. The objective of such a case would be to determine whether the 
theory provides good explanations or whether alternative explanations need to be 
developed.
In situations where the researcher wants to extend a theory to cover a wider range of 
circumstances, an extreme case would be appropriate. Such a case would indicate the 
extent to which existing theory can be extended to provide explanations for widely 
differing circumstance and to identify areas where the theory needs to be modified. This 
can extend to situations where there is little available theory.
(5.3.3) What type of case study will be adopted in this research
In this research, it is intended to investigate why/why not firms apply RPE, what design 
is used, what outcomes result and what environment will encourage and enhance the use 
of RPE. These aims are consistent with the orientation of exploratory case studies. The 
intention is to explore both the phenomenon and its context. From the outcome of this 
exploration, generalisations could be drawn about the circumstances in which RPE 
works effectively (i.e. what design, for which managerial level, in which organisational 
culture and environment). Thus the research focus is outside the scope of the explanatory 
case study which limits the objective of the investigation to explaining the specific case 
only. As indicated in chapter three and four of this thesis, the research arguments are set 
in the form of questions. This means that the research intention does not imply testing 
hypotheses, or falsifying theories about RPE, nor does it include experiments about new 
techniques. The research aims are not confined to describing the actual practice of RPE 
in different environments as a descriptive case study would provide, but broadens to seek 
explanations for those practices as well. However, this study might contain an element of 
the critical case study. In chapter four, some gaps between the literature and the practice 
of RPE have been recognised. Although these issues represent problems not addressed in 
the literature, they do not contradict RPE. Nevertheless, the contingency framework 
adopted in this study might result in suggesting changes in RPE to suite different 
managerial levels and different contexts. Scapens (1990, p: 267) discusses the case 
studies within neo-classical economics and social theories. In the former, case studies are 
concerned with exploring the use of accounting information by managers taking planning
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and control decisions and used by researchers to generate hypotheses which will be 
tested by other empirical research methods. However, accounting practices are not 
natural phenomena but socially- constructed phenomena which can be changed by the 
social actors themselves. To understand accounting from this perspective requires 
detailed studies of accounting in practice. It also requires locating the phenomenon in its 
historical, economic, social and organisational context. Case studies are particularly 
suitable for this type of research. It is not within the orientation of this research to 
generate hypotheses that would be tested by other tools and also as indicated in chapter 
four, this research moves from neo-classical economic perspective to contingency theory 
(which was classified by Hopper and Powell (1985) among the social theories). 
Therefore, the case study is used in this research within contingency theory to explore 
the practice and context of PRE.
Scapens (1990, p: 273) argues that in a programme of case study research, multi-case 
studies can be used for two purposes; replication and theory development. A number of 
similar cases might be selected to replicate the theoretical explanations. Alternatively, 
dissimilar cases may be selected to extend the theory to a wider set of circumstances. 
The difference between the individual cases will be determined by the direction in which 
the theoretical extension is desired. The objective of such multiple cases is to develop a 
rich theoretical framework, capable of explaining a wide range of circumstances. 
Eisenhardt (1991) supports Scapens’ (1990) debate and states that one of the central 
arguments of building theories from case study research was that multiple cases are a 
powerful means to create theory because they permit replication and extension among 
individual cases.
In this research, multiple cases will be used for replication rather than for theory 
development. It is intended to identify different patterns of RPE in different 
environments, different companies, industries and different managerial levels. As Scapens 
predicts, similar cases would provide more evidence/acceptance for the argument under 
investigation and dissimilar cases might extend the arguments in new directions. The 
following section explains how a case study may be implemented.
Problems with Case study "Generalisability"
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Concerning generalising from case studies, Hartely (1994) argues that if cases are 
correctly sampled to be typical in specified ways of the population, then the results can 
be deemed to be applicable (generalisable) to the specified population. Generalising can 
be difficult for quantitative studies as well when there is heterogeneity and where the 
processes have not been elucidated. This is where case studies can be useful. The 
detailed knowledge of the organisation and especially knowledge about the processes 
underlying the behaviour and its context can help to specify the conditions under which 
a particular behaviour can be expected to occur, so generalisation is about theoretical 
propositions not about population. Thus, the basis of the generalisation is not primarily 
about the typicality of the organisation; it is about the existence of particular processes, 
which may influence behaviour and actions in the organisation. Hartely (1994) debates 
that understanding the contingencies (context) in which those processes occur is 
important. Also collecting evidence from various sources to test constructs and theories 
as long as using existing literature to assess the extent of generalisable finding is 
important. Writing with a clear conceptual framework rather than a narrative one will 
also help to relate theory to the literature and aid generalisation. Undertaking more than 
one case study may increase confidence in findings as well.
(5.3.4) How to implement a case study
Yin (1994, p:14) describes four activities to implement a case study:
1. Consider the theory
2. Define and design
3. Collect and analyse
4. Conclude, modify and develop
5. Reporting the case study
Eisenhardt (1991) considers the analysis process is the most important in developing case 
studies where within-case analysis should be coupled with a cross case analysis to search 
for patterns. The key to good cross-case comparison is counteracting these tendencies by 
looking at the data in many divergent ways. One tactic is to select categories or 
dimensions and then to look for within-group similarities coupled with intergroup 
differences. Dimensions can be suggested by the research problem or by existing 
literature or the researcher can simply choose some dimensions. A second strategy is to 
select pairs of cases and then to list similarities and differences between each pair. A third
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one is to divide the data by data source (e.g. questionnaire data and interviews data) and 
analyse them. Brown (1995) argues that the comparative structure is applicable to 
explanatory, descriptive and exploratory studies. The following section provides details 
of the research design for the case studies which will be undertaken in Egypt and 
England. The outline of the interviews and the questionnaire along with the reasons 
behind choosing the two research environment, are explained below.
(5.4) Part Four: Designing and implementing the case studies
The research design included a plan for the companies which can be approached for 
collecting data, the tools for capturing data and the measurements of the key variables. 
These elements in the research plan are detailed below.
(5.4.1) Selecting the cases
In this research, it was decided to develop case studies from Egyptian and UK 
companies. Egyptian companies have been chosen, because it is the environment to 
which the researcher belongs and this will provide familiarity with accounting practices, 
culture and understanding of the political and economic background of the companies. 
This is also an opportunity to investigate the western established technique “RPE” in a 
non-Anglo Saxon culture. Moreover, the Egyptian economy has been shifting -since the 
mid 1970’s- from a centrally planned economy to free market economy with an on-going 
privatisation policy and an increasing role for the private sector in the national economy. 
It is expected that the state- owned companies and privately- owned companies would 
have different systems, business environments, strategies, controls and cultures and it is 
hoped to explore these differences.
Eisenhardt (1989) argues that as in theory- testing research, the concept of population is 
crucial because it defines the set of entities from which the research sample is to be 
drawn. From this population, cases are chosen for theoretical -not statistical- reasons. 
For example, cases may be chosen to replicate previous cases, extend emergent theory or 
fill theoretical categories and provide examples of polar types. Eisenhardt (1989) 
concludes that while there is no ideal number of cases, a number between 4 and 10 cases 
usually works well. With fewer than 4 cases, it is often difficult to capture complexity 
and it is likely to be unconvincing, unless the case has several mini-cases within it. With 
more than 10 cases, it quickly becomes difficult to cope with the volume of data. 
Ezzamel and Willmott (1998) developed 6 intensive case studies and reported 2 of them
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in their paper about accounting, remuneration and employee motivation in the new 
organisation. They focused on 2 cases because they obtained intensive data from these 
organisations which were also fairly large with enough sub-units to exhibit variation. 
They argue that by this choice, they sought to explore fully the details and dynamics of 
remuneration schemes or relate them to specific contexts.
Therefore, in order to cover the two environments which were planned to investigate 
(Egypt and England) and in order to gain a varied and diverse picture and to allow 
comparisons, a plan was designed to develop 6 cases, 4 from Egypt and 2 from England 
for the following reasons. Firstly, for Egyptian companies, because of a lack of 
information about companies practices in remunerating management, it was not possible 
to identify a population or to decide which companies to examine. Nevertheless, the 
objective was to allow chance to "catch" at least one company which might be using 
RPE. To help with this plan, the researcher thought to target those companies which are 
known to be involved in local and/or international competition with big enough size and 
rich practice to evolve a variety of units, activities, ...etc. There were three companies 
with these features: Ceramic, Dairy and Steel companies. This proposed selection was 
complemented by targeting Trade company which was well known as an old public 
company selling heavy machines (e.g. farming and construction machines). The choice of 
Trade was built on two bases: access and being a public company which was expected to 
enhance the variety of patterns of practice explored in the case studies (because the 
ceramic and dairy companies were private and the steel one was a joint venture with 
Japanese institutions).
Secondly, for the UK part of the field work, it was initially planned to investigate the 
practices of RPE in a sample of 2 UK companies (out of the 20). One of the companies - 
at least- should:
1) Practise RPE
2) Use various measures of performance (financial and non-financial) if possible
3) Use stock market measures for performance
4) Use various forms of paying rewards
The notion behind stating the first four criteria was to allow a study of the research 
arguments (such as using RPE and what measures, rewards and variables affect it) that 
constitute the core of this research. Late in this chapter, the research activities in each 
environment will be presented.
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(5.4.2) Tools for collecting the data
(5.4.2.1) The outline of the questionnaire
The questionnaire was designed to explore and explain both the facts and attitudes of 
employees at various levels, about the performance management in general and RPE and 
its contingents in particular. It should be mentioned here that both actual and 
hypothetical experiences were targeted in this survey (i.e. if they have an RPE system, if 
they do not, and why). I also planned to obtain feedback from various parties; those who 
design the control systems and those who are “controlled” by these system, at various 
managerial levels. It was of particular interest in this investigation to recognise the 
factors which would/ affect the design and implementation of RPE and the performance 
management systems in general.
More specifically, the main objectives of the questionnaire were:
(1) to gain a wider understanding of the practice and the rationale of measuring, 
evaluating and rewarding performance in each company.
(2) to explore the specific factors (either organisational, environmental or personal) 
which affect these practices.
(3) to highlight employees’ perception of RPE, whether it is used in their company or 
not, why and how they implement it.
(4) to examine the research arguments about the contingents of RPE (i.e. the influence of 
targets’ difficulty, performance measures and reward form on responding to RPE).
(5) to frame further issues which might affect RPE (other than those mentioned above).
(6) to obtain feedback from various managerial levels.
The final version of the questionnaire which was used in Egypt consisted of 26 question 
in 5 A4 pages. It was divided into three parts: general information about the respondent, 
RPE perspectives and contingents. Each part concerned specific issues starting from the 
more general to the more specific (Appendix B-2). The questionnaire was developed and 
tested in a pilot study among Business and Law colleague researchers, some banking 
practitioners and steel industry engineers (where I conducted one of the case studies 
later). Over a period of nearly 7 months, both the content and wording of the 
questionnaire was assessed in the light of the pilot’s feedback and intellectual 
development. Each question was modelled so that it was as short, precise and 
understandable as possible. The questionnaire carried the instructions and a space for the
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respondent to write any comments. The questionnaire was described by one of the pilot 
respondents as being “straightforward” and I have not been informed of any difficulties 
regarding the time taken in answering it. This suggests that its size was quite reasonable 
but some engineers reported that they did not understand some technical terms expressed 
in accounting language (copy of this piloted questionnaire is provided in Appendix B-l) 
that was attended to later.
(5.4.2.2) Variables and Measurements
This study explores the managerial perception of RPE, its rationale, design and 
outcomes. Therefore, PRE -the key variable- was measured according to the total of the 
respondents answers about the extent to which they think RPE can motivate them to 
work harder and can monitor/ reveal the effort which they spend in the job. Both roles 
were suggested in the literature and the data showed a significant correlation between 
them, which suggested that when motivation increases through RPE, its ability to 
monitor employees’ effort increases. The following table shows how each variable was 
measured in the questionnaire:
Table (5-1) Variables and Measures
Variable How measured
Potential of RPE Do you think rewarding upon the relative performance can help in: 
-motivating the employees to work hard.
-indicate the real effort of the employees.
- others, please specify
Objectives sought 
from work
What are the objectives which you seek from work : (please tick as appropriate) 
-money
-gaining esteem
-creativity and innovation in performance 
- Others, please specify
Preferred Performance 
measures
Do you think your work is well expressed in: 
-financial terms [ such as: cost, profit...]
-non financial terms [time, quality, accuracy ...1
Preferred Reference 
group
Do you think that your peers should belong to: 
-the same company 
-companies in the same region 
-the same industry 
-the best 100 company nation-wide 
-others, please specify
Preferred Reward form - How would you prefer to collect your rewards on RPE 
-cash 
-shares
-deferred pay (e.g. post retirement benefits) 
-holiday and welfare 
-others, please specify...
* Questions to be answered on a 5 point scale ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree.
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The investigation described different practices among the three companies in terms of the 
control systems generally and the RPE specifically. The following table presents briefly 
the control practices in the three companies followed by a detailed account of the 
individual companies including the company’s background and a summary of the control 
system in use.
(5.4.2.3) The interviews
The purpose of the interviews was to “explore” the rationales and the context in which 
RPE was applied. Many researchers in the domain of management accounting discussed 
this role for the case study (Otley &Berry 1994, Scapens 1990). The interviews were 
semi-structured, guided by the research questions. However, the interviews also aimed to 
detect the interviewee’s experience, point of view about the control practices generally, 
RPE - if  used- why used, what factors affected that use, how did the interviewee and his 
colleagues/ managers see targets, performance measures, rewards and the rationale 
behind these practices. A copy of the interview guide is provided in Appendix (B-4). A 
special point of concern here was to collect examples, explanations or experience from 
the company’s history or from the participant’s own experience in other companies with 
the control system and performance systems. This issue was particularly important to 
investigate the context of the company’s practice and to draw any comparisons between 
different companies. The following part reports on the actual access and research 
activities undertaken in this study.
(5.4.3) Access and research activities
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This section reports -individually- on the participating companies in Egypt and England, 
sources of data that were made available to the researcher, the research activities that 
were undertaken, key facts about the companies and a summary of their control 
practices.
(5.4.3.1) Section One: Egypt Field Work 
The Participating Companies in Egypt
Efforts were made from the researcher to access the 4 companies as planned; "Ceramic, 
Dairy, Steel and Trade", supported by an introductory letter from Cairo university which 
explained the researcher's post there, mission and seeking participants' co-operation.
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Access was granted from the Trade, Dairy and Steel but denied from the Ceramic 
company for lack of time. However, three companies co-operated in providing data, as 
detailed in chapter six.
The contingency theory framed the case study approach in collecting the data from 3 
Egyptian companies. In order to maintain confidentiality and anonymity -as promised to 
the participants - and in order to avoid ambiguity or confusion in this thesis, the 
investigated companies will be given the following dummy names: "Trade", "Dairy" and 
"Steel".
The research design included a questionnaire, semi-structured interviews and 
documentary material as sources for collecting the data. The companies provided the 
researcher with financial reports and reports about activities, which had been prepared 
for internal and external uses. These documents reported not only the financial results 
but also the reasons behind them, any problems the company encounter/ed, current 
position and future outlook. For Steel company, the researcher also depended on the 
data available on the internet about the company, its background, its linkages with 
international Steel organisations and its undergoing projects which the company 
implements within the expansion strategy (Appendix C-l).
The questionnaire consists of variety of forms (for example, factual questions, attitudes 
questions and " other factors" that might be related to the point but not considered by the 
researcher. The questionnaire consisted of two main parts: first: questions about 
objectives from work and the potential of PRE, second: questions about the preferred 
target/ peer group, measures and rewards. Table (5-2) summarises the key facts about 
the three Egyptian companies which agreed to participate in the study.
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Table (5-2): Key Facts about the three companies
Variable company (1) 
Trade
company (2) 
Dairy
company (3) 
Steel
- Ownership -public -private (Egyptian) -joint venture 
(Egyptian and 
Japanese investors)
-Activity -import and export, 
heavy equipment
-dairy products -steel
-Foundation date -1927 -1989 -1985
-Financial position -financial losses and 
overdrawn recently
-strong, growing -strong, expanding
-Market they work in -national + few 
transactions with Arab 
countries
-national only -national and 
international
-Competition -strong, national -strong, national -strong,
international
-Benchmarking -not used -used to evaluate 
top management 
only
-used to monitor the 
firm against 
international steel 
producers
-Rewarding upon 
comparisons ‘RPE’
-not used -used for top 
management only, 
irregular
-not used
The first Company is Trade” company works in importing and exporting mechanical and 
electric equipment, 2500 employees and £ 840 million turnover and 70 years experience 
but achieved losses in the last three years (95-98). The second company is “Dairy”, one 
of three companies that dominate the local dairy market, privately founded in 1989 with 
a capital of £60 m and 850 workers, 7 factories, a complicated marketing and 
distributing network and with exports to Arab countries. The third company is a Steel 
company founded in 1985 as a joint venture company between Egyptian public sector 
industrial and financial companies, Japanese investors and shareholders. It has and 
continues to benefit from the strong technical support of its Japanese partners, and the 
consultancy arrangement it has with the British Steel Corporation. The company has 
over 3,500 employees and its production covers nearly 50% of the national demand 
(80% of their production) the rest is exported to the USA, Germany Italy,...etc. The 
head office, departments and the five factories located in Alexandria. One of the unique 
features of this company is that it does not have any female staff! The following table 
provides a summary of the control system in the three companies before presenting the 
questionnaire's outline of this research.
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Table (5-3) the control system in the three companies
Item tO compare company (1) Trade company (2) Dairy company (3) Steel
1. Setting 
targets:
-financial only,
departments
participate.
-a higher set of targets 
used for motivation
-sales department starts 
estimations in financial and 
non financial terms then other 
follow
-competition is carefully 
considered
-higher levels used for 
motivation
-each department gives 
estimations in financial 
and non financial terms
-higher levels used for 
motivation. Previous 
achievements are the 
minimum level for new 
targets
3.Evaluation 
svstem:
-span of time 
of reviews
-comparing actual 
performance with: 
-targets
-previous performance 
respectively.
-monthly and annual 
review
-comparing performance 
with:
-targets
-national competitors
-best performer in the
decision
-monthly, weekly review (and 
daily for sales staff)
-comparing 
performance with: 
-targets
-previous performance 
-other departments 
-international steel 
producers
-monthly, quarterly and 
annually review
4. Re wards* -upon meeting targets, 
if  targets are missed, 
rewards missed as well
-paid monthly in cash, 
some non financial 
rewards awarded for 
top management only.
-no fines
-no internal comparison
-no external 
comparison
-different rewards designed 
for different levels of meeting 
targets
-mainly in cash + some in non 
cash paid monthly
-fines imposed for negligence 
or losing customers
-some rewards upon internal 
comparisons with the best 
performers
-some rewards for top 
management upon 
comparison with competitors.
-rewards upon meeting 
targets, if  targets 
missed, rewards 
missed.
-mainly in cash, some 
non cash (travel, 
learning opportunity 
...etc.
- no fines
no rewards on 
internal comparisons
no rewards on 
internationals 
comparisons
Use of RPE:
5.Factors 
affect RPE:
- RPE is not used
-governmental 
interference and 
controllability problems
-RPE is used
-growing and competition in 
the food industry
- RPE is not used
-expansion, exporting 
and the international 
competition in the steel 
industry
The sample; response and interviews
The study was conducted during the summer of 1997. Access was successfully 
negotiated with three companies. Two research tools were used, interviews and a 
questionnaire. The interviews were used accompanied by an examination by
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questionnaire and internal documents. A Demonstration of the structure, implementation 
and output of the interviews is given separately in this report.
All questionnaires in the three companies were handed2 to the participants in each 
company upon suggestions from the department which negotiated access. Also 
questionnaires were collected by hand from the research sites. The reason for this 
delivery by hand rather than posting questionnaire was that the latter route was not 
usable in this environment nor was it reliable. The researcher’s presence there probably 
be a matter of practising a type of “social pressure” on the participants. That might 
create interest and a feeling of self- esteem because others’ seeking his/ her experience. 
The following table summarises the research endeavour on the research sites:
Table (5-4): summary of the research activities in the four companies
Company
name
Number of Questionnaire: 
Distributed collected % response
Interviewee’s post number of 
Interviewee's
Meetings’
number
Meetings
duration
Trade 85 36 42 Planning & follow up manager 
Planning & follow up manager 
assistant
Importing officer 
Maintenance engineer
4 5 7 (hours)
Dairy 65 21 32 Managing director 
Marketing director 
Delivery chief- Northern Area
3 4 4
Steel 90 14 15 Operations manager 
Production control officer 
Galvanisation division manager
3 3 5
Total 240 71 29.5 10 12 16
(5.4.3.2) Section Two: England Field Work
Choosing the company, access and research activities
2 The questionnaire package which was submitted to the “gatekeeper” in each company included:
*An introductory letter from Cairo university describes the researcher’s post there, her mission in 
the company and seeks participants’ assistance (copy in Appendix B-5).
* A cover letter from the researcher explaining briefly the research topic and the issues she was
investigating (copy in Appendix B-6).
* A copy of the questionnaire (Appendix B-2)
The questionnaire package which was sent to the ordinary participant did not include the introductory letter. 
However, the cover letter which was used with all questionnaires included information about the researcher’s 
post in Cairo university.
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All the 20 companies were contacted by the researcher to determine the best person to 
start the investigation with. Ideally, this should be the member of staff who was directly 
responsible for the remuneration systems. Access was negotiated with the potential 
companies but no progress was made except with Yorkshire Electricity and United 
Utilities. Lack of time and lack of willingness to participate in the research were behind 
denying access.
Both Yorkshire Electricity and United Utilities worked in multi utilities (gas, 
electricity,...), in the same geographical area "The North of England" and both were big 
companies. United Utilities satisfied the 4 criteria for a company to participate in this 
research; it used RPE, with financial and non-financial measures and rewards. Yorkshire 
Electricity was known to the researcher as one of the 20 companies which used RPE 
before actual visits to it took place.
In Yorkshire Electricity, the identified head of remuneration division asked for 
confirmation that the researcher belonged to Sheffield Hallam University. After given it, 
an interview was arranged with the researcher in the company’s corporate centre in 
Leeds. The interview was tape- recorded with the approval of the interviewee. That 
interview exposed the researcher to some aspects in the process of evaluating the 
directors specifically. Nevertheless, at that time, Yorkshire Electricity had just been taken 
over by an American company which had dramatically changed the control system and 
Yorkshire Electricity was not using RPE any more. However, many reasons led to a 
decision not to draw a case from the company because:
1) Limited data were gained because the interviewee had limited knowledge about the 
remuneration practices apart from those at the directors’ level and the wider practice of 
performance management.
2) Any attempt to identify and arrange interviews with other relevant individuals failed.
3) The interviewee responded to the researcher’s wish and offered to distribute a limited 
number of the questionnaires (5 or 6 only) in his company, replies for which were never 
received.
For all these reasons, it was thought that there is no purpose in pursuing Yorkshire 
Electricity.
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Negotiating access to United Utilities was successful right from the beginning. After 
identifying the group director of remuneration and pensions who was responsible for the 
remuneration (in May 1997), the first interview was arranged by my supervisor to take 
place in July 1997 in the group headquarters in Warrington (near Manchester). The 
interview lasted about an hour and a half and was witnessed by my supervisor. The 
interview was tape- recorded upon approval from the interviewee and the researcher 
took some notes as well. The interviewee offered the researcher some internal 
documents titled “Performance Management- Guidelines for Managers and Staff’ 
(Appendix D-l). It was agreed in the meeting that there would be further contact to 
arrange other meetings and to plan the distribution of the questionnaire in the company. 
From May 1997 to the Christmas 1998, there were many attempts by the researcher and 
her supervisor to contact the interviewee but in vain. After the Christmas 1998, 
communications successfully allowed the arranging of another meeting with the same 
subject in February 1998 with the researcher only in Hallam University and lasted about 
2 hours. The interview was tape- recorded and notes were taken as well. In that 
interview, the interviewee offered to a follow-up contact to arrange some more 
interviews with other members of staff (some of whom are rewarded under RPE and 
some are not so that a variety of managerial levels would be maintained). Furthermore, it 
was agreed that the researcher would send copies of the questionnaire to the interviewee 
who would take the responsibility of distributing them within the company with a 
memorandum to show the company’s formal support for the research. The questionnaire 
was sent -as agreed- and the researcher started to receive replies on Aril 1998. The 
interviewee had advised the researcher earlier to keep the length of the questionnaire to a 
“reasonable” size. The reasonable length was judged by the interviewee to be 4-5 pages 
and the number around 60 copies. The researcher had to accept and keep these terms. 
The group director of remuneration and pensions handed the responsibility for 
administrating the questionnaire and arranging for further interviews to the group 
personnel director. The group’s personnel director efficiently ran the administration 
process of the questionnaire but arranging more interviews was not similarly successful. 
At that time, the group remuneration and pensions director revealed that the situation in 
the company was sensitive because it coincided with his receiving the result of RPE 
(which was carried out by an external agency) and it showed that two of the senior 
management members were at the end of the ranking list as one of the executives would 
simply go!. The remuneration director expressed some worry that interviewing some of
those individuals at the time before they knew the results of the process would probably 
raise many speculation in the company or those individuals might give some feedback 
which was coloured by this impression of the recent evaluation process. On the other 
hand, the personnel director (who was the gatekeeper of the data collection) insisted on 
contacting the possible interviewees before the researcher got hold of them. However, 
for all these reasons and in spite of the researcher’s many attempts to enhance the data 
by more interviews, she had no further success.
The questionnaire which was distributed in United Utilities, was accompanied by a letter 
from the researcher, explained the research themes, sought co-operation and emphasised 
confidentiality (a copy of the letter is found in Appendix B-7). The questionnaire 
contained the same questions as used in the first part of the field work in Egypt, except 
for some changes (the two versions of the questionnaire are provided in Appendix B-2 
and B-3). These changes were undertaken after doing the first part of the data collection. 
The reasons for making these changes were to develop the data collection tool to capture 
more, specific and related data and to stick more tightly and precisely to the arguments.
(5.4.4) The Research Objectives
It is hoped that the following objectives would be achieved in this research:
- to gain knowledge about the potential of the relative performance evaluation as an 
evaluation technique.
- to identify the individual, organisational and environmental context within which this 
technique functions.
- to tackle the recognised weaknesses in the previous studies of relative performance 
both at the theoretical and practical level. Specifically because the previous studies 
on the RPE in the UK (Conyon and Leech 1994, Conyon & Gregg 1994) were 
conducted on published data and the only evidence about practice of RPE was 
collected depending on statistical regression of the relationship between pay and 
performance. The experience of the companies with the RPE has not been explored 
or analysed before. Therefore, an attempt will be paid to test the theory behind the 
RPE and its context.
(5.4.5) The research’s potential contribution
It is hoped that the research offers the following contribution:
* Extending the studies of RPE by opening up new arguments about the mechanism of 
the RPE, its abilities and its context, which peers, which measures, which incentives).
136
* Introducing new variables in the analysis (targets difficulty, performance measures, 
form of rewards) and new structures about the previously investigated variables.
* Addressing the arguments within the contingency theory framework rather than 
agency theory which frames the literature.
* Releasing the basic argument from the economic dominance and handling the debate 
with the accounting content of performance- pay relationship.
* Testing the questions by a survey/ case study whereas most of the previous studies 
have depended on archival data. The Academy of Management in 1996’s conference of 
“Managerial Compensation and Firm Performance” sought this attitude.
* Obtaining feedback from different parties involved in the system (appraisees and 
appraisers; different managerial levels) which have not been investigated before.
(5.4.6) The research limitations
There are many factors which put various limitations on this research, among these are; 
the time-span, academic background and resources; the requirements for keeping the 
research focused and under control. These factors altogether led to selecting the 
identified variables (i.e. target’s difficulty, type of performance measures and type of 
rewards) to be investigated. Nevertheless, It is not denied that there could be many 
other variables that might influence the phenomenon under consideration such as risk 
preference, degree of competition,...etc. A second boundary in this research is that, 
handling the argument about RPE within an accounting domain, the researcher is aware 
that the phenomenon have many other aspects that can be discussed within economics, 
behavioural and managerial perspectives. I have come across some of these treatments 
while doing the literature review. This highlights that RPE is a contentious topic and 
there are many argument regarding the perspective within which it is selected to be 
debated. It also framed the dimensions or aspects which emerge from it (such as 
enquiring what is the impact of time on the potential of RPE, the impact of national 
culture, the scope of applying RPE, can it extend to international level). The researcher 
could identify many arguments while doing a critical review of the literature to select 
some arguments to be examined among them. A third influential constraint on the study 
is that it has been assumed that employees are one homogeneous group without 
identifying differences as to the managerial level, attitudes,...etc. The researcher is 
aware that this variable like the other omitted variables can have an influential effect on 
the RPE. Finally, any interaction is recognised to be possible between variables and
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could be possibly be influential; however, any interaction has been dismissed in this 
research.
Summary
Looking at RPE as a control system, this chapter focused the research arguments in: 
whether RPE could motivate employees to improve performance, by which content and 
in which context. More specifically, the arguments centre around: whether RPE could 
motivate employees, what is the impact of the perceived difficulty of the peer group on 
the response to RPE and what is the impact of the different measures of performance 
(financial and non-financial, market measures and accounting measures) and varying 
rewards on RPE.
These arguments were planned to be tackled within contingency framework using a 
case study method. It was thought that this would fulfil the potential contribution 
(along with the genuine suggested arguments and framework). However, case study 
might generate limitations on the generalisation of the research findings. This 
restriction, was remedied -partially- by implementing multi- case studies (three 
companies granted access in Egypt and one in England) and by using interviews and 
questionnaire to collect evidence in the investigation.
The following three chapters report the field work, analysed on multi levels. This 
starts with chapter six which provides an individual account of each of the three 
Egyptian companies including the company’s background, performance measurement 
system and data collected from various sources regarding RPE.
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Chapter Six 
Egyptian Data - Individual Case Studies 
Presentation, Analysis and Commentary
Chapter five focused the research arguments on whether RPE is motivating and whether 
and how the difficulty which employees perceive related to each peer group, could affect 
their response to RPE. Also, what is the impact of measuring performance in financial 
and non financial terms, using accounting measures comparing to market measures and 
varying rewards on RPE. The research epistemology is proposed to be anti-positivistic 
where the knowledge about RPE would be built upon the data which the subjects 
involved (i.e. employees and their superiors) would provide. This could allow an 
exploration of the perception and experience of both employees and their superiors, the 
rationale and experience with RPE from the subjects involved. Contingency theory was 
selected as a framework to examine the content and context of RPE and the factors that 
might affect applying RPE or not, for whom, on what bases and in which circumstances. 
Case studies method is the tool by which the research will be implemented and interviews 
and questionnaire were prepared to collect data from four organisations (three granted 
access in Egypt and one in England).
This chapter reports the data of each case study in Egypt (which were collected by 
various tools: questionnaire, interviews documentary material). For each case, the 
presentation includes an outline of the company’s history and background, a summary of 
the performance measurement system, an account of the questionnaire data and 
observations from the interviews data which distinct the practice in the company from 
the other companies. A note to be made here is that, the presentation will confine to a 
separate account for each company, with no attempt to compare these accounts or 
practices because that will be done in chapter seven. The other point to be mentioned is 
that, no attempt would be made in this chapter to discuss, interpret or relate the findings 
to the literature, as chapter eight will be allocated for this purpose.
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Part One
Presentation and analysis of the Individual Case Studies
This part starts with demonstrating an account of each company. This includes a 
summary of the company’s background, its control system, a presentation of the data 
from the questionnaire and from the interviews. It should be stated here that all financial 
figures in this chapter -for the Egyptian companies- are in Sterling.
(6.1.1) Case (1) The Trade Company
Background of the Trade Company
Data collected from Trade company’ reports, internal reports and reports of the Ministry 
of Administration of Public Sector and the Chamber of Commerce, show that Trade 
company is a subsidiary retailer belonging to the public sector. It was founded in 1927. It 
is 100% owned by the state and operates through branches all over the country but it is 
run by a corporate office in Cairo. The capital in 1996 was £80m and the number of 
employees was 2,440.
The company was established originally to provide tractors and other farming machines 
to local customers. Its activities were expanded over the decades from importing farming 
machine to importing and exporting variety of mechanical and electric machine (e.g. 
construction machine, house appliances,...etc). In parallel to that, the company works in 
the repair and maintenance services and engineering construction. Among the increasing 
operations of the firm are distributing the products of local factories. The company also 
supplies plants’ machinery, air-conditioning and cooling appliances, irrigation and 
drainage stations and public utilities. Recently, the company adopted a policy of 
diversifying activities and started to operate in reclaiming the desert.
Geographically, the company operates nation- wide and exports the industrial products 
of local manufacturers to some Arab countries as well. In spite of the financial difficulties 
which the company has been suffering from over the last three years, it has a long history
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in providing heavy equipment, especially farming machinery. At some time in the past, it 
not only dominated the national market but was monopolising the market of supplying 
some for these products.
The organisational structure is both functional and geographical. Therefore, the company 
is divided into the following departments: sales, importing, exporting, maintenance, 
finance and administration. The sales department is divided geographically into branches: 
Cairo, Alexandria, Suez Canal region, Delta region and the Southern region (please see 
map of Egypt below). The departments are divided into divisions -if the volume of work 
allows, for example: the importing department consists of commodities’ divisions; e.g. 
tractors and other farming machines, heavy equipment, electric appliances ...etc.
h  - ‘'Shari1** ■ 
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Current Financial Difficulties
In the financial report of the company for the fiscal year 1995/1996, the company
reported achieving losses and accompanied this by some potential reasons for this
negative financial performance, these factors are summarised below:
Difficulties emerge from several current governmental policies:
• The change in the economic policies in recent years from adopting a centrally 
planned economy to a free market economy led to a contract in imports for other 
governmental sectors during 1995 and 1996.
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• After liberating external trade, some international suppliers have cancelled their 
contracts with the public agents and moved to private companies to be their agents.
• Deflation, stagnation and the current shrinking policies, which dominate the local 
market negatively, impacted on the activities of the firm.
• Another aspect of deflation, is the failure to launch new projects/ factories by the 
state and leaving that mission to the private sector. This has decreased the company’s 
share in the foreign trade’s market.
• The flexibility which the private sector’s work environment enjoys comparing to the 
restricting commitments of the public sector especially in compiling to the rules and 
regulations.
The report also included the following issues as problems relate to the company itself:
• Dependence on external sources of finance and huge interests have raised the costs in 
spite of the decrease in profitability rates because of deflation.
• Over-employment in the company due to the merging and take-over processes that 
have happened in the recent decades.
• Despite these difficulties, the company has managed to increase export operations on 
behalf of other public units, especially to Saudi Arabia.
The Performance Measurements System
In Trade, targets of performance were set by departments’ participation and a committee 
at the top level revised estimates, which took into consideration the general market 
trends. When the budget was approved (i.e. how much surplus was aimed at), it was 
subdivided into activities (importing, exporting for sister public units, distribution for 
local producers, reclaiming the desert, maintenance service,....etc) and divisions (target 
for the finance department, purchasing department, sales department ...etc). Sales were 
the leading activity in the planning process.
In order to motivate employees, another version of the plan -usually higher than the 
expected plan- was announced to employees. Targets were drawn in financial terms only, 
the idea was that ultimately, non-financial goals such as quality, customer services, etc. 
should have some financial echo. Consistent with targets; performance was measured in 
financial terms only, even for services departments such as maintenance. Performance 
was compared monthly to the budget -only- and employees were rewarded accordingly 
in cash (in addition to the basic salary). However, There were some non-monetary items
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(e.g. holiday, car...) which were limited only to top management and not related to the 
level of achievement. Table (6-1) below shows a summary of the questionnaire data of 
Trade company. It should be recognised that, in all the tables which present statistics in 
this chapter:
1. % of agree = % of respondents who agree and strongly agree to total respondents
2. correlation between a variable and RPE is Spearman correlation coefficient
3. sig** = p= .05
4. sig* =p=. 10
5. all correlation relationships should be assumed positive unless otherwise specified
6. The respondent’s ranking of peers’ difficulty was translated into the same categories 
used in England data to describe difficulty. That is, giving a peer group rank "1", was 
translated to "easily attainable", "2" = difficult but attainable, 3 = extremely difficult 
and barely attainable and "4" was for too difficult and unfair.
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Observations from the questionnaire:
Table (6-1) above indicates that 44.5% of the respondents of Trade agreed on RPE as a 
motivational and monitoring tool. In doing so, the respondent sought to receive the 
money (80.6%) which it might provide. The respondents reported that the most 
preferable peer group under RPE was peers from the same region (65.6%) and then 
peers from the same company (61.1%). The assistant of Follow-up department who was 
interviewed, indicated that, being a retailer, the company was concerned about 
competitors who operated in the same geographical area. In terms of describing how 
difficult it was to compete with peers, 47.2% ranked peers from the same company in the 
4th position which was the code of "easily attainable", while 33.3% ranked peers from the 
same region in the 3rd category "difficult but attainable". 27.8% classified peers from the 
same industry in the 2nd place as "extremely difficult and barely attainable" and a similar 
percentage of respondents put peers from the top 100 companies in the 1st place as a 
"too difficult and unfair" target. Spearman correlation shows a significant positive 
correlation between RPE and difficulty in competing with peers from the same company 
(at p= 5%) and with peers from the same region at (p =7%). With regard to considering 
"peers from the same industry" unattainable target, the Planning and Follow-up Manager 
of Trade clarified that according to the public sector’s structure, the company belonged 
to the heavy industries group. That group contained mainly manufacturers of machines 
and equipment whereas Trade was only a retailer that dealt in those products. This 
suggests how difficult it would be for Trade to compete with other companies in the 
same group.
There was an equal preference for Performance to be measured by financial and non 
financial measures (77.8%), but only the financial measures were correlated to RPE. This 
preference for financial indicators could be because respondents considered them 
controllable (41.6%), accurate (76.7%) and time-related (38.9%). These features were 
positively and significantly correlated to the financial measures and to RPE whereas only 
controllability and accuracy where correlated to the non-financial measures as well, but 
the correlation coefficients were higher for the financial measures. Within the financial 
group, accounting-based indicators gained more approval than market-based in terms of 
controllability (69.4% to 22.3%) and were also found significantly correlated to RPE.
The respondents also preferred the RPE reward to be in cash (86.2%), post-retirement 
benefits (25%) and better working conditions (52.8%) and 69.4% agreed that varying
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the form of reward would enhance RPE. The follow-up division manager in Trade, his 
assistant and the maintenance engineer reported current poor work facilities and 
conditions in Trade, which might be the reason why having better working conditions as 
a preferable form of rewards.
The Manager of Purchasing Farming Machines recorded that, some factors should be 
examined when considering RPE schemes such as: achieving the department’s objectives, 
measuring the various aspects of performance (e.g. quality, time, co-operation). Also the 
Customers’ Accounts Manager considered, companies should have control over their 
decisions (i.e. the decisions should be intrinsic), they should not be imposed from any 
external forces upon the firm. Middle and lower management showed concern for the 
operational side of RPE for example, the Exporting for Local Suppliers’ Officer raised 
issues like similarity in companies’ operations, location, financial situations and the 
employees' jobs, work load, experience and work environment (participation, ...etc) 
should be investigated. The Inspection Officer and Foreign Suppliers' Administrator, who 
participated in the questionnaire enquiry, recommended that RPE be held intrafirm 
among departments and divisions because they would be sharing the same work 
environment. However, The Follow-up Assistant Manager raised some suspicion about 
RPE. He argued firstly that the whole point of benchmarking and competing with other 
companies applied to a financially healthy companies not to those who struggled to 
overcome losses and had difficulty achieving their own targets. Secondly, in operational 
terms, how could a firm get information about the performance of different employees in 
other companies? How could similarity in the bases for measuring be secured while each 
company used different measures to monitor that performance. That was not the case for 
top management because the company's performance could be taken as a surrogate for 
top management's performance. Similarity in measuring the companies' performances 
could be secured by a minimum compliance with professional standards. Therefore, RPE 
-by definition- seemed applicable to top management only.
Observations from the interviews 
Sales lead planning:
In Trade, the leading activity in providing the estimation was sales and the purchasing; 
production and finance were planed accordingly. This pointed at the centre of attention 
and the nature of activity. Trade company is a retailer where goods are bought (mainly 
from foreign suppliers and sometimes from local producers) centrally in Cairo and 
distributed all over the country without any conversion operation-taking place in it.
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Therefore, sales was the dominating activity as explained by the Head of the Follow -up 
division in Trade:
We always have one objective: profit, and sales equipment and machines is the activity 
which provides 95% of our profit, the rest of the activities in which the company is 
involved (such as providing maintenance services, training,...). Recently the company 
started to involve in reclaiming the desert to distribute risk and seek new areas for 
making profit to help with the current financial problems. This latter activity probably 
contributes 5% to the profit. Thus, we focus on the sales activity.
Attitudes towards RPE:
In Trade company, RPE was not applied and 3 out of 4 interviewees rejected it for 
various reasons. For example, the Planning & Follow-up Manager refused it because of 
the pressure and difficulties staff experience currently and because there was no local 
equivalent peer to be compared with it. The Follow- up Assistant Manager had a 
stronger view about RPE:
There is a big diverse in pay and in the conditions under which people work in the 
companies which belong to the same sector. I  refuse the comparison. If the company 
announced that there would be rewards based on the competition with other companies, 
I do not think this would motivate the employee to work better. There should be stability 
in our company’s policies & strategy first.
The Importing officer refused RPE because the company had suffered losses currently 
and in his view was not in a condition to compete with others, however, he suggested an 
alternative version of RPE which was internal comparisons. The only interviewee who 
accepted RPE was the Maintenance engineer who considered that it would feed 
competition and produce improvement by learning from successful peers.
Attitudes towards the components of RPE scheme:
The maintenance engineer in Trade supported the argument that RPE could play a 
motivational and monitoring roles especially when performance was measured in both 
financial (but not market) and non-financial terms where that would reflect all aspects of 
his work. However, no approval was recognised for a positive impact of varying rewards 
on RPE. The maintenance engineer preferred the non-monetary type specifically houses 
or accommodation. He argued that:
“The company could try to get a number of units for staff in the new cities and when it 
negotiates for many individuals, it might get a good deal, good conditions more than what 
individuals would come up with if  they did that individually”.
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Non financial measures in a service industry:
In Trade and in consistency with setting targets only in financial terms, performance was 
measured only in financial terms for all departments. The Follow-up Manager considered 
that quite suitable for a retail company sought profit from all departments including 
service department. Another point he mentioned was that using financial measures only 
was another “imposed” practice by the parent company. That was because those 
measures were seen as helpful in comparing the companies with different activities, 
which the parent company governed. Nevertheless, still in Trade, some staff saw that 
some aspects of their work should be better expressed in non-financial terms. As the 
Importing Officer commented:
Performance is measured is financial terms only now, but personally, I wish other types 
of measurements were used. For example, there are some aspects of my work, which are not less 
important than the financial ones such as accuracy, expanding the scope of investigation 
When considering the suppliers’ offers, the degree of analysis and the amount of data upon 
which a/ supplier/s is/are selected, ...etc.
Implications of being a public company:
The four interviewees highlighted some implications of Trade’s being owned by the state. 
First, the state interfered in: setting targets, the control and monitoring reports to various 
supervisory bodies and using the unified accounting system. The Assistant of Follow-up 
Manager argued that:
“My company (due to some importing transactions with Eastern European countries) has 
suffered losses and we have not receive our rewards accordingly although we work hard and 
we are not responsible for the reasons or policies which led to these losses. The losses have 
been occurring for 3 years. If the impact of these decisions which are imposed on us had been 
removed, we would be doing well (and it is being removed for the purpose of tracing the 
corporate performance over time but not for the purpose of rewarding)”.
(6.1.2) Case two: Dairy company
Background of the company
The data collected from the company’s reports and the interviews with the managing 
director and the marketing manager reveal that the company was founded in 1989, the 
capital is now £60 m and the labour force is 850 workers. The company is privately 
owned. The main products are white cheese, Mozzarella, Cheddar and Cream cheese. 
When the company started production in 1989, it began with a type of cheese that a 
competitor company used to produce using fully automated technology, while Dairy 
depended on a manufacturing technique which mixed automation and human element. In 
order to develop different operational plans (e.g. for production, sales and finance) at the
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beginning of the work, there was no data available about sales or scale of production. 
The marketing manager suggested that the new product should be tested through a "pilot 
study" by a specialist agency. The key point, which Dairy wanted to find out was, the 
customers’view of the price and the quality of the new product along with a comparative 
analysis for the quality and price in the competitor companies. That is, they started by 
producing the same product, which the competitor worked in, but of a higher quality and 
at a lower price. When the test provided evidence that the new product could do well in 
the market, they started a "sample production". The idea behind this cautious strategy 
was to test the market and get a true feedback about the performance of the product and 
how it would be before scheduling the production, marketing and distribution capacities. 
In order to justify this practice to the board of directors, the Head of the Marketing 
Department illustrated that the Egyptian market had a very specific nature and was very 
changeable. The pilot and the test studies revealed the competitor’s performance in terms 
of quantity, sales’price, the strengths and weaknesses. The orientation in Dairy company 
as declared by the Marketing Manager was to:
"Learn from the weak points of the competitor and to outperform him even in one 
point (packing, price, delivery, and availability in different sites far or near, varying 
in sizes and prices or designing smoother payment schemes if  possible."
The strategy of Dairy was to adopt a "penetration policy" when it joined the market for 
the first time. Dairy discovered then that the competitor was suffering from lack of 
concern and follow-up when handling customers’ orders and irregular services as well. 
These were among the core points in developing the production, marketing and 
distribution plans. The company started with three factories in Great Cairo (this includes 
three cities: Cairo, Giza and Kalyobia) and their own transport and distribution services 
to market in Cairo and some nearby cities such as Menia and Tanta (see map above). The 
population of Cairo alone was 12 million people. The feasibility study and investment 
plan were developed and carried out on the basis of gradual expansion.
The expansion in 1997 was accompanied by completely new production policy. Although 
the company used to distribute its products in almost the whole of the country (e.g. 
Tanta on the Nile delta, Alexandria in the north on the Mediterranean, Asyut to the south 
and Canal cities to the east), all sales was supplied by the factories in Cairo. That caused 
pressure and sometimes crises with the transport and delivery staff. With annual 
increases in the Egyptian dairy market following the increase in population, and good 
performance, the company considered a proposal to launch four factories in Asyut, 
Tanta, Alexandria and Port Said at the same time. Before any actual production started, 
the sales staff undertook the task of collecting data about the potential customers in each 
city who were normally wholesale traders and retail traders. Because the company was 
already distributing its products in these cities, it held a share of the market there, but the
149
potential was to attract new customers, those who used to buy from the competitors of 
Dairy. The investigation which the company conducted, covered the needs of the 
customers in terms of quantity, services which they were willing to receive and services 
which they actually receive from other competitors.
The Performance Management System
Dairy aimed to gradually dominate the dairy market in Egypt by providing products with 
better quality and lower prices. In order to translate this mission into annual plans, sales 
representatives estimated the expected sales of each type of cheese, then plans for other 
functions (e.g. production, purchasing, finance) were established accordingly. 
Competition was carefully taken into consideration including what competitors provide 
to customers, in terms of quantity, quality, price, service, ...etc compared to what the 
company provided. Quality was “the number one factor” which the company aimed to 
keep and to improve along with other factors such as quick response to customers' 
needs, improving services...etc. Performance was measured in financial and non-financial 
terms for all jobs at all levels and reviewed monthly, extended to a daily basis for the 
salesmen.
In order to motivate employees, a budget with a 20% rise above the planning budget was 
announced to the staff. The Marketing Manager considered the 20% a "safe margin" for 
fluctuations in performance and that plan was successful in achieving the company's 
targeted figures. However, penalties were imposed for any proven defect in serving the 
customers. Furthermore, the comparison with performance in the past years served in 
planning expansion. Rewards were given on meeting targets. Surprisingly, the marketing 
manager reported that employees in Dairy receive one of the highest salaries in the 
country (the secured part of the remuneration) and this meant, reward upon 
achievements (the changeable part of the remuneration) had little to do in motivating 
them! Rewards were paid in cash and in non-monetary forms (e.g. holiday, car). The 
figure in table (6-2) below summarises the questionnaire data of Dairy company. The 
table should be read according to the terms which were identified in page 143 of this 
thesis. Moreover, caution should be exercised regarding the importance of the regression 
results of Dairy data because of the limited sample size (only 21 data point). That is 
because the statisticians warn that regression results for a sample that is less than 30 
observations would have a limited importance.
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Observations from the questionnaire
The table above shows that, in Dairy, 38.1% of the respondents approved of RPE as an 
motivational and rewarding technique. The low acceptance for RPE in Dairy although it 
was the only Egyptian company -in the sample- which applied RPE, was accompanied 
by low preference (19%) for peers’ comparison as an evaluation technique. The 
questionnaire data showed that the lowest criteria in evaluating performance, was 
meeting targets (85.7%) followed by meeting budget (80.8%) and comparing to the past 
(52.4%). However, 71.55% of the respondents agreed that RPE would generate money 
for them. That was sustained by preferring peers from the same company (76.2%). 
Following this, peers from the same industry (which was currently used) was preferred 
by 52.4% and the peers from top 100 companies 19.1%. In terms of classifying the peers 
according to the difficulty to compete with, peers from the same company were equally 
seen as easily attainable (28.6%) or difficult but attainable (28.6%). Peers from the same 
region were considered too difficult and unfair (23.8%). Peers from the same industry 
were ranked as difficult but attainable (61.9%) while peers from the top 100 were equally 
classified as difficult but attainable or extremely difficult and barely attainable (28.6%). 
However, the total of the "unattainable" ranking of difficulty to compete with peers from 
the top 100, was 33.3% of total respondents compared to 23.8% for the total attainable. 
Spearman correlation test shows no significant association between RPE and difficulty of 
peers.
Respondents preferred the currently used non-financial measures (85.6%) and preferred 
the financial measures less (61.9%). Regarding the features of measures, 
comprehensiveness was preferred by 61.9%, accuracy 61.9%, controllability 52.3%, and 
time-related 38.1%. RPE was correlated with comprehensiveness and accuracy. Financial 
measures were found positively correlated to accuracy of measures and negatively 
correlated to time-related (p=.08) whereas non-financial measures were positively 
correlated with comprehensiveness, negatively correlated to time related and positively 
to accuracy (p=.10).
Within the financial measures group, controllability over accounting measures was 
approved over market measures' (42.9% to 38.1%), however, both were significantly 
correlated to RPE (stronger accounting). This points at the possible impacts of market 
on RPE. Reward was preferred by 76.1% to be in cash and 52.4% in shares. Better
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working conditions did not appear in the list probably because they were satisfactorily 
provided. However, 47.6% agreed that varying the reward of RPE would enhance RPE. 
The manager of the October City factory of Dairy recorded other roles for RPE such as 
increasing competition between companies (but this might destroy group co-operation) 
while the Supervisor of Supplies argued that RPE could motivate employees for higher 
productivity. Regarding goals from work, the Production Engineer reported that goals 
from work include "to be part of a successful organisation" and to get promoted.
Observations from the interviews:
Special role for the sales staff:
Dairy is a manufacturing company which deals in dairy products with a short production 
cycle and a high capability to adapt to market demand. This suggests that the company 
probably needs to control the sales side of the operations in order to survive. The 
marketing manager revealed a special interest in the work of the sales representatives in 
relation to the company’s growth:
The sales representative is the face of the company in front of the customer. I depend 
on his good regular services to customers as one of the pillars to sustain my growth (along with 
quality and good price). I also depend on his observations of our strength and weak points and 
the competitors’ strengths and weak points.
The rationale, implementation and relevance of RPE:
Dairy is the only company among the Egyptian companies under investigation which 
used RPE. In doing so, the company compared its performance to a set of 5 or 7 food 
producers (its wider industry) including the major dairy companies (its direct 
competitors). The purpose was to reward the top management by holding them 
responsible for the company’s performance relative to the competitors. Under this 
scheme, performance was measured in terms of profit and sales revenue and reward was 
paid in cash at the end of the year in a lump sum (arbitrarily determined). However, this 
practice was rather irregular and lacked a clear basis for calculating the reward or who 
was entitled to it. The managing director explained why RPE was used for top 
management only:
“The top management is responsible for the whole work, making policies, following-up and 
executing these policies. Therefore, the total performance of the company should reflect how 
the top management thinks and works. Also, Top management has qualifications and 
experiences different from the other managerial levels. On the other hand, the market in Egypt 
in open, it is quite possible to know about your competitors’ who share the business 
environment. Hence, I believe it is the responsibility of the top management to handle those 
competitors and to be evaluated accordingly.”
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The managing director and the marketing manager saw differences in mentality, 
perception and motivation of each managerial level; for example shop floor employees 
are not likely to have the comprehensive view of company’s strategy and hence 
understanding how important it was to compete with other companies.
Target difficulty and the money item of RPE:
The Managing Director, the Marketing Manager and The Chief of Southern Region 
Delivery agreed that targets under RPE (i.e. the peer group) should be difficult enough 
to trigger employees’ abilities to work harder but should be attainable at the same time 
otherwise it would de-motivate them. Target attainability was particularly important 
because of the influence which it would have on the employee’s reward.
Different potentials from RPE:
Interviewees revealed a general attitude to support RPE for different reasons, for 
example to trigger creativity, to challenge management. Only the chief of the Southern 
region delivery raised some reservation related to “who should we be compared to?” and 
“how similarity in working conditions, load, facilities can be secured in the comparison”.
Critical non-financial issues:
In Dairy, both financial and non-financial measures were used. The Managing Director 
considered both types equally important and welcomed by employees at various 
managerial levels in the company. Specifically, creativity, quality and customer services 
were critical issues for improvement and expansion as the marketing manager indicated:
Customer care, meeting time schedules, creativity and quality of services are as important as 
the amount of sales if  not more. The whole marketing work is built on keeping a good 
relationship with the customer through providing better services and care. If this basis is 
provided, offering the product for a price higher than some competitors can be acceptable by 
customers as long as the sales representative succeeds in persuading him/ her that the rise in 
the price is justified, either by higher quality or services. A customer can pay higher price to 
the supplier whom he trusts. That’s why keeping the trust of the customer is very important 
especially with the tough competition which we work under.
The other essential non-financial aspect in Dairy was the health and safety of the 
products. The importance of keeping high standards of product safety stemmed from the 
fact that the company dealt in food products and any mistake might affect the customer’s
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health and destroy the company’s reputation. Therefore, the company got rid of any 
defective production regardless of the loss.
Fines for negligence:
The Marketing Manager referred to "fines for negligence" which were imposed if 
negligence or mistreating customers was proved. The marketing manager explained the 
reason behind this position as:
The sales representative receives the highest salary for a sales representative in the 
country, on the other hand, I want him to be always in front of the customer. Customer 
care and providing high services are among my pillars to increase my share in the market. 
I also expect my sales representatives to report the strength and weaknesses of us and of 
our competitors for my plans. I pay him a lot and I expect a lot from him, if  he lets me 
down, I reduce his money.
Implications of being a private company and company’s strategy:
The three interviewees of Dairy reported that the company encouraged competition 
among employees via the internal and external comparisons as a recognisable feature in 
Dairy’s organisational culture. In doing so, the company sought to work more effectively 
and creativity, controlling costs, quality and customer care as methods for achieving its 
goals. The marketing manager placed a special emphasis on providing new and high-level 
service to customers and depended on two strategies to push the sales staff: salary and 
“reprehension” in case of inadequacy. Quality was specifically important and any defect 
in food products might affect the health of the customer.
(6.1.3) Case Three: Steel Company
Background of the company:
1- In 1982, Steel Co. was incorporated with technical and financial assistance from a 
Japanese consortium, and the International Finance Corporation (IFC), to meet some of 
Egypt's needs for steel reinforcing bars (rebars), for the construction industry. The 
company aims to benefit from the strong technical support of its Japanese partners, and 
the consultancy arrangement it has with the British Steel Corporation.
2- The Company was set up under Investment Law 43 of 1974 (later replaced by law 
230 of 1989) as a joint venture company between Egyptian public sector industrial and
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financial companies, a Japanese Consortium composed of Nippon Kokan, Kobe Steel 
and Toyo Menka Kaisha (renamed Tomen), and the IFC. In 1994, the Company 
increased its capital to partly finance a major expansion. Steel’s employees and the IFC 
subscribed to this capital increase which raised Steel’s private sector ownership from 13 % to 28 
%. Recent share sales by public sector shareholders have further increased private sector 
participation to around 36%.
3- The Company was originally designed as an integrated rebar plant with a nominal 
output of 745,000 metric tons per year (tpy). It uses the Midrex Direct Reduction Iron 
process (DRI), to produce the major portion of its iron needs, with imported iron ore 
pellets and domestic natural gas as the reducing agent. This coupled with the electric arc 
furnace, continuous casting and modem bar and rod mills, proved to be the best 
alternative for Egypt. Indeed, locally available natural gas in nearby Abu Qir field, and 
the high cost of imported steel scrap: made the DRI route more cost effective than 
conventional scrap based electric arc furnace steel making. This resulted in an 
internationally competitive operation with attractive financial returns (source of data: 
The internet, Home page of Egypt/industry: http://163.121.10.47/PROJECTS/Steel/ ) 
The company is currently involved in two major expansion projects. Alexandria Steel 
company, has 3,500 employee, it covers nearly 50% of the national demand (80% of 
their production, the rest is exported to the USA, Germany, Italy,... and they get the raw 
material from Sweden, Brazil)
The company is aware of the social affairs and effectively contributes into Alexandria’s 
surrounding community. For example, the company’s training centre tailors some 
courses to the technical staff of "Alexandria's Arsenal" in many fields. Also the company 
sometimes borrows some of their staff on a temporary basis to fix some jobs. In addition 
to this co-operation, the company's expansion and the launching of new factories is 
supposed to create many job opportunities for individuals and for local contractors. 
More importantly, Steel pays great attention to the environment. The company has been 
awarded the ISO 14002 environment certificate. In Steel there is a commitment to using 
technology which causes the least level of pollution. The company is also interested in 
keeping high standards of practice in handling the refuse, for example it does not get rid 
of it by throwing it into the Mediterranean sea. The following is the organisational 
structure of the company:
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The organisation structure of Alexandria Steel Company
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The Performance Management System
Before the beginning of each year, each department was asked to set up its plan for the 
coming year. This included the amount of production, quality, requirements,...etc. 
Estimations were revised and co-ordinated by the quality control division and top 
management. After approving the budget, it was decomposed into departmental and 
divisional plans. However, the budget was adjustable semi- annually. The annual budget 
was set taking into account the companies long-term strategy which sought to expand 
and increase exports of steel products. In order to motivate employees and avoid 
fluctuations in the company’s performance, the previous year’s performance was set to 
be the minimum of the current year’s target.
Performance was measured in both financial and non-financial terms. The company 
placed a special emphasise on monitoring creativity, innovation, quality improvements, 
savings and particularly industrial safety because of the location near the Alexandria 
harbour. Division performance was assessed against the budget, the past, other
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divisions; the whole company was compared to international steel producers. The first 
reason for this was because of being a joint venture, the Japanese partners matched the 
company’s performance to counterparts in Japan and Germany. Second, the company 
networked with the international market (through importing the raw material and 
exporting about 80% of the production). The third reason was the lack of a local 
equivalent. However, employees were rewarded upon comparisons with targets only. 
The division’s performance used be reviewed annually but both the employees and the 
factories' machinery experienced pressure and frustration because of the huge efforts 
required -in a short time- to cover the gap between the actual performance of the year 
and the target of the year. As a result, the company moved to quarterly assessment 
where the gap between the actual quarterly performance and the target quarterly was 
relatively small and comfortably recoverable. The individual’s performance was reviewed 
semi-annually, measured in technical terms including innovation and creativity, their 
behaviour towards their line manager, co-workers and colleagues in other divisions. The 
performance review was carried out by two evaluators who tried to rank employees on a 
"normal distribution" curve according to who was at the top, average, below average, etc 
and employees were rewarded correspondingly. Participants recorded their satisfaction 
with this system. Rewards were paid in a variety of forms, mainly in cash but non-cash 
items such as: travel opportunity, medical coverage, subsidised food and accommodation 
(for key staff who were on call 24 hours a day) also existed. A marked practice in Steel 
was developing staff skills continuously through training internally, external or abroad. 
The table below displays the questionnaire data of Steel company. The table should be 
read according to the terms which were identified in page 143 of this thesis (i.e. what the 
items in the table mean) which were applied to presenting the data of Trade and Dairy 
companies. The same limitation of the regression in Dairy (page 150) applies here. The 
importance of the results of the regression should be observed with caution due to the 
very limited size of sample (as N= 14 only).
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Observations from the questionnaire
As the table above indicates 57.1% of Steel’s respondents approved RPE as a 
motivational and monitoring technique. In doing so, 92.8% expected to gain money from 
it and 42.9% expected to gain esteem. Under RPE, the respondents preferred to be 
compared to peers from the same industry (50%) and top 100 companies (57%) but not 
the region as there was no equivalent to Steel company in Alexandria region. Using peers 
from the same company was preferred by 42.9% but hold a significant negative 
correlation with RPE. In terms of peers difficulty, 28.65% of the total respondents 
ranked peers from the same company as either easy attainable or difficult but attainable, 
21.4% classified peers from the same region as too difficult and unfair. However, 57% of 
respondents considered peers from the same industry as a difficult but attainable target 
also peers from the top 100 (35.7%). Spearman correlation shows significant association 
between RPE and the difficulty to compete with peers from the same industry and top 
100.
Performance under RPE was preferred to be measured in non-financial (64.3%) and 
financial terms (50%). Regarding the features of the measures, accuracy was preferred by 
85.7%, comprehensiveness 42.8%, time-related 35.7% and controllability 21.4%. 
Financial measures were found positively correlated to the comprehensiveness of the 
measures (p= .10) and time-related (p= .06) whereas non-financial measures were 
correlated to controllability (at p= .08) and accuracy of measures (p= .06). None of these 
features of the performance measures was found correlated to RPE at p= .05 or .10.
However, within the financial measures group, the accounting measures were reported to 
be more controllable than the financial market measures (71.4% to 28.5%) although 
neither was significantly correlated to RPE. Regarding rewards, it was welcomed to be 
firstly in cash (78.6%), then shares (71.4%), post-retirement benefits (71.4%) and 
holidays (67.1%) and 57.1% agreed that varying the form of reward would enhance 
RPE.
The respondents in Steel provided some comments regarding other possible uses of RPE. 
For example, the Specialist in Customers’ Contracts considered that RPE could tie the 
company to the environment and determine the company’s position in front of the 
competitors. The Quality Controller regarded RPE as a mechanism to motivate
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employees to improve their skills continuously and provide a chance for ambitious 
individuals to prove their qualities. An Engineer in the Rat Production Factory recorded 
that RPE could shed the light on those who work harder and hence help them to get 
better jobs in the company or in other companies. Unlike Dairy respondents who were 
suspicious that RPE might ruin the group work spirit, a Chemist in the Inspection 
division in Steel argued that RPE might enhance co-operation between co-workers to 
compete effectively with rivals outside the company. However, the Head of the 
Production Shift, Engineer of Production Planning and Specialists in the Follow-up and 
Customer Services argued that similarity in type, ownership, technology and markets 
should be secured before doing any benchmarking. Furthermore, the Engineer in the 
Direct Reduction Factory suggested other peer groups such as the heavy industries 
sector and the most successful companies in the private sector as reference groups.
Observations on the interviews:
Attitudes towards RPE
The Operations manager approved RPE for many potential benefits: it could increase 
loyalty to the supportive work environment which encouraged hard work and enhanced 
creativity. The Production Control Officer added that RPE could polish merits, provide 
better job opportunities in other companies although it might feed "individualism". The 
Galvanisation Manager raised questions about how performance would be measured, by 
effort or by outcome. Regarding the roles of RPE, the Galvanising Manager while 
accepted the motivational part, inquired about the monitoring ability of RPE as:
“Performance” is a joint product of many inputs among which is the employees’ effort.
How would RPE separate the “human input” from the other inputs and monitor it?”
When RPE design manipulates its purpose
The Operations’ Manager in Steel debated that unattainable targets might work against 
the aims of RPE. His argument was; RPE was proposed to trigger employees’ needs for 
money and esteem. Nevertheless, if a target was too difficult, employees might lose not 
only money but social esteem as well, because they might be seen as lazy, not hard 
working individuals and not able to achieve their target. Therefore, unattainable targets 
might ruin the potential of RPE.
Long Term Considerations:
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The Production Officer, the Galvanising Manager and the Operations Manager who were 
interviewed, recorded that non-financial aspects such as quality, creativity, savings and 
safety were /should be clearly monitored under the control system and RPE. There were 
two roots for this importance: First, from the employees’ point of view, it meant that all 
dimensions of their performance would be included hence the measurement would be 
fair. Second; from the company’s view, that emphasised the organisational culture which 
stressed the importance of quality, development and creativity. Those items were seen as 
the pillars of long term growth and expansion.
Experience with market measures:
The three interviewees of Steel rejected market measures. The Galvanising Manager in 
Steel argued that if market measures were generally inefficient for any performance 
evaluation, they were particularly inefficient and irrelevant for RPE and the evidence 
was:
“Two years ago, some people played a game in the securities exchange and risen the share 
price of Steel rose from £ 170 to £240 in one week and it fell down again the week after. 
Was that a true change in our performance? Should we be rewarded for it?”
Balance between financial measures and non-financial measures:
In Steel company, the Production Controller called for a balance between the financial 
and non-financial aspects of work. In his view, appreciation of the non-financial 
measures should not eliminate or understate the importance of the financial measures 
because:
For me both the financial and non-financial measures are important. It is not 
enough that we report that the factory was producing 800 tons and now produces 900, but 
also how much it costs. We can produce a massive amount but instead of costing the ton 
£100, it costs us £200 for spare parts, fuel and oils. Cost is an element which we jointly 
control with the finance department. At the end of the month the finance department 
reports that, for example, the direct reduction division consumed (and costs) £11  per ton 
for spare parts, £25 per ton for fuel, £32 per ton for oils.
Features of organisational culture:
The Operations’ Manager recorded that Steel developed and encouraged the values of 
competition, participation and creativity. The Galvanisation Manager reported that the 
management at all levels was supportive to the levels below. Therefore, most of the 
proposals and the QCS (Quality Control Service) were raised and implemented by the 
shop floor workers. The company’s vice president showed a special concern for the 
technical issues (the company was awarded the ISO 9001 for quality and the ISO 14001 
for environment two years ago). The organisational culture of Steel had an open
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environment, a flow of communication, training and developing skills programmes for all 
employees.
Implications of being a joint venture with Japanese companies
Being a joint venture, Steel adopted some aspects of the Japanese management style. For 
example, The Operations Manager mentioned that division’s power to take decisions, 
leadership (at all levels) encouraged new ideas and proposals from all managerial levels. 
The Galvanisation Manager recorded that the system tied the individuals’ to the company 
through the job-for life which it provided. This gave not only security for jobs and less 
mobility among employees but made the company like the employee’s own family. This 
security was accompanied -in the Production controller’s view- by a satisfying pay 
package. Also the company’s culture supports “togetherness” and co-operation.
Reservations on RPE
The respondents of the three companies recorded some reservations on RPE, its merit, 
relevance to the various managerial levels and the basis of calculating the reward. For 
example, The Manager of October City factory of Dairy debated that RPE might destroy 
the group work spirit while competing to get the reward. On the other hand, the Follow- 
up Assistant Manager in Trade argued that this system could be difficult to apply on 
middle and lower management because it would need a huge amount of details about 
counterparts in other companies. The Galvanisation Manager in Steel considered that, if 
RPE was to be applied, it should be explained to the employees so that they understand 
and approve it. Regarding the basis of calculating the reward, the Head of Importing 
Construction Machines argued that if incentives were calculated as a percentage of 
salary, so whoever got a big salary would consequently received a big incentive. 
Therefor, the reward would not be because they worked hard, but because they were 
basically on a high salary.
Summary
In this chapter, the data of the questionnaire, interviews and other documentary sources 
for every individual company have been analysed. The data show that RPE was used in 
Dairy company only but not welcomed, not used and not welcomed in Trade and not 
used but sought to be used in Steel company. The participants from the three companies 
acknowledged the motivational role of RPE (but not the monitoring role) and RPE's 
ability to generate money rather than esteem (both money and esteem in Steel). Peer 
group, measures and rewards are influential variables on RPE. In Trade, peers from the
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same region and the same company, financial measures only, cash rewards, post 
retirement benefits and better work conditions were preferred. There was a strong 
implication of being a public company appeared in the governmental interference which 
was not favoured by the participants. In Dairy, peers from the same company, industry 
and top 100 companies, both financial and non financial measures and cash and shares 
reward were preferred. Links to stock market were a major factor behind applying RPE. 
In Steel, using a peer group from the same company would be expected to negatively 
impact RPE. Peers from the same industry and top 100 companies, both financial and 
non-financial measures, reward in cash and shares and holidays were preferred. Chapter 
seven provides different analyses for the data of the three Egyptian companies in various 
directions. Firstly the whole questionnaire data will be combined to provide a picture 
about the Egyptian practice of performance measurements and RPE. Then, comparisons 
between the companies, the sectors (public and private) as well as attitudes (those who 
agree on RPE, who refuse and who are neutral) will be examined.
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Chapter Seven
Presentation and Comparison Between The Companies
and Sectors of The Egyptian Data
* * * * * * * * * * *
Chapter six provided an account for the case of each of the three companies under 
investigation. Trade company was a public company, used to lead the national market of 
heavy machine e.g. for farming, construction and suffered from looses recently. RPE was 
not used and not welcomed because of the governmental interference and lack of 
controllability. However, if RPE was to be applied, it would be accepted to gain money 
and peers from the same region and the same company were preferred financial and 
accounting measures and rewards in cash, post retirement benefits and better work 
conditions. Dairy was one of three companies dominating the dairy market in Egypt and 
expands into Arabic countries. RPE was used, welcomed by and applied only to top 
management, while other managerial levels had some reservations on it. RPE was seen as 
a money generator tool and the comparison group was preferred to belong to the same 
company, industry and top 100 companies, non financial measures were preferable more 
than financial measures especially innovation and creativity as the way to grow and 
expand. Market implications led to thinking of RPE as a tie of top management’s reward 
to competition. Because respondents were on a good salary in Dairy, they welcomed 
RPE reward in cash or shares. Steel is number " 1" steel and iron producer in the Middle 
East. RPE was not applied there but sought to be applied provide money and esteem, 
peers preferred to belong to the top 100 companies. Employees preferred both financial 
and non financial measures of performance to keep close to the international standards 
and rewards were welcomed in form of shares.
This chapter presents comparisons between the data of the three Egyptian companies on 
different levels. Firstly, all the questionnaire data will be shown, then, comparisons 
between the three companies, the two sectors (private and public) and the attitudes 
towards RPE will be made. Thus, the chapter is divided into four parts. Part one 
provides an overview of all questionnaire data on Egypt collectively in order to 
demonstrate an overall view of RPE, attitudes, potential and design. Part two contains a 
comparison -in two sections- between the questionnaire data and the interview data of 
the three companies. Part three runs a comparison between the data of the two sectors 
(public sector and private sector). The last part reports an attempt to discriminate the 
quantitative data for the three Egyptian companies together according to the attitude 
towards RPE.
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(7.1) Part One
Collective Data of Egypt’s questionnaire
Table (7-1) provides a summary of the questionnaire data for all the Egyptian companies 
(71 data units). A detailed presentation of the questionnaire data is provided in Appendix 
(C-2). The table shows the frequencies, Spearman correlation coefficient and the 
significance of these correlation regarding RPE and its contingents.
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For all the Egyptian data, 45.1% of the total respondents agreed on RPE as an evaluation 
technique because of its ability to motivate employees (67.6%) through money (74.7%). 
Under RPE scheme, 62% of the respondents preferred to be compared to a peer group 
from the same company then peers from the same industry (46.5%) and peers from the 
same region (39.4%) and 36.6% preferred peers from the top 100 companies nation­
wide. The advanced preference of intrafirm comparison and regional comparison could 
be an impact of the respondents of Trade company which had this as their first 
preference. Preferring peers from the same industry appeared as a combined result of 
Dairy and Steel preferring it. In terms of difficulty to compete, with the different peers, 
47.9% of the respondents from all the Egyptian companies classified "competing with 
peers from the same company" as an "easily attainable target". However, competing with 
peers from the same region was described as equally (25.4%) easily attainable or difficult 
but attainable. Peers from the same industry was best described as a difficult but 
attainable target by 42.3% while peers from the top 100 companies were equally 
considered (21.1%) extremely difficult and barely attainable or too difficult and unfair. 
Spearman correlation showed a significant association between peers from the same 
company, region and industry and RPE. Also it revealed a significant coefficient between 
RPE and the difficulty to compete with peers from the same company (at p=.05) and 
difficulty to compete with peers from the same region (p=.07). This suggests that, 
respondents saw that the more difficult the peers from the same company and region 
were, the more RPE could be motivating.
In terms of measures, the overall view shows a tendency to prefer non-financial measures 
first (77.5%) as supported by respondents in Dairy and Steel followed by favouring 
financial measures (67.6%) as firstly chosen by Trade participants. Both financial 
measures and non-financial measures are significantly correlated to RPE. Within the 
financial group of measures, the accounting based measures was favoured (62%) over 
the market based ones (which were embraced by 28.1%). Only accounting measures 
were significantly correlated to RPE. For the whole sample, cash is the first preference 
for rewards (81.7%), followed by shares (49.3%) -generated from the support of Dairy 
and Steel respondents- then holidays (46.5%), better working conditions (40.8%) and 
post-retirement benefits (38%) sought by Trade respondents. Cash, shares and better 
working conditions were significantly correlated to RPE at 95%. Post-retirement benefits 
were correlated to RPE at 90%.
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The regression model indicated that the objectives from work as a group had a 
significant influence on RPE due to money (sig. =.002) and esteem (sig. =.102). With 
regard to the influence of performance measures on RPE, the group of different peers 
(not including the top 100) was influential at p=.05 led by peers from the same region 
(sig. =.06). Including the top 100 made the group significant at p= .10. However, the 
regression of the different degrees of difficulty related to each peer group -together- and 
RPE was not significant. Nonetheless, the difficulty of peers from the same company - 
individually- had a significant impact on RPE at 95% confidence interval. The financial 
and non-financial performance measures together were significantly influential -as 
indicated by regression- also were the various types of reward group.
(7.2) Part Two 
Comparison between the three firms
(7.2.1) Section One: Questionnaire data
While the previous section set out the case for each company individually, the intention 
here is to trace some similarities and dissimilarities between the three firms, as 
summarised in table (6-4):
Table (7-2) Comparison between the three companies regarding RPE
Variable Trade co. ( Public) Dairy co. (Private) Steel co. (Joint Venture)
Fact: use RPE No Yes No
Attitudes: 
Accepting RPE 44.5 38.1 57.1
Objectives which 
RPE satisfies
money money money- esteem*
RPE desisn 
Preferable peers same region- 
same company
same company 
-industry 
top 100*
same company (negative 
correlation) - top 100*- 
industry
Measures Financial
Accounting*
Non Financial
- financial 
Accounting
- market
Non Financial 
- financial* 
not any
Rewards Cash- post 
retirement benefits 
-better work 
conditions
Cash- shares Cash-shares- holiday*
*  Calculated as the % of those who agreed and strongly agreed to total number of respondents * p= .10
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This table can be read as: (a) There are some attitudes/ preferences shared by the 
respondents of the three companies (b) Some attitudes shared in a cluster (c) Some 
unique aspects in each company. This section highlights these directions as the following 
figure outlines.
Trade
U nique (privat^)
(public) uniqi
Prefer peers from sam e region
Post- retirement benefits + better
work conditions
Shared by all:
RPE fo r  money 
Financial measures
Shared on this axis
Peers From the same com pany Nothing shared!!
Reward in cash
Dairy Steel
(joint venture) U nique
Market measurer's. Shared on this axis
Correlated to RPE ) Peers from  same industry + top 100 companies /'R P E  neg. cor. Peers
from  same co.
Prefer non financial measures \  prefer holidays
Prefer rewards in shares ^ ^ _ R P E  for esteem
Figure (7-1) What is shared and what was unique regarding RPE in the three companies 
First: What is shared between the three companies
While the three companies differed as to whether or not they currently use or prefer to 
use RPE, the data showed that the participants of the three companies were similar in 
seeking money from RPE, appreciating the financial measures of performance and 
rewards in cash.
Second: What is shared in a cluster
On the cluster level, respondents of Trade and Dairy preferred peers from the same 
company. For Trade it was an aspiration and for Dairy it was a reflection of reality where 
intrafirm comparisons were a usual practice and welcomed as a version of RPE for non­
senior managerial level. The respondents of Dairy and Steel aspired to compete with
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peers from the same industry (as currently used in Dairy) and the top 100 companies 
nation-wide. While neither of the companies was among the top 100, both had an 
advanced position in their industries. Dairy was one of the three companies that 
dominated the dairy market in Egypt while Steel was the biggest steel producer in Egypt 
and the Middle East. Both companies appreciated non-financial measures. In Dairy, 
quality and creativity were ways to compete effectively and to support the expansion 
strategy. In Steel, quality and safety were crucial to survive in the international arena. 
The respondents from the two companies preferred shares as a reflection of the high 
salary which they received and an indication of the risk-taking attitude which their 
company encouraged.
Third: What is unique in each company
Some attitudes were recognised by the individual companies. In Trade only peers from 
the same region appeared as a preferred peer group, rewards in the form of post­
retirement benefits and better working conditions. These unique features reflected the 
situation in Trade. Being a retailer, the company was interested in the performance of 
rivals who were operating in the same area and were having the same access to 
customers. Dairy and Steel which were manufacturing companies seemed not to have the 
same concern. Also because Trade was a public company, it was directly affected by the 
legislation regarding labour. At the time of doing the empirical work, new legislation 
allowed employees in the governmental units and public sector to have early retirement 
at the age of 45 for an attractive package of benefits. In addition to this, 36% of the 
respondents of Trade belonged to the senior level who -according to the promotion 
system in the public sector which materially depended on time spent in the grade /post- 
would fall within the age scale which was eligible for early retirement packages. These 
reasons might explain the concern of Trade's participants to receive RPE rewards in a 
post-retirement form.
In Trade, RPE was not used and rejected -as detailed earlier- due to a lack of 
controllability over targets and performance which were governed by the state’s policies. 
However, if RPE was to be used, the similarity between companies should be secured 
and then, peers and rewards (but not the performance measures) would be influential, 
and the financial measures were the only type currently used and preferred.
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In Dairy, the unique features were using RPE (although data showed a limited approval 
for it) and market measures were positively and significantly correlated to RPE. The 
Marketing Manager explained that RPE helped in linking the company to the business 
environment and was consistent with Dairy’s growth and expansion strategy in 
monitoring its position among competitors. Moreover, The Managing Director debated 
that top management was responsible for handling the impact of competition and RPE 
provided a means for reviewing whether top management took that responsibility. 
However, applying RPE on an intrafirm basis was welcomed for non-senior levels. In 
Dairy, market measures were found strongly correlated to RPE. This indicate that it 
might be an impact of the securities market on Dairy. The Managing Director and the 
Marketing Manager explained two related points. First, top management was responsible 
for managing competition and the expansion policies and in the meantime it was given 
the authority and flexibility to take whatever decisions were required. Dairy company 
mainly operates locally, therefore -as the Marketing Manager indicated- "the dairy 
market" was both known and representative for members. A consistent thread could be 
traced in that direction because market measures were seen as influential, meanwhile, 
peers from the industry and the top 100 companies were preferred as comparison groups 
and shares were preferred as a form of pay.
In Steel, RPE was not currently used, but welcomed by the staff. It should be noted that 
RPE was found negatively and significantly correlated to peers from the same company 
(unlike the case in Trade and Dairy). The Galvanisation’s Manager recorded that they 
experienced some benchmarking processes where some operations and costs were 
matched with similar steel factories in Germany and Japan. That helped in diagnosing 
some extra-spending and waste. Such experience might not be gained if the comparison 
was confined to colleagues and co-workers. This reveals that respondents in Steel 
focused on the “learning” side of RPE rather than the "motivating" side of it. Holidays 
appeared in the list as a preferable form of reward and this was a reflection of real 
practice.
(7.2.2) Section Two: Interview data
In order to keep the chapter to a reasonable length and maintain the presentation of the data in 
focus, this section will be allocated directly to the data about RPE. A lull exposition and 
analysis of the companies’ practices of control systems is provided in Appendix (C-3). This 
section consists of three main parts: first a report on the facts and attitudes towards RPE. The 
second part will shed light on the contingents of applying RPE. The last part identifies some 
implications of organisational culture and national features on controls, employees’ response 
and to RPE.
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Section 2-1: Facts and  attitudes about RPE
What is the position of RPE among the other evaluation techniques?
When the importance of RPE -relative to the other evaluation techniques was investigated in 
this research, the Marketing Manager in Dairy supported the internal comparisons more than 
RPE on the basis that:
It is more effectiveness. The individuals feel it and its effects more. If we say 
your colleague in the maintenance department has been awarded a "recognition 
certificate" because of some good performance, all staff will be impressed 
because they know their colleague and they know the working environment so 
they can recognise why this has been considered an outstanding achievement
The Head of the Galvanising division in Steel adopted the same point of view with special 
emphasis on the importance of the budget as the first evaluation criterion.
The questionnaire respondents supported the previous view where -in total- the performance 
evaluation criteria were ranked as follows:
Comparing to the budget- comparing to the past- comparing to peers
Different attitudes towards RPE:
Different attitudes could be discovered among the participants in each company. Table (7-3) 
summarises the attitudes and the explanation given by each interviewee. The aim of this 
summary is to detect the general pattern in each company.
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Table (7-3) Participants’ attitudes towards RPE
company interviewee the attitude reasons behind the attitude
Trade
(public)
-Planning & follow up 
manager
-reject -the pressure and difficulty with low pay in Trade 
incomparable, no local equivalent peer to compare 
with.
-Planning & follow up 
manager assistant
-reject there is a big divergence in pay and work 
environment + 1 am not responsible for my 
company’s losses.
- Importing officer -reject losses - internal comparisons more effective, due 
to sharing the environment, will reveal differences 
in effort.
-Maintenance engineer -accept - it will feed competition + improvement by 
learning from successful peers
Dairy
(private)
- Managing director -accept - our experience show that performance 
comparisons triggers creativity.
- Marketing director -accept -for top management + in establishing stage, we 
used to check competitors’performance to 
challenge our management, was associated to 
more money and recognition
- Delivery chief -reject - who should we be compared with? how 
similarity in work condition, load, facilities can be 
guaranteed before the comparison.
Steel
(joint
venture)
- Operations manager -accept - it will increase loyalty to the supportive
environment +
creativity.
-Production control 
officer
-accept - it would motivate and polish merits + might 
provide better job opportunities in other companies 
+ but it feeds "individualism"
- Galvanising division -reject - similarity should be guaranteed before a 
meaningful
comparison takes place.
Firstly, the attitude of the interviewees were consistent with that of the questionnaire 
participants in Trade and Steel but not in Dairy where 2 of the 3 interviewees belonged to the 
top management that introduced the scheme and supported it. However, the table above 
shows that there is a general attitude against RPE in Trade company which did not -in fact- 
use RPE. In Dairy and Steel, the attitude towards RPE was welcoming rather than rejecting. 
In Trade, the low salary, the discouraging working system, difficulties and the governmental 
interference in planning and lack of a constructive environment which encouraged creativity, 
all these reasons undoubtedly formed the negative attitude which the employees hold towards 
RPE (as detailed in Trade section of this chapter: page 137).
In Dairy company where RPE was already applied to senior management, the interviews 
sustained the general attitudes which welcomed RPE. Both the Managing Director and the
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Marketing Manager stressed the potential outcomes of RPE. For example, the Managing
Director argued that performance comparisons would enhance creativity:
Once the production manager suggested changes in the production scheduling and 
asked us to approve radical changes in the materials’ supply, in that way, we could 
defeat "A1 Mutahedein" company which was competing in producing dairy 
products at that time. As a result of this plan, the production improved. Here, the 
comparison with other companies fed the ambition of the staff.
The work of competitors has been a tool for drawing the company’s strategy and a tool for 
operationalising this strategy, as the marketing manager explained:
For a new company, to get a place in the market, you should outperform the 
competitors, if  only in one aspect. We built our strategy on a “low cost, vast sales” 
basis and we believed that higher quality and lower price is our way to apply that 
strategy. We also used to “pilot” our new products in the market, we used to ask 
customers: how they find the new cheese -for example- in terms of taste, shape, size 
and price compared to the cheese of our competitors.
The Chief of Delivery to the Southern Region in Dairy raised some reservation on RPE. 
More specifically he argued against using RPE for non- top management level (e.g for 
drivers and deliver staff) because in his view:
It is difficult to do external comparisons of drivers’ performance, With whom will 
our drivers be compared? Drivers from the private sector or public sector? I know 
that in the private sector they buy the best vehicles and they hire the best drivers. 
The public sector has many problems.
In Steel, the attitudes followed the same direction as in Dairy, where there was general
approval for RPE but with one reservation about guaranteeing similarity before doing the
comparison. The Manager of the Galvanising division (who was against RPE) argued that, 
there were many problems raised from adopting Japanese management styles, for example:
a large portion of the engineers’ time is spent in the factory, in activities which 
are not initiated for them but for the Foremen. But because the foremen do not fulfil 
the specifications of “foreman” in the system, they always need the engineers’ 
support. This time should have been used in drawing up policies for the division 
and for intellectual and creative work.
However, the Operations Manager in Steel argued that esteem could be gained by working 
for a company which is well regarded by the society as he indicated
I would think RPE might provide esteem as well as money although our working
in a successful and well appreciated company gives us this social esteem.
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The drives behind RPE and the proposed roles o f RPE:
As the table above indicates, the participants who approved RPE in the three companies, 
accepted that it would motivate employees to work better by triggering the employees’ 
needs for money and esteem. The Managing Director of Dairy -although he approved the 
motivational role of RPE- raised some doubts regarding the monitoring ability of RPE and 
argued:
I find it rather difficult to agree that peer comparison would reveal employees’ effort. 
How would effort be measured initially? Is it the amount of work hours? Is it the 
number of produced units? Any output is a joint product of many factors how can I 
separate the impact of human effort from that of the management, the system, the 
policies....etc.
This suggests that, either the monitoring function of RPE has not been thought of before, 
even in the companies which implement it and/or that it is not a clear task for the technique. 
Regarding the needs which RPE was argued to trigger (i.e. money and esteem), the 
interviews revealed that money, esteem, creativity were fundamental needs to all employees 
in all managerial levels in all companies and the differences were in the importance which 
the person gave to each of them. The Assistance Manager of Follow- up in Trade argued: 
"all managerial levels need money, the person who has a million wants another" but the 
head of Galvanising division in Steels added: "Yes money is number one, but there should 
be numbers 2, 3 and 4". Another piece of evidence in seeking esteem was experienced in 
the three companies through non-financial rewards (such as a “thank you letter”, allowing 
promotion for talent, the company’s annual dinner ...etc).
The second sub- argument here is about RPE’s ability to satisfy money, esteem and other 
needs. The Managing Director of Dairy supported the argument that RPE triggers the need 
for money and esteem by an example from his own experience (as presented earlier) where 
competing with peers -during the establishment stage - was associated with gaining esteem, 
recognition, and money. The Maintenance Engineer in Trade related RPE to the national 
competitions in Egypt between companies such as the Production Cup which is awarded to 
companies for outstanding achievements and the Ideal Worker award which was awarded in 
each profession to the best performer.
The point which the researcher raises here is that, the Production Cup, is a contest between 
companies not individuals. The Production Control Officer in Steel raised an argument
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about the difference between running comparisons on companies or on individuals’ 
performance and expected each of them to have a different implication on individuals:
Comparisons between the employees in different companies, would raise self­
esteem. If it is run on companies, everyone would feel that he/she is a part of a 
successful entity but if the comparison is between "individuals" it would show a 
"successful individual" rather than " a successful company".
Why is RPE unfair
The manager of the Galvanising division in Steel company debated that RPE would be 
unfair in any case even if the comparison was between national companies. The source of 
unfairness he saw was; how the bad or good performance could be recognised as he 
enquired:
I do not think it would make RPE more attractive to me if  the comparison was held 
between Egyptian companies. It would still be unfair. My personal view is: if  I am 
compared to a manager in another company, they make losses and we make profits 
although the manager there works better than me, how are we going to sort the 
situation out? where is the fairness.
Where RPE is acceptable:
On the other hand, the participants mentioned a number of variables that should be 
considered in order to make RPE acceptable. The Galvanising Manager in Steel wanted all 
circumstances to be taken into account, this included economic, social and environmental 
circumstances, everything that might affect a manager when he took decisions, the freedom 
which he had to make decisions, ...etc. The Follow- up Assistant Manager in Trade - 
generally - put one condition for accepting RPE, it was to guarantee similarity between 
companies whereas the Importing Officer considered that it would be an obstacle to RPE 
because of the huge amount of data needed for the comparison. .
New vision/ roles/ understanding for RPE:
The participants in the enquiry provided further roles and versions of RPE. The first new 
version of RPE was the internal comparisons. The Marketing Manager of Dairy and the 
Assistant Manager of the Follow- up in Trade agreed with that view and the latter 
discussed:
It seems more reasonable if the comparison is held in the same company between 
people who work under the same conditions. In some companies, the employees do not 
get their salaries for three months, this is not the case with me. I receive my salary on 
24 or 26 of each month so are they the same circumstances?
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Here, the comparison was thought to be meaningful because of the environment within 
which the performance figures emanated were similar.
The Marketing Manager and the Managing Director of Dairy company which actually 
applied RPE, provided another use for RPE from their real experience. The company used 
RPE in planning because:
The company specifically seeks any areas where it can outperform the reference 
companies to enhance the effort in that direction and also to benefit from the 
experiences of other companies. Rewards are entitled upon meeting targets for top 
management.
The management’s basic rationale for this practice was thought to be; it was a tool to 
position Dairy among other dairy producers in Egypt and this highlighted the need for 
further investigation. For example, at what points could Dairy outperform other dairy 
producers such as; “Juhayna”, “Milky Land” [seethe Appendix (C-4) for further details 
about these companies] and the foreign companies which market in Egypt? Then Dairy 
could start to build strategies to face competitors.
Section 2-2: Contingents of RPE
This section reports the interviewees’ feedback concerning the research argument: what 
contingents affect RPE? This includes studying the components of the system (the peers, 
the measurements and the reward form) and any other variables suggested by the 
participants. Therefore, this section will be divided into four parts: Peers, measures, form 
of reward and other contingents. Table (7-4) below summarises the attitudes towards the 
proposed contingents of RPE and the reasons behind these attitudes.
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Table (7-4)
Attitudes towards the contingents of PRE and preferable peers, measures and form of
rewards
Targets
company subject attitude about 
target’s difficulty
the preferable 
peer group
why preferable
Trade
Dairy
Steel
-Maintenance engineer 
-Marketing manager
- Production control 
officer
-Target should be 
difficult but 
attainable
-Target should be 
difficult but 
attainable
-Target should be 
difficult but 
attainable
-private maintenance 
companies
Not mentioned 
-chemical and fertiliser
- we’ll improve from learning 
from good experiences
-similar industry
Measures
Company Subject attitude towards 
F. and/ or non 
Financial
Examples of 
Preferable measures
Why preferable
Steel
Dairy
Trade
- Production control 
officer
-Marketing manager
- Maintenance 
engineer
non F
F. and non F 
F. and non F
quantity - quality
Not mentioned 
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
- direct, has financial echo 
-both are important-reflect my work
Form of reward
Company Subject attitude towards 
form of reward
Examples of 
Preferable measures
Why preferable
Trade
Dairy
Steel
-importing officer 
-maintenance engineer 
-managing director 
-Galvanising decision
money only 
-non monetary 
-money only 
-money only
-cash
-accommodation
-cash
-cash
-the company’s share do badly 
currently.
-the company can negotiate for good 
contracts in the new cities.
- there is no reason why the company 
takes decision on my behalf.
-non cash scheme seem 
unnecessarily costly.
I: Peers
The feedback about the peers shown in the table above has two main points: target’s difficulty 
and the preferable peer group. A general attitude to be noted is that interviewees agreed on 
the importance of setting targets as challenging but attainable levels especially under RPE for
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various reasons. Firstly: because of the relationship between target difficulty and business 
strategy, as the Operations Manager in Steel explained:
The point of target’s difficulty is related to setting plans and it depends on the company’s 
strategy and whether it is going to continue with the same capacity or will increase it, 
whether it aims to maintain its market share or expand it. In each case targets are 
different.
Also, attainability of target was emphasised by the Operations Manager of Steel in order not 
to de-motivate employees and in order not to miss their rewards, as the Managing Director of 
Dairy argued (page 151 of the thesis).
Regarding the preferable peers, the Maintenance Engineer in Trade preferred to be compared 
to a maintenance company in the private sector so as to learn from a successful experience. 
The Production Controller in Steel (who holds a degree in chemistry) preferred chemicals and 
fertiliser companies or wider engineering companies.
II: Measures
In terms of measures, the general attitude was in favour of using both financial and non
financial measures. In Trade, although the financial measures only were currently used (and
this practice was welcomed by some employees such as the Follow- up Manager and his
assistance), the Importing Officer required non-financial measures to be used.
The employees’ attitudes in Dairy and Steel towards performance measures were not
divergent as the participants agreed on the importance of both financial and non financial
indicators as part of the organisation’ culture and actual experience with these measures. As
the operations manager in Steel stated:
Surely the efficiency of this system will be affected by measuring the performance in 
financial and non-financial terms. The non-financial terms are inevitable for us and 
neglecting them is a big deficiency.
Market measures
The participants disapproved using market measures under RPE. This was because of lack of 
controllability and representativeness that would negatively impact on the employees' income. 
For example, the Importing Officer in Trade explained his attitude and the situation in his 
company:
I do not welcome the proposal that my performance be measured by the share price 
or any securities index. My company has achieved losses in the last three years (about 
£m 21 in the last year alone) and is over-drawn from banks by about £  m 40 while I
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work hard. I am not responsible for the reasons or policies which have led to these 
losses and to the collapse of the share price. So why should my performance be 
evaluated by referring to it? It (the share price) does not represent my performance, 
my performance is represented by technical and financial measures.
The Production Controller in Steel directly predicted that the use of market measures
would worsen the response to RPE as:
I am not convinced by the market measures and I think RPE will be worse using these 
measures, neither I nor my peers would be responsible for the movement in the shares 
of our companies.
The managing director of Dairy company discussed the proposition that RPE would filter
the impacts of uncontrollable events from the performance measures. He argued that
from a theoretic point of view this might be correct, but in reality there was already a lot
of pressure on his managers by challenging them to compete with companies different
from Dairy in size, capital, technology, as he indicated:
For example, a company like "Halwani" -which is a branch of a Saudi 
organisation with huge investments- can mount a big/ strong advertising 
campaign on the TV, I might not be able to do the same or for the same period of 
time and these issues affect the share price. Regardless of these differences, I 
push my managers to compete with these companies. Here the situation is tough 
enough and the use of share price will not help, it will not change the fact that 
there are differences between our company and those competitors.
HI: Rewards
Regarding the form of reward under RPE schemes, different participants did not approve
the argument that diversifying the form of reward would enhance the system, as the
production controller argued:
I do not see any point in varying the form of reward. It would be like the 
company taking decisions on my behalf.
The managing director in Dairy agreed with this notion:
I do not think varying the form of paying the rewards would be of much use. From 
our experience, individuals prefer to take their money in cash and spend it as they 
wish. There is no reason why we should pay them in the form of a holiday, 
investment of shares, houses, ...or whatever.
This seems to be a general tendency among the interviewees -who belong to different 
managerial levels- to prefer receiving rewards in cash in the first instance. As The importing 
officer in Trade stated:
Generally and not related to RPE, cash is better. There is no point in the company buying 
shares on my behalf or paying for a holiday and deciding this as part of my remuneration 
package.
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The head of Galvanising division in Steel considered it would be unnecessarily costly 
to issue such plans as it would need a special division to run them.
The Importing Officer in Trade company raised a specific view about this:
In the last 3 years, our shares have been doing badly in the securities exchange and 
the performance of the company should improve in order to improve our shares 
performance. In principle, if  I want to invest in shares, there are some successful 
portfolios issued by the commercial banks for example A1 Ahli = National bank of Egypt 
and Misr Banquet = Egypt’s bank and other private and joint banks. In my view, these 
portfolios are more profitable. They are run by qualified and specialised staff. Also the 
two banks diversify the component of the portfolio by including national and 
international securities which would spread the risk and increase the probability of 
achieving profit.
It is worth mentioning here that Both A1 Ahli and Misr banks are the most popular 
and the biggest commercial banks in Egypt. They are also public and have been 
operating there for over a century and have finks with the international banks. For 
example there are finks between the A1 Ahli bank and Barclays.
In conclusion, it seems that the feedback from the interviewees was not in favour of 
the argument that varying the form of reward would enhance the employees’ response 
to RPE.
Other Contingents:
The feedback from the interviewees suggests variables other than the above which 
might affect RPE such as; the organisational culture, the characteristic of the public 
and private sector environment and the national culture. The following section will be 
allocated to report on these variables and how they have been highlighted by the 
subjects as well as how they might affect the control process generally and RPE 
specifically.
(7.3) Part three 
Comparison between the Public Sector’s Case and the Private Sector’s Cases
The following section divides the data into: the private sector’s data and public sector’s 
data and reviews what is shared and what is unique to each sector. The reasons for this 
analysis are also given.
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(7.3.1) Section One: Questionnaire data
This section is based on dividing the data into: data of companies belonging to the public 
sector (which is the Trade company) and data of companies belonging to the private 
sector (which are Dairy and Steel companies). Therefore, the data of Dairy and Steel 
companies will be aggregated together to form the private sector’s data. As in the 
previous section, the presentation will include the data from various sources 
(questionnaire, interviews, documentary material).
Why this comparison
The aim of this section is to detect the similarity and dissimilarity in the pattern of the 
data collected from the public and the private sectors. The reasons for this are (1) It has 
been observed from checking the questionnaire data and the interview data that there are 
differences in the control practices, rationale, long-term vision, perceptions and 
aspirations between the private sector cases and the public sector case. These differences 
are thought to stem from the implications of being a “state owned” or “privately owned” 
company, the organisational culture and the employees’ attitudes, the experience and 
expectations in each sector. (2) It has also been recognised that the public sector's data 
(Trade company) are remarkably different from the private sector’s (Dairy and Steel). 
However, there is a degree of similarity between the companies in the private sector 
(Dairy and Steel). (3) The two sectors are almost equally represented in the sample, as 
there are 36 usable questionnaire and 4 interviews for the public sector and 35 usable 
questionnaire and 6 interviews for the private sector, this suggests that the two sets of 
data can be compared.
(7.3.1) The questionnaire data of public vs. private sector
Table (6-6) below summarises the answers of the respondents in Trade which is a public 
company and both Dairy and Steel together as private companies. It should be noted that 
the critical value of correlation for each of the public sector’s sample and the private 
sector’s which has almost an equal samples (36 and 35 observations respectively) is .279. 
That is, a correlation coefficient below .279 means it is unlikely that an association would 
exist between the two variables in the whole population at a confidence level of 95%. 
Table (7-5) below presents the questionnaire data of each sector in a comparative form.
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Table (7-5)
Comparison between the questionnaire data of the public sector and private sector
-^Statistics
Variable
• % of 
Public
agree
Private
*  correlation to RPE 
Public Private
significance of correlation 
Public Private
RPE 44.5 45.7
Roles of RPE
Motivation 61.1 74.3
monitoring 50 45.7
Objectives from work
money 80.6 80 .44** .58** sig.** sig**
esteem 30.6 8.6 .24 .08 non sig. non sig.
creativity 27.8 34.3 .30 .02 non sig. non sig.
Peers from
The same company 61.1 62.8 .41** -.014 sig.** non sig.
The same region 65.6 22.9 .32** .19 sig.** non sig.
The same industry 41.7 51.4 .023 .48** non sig. sig.**
Top 100 38.9 37.1 -.13 .47** non sig. sig.**
Performance measures
Financial 77.8 57.1 .32** .34** sig.** sig.**
non financial 77.8 77.2 .006 .4 9 ** non sig. sig.**
Accounting 69.4 54.3 .23 .51** sig* sig**
market measures 22.3 34.3 .03 .25 non sig. sig*
Rewards
cash 86 .2 77.2 .29** .62** sig.** sig**
shares 38.9 60 .09 .52** non sig. sig**
post retirement benefits 25 51.5 .39** .14 sig.** non sig.
holiday 30.6 62.9 .11 .15 non sig. non sig.
work conditions 52.8 28.5 .39** .17 sig.** non sig.
• % of agree = % of respondents who agree and strongly agree to total respondents
*  correlation between a variable and RPE is Spearman correlation coefficient 
-sig** = p= .05 
-sig* = p=. 10
-all correlation relationships should be assumed positive unless otherwise specified
Potentials of RPE
RPE was approved by the private sector’s respondents more than the public sector’s 
(45.7% to 44.5%) to motivate employees (74.3% to 61.1%) and monitor employee’s 
effort (45.7% to 50%). However, the respondents in the two sectors equally agreed that 
money was the first objective from work which RPE could satisfy (80% in the private 
sector and 80.6% in the public sector). Although money as a goal from work was 
supported in the two sectors, it had a bigger correlation to RPE in the private sector.
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Peers:
The preferable peers in the private sector were, those from the same company (62.8%), 
same industry (51.4%) and the top 100 companies nation-wide (37.1%) respectively. In 
the public sector, the participants preferred peers from the same company (61.1%), 
region (65.6%) and industry (41.7%). The preferred peer groups significantly correlated 
to RPE in each sector.
Caution should be exercised in understanding this result as the researcher believes that it 
resulted from the type of activity of the public company -which had been investigated- 
rather than being a genuine feature of the public sector’s companies. As a retailer, Trade 
public company was interested in the location, where to operate, how much profit it 
could generate from a specific site and how the peers in the region performed.
It should be noted that in both sectors, the preference of peers moved from "competing 
internally" to "competing externally". However, the private sector data had a negative 
correlation to RPE. This could be because of the impact of Steel data which - 
individually- had that correlation.
Type of activity and performance measures:
In the private sector, 77.2% of the respondents approved non-financial measures to 
57.1% for financial measures but both were significantly correlated with RPE. In the 
public sector both types of measures were equally accepted (77.8%) but only the 
financial measures had a significant correlation with RPE. The linear regression predicted 
that, in the two sectors, performance measures would be influential by RPE. 
Respondents of Trade argued that the type of activity coloured the choice of the 
performance measures. In their view, Trade was a retailer and its respondents believed 
that the financial measures (e.g. profit, sales revenue,...) indicated the work involved 
because they do not do any transformation on the products/ services which they sell. 
Dairy and Steel were manufacturing companies therefore the non-financial aspects (such 
as quality, customer service, meeting time schedules,...) were more preferable and 
commonly used. Employees in the private sector pursued measures which were accurate 
(71.5% of the respondents) and comprehensive (54.3%). RPE was significantly 
correlated to the measures' accuracy and comprehensiveness. However, the financial 
measures were found correlated to accuracy only at p=.06 while the non-financial
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measures were positively and significantly correlated to accuracy and comprehensiveness 
but negatively to time related.
Market Measures:
Both sectors preferred accounting measures comparing to market measures; in the 
private sector, accounting measures were preferred by 54.3% to 34.3% to market 
measures and the gap increased in the public sector because 69.4% approved accounting 
measures to 22.3% for market measures. However, respondents in the two sectors had 
limited approval (25.7% in the private sector to 14.9% in the public sector) for the 
notion that market measures reflected their work satisfactorily. However, while the 
accounting measures were correlated to RPE in private sector at p= .05 and in the public 
sector at p= .09, market measures was correlated to RPE in the private sector only and 
that was at p= .07. This association could be due to the impact of Dairy data applied to 
the whole sample of the private sector. Moreover, only 34.3% of total respondents in the 
private sector compared to 30.5% of total respondents in the public sector, agreed that 
using financial market measures would enhance RPE.
The group of non financial measures which has been investigated, received different 
approval as follows in table (7-6) below:
Table (7-6) Sample of non financial measures:
variable public* Private*
Customer service 88.9 100
Good use of the resources 61.1 57.2
Innovation 94.4 45.7
Developing new markets 75 60
Quality 66 .6 91.4
* % of agree = % of number of respondents who agree and strongly agree to total respondents
In the private sector, quality has an advanced position because it is an emphasised item in 
the culture of the two companies and a means for outperforming competitors. Achieving 
budget gained a more advanced position in the public sector where “avoiding risk” and 
sticking to governmental decisions and procedures was the dominant feature, unlike the
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private sector which encourages creativity and risk-taking. Therefore, serving customers, 
providing quality higher than competitors, seeking new markets and targeting efficiency 
by making good use of the resources, are more advanced in the private companies. 
However, the respondents in Trade pursue innovation (which is not used currently) 
probably as a means for overcoming current problems. Customer service is similarly 
important for the two groups.
The frequencies in table (7-6) above show that the preferred measures in the public 
sector -respectively- were: innovation - customer service- developing new markets - 
achieving the budget - quality - good use o f resources- reducing costs
while in the private sector they were: customer services -quality -developing new 
markets -making a good use- reducing costs -achieving budget.
The order of preference might reflect the organisational culture and employees’ attitudes 
and inspirations in each sector.
Form of rewards:
The data reveal that, in the public sector the order preferred for receiving RPE’s reward 
is: in cash (86.2% accept), better working conditions (52.8%) and post-retirement 
benefits (25%). In the private sector, cash had the biggest appeal (77.2%), then holidays 
(62.9%), shares (60%) and post-retirement benefits (51.1%). When reading these data in 
the light of the respondents' comments and the companies' reports, two observations can 
be made. First, because of low pay in the public sector compared to the private, 
immediate cash was preferred more than other fonns to finance personal needs. High 
remuneration in the private sector, allowed employees to postpone receiving the reward 
immediately, aiming to gain more benefits from it in the future. That was probably why 
shares were preferred in the private sector. The second point is; respondents in both the 
private and public sectors reported that work conditions were generally poor in the 
public sector and satisfactorily provided in the private sector. Therefore rewards in the 
form of better working conditions were sought by the public sector respondents but not 
the private sector. The respondents in the public sector approved that varying the form 
of reward under RPE would improve the system more than the respondents from the 
private sector (69.4% to 48.6%). In summary, the differences in the pattern of data 
between the public and private sector can be shown in the following figure:
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Private sector Public sector
What is shared
RPE for money- prefer financial (and accounting)measures- reward in cashV v
What is unique What is unique
RPE used
Prefer peers from industry + top 100 prefer post-retirement benefits
Prefer non-financial measures +
Accept market measures prefer better working conditions
Accept shares
Figure (7-2)
What is shared and what is unique in the public and private sector regarding RPE
(7.3.2) Section Two: Interview data
Some differences between the public and private sectors could be recognised from the 
questionnaire and interview data. These differences extended to many issues such as how 
individual see themselves and their company, attitudes towards risk, level of pay and 
availability of facilities. Before exploring these differences, table (7-7) summarises the 
features of the private sector’s work environment and the public sector’s, as extracted 
and deduced from the data.
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Table (7-7) Features and implications of public sector vs. private sector 
(source: the respondents’ comments on the questionnaire and interviews)
Public sector Private sector
- Red Tape -Flexibility
- Seniority control - opportunities for merit
- Run for purposes other than profit, 
but performance is not matched to 
those purposes
- Run and evaluated on profit.
- Employees’ concerns are narrow: 
struggle to sort out problems
- Employees’ concerns are wide; 
environmental awareness, expansion,
-Central authority in taking 
decisions
Delegating authority and 
responsibility to various levels
-Heavy governmental interference - management takes its own decisions
-Competition and creativity are not 
noticeable features
-Competition and creativity are 
fundamental feature
-Low work load & low pay - Big work load & high pay
- No continuous development of 
staffs skills
- Training to develop staff skills is a 
basic practice
- Over employment - necessary staff only is employed.
Differences between Public Sector and Private sector’s data:
I: How respondents saw themselves
In terms of how the interviewees’ saw and described themselves, in Steel company, the 
operations manager stated that, every employee tried -in his field- to contribute to the 
corporate goal via creativity, innovation and good use of time. Therefore, developing the 
skills of the staff was a continuous practice. He also predicted that money and esteem 
were important to everyone and differences in preferences depended on individuals; 
however, nobody preferred his income to decline, even the senior management, but 
money had limits in satisfying needs.
The production control officer in Steel highlighted issues at the corporate level and 
others at the operational level. For example, he perceived the company as: "We are” the 
best and biggest steel producer in Middle East and we seek to expand. The Head of the 
Galvanisation Division shared this attitude with the Production Controller and explained
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that the work system and environment in Steel strengthened the relationship between the 
worker and the company to the extent that people liked Steel and preferred it to then- 
own homes. He also gave this example:
" Literally, the work hours should finish at 4:30 PM, in reality staff normally happily 
stay till 7:30 PM and one might stay 36 hours continuously in the factory if  there is a 
problem. Also staff are proud of the company’s contribution to the local community and to 
health, safety and environmental awareness.
The Marketing manager in Dairy identified employees’ satisfaction through good salary 
and good work environment which encouraged creativity. Because the company sought 
to outperform its competitors in the dairy market via better products and lower prices, 
this created opportunities for individuals to contribute to the company’s success. New 
ideas and developments from all managerial levels were assured. Also, merit was 
acknowledged and supported and could lead to promotion to higher levels.
The chief of the delivery service of the Southern region believed that the employees in 
Dairy were in a better situation, compared to staff in other companies. In his view this 
was because, any transport service (either for people or goods) needed a good vehicle 
and a good driver and Dairy had both. The company had strong vehicles, which could 
handle the heavy load of work such as Chevrolet, Bedford, Mitsubishi and Daihatsu. 
Also the work was planned and allocated to the drivers so that they could do it 
comfortably and without feeling frustrated.
The interviews in Trade were coloured by the current financial difficulties (where the 
company had suffered losses and overdraft for 3 years), the lack of facilities and poor 
work system. The Importing Officer in Trade highlighted the lack of co-operation and 
initiatives among co-workers. The Assistant of the Follow- up Manager referred to the 
diversity in pay and work environment between individuals with the same qualification in 
the same job but in different companies. He also considered that money was not the 
solution to the current problems, there was a need for A more supportive work system. 
The maintenance engineer in Trade reflected on the lack of resources In providing poor 
services to customers.
In spite of the difficulties which have been highlighted by the participants of Trade and 
the disappointment with the current situation in the company, the assistant of Follow- up 
division’s manager, believed that the situation could improve since he stated:
We do not lack anything to succeed, we deal in goods with a rapid rotation rate and a 
high rate of liquidity. I believe we can pay back the bank as scheduled. We are required 
to compete with the private sector while I have my hands tied by restrictions, red tape, over­
employment and at the same time we do not have the facilities which the state gives to 
encourage the private sector.
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In addition to the differences in the employees’ view of themselves in the three 
companies, some features of the organisational culture of each company and their 
implications for the control system are highlighted in the following section.
II: Attitudes towards competition/ risk-taking
The manager of the Galvanising division reported that staff worked enthusiastically and 
took risks because they participated in the company’s success and made suggestions at all 
levels. Even the fact that the company had an overdraft currently, did not cause him any 
worry because he believed that:
There is no such thing as a “steady state”, a project might not make profit straight away all 
years through. If some circumstances caused losses, it is the duty of the labour force to support 
the company in difficult times just as they enjoyed the profits in the good times.
The Galvanisation manager in Steel, argued that there was a high level of aspiration 
among the employees and the company encouraged this attitude by internal comparisons 
and by an external comparison for the whole company.
The participants of Dairy shared the same attitude towards accepting competition as 
those participants of Steel. The Managing Director of Dairy stated that if the 
management feared competitors, it would do nothing. Therefore, its task was not to 
move in the shadow of competitors, but to stand up and compete with them. Thus, the 
company managed to create a place for itself in the milk and dairy market through 
gradual and steady expansion. On the other hand, the managing director indicated that 
there was already high pressure on the manager in Dairy. This pressure stemmed from 
the fact that managers were challenged to compete with companies with bigger 
investment, more advanced technology and better distribution channels. For example, the 
company competed with Qangary which is a Saudi company with considerable resources 
and Halwani which could invest in constant advertisements on the TV at peak time; 
something which Dairy could not afford, or not for the same period of time. However, 
the general manager of Dairy considered that the managers had succeeded in that 
challenge and the evidence was that Dairy now was one of the 3 leading companies in the 
milk and dairy market in the country.
On the other hand, in Trade, the importing officer gave an example of the attitude 
towards risk in his company:
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"Colleagues in the Finance department have returned -many times- a letter which I sent 
to them to pay a supplier, each time they ask for some more information, documentation. They 
want to protect themselves when it comes to accountability and the result is, more time is spent 
doing a job"
However, The questionnaire data supported these differences. The T test of differences 
pointed at significant variations between the private and public sector in the employees’ 
attitude towards competing with the average peer group or the best. The mean for 
choosing the average of peers is higher in the public sector than the private sector. This 
provides further evidence -in addition to the interviews - for the low risk-taking in the 
public sector compared to the private sector.
Ill: the level of pay
The assistant of the Follow- up Manager in Trade referred to the gap in pay and the 
working environment between individuals with the same qualification, in the same job 
but in different companies. The financial reports and internal documents of the three 
companies under investigation, showed that remuneration in the private sector was ‘2- 3 
times higher than in the private sector as detailed in table (7-8) below:
Table (7-8) Wages in Trade, Dairy and Steel (1996)
company number of 
employees
average annual 
wage (£)
total annual 
wages (£m)
Trade 2600 3787 9.846
Dairy 850 6362 5.407
Steel 3600 9202 33.127
Table (6-9) shows that the lowest average in the three companies was in Trade while in 
Dairy it was about twice as large as the average annual salary in Trade. The average 
salary in Steel outperformed that in Trade and Dairy and reached about 3 times the 
average in Trade and one and a half that in Dairy. That was one of the features of the 
public sector in Egypt, where wages were lower than those in the private sector.
There were two implications concerning the level of pay and motivating employees. In 
Trade, the low wages was one of the reasons which contributed to the employees’ 
dissatisfaction. The importing officer shared the disappointment with the Head of 
Follow- up Division who explained:
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We work under pressure, one might do the work of two although paid less than 
one’s peers in other companies. For example if  you look at an accountant here and one in 
a bank, you will find the workload is different, the work facilities are different and the 
pay is much better.
In Dairy, the high basic salary of the sales representatives was believed -by the marketing 
manager- to leave little opportunity for rewards to motivate employees. The marketing 
manager in Dairy argued that, if a sales representative received for example £200, if it 
rose to £500, this might motivate him to work harder but if he was receiving £1000 and 
it increased to £1500, then he might not be interested in collecting more. The big salary 
provided good satisfaction for his basic needs and more money might gradually lose its 
ability to motivate him. The danger here was not that his performance would stay 
constant but it might decline because of the competitors' push. In that case, other 
motivational tools (e.g. encouraging ambition, promotion, creativity, ...etc) should be 
considered and that was what Dairy was adopting.
This practice has been discussed in the literature (for example Emmanuel et.al. 1990) 
with reference to the level of pay and that of changeable reward. Setting the highest level 
of wages has been argued to be attractive for employee and motivating at the same time. 
More investigation for this particular pattern of remuneration in Dairy company will take 
place in chapter eight.
IV: Availability of facilities
The Maintenance Engineer in Trade and the Importing Officer reflected on the lack of 
resources in providing poor services. The former stated that using poor quality material 
and fuel and employees with limited skills were behind the poor services provided to the 
customers. The importing officer explained that his work involved a lot of contact with 
foreign suppliers and this needed a good communications network. The company's 
current telephone system was out-of-date and unreliable. These issues made doing a job, 
both more difficult and more time-consuming. On the other hand, the Marketing manager 
in Dairy reported that one of the company's pillars of success, is through acquiring new 
technology and communications systems. The company's head office and factories 
provided facilities which were supportive for the staff. Steel's operations manager stated 
that the company invested in technology in the new factories which it established and in 
the renewal processes. An up-to-date and reliable communications network existed 
where the company was open to the industry nationally and internationally. The 
company's home page on the internet provided a useful tool for both the company and 
potential investors to interact.
The following section highlights aspects in the organisational culture of each company 
and their implications for the control system. In spite of the difficulties which have been
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underlined by the participants of Trade, the Assistant of Follow- up Division believed 
that the situation can improve as quoted in the section about "How respondents saw 
themselves", page 187.
Organisational culture
There were various aspects of organisational culture that could be traced in every 
company. In Steel for example, the management believed that the best person to provide 
a solution for a problem, was the one who would do the job himself. Therefore, most of 
the proposals and the QCS (Quality Control Service) were suggested and implemented 
by the shop floor workers. Competition, employees’ participation and management 
support were basic values of the company’s culture, as the Galvanising manager reported. 
Management at all levels, was supportive to the levels below, and there was a special 
concern from the company’s vice president for the technical issues. That emphasised the 
importance of the non-financial aspects of the work. Combined with that were, the open 
environment and the flow of communications between the various managerial levels. 
Also, providing training and developing skills programmes for employees has been a 
continuous practice by the company. This training took many forms, either internally in 
the training centre of the company or externally or abroad. This practice was applicable 
to all managerial levels from workers, foremen to engineers and administrators.
The first feature in Dairy’s organisational culture was encouraging competition among 
employees via internal and external comparisons. When doing so -as the marketing 
manager stated- the company depended on providing products with higher quality and 
lower prices (low price, vast margin). Nevertheless, the company did not become 
involved in “price war” with competitors. Alternatively, the company sought creativity 
and controlling costs and working more effectively. In order to undertake this strategy, 
the company depended on quality and customer care as the way to achieve its goals.
The T test of differences showed significant differences between the public sector data 
and that of the private sector in terms of employees' participation. The mean of 
participation was higher in the private sector whereas the mean of being consulted was 
higher in the public sector.
(7.4) Part four 
Analysing data by attitude towards RPE
In order to investigate whether this picture differs according to the managerial level or a 
preference for RPE, the T test was operated and following are the results.
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Splitting data by preference for RPE
The frequencies of the whole Egypt data showed that 45.1% of the respondents accept 
RPE as an evaluation and reward technique, 42.2% did not specify whereas 7% clearly 
rejected RPE. When tracing the differences between these three sub-groups of data, the 
T test showed that there were significant differences (at p= .05) between those who 
agreed on RPE, those who disagreed and those who were neutral about RPE.
Regarding the "agree"- "disagree" groups
The table shows that those who approved RPE as an evaluation and reward technique 
believed that they could gain money by it. They also took some part in the performance 
system of their companies and their performance was matched against that in the 
previous periods and with peers. However, in this group’s view, the comparison under 
RPE should be made with the average of the peer group and not its peak point. Also 
performance should be measured in both financial (e.g. measurements of achieving 
budget) and non-financial terms (e.g. customer service measures).
This data reveal that those who respond to RPE, do so to earn money (and not esteem). 
This disproves the theoretical assumption of social comparison theory (Young 1986, 
Fredrickson 1992) and this could be extended to expect that employees’ attitudes, 
perceptions and reactions to the package’s design and components would be driven by 
their primary motive which is earning money. Hence, employees preferred the 
performance measures which would not diminish their reward under RPE scheme.
Regarding the "agree"- "neutral"groups
The T test shows significant differences between these two groups regarding: the ability 
of RPE to monitor effort, the reverence of RPE for non-senior management, compared 
with peers from the same company, preferring accounting measures, cash and better 
working conditions.
The main point to be observed here is the difference between the two groups regarding 
the monitoring role of RPE. In this study, RPE was measured by the summation of 
answers to its motivational and monitoring abilities, so if there is a significant difference 
between two groups regarding monitoring, this meant that half of the measure was 
controversial between the two groups.
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Regarding the "rejecting"- "neutral" groups
The T test indicates that there are significant differences between those who reject RPE 
and those who are neutral about it regarding the motivational and monitoring of RPE and 
its ability to generate money for them. The two groups also differ in their participation in 
the control system, comparing performance to the past and to peers and the relevance of 
RPE at all managerial levels. The two groups also disputed whether performance should 
be compared to the average or the top of the peers and whether performance should be 
in non-financial terms. The differences extend to all forms of rewards under 
investigation.
While the basic difference between the "agree"- "neutral" group was about the 
monitoring ability of RPE -where the former group approved it whereas the latter did 
not- the conflict between the opposition group and the neutral group extended to both 
the motivational and the monitoring abilities of RPE.
Overall comment
The following remarks could be made regarding the T test for differences between 
respondents who agreed (45.1% of the total respondents), disagree (7%) and were 
neutral (42.2%) to RPE, while 5.7% did not answer the enquiry:
• There is no dispute between those who agreed and those who did not agree on RPE 
regarding its motivational and monitoring roles, nor regarding its potential to produce 
money for the participants.
• There is a conflict between those who agreed and those who were neutral regarding 
the monitoring part of RPE. Given that 45.1% agreed on RPE, and 42.2% was 
neutral, then, RPE is welcomed in a weak way. That is, it is almost the same for 
respondent to accept RPE or not care about it. In either case, the respondents 
approved it as a mechanism which could motivate employees and generate money for 
them, but not as a mechanism for monitoring employees’ efforts in work.
• Those who rejected RPE showed greater suspicion towards both the motivational and 
monitoring abilities of RPE and to money being gained through it, than those who 
were neutral about it.
Summary
In this chapter, the data of the questionnaire, interviews and other documentary sources 
have been analysed. Being a summation of the individual companies, the questionnaire 
data of all Egyptian companies showed a lack of acceptance of RPE, and if accepted, the
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aim was to gain money rather than esteem. The preferable design for RPE was to use a 
peer group from the company, then industry and region and performance is sought to be 
in financial and non-financial terms. Many forms of rewards were welcomed: cash, 
shares, better work conditions and post-retirement benefits.
Respondents of public and private sectors shared the attitude to accept RPE to gain 
money rather esteem, not to decline the importance of financial measures of 
performance, to prefer accounting measures over market measures in RPE packages, and 
to take its reward in form of shares.
However, there were some aspects of dispute between the two sectors regarding the 
organisational culture, level of pay, attitude towards risk, availability of facilities. For 
example, a strong implication of being a public company (Trade) was the governmental 
interference in planning and running the company, that was seen as a loss of 
controllability which hinder the appeal of RPE. The poor facilities in public sector 
resulted in the respondents preferred to get RPE reward in form of better work 
conditions. While in the private sector companies (Dairy and Steel) higher tendency to 
take risk led to preferring peers from the same company, industry and top 100 companies 
and performance to be in both financial and non financial terms. Higher salaries made 
respondents in private sector prefer reward in cash and shares. In private sector also, 
RPE was correlated to using market measures and competition which the companies 
were exposed to, was one major factor behind applying RPE. The environment of private 
sector (rather than public sector) seems generally relevant for applying RPE and internal 
comparisons in the company was seen as another version of RPE relevant for middle 
management. Chapter eight reports the data of United Utilities in England. This includes 
the data from various sources, integrated to present an outline about the company, the 
control system and RPE.
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Chapter Eight
England Data- United Utilities pic 
Presentation, Analysis and Commentary
Chapter seven reported the Egyptian data all together and on different levels. The 
questionnaire data of the Egyptian companies -taken together- carried some features 
from the individual companies. There was lack of acceptance of RPE as in Trade and 
Dairy individually. However, if applied, it was expected to provide money but not esteem 
as the picture of Trade and Dairy told. The preferable peer group was that which 
belonged to the same company first (as in Trade and Dairy), the same industry (as in 
Dairy) and the same region (as preferred in Trade). Performance was preferred to be in 
financial and non financial terms (as in Dairy and Steel) and rewards were welcomed in 
cash (as preferred by all), shares (as in Dairy and Steel), better work conditions and post 
retirement benefits (as in Trade).
There were some differences between public sector and private sector with regard to 
organisational culture, level of pay, attitude towards risk, availability of facilities. The 
environment of the private sector generally seemed to suit RPE more than public sector 
because the former provided a supportive culture which encouraged creativity, taking 
responsibilities and risk, good facilities and high pay.
This chapter provides a report, analysis and commentary on the control system. This 
highlights the system as it is set, in terms of planning, measuring, evaluating and 
rewarding performance and as it is perceived by participants. Separate section is 
allocated for the company’s practice of RPE, the rationale, potential, experience and 
context. A special attention will be paid to the implications of variables such as 
competition in the market, overseas activities, type of customers (e.g. the huge 
institutional customers), what is acceptable, what is fair, how the interviewees see the 
company, how they see themselves and the business culture. The chapter is divided into 
three parts; firstly: a background about the company and a summary of the control 
system. Secondly there is a presentation of the questionnaire data and thirdly a 
presentation of the interview data.
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(8.1) Part One 
The company’s background and the control system
(8.1.1) Background of the company
United Utilities PLC was created in October 1995 following the merger of the UK utility 
companies Norweb and North West Water (Source: The company’s home page on the 
internet: http://www.unitedutilities.com as checked on 11/12/1999). The company 
operates in water distribution, water waste treatment, electricity generating and 
distribution & telecommunications. The company’s Annual Report and Accounts 
1999 shows that its services were provided to over 37 million customers, three-quarters 
of whom are overseas (in 41 countries). Furthermore, United Utilities’ turnover from 
continuing operations was £2.276 billion and the operating profit was £ 691.0 million. 
The company’s average number of employees was 10,500 employees. The group’s 
headquarters are in Warrington (there is also a central branch in London). The company 
rates itself, as one of the world’s leading suppliers of high quality utility and business 
support services. The company’s major contribution, through its different operations and 
investments, is to maintain sustainable improvements in the natural environment.
Around the world, the company serves a further 30 million people from Argentina to 
Australia. It enjoys an operating profit after development costs of £5.1 million. New 
projects have been won in the United States. It seeks water and wastewater operating 
contracts, as well as electricity distribution and supply opportunities. United Utilities has 
substantial contracts in Argentina, Australia, Scotland and North America, where US 
Water is jointly owned with its partner "Bechtel", operates water and wastewater 
systems.
Bechtel is a global engineering-construction organisation. Bechtel provides premier 
technical, management, and directly related services to develop, manage, engineer, build 
and operate installations for customers world-wide. Being a world wide company, 
Bechtel works on a variety of construction projects in over 140 countries, with a $12.6 
billion revenue in 1998 for completed work and $13.3 billion for new-booked work in 
1998. Some of Bechtel’s projects include building the Arab-oil transition pipeline in 
Kuwait, Space stations in Florida and California, the Channel Tunnel and the Hoover 
Dam (Source: Bechtel's web site: www.bechtel.com- as checked in 23/3/99).
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For United Utilities, the home territory is the UK regulated environment and the 
company has been through the process of privatisation. The company has a strong 
financial track record and excellent relationships with international financial institutions 
and good access to funding for projects. Therefore, it can provide private sector 
investment to upgrade and operate facilities on behalf of a municipality or a nation state, 
with varying degrees of public or private sector ownership to suit local requirements. 
The size of operations in the various activities -according to 1999 Annual Report was 
shown as:
UK Water and Wastewater:
average 2,000 megalitres of drinking water supplied daily 
40,600 kilometres of water mains 
39,700 kilometres of sewers 
£960.1 million turn over 
UK Electricity
£357.2 million turnover 
23,800 GWh of electricity 
45,000 kilometres of underground cable 
14,000 kilometres of overhead lines
(8.1.2) Section one: The control system in United Utilities 
Features of targets:
These guidelines revealed that United Utilities was committed to help people achieve 
their potential and gain recognition for their contributions to the organisation. These 
guidelines linked the preferable features of targets to leadership. This implied two issues; 
first: employees' participation in planning and the importance of goal clarity. However, 
the guidelines drew the attention of the directors to define the key goals and prioritise 
them according to the overall plan of the group. No standard format for objectives was
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provided but the guidelines recommended the following set of features to be in the 
targets under “Preview of Objectives of (1997/1998):
♦ Specific
♦ Measurable
♦ Attainable
♦ Relevant
♦ Time-related
The performance Evaluation System:
The Performance Management Guidelines (Appendix D-l) introduced two new policies 
in the performance planning and review; Performance Management Review in April/ May 
each year and a Learning Review in October.
I: The Learning Review
The Learning Review would develop an individual Learning Plan which would identify 
activities to be undertaken during the next year to:-
♦ improve the employee’s current level of performance against agreed objectives and
♦ gain the level of experience and competence to work in different roles to help the 
employee progresses to meet his/ her career aspirations.
II: The Performance Management Review
The Performance Management Review was designed to increase the amount of shared 
information. In that process, an employee should receive constructive feedback on their 
performance and their could discuss with his/ her manager how their performance 
impacted the Directorate’s overall ability to achieve its business goals. The Review 
should be based on two areas:-
♦ a discussion of the employee’s performance during the previous year against 
objectives
♦ the setting of suitable individual or team objectives for the previous year.
The Performance Management Review discussion should rate the performance 
as: Excellent - Very Good- Good- Satisfactory- Unsatisfactory.
The performance rating would then be used to build rewards as part of the annual salary 
review in July.
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Remuneration policy’ objectives:
United Utilities’ annual review report of 1999 revealed that United Utilities aimed to 
attract, retain and motivate appropriately talented individuals at all levels and sought to 
provide competitive salaries and benefits for all its employees. Within that framework, 
the remuneration committee’s policy objectives were to ensure that the remuneration 
packages:
- were directly aligned with the performance of the Group and the interests of the 
shareholders; and
-fairly and responsibly rewarded executives for their contribution to the Group’s 
performance
It is worth mentioning that, the Group compensation and pension manager who was 
interviewed for this research claimed that the committee’s composition, operation and 
responsibilities complied with the recommendations of the Greenbury Report. The 
objectives above (attract, retain and motivate employees) and those related to keeping 
comparable packages to the practice in other companies, were confirmed by the group 
remuneration manager who was interviewed in this research. He argued that, two 
methods were adopted to fulfil the objectives above: first; consultation with employees 
regarding the remuneration plans and satisfying the professional recommendations (such 
as Greenbury Report).
The first observation on these guidelines, is that, they lack any “guidance” for 
“performance measurements”. Secondly, it appears that the core evaluation criterion in 
United Utilities is related to the objectives and is carried out once a year. Senior 
management is compared to: the objectives and the FTSE 100. The directors and other 
levels are matched against the objectives only.
(8.2) Part Two: The research data of United Utilities
(8.2.1) Section One: The questionnaire data
The questionnaire data have been collected from United Utilities group by 26 
questionnaire (as detailed in chapter 5). Details of the analyses of the questionnaire data 
of United Utilities are provided in Appendix (D-2). A summary of the analyses is shown 
in the table below.
It should be noticed that the regression results of United Utilities data should be 
interpreted cautiously due to the limited number of data points included (as N= 26).
In all tables which present statistics in this chapter, it should be recognised that:
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1. Number of the questionnaires is: 26
2. % of agree = % of respondents who agree and strongly agree to the total
3. correlation to RPE is Spearman correlation coefficient 
4 sig** = p= .05
5. sig* = p=. 10
6. all correlation relationships should be assumed positive unless otherwise specified
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4
O bservations from the questionnaire
Objectives from work and the mechanism of RPE
Although United Utilities applies RPE to reward top management, only 42.2% of the 
participants in the questionnaire enquiry accepted RPE, and agreed it could be a 
motivational (57.7%) and monitoring (53.8%) tool. While all participants sought to gain 
money and 96.1% looked for personal satisfaction from work, 80.8% were in agreement 
of doing outstanding work and promotion while 76.9% for esteem. However, only 
61.5% reported that money was currently satisfied with the company’s pay system 
compared to 34.6% for personal satisfaction, 42.3% for doing outstanding work, 30.8% 
for esteem and promotion. Regarding RPE’s ability to satisfy objectives from work, 
26.9% of the respondents agreed that RPE could provide them with money only, 15.4% 
saw that it could provide social recognition only whereas 19.2% agreed that it could 
provide both money and recognition. Furthermore, each of the three outcomes was 
significantly correlated to RPE.
Contradictions with the current practice of RPE:
(a) Peers:
The survey indicated that respondents from United Utilities preferred the 
comparison with peers from the same company (76.9%), a group from the same industry 
(61.6%), the top 100 companies (26.9 %) and peers from the same region (11.5%). What is 
worth observing here is that, peers from the top 100 companies was preferred by 
only 11.5% of the respondents, although United Utilities uses the FTSE 100 in its 
RPE scheme for top management. 5 participants in this investigation represented 
those members. This might suggest that the design of this item in the remuneration 
policy was not widely welcomed across the company. However, RPE was 
significantly correlated to peers from the same region and the top 100 companies.
As shown in the table, 61.6% of the respondents reported that being compared with 
peers from the same company was either easy or difficult but in both cases 
attainable, and that was the biggest support to a peer group. Competing with peers 
from the same region or from the top 100 companies under RPE was seen as too 
difficult and unfair (by 30.8% and 34.6% respectively). Peers from the same 
industry was equally described to be either difficult but attainable or extremely
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difficult and barely attainable (by 34.6%), however, a total of 42.3% described it as 
attainable, comparing to 38.4% who considered it unattainable. The point to be 
observed here is that, United Utilities used the FTSE 100 as a comparison group 
for its RPE scheme. Nevertheless, that comparison group was described by the 
participants in the enquiry to be "too difficult and unfair", this raises some doubt 
about the acceptability which that evaluation scheme held in the company.
As for the actions which the respondents might take if they considered the goals 
"too difficult and unfair", the greatest number of respondents (73.1%) reported that 
they would negotiate changes in the system. However, 38.4% would work against 
the system, whereas an equal percentage of 26.9% would continue to respond 
positively or ignore the system.
Spearman correlation showed a moderate significant association between RPE and 
peers from the same region and the association increased with peers from the top 
100 companies. This suggested that under RPE, the employees would likely be 
motivated to spend more effort when the comparison group belonged firstly to the 
top 100 companies, then to companies in the same region. This is consistent with 
the actual practice of United Utilities, which uses RPE to reward senior managers 
by comparing their performance to that of the FTSE 100. Also this shows that the 
employees in United Utilities might have a high level of aspiration. When the 
regression model was applied for RPE and all the peer groups, and for RPE and 
only for peers from the same region and the top 100 companies, both models were 
significant at a confidence level of 95%. However, the small number of 
questionnaires requires a careful interpretation of all regression output of United 
Utilities data.
(b) Performance measures
The use of both financial and non-financial measures under RPE was recorded by 
92.3% compared to 30.7% for the financial measures only. When exploring the 
features of the measures, the respondents made the following observations:
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Table (8-2) Features of financial and non-financial measures
The Feature Financial measures %* Non Financial measures %*
Comprehensive 46.1 73.1
Controllable 61.6 76.9
Time- related 61.5 61.5
Accurate 53.9 65.4
* % of agree and strongly agree to total respondents
As table (7-3) shows, the non-financial measures scored higher than the financial 
ones in being comprehensive (73.1% to 46.1%), controllable (76.9% to 61.1%), 
and accurate (65.4% to 53.9%). Both types of measures were equal in being time- 
related (61.5%). Although the data did not suggest that any of the two types of 
measures was mutually exclusive, this result held a contradiction with the current 
practice of RPE in United Utilities. That practice was built on financial only 
measures whereas the respondents preferred their work to be measured financially 
and non-financially under RPE. Spearman correlation showed no significant 
association between RPE and financial or financial and non-financial measures.
When groups of market-related measures, financial-related measures and operating 
measures were investigated, the most currently used measures were: meeting 
budget (approved by 80.8%), quality (65.4%), efficiency (57.7%), profit (53.8%) 
and customer service (50%). Regarding the preferred measures, 50% of the 
respondents reported that, customer service and quality were currently used while 
meeting the budget 42% reported it to be in use currently, otherwise there was a 
gap between how much the other measures were preferred and how much they 
were used. A comparative review between what was preferable and what was 
actually used is provided in table (8-3) below:
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Table (8-3) Comparison between currently used and preferred performance measures
in United Utilities
Performance Measures Currently used
%
Preferable to be used
%
M arket related measures:
securities market measures 3.8 3.8
-products & services market measures 15.4 23.1
factors (supplies) market measures 0 3.8
Financial related measures:
- meeting budget 80.8 42.3 '
-profit 53.8 34.6
-sales revenue 26.9 11.5
-cost reduction 38..5 19.2
-accounting measures 15.4 15.4
Operating measures:
creativity and innovation 26.9 34.6
customer services 50.5 50
quality 65.4 50
developing new markets 19.2 26.9
human resources development 30.8 26.9
efficiency 57.7 34.6
* % of agree and strongly agree to total respondents
The comparison reveals that: the market related measures were the least used and 
preferred of all. Only customer service measure met the expectation of the 
respondents (preferred by 50% and was reported to be used by 50% as well). Quality 
was preferred by 65% but reported to be actually used by only 50%, then profit 
preferable by 53% and usable by 34%, efficiency preferable by 57% but usable by 
34%. The big gap in employees’ expectations appeared in meeting target which was 
the most preferred measure (80.8%) but reported to be used by 42%.
(c) Securities market measures
As the table (7-2) shows, 50% of the respondents recorded that their performance 
had been measured by accounting measures and 50% preferred these measures to 
be used in RPE system. On the other hand, 7.7% had had experience with market 
measures and the same percentage approved of these measures for RPE. The 
respondents reported that market measures were less controllable than accounting
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ones (7.7% to 38.4%). However, the mean and median supported that attitude. As 
for the controllability of accounting measures they were 2.84 and 2 respectively, 
whereas for the controllability of market measures they were 1.73 and 1. According 
to the coding system in this study, 2 was a “disagree” answer and 1 was a “strongly 
disagree”. This leads to the conclusion that respondents saw that both types of 
measures uncontrollable and market measures were lesser in that respect. This is 
another point which does not satisfy the employees because the current practice by 
United Utilities depends on TSR which is a market-based measure. However, 
34.7% of the respondents agreed that using market measures in RPE could 
encourage competing with performers in other companies. Spearman correlation 
showed a significant correlation between RPE and market measures' controllability 
(p=.05).
(c) Rewards:
Respondents explained that their remuneration package in United Utilities included 
the following items:
Cash (96.2%), holiday (76.9%)), medical coverage (69.2%), post retirement 
(61.5%), shares (46.2%) and finally work conditions (26.9%).
Under RPE, the reward is preferred -respectively- to be:
Cash (88.5%), shares (65.4%), medical coverage (50%), post retirement benefits 
(50%), holidays (42.3%) and better working conditions (42.3%).
The first ranking shows “what is available" and the second ranking provides "what 
is preferable under RPE”. The latter preference is actually contradictory to the 
current long-term incentive scheme which is the RPE application in United Utilities 
where the reward is paid mainly in shares and, exceptionally partially in cash (as 
detailed later). However, 69.2% of the total respondents recorded that they were 
satisfied with the current pay systems in United Utilities.
As for reasons behind the employees' satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the remuneration 
package in United Utilities, three streams could be recognised from the respondents' 
comments: one stream agreed, another disagreed and the third agreed with reservations.
The "agree" stream described the pay as; a good salary package has seen regular 
increases, company car, health & shares, very comparative. In addition, it reflected the 
level of responsibility, skills and contribution to the business. The package was also
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balanced, comprehensive and adequate. Some reservations, it was a good salary with a 
bonus if the division did well and in another view, it was seen as broadly right in design 
but greater share incentives would lead to better incentives
Two respondents described their personal situation: The investment executive stated 
that he was satisfied with the pay in United Utilities because the salary level was the 
important issue at this stage of his career. Also a Research Associate reported that for 
their level of management, they considered it adequate. Share options seemed to be the 
only objection he/she thought everyone should benefit rather than only the senior 
management.
On the dissatisfaction side, the Senior shift control engineer of Norweb was strongly 
dissatisfied with the current pay in United Utilities, as it was not large enough. Other 
views argued that improvements in performance, flexibility, innovation etc... by 
colleagues and the respondent, had improved company performance nevertheless, 
rewards taken by senior management were not passed on! Also, one respondent would 
like more opportunity for employees to enjoy a “flexible” remuneration package so that 
they could take more in some forms and less in others. Other views saw that the cash 
element must reflect true salaries and your worth in comparison to your peers because the current 
package was undervalued in comparison with similar roles across the organisation and 
could produce disparity between management levels. All should receive the same formula 
against the measurement (e.g. all should receive shares not only just the higher levels), 
not as currently used where little was done to increase basic salary
Importance of the different components of RPE
In this research, the theoretical assumption implied that the importance of RPE’s 
components was: peers, measures then rewards. Nevertheless, the evidence from 
the fieldwork suggested that the order of importance: measures first (46%), the 
type of reward (31%) then peers (23%).
Differences between managerial levels?
ANOVA test of variance shows no differences between managerial levels regarding 
RPE, the motivational and monitoring roles of RPE, nor the objectives from work 
except for promotion. The following table presents the approval which the various 
managerial levels gave to “promotion” as a goal from work.
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Table (8-4)
Different managerial levels of approval of “promotion” as a goal from work
measure Managerial levels: 
middle directors executives
Number of participants in each 
managerial level
2 16 8
number of respondents who agreed on 
promotion as a goal from work in this 
managerial level
1 12 8
% of number of respondents who agreed on 
promotion as a goal from work to total 
participants from this managerial level
50% 75% 100%
Total respondents 26
Table (7-4) shows the higher the managerial level among participants, the more 
they tended to approve promotion as an objective from work. While 50% of the 
participants in the middle management sought promotion, 100% of the executives 
did and 75% of the directors who participated in the enquiry.
Regarding the elements of RPE, ANOVA test of variance indicated no significant 
difference between the managerial level regarding the peer groups, performance 
measures or type of reward. This result could have happened as an echo of the 
limited variety of managerial levels’ representatives in the sample, as the vast 
majority of respondents (92.3%) belonged to the senior level (directors and 
executives).
(8.2.2) Section Two: The interview d a ta
The data presented and analysed in this section, are extracted from two sources, first the 
interviews with the Group Remuneration and Pension Manager and the observations of 
the respondents on the questionnaire, who commented on the RPE. Each of these 
sources will be identified wherever used throughout the section.
(8.2.2.1) The interview data about the control system
Targets’ attainability:
The group remuneration and pension manager stressed the importance of setting 
attainable targets because as he predicted:
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If there is a disagreement between the supervisor and the employees about the 
target, there will be a disagreement later on. This happened in our Gas operations and 
either during the course of the period or at the end that we assess the achievability of 
the target and would possibly adjust it.
Assessing the attainability of targets requires not only reviewing performance but also 
investigating how much they achieved and the reasons behind the deviation:
“Last Christmas we had a situation where the telephone services people missed their 
target because they were having their own Christmas lunch then as to get people out and 
other people back to supply, there was no way they catch their target.
Investigating the reasons behind the deviation from the targets was not the only issue 
that the remuneration manager raised, but also the target measurability or quantifiability.
Target measurability or quantifiability:
The group remuneration manager re-emphasised that an objective should be measurable 
although this might be difficult in a service industry. However, the company tried to 
quantify targets, for example:
In a service standard environment, we set a target for telephone services as: 99% of calls 
have to be answered within 3 minutes on the telephone, this is quantifiable and measurable.
Furthermore, different objectives were drawn for the different types of activities (gas, 
water and telecommunications) within the corporate objectives as the group 
remuneration manger explained:
On the gas side, we have people living in the South West of England getting customers but 
the objective was not: get as much customers as you could. The objective was not financial 
rather it was the experience we have built in getting customers. The Telecoms activity, we've 
people totally devoted to developing the telecommunications and they will be targeted on how 
successful they are in that.
Target's time- related:
The importance of the time-related feature of targets had two sources: First, 
performance assessments and rewards would be set according to meeting targets in a 
specified period of time. Second, some employment arrangements were entirely based on 
time- related achievements. The example which the interviewee gave, was:
Norweb was a 50- 50 partner in a power-generating project in Lincolnshire and the contract 
for the manager was critically time-related. The overall project was probably two or two and 
a half years so his bases of employment was time related, his performance was time and 
quality-related, what to do and when.
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Performance measures:
The data available from the interviews in United Utilities raise the following issues 
regarding the performance measures which will be addressed in detail in this section:
- Differences in markets
The “big customers” implication 
The importance of non financial measures
- Market measures and employees’ controllability over measures
- How the circumstances in each activity affect the performance management
1. Different turnover and different profit in each activity:
The company’s annual report for 1996/1997 (before doing the interviews) showed that 
the company was achieving different results in different activities. For example, the gas 
operations were suffering losses whereas electricity was generating most of the group’s 
profits, the remuneration manager explained:
“At that time we were in a trial in the South West of England. Our objectives were not 
particularly securing huge numbers of customers but to create a number of customers to test 
the whole system and integrate that with our existing activities and the IT back up”. So it 
was to sort out what sort of player we want to be? There is no point in getting customers at 
all costs.
The previous expansion situation in the gas operations at that time was not repeated in 
the other activities, e.g. electricity, communications,...etc. However, the annual financial 
report included a different turnover and different profits for the various activities as 
shown below:
Table (8-5) Segmental Information- turnover and profits (1999)
Company’s
name
Business area Turnover
£m
Profits before interest 
and taxes £m
% of profit 
to turnover
North West Water Water and wastewater operations 905.3 394.2 43
Norweb Electricity distribution operations 342.7 154.5 45
Energi Energy operations 1120.9 26.2 2.3
Norweb Telecom. T elecommunications 23.4 .2 .8
Vertex International operations 7.7 5.6 72
United Utilities Facilities management 193.8 28.6 14.7
Differences in the market
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The high percentage of profit to turnover in the electricity distribution activity stemmed 
from a vast sales- low margin economics, a stable market equally pressurised where the 
industrial service standards should be followed as well. That was unlike the gas market, 
which implied approaching new customers in a gradual expansion policy, as the chief 
executive recorded in the 1998 annual report (page 8):
“The Group’s profits are derived primarily from our UK regulated utility activities of water 
wastewater and electricity distribution. These provide a relatively low risk and stable income 
stream”
Specific concern for the international operations:
The international markets where United Utilities operated had different implications for 
the performance management and rewards, as this example by the group remuneration 
manager revealed:
A manager had made an accounting provision against bad debts -defence- of a 
substantial amount which has taken up profit and wiped out the bonus for him, for 
making very prudent business decision and our international partner lose too.
The group remuneration manager confirmed that it was importance to draw a balance 
between being “cautious” and “keeping profit targets” as the corporate mission requires:
“We’ve also responsibility to the shareholders for the annual return on the investment 
they have made Yes, you’ve to be cautious but if  you rely solely on a defensive approach, 
you’ll not be able to keep your commitments towards shareholders. It needs a balance”.
The concern which United Utilities paid to its international operations, led to establishing 
a separate division for those operations. The aim was that, the circumstances and 
performance of each sub-division were evaluated and rewarded separately. 
Consequently, staff in a specific job, division or country could get their bonuses and 
others did not. The group remuneration manager elaborated on this situation as:
“We have a contract with the international arena -quite wisely I think - you’ve got to work 
bonus so that you do not affect the handcuffs in any change but to protect their account for 
it and put it back below the line”
2. Reasons behind the high profits o f the electricity distribution o f "Big Customers"
The reasons behind the major contribution of the electricity distribution in the group’s 
overall profit was due to the company’s contracts with some “big customers” such as
214
Manchester Airport, Manchester United, Marks & Spencer. This practice existed 
mainly on the electricity side of business. The remuneration manager revealed that the 
major customers’ market has been opened to competition for some years now. These 
customers are small in number, large in size and have a facility whereby they can take the 
group as a whole to any demand. For example, if it was Marks and Spencer, then it 
meant all their outlets or Tesco’s, all Tesco’s supermarkets. Therefore, when these 
customers contacted to purchase electricity from United Utilities, that implied high risk 
as it was a very competitive market. Contracts' negotiations with these customers, 
included arrangements for: the reliability of service, at what time it should be provided, 
from which source and at what cost.
Importance o f Non financial aspects o f performance
The Group remuneration manager drew attention to two specific forms of the non- 
financial aspects of the work which should and were measured in United Utilities. First: 
quality of services and second, customer services. Quality was important to United 
Utilities not only in its electricity operations but in water supply and disposal as well. The 
company would be fined if it did not meet the service standards. For example in North 
West Water Limited, one of the directors there was called the “Quality Director” and his 
job was entirely based on quality of water supply, so he was evaluated accordingly.
Getting a feedback from the customers about the services provided was another measure 
of the non-financial aspects of performance, the interviewee gave two examples of this:
We do not measure the quality of the service by: how many phone calls are answered in a 
given time, instead, it’s how many complaints have we had. Also, I could make my electricity 
cheaper than everybody else but I couldn’t guarantee it to be there if  you switched it on. There 
are service standards for supplying electricity.
Market measures and employees’ controllability over measures:
United Utilities (and other UK companies e.g. British Petroleum, Boots, BOC 
Chemicals) used Total Shareholder’s Return (TSR) in measuring and rewarding top 
management under RPE scheme. Nevertheless, the group remuneration manager had 
some reservations about TSR. That was, controllability over such measures; he 
speculated:
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“If a player has been measured by a performance level over which he has no control, it’s 
not fair from the individual’s point of view, and this is not right either from the company’s 
point of view and the net result is negative. There are people who do not agree on the 
share price and we are considering that. We work on improving profit sharing schemes by 
looking at performance management”
However, he highlighted the reason for using this measure as:
“Market share price is a company type of measure not an individual type of measure.
If you want to compare your company to another, you search for a company’s type 
of measure like share price”
This interpretation is consistent with the definition of RPE where “the company” is 
compared to “other companies” in rewarding “top management”. It also implies that top 
management is responsible for the overall performance of the company to the extent that 
there is no distinction between the performance of the company and the performance of 
the top management.
The performance evaluation criteria
The performance management guidelines shown earlier in this chapter revealed that the 
basis for evaluating performance in United Utilities was by referring to targets. However, 
the interviews and company's report 1998 disclosed that senior management are matched 
against the FTSE 100 under the RPE scheme. The group remuneration’s manger stated 
that the company did not hold any internal comparisons between the divisions because:
“If we do internal comparison within a given department, or a given function like: how many 
kilometres of cables you’ve laid this year? But another question will rise: how easy to lay a 
cable in Sheffield City Centre compare to laying it in the Moor? We used to do that quite a 
lot in our electric contracts activities, where we say; take the job, get the materials and get 
the work done and we see how they are done it under an internal comparison.
Another observation by the remuneration manager was that, the most senior management 
were judged -to a significant degree- on profitability (e.g. earnings per share) while other 
managerial levels were judged on operational measures (e.g. for gas, gaining more 
customers, in telecommunications, developing new services,...etc).
The reward system
In formulating and implementing its policy, the remuneration committee gave full 
consideration to the best practice provision annexed to the Listing Rules of the London 
Stock Exchange, and took professional advice from within and outside the company. At 
the 1996 annual general meeting, shareholders approved a new incentive plan for 
executives to replace the annual bonus and the granting of options under the executives’
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share option scheme. Reasons for the change and details of the new plans are set out 
below.
The previous share options plan:
In the 1998 annual report, the remuneration committee recorded that the executive 
directors were eligible to participate in the employee sharesave scheme. With the 
introduction of the incentive plan, the granting of options under the executives’ share 
option scheme was discontinued in 1996. Share ownership was generally regarded as an 
effective means of aligning the interests of the executives and the shareholders. The 
group promoted greater ownership of shares in the company through paying incentive 
awards in shares and by encouraging executive directors to accumulate and hold shares 
with a value approximating their annual salary. The motives behind moving from the 
share options to the short and long-term incentives seemed to be a general trend in the 
utilities companies generally not only United Utilities, as the group remuneration 
manager explained:
“Utilities had a hard time with it because share options allow individual directors to sit 
there and get the share options and make loads of money. Those gains were not linked to 
how they are necessarily handling the company’s performance. So we should not be going 
down this route, and that’s where some companies had their long-term plans, others have a 
mixture of long-term plans and share options.
The new long-term incentives plan with its tying reward to performance and to 
competing with the FSTE 100 was seen as a remedy for those weaknesses.
First: The Short-term plan:
The short-term plan was an annual bonus plan that was set up in 1996 where Profit 
Before Taxes (PBT) was used as a performance measure. The target was set on two 
levels, basic [normal] budget and stretched budget. The plan allowed up to 40% of 
annual salary for executives. PBT was measured either for the whole group or group and 
division performance depending on the executive’s position. The basic scheme was 
applied to the top 16 executives; for tax purposes, the basic scheme was paid in shares 
via a trustee with a delay for two year. However, half of the top 16 executives, who were 
not in the main board, could ask the trustee for the award to be paid in cash. If it was 
paid in shares, at the end of the year to which the bonus related, the corporate 
performance was checked and the award was made accordingly. A trustee would keep
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the shares for further two years. If for example, the first year of the plan is 1996- 1997, 
those who were awarded shares would not see them until 1999. The rationale for that - 
as the group remuneration manager believed -  was to be another form of “golden 
handcuff’.
Second: Long-term incentives plan:
Because the long-term plan for rewarding executives in United Utilities is the company’s 
application of RPE, the details of that plan, feedback about it and the factors involved 
will be discussed in the following section about RPE.
(8.2.2.2) RPE in United Utilities- Content and context
This part explains how RPE is implemented in United Utilities under the long-term 
incentives plan, for whom and what is the expected influence of target difficulty, market 
measures and of varying the form of reward and any reservations or problems related to 
RPE.
I: How RPE is implemented (The Long-Term Incentives Plan for executives):
In the annual report of 1998, the long-term incentives plan for executives was described 
as rewards related to the returns to shareholders. The company’s performance is assessed 
on the basis of total shareholder return (TSR) which includes share price appreciation 
and gross dividends, measured over a period of three consecutive financial years. TSR is 
compared with the performance achieved by the two-comparator group of companies - 
the FTSE 100 utility companies and the remaining FTSE 100 companies excluding the 
utility group. No reward is earned if the company ranks in the bottom half of that group. 
This practice raised some questions, for example: who is entitled to the reward under 
RPE and why, why TSR is used, what is the experience with it and what is the outcome 
of applying it (i.e. is it efficient, did it achieve its aims).
RPE for whom
In United Utilities -as in the other UK companies - RPE was applied to senior executives 
only. The group remuneration manager expected it to be difficult to apply it to other 
managerial levels because:
“first of all I’ve got to set what measures to use and get people to accept them. As in the 
case of a teacher, is it the absolute number of GCSE passed students will measure the 
teacher’s performance or the real successful teacher who starts from a low basis pupils
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and get them through the final exam. Who achieved more? That’s the problem down the 
organisations, what’s being measured? and who you are comparing with, Motor electric 
companies? Obviously not. Scottish Farms? Yorkshire Water?”
The researcher argues that choosing the measurements and the peers are general issues 
related to any application of RPE not only to the non-senior managerial level. However 
the interviewee suggested another version of RPE for managerial levels other than senior 
management. He argued that the majority of the company’s activities were in a regulated 
market. Therefore, the performance of the employees whose work was directly related to 
service standards, should be compared to these standards. The problem -in his view- was 
as ever, the practicability and the creditability which the system might have.
Among the respondents who wrote comments in the questionnaire on "who should be 
rewarded by RPE", 6 out of 10 saw it was applicable at all managerial levels. A 
respondent thought it should be used for middle and senior management while 3 believed 
that it should be used for none because it could not be done fairly and matching against 
targets should be used. However, when the respondent were asked if different patterns 
(and what) of RPE should be used for the different managerial levels, the comments 
included more detailed views. Respondents recorded that performance was currently 
measured in absolute (not relative) terms and rewarded against specific objectives but no 
comparison to peers made. Rewards were linked to performance against financial targets 
and personal objectives rather than performance against colleagues. That performance 
was based on skills and abilities for the role as stated in role profile for the job, 
competence and the level for each competence was agreed with the line manager. The 
degree to which these competence were met, determined (or used to) the position within 
salary scale. Regarding "who should be rewarded on RPE", the comments suggested that 
no one should be rewarded by RPE, all should be objective driven and independent. Also 
co-operation would achieve more than competition. In a second view, it was argued that 
RPE was not considered a suitable benchmark against which indicators could be 
measured.
A third prospect maintained that the system had developed sufficiently since Vertex (one 
of United Utilities' group) was formed in June 96. A view, which emphasised the gap 
between the pay of different managerial levels, considered that the senior management 
ensured they got their “snouts in the trough” whatever happens and they “take a bigger 
slice of the cake” whatever company performance, is. On the other hand, middle
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management were rewarded for enforcement and acted as soundproofing from what was 
expected by junior staff. One respondent saw that there should be a difference in the 
application of RPE between the managerial levels in terms of financial bonus but not in 
terms of a league table and recognition.
The way in which United Utilities applies RPE, leads to two arguments regarding the 
peers: why two peer groups were used and how they were perceived in terms of 
difficulty to compete with.
Why two peer groups:
The group remuneration manager explained the rationale behind using two peers groups 
(the FTSE 100 and the utilities within the FTSE 100):
“We mean to challenge our executives, and to be in our own field, with the utility people. 
Yes we are a FTSE 100 but the problem is that, the FTSE 100 contains all sort of companies 
and all sort of markets. So major institutional shareholders said, look at utilities. Yet again 
this is very simplistic because you got Telecomes, gas, electricity and there are a couple -like 
us- multi utilities, and the take over affect TSR.
The participants in the questionnaire investigation recorded other targets which they 
preferred to be compared with, such as: performance of peers in the same department, 
individual targets and a respondent recorded that within his/her group, they compared 
with last year’s performance.
How difficult to compete with the FTSE 100
Two reflections of target difficulty could be identified; first, the company realised that 
difficulty and set different pay bands for different achievements, and second, the 
employees’ reaction to what they consider unattainable goal. Firstly, according to the 
long term incentive plan, if the company was below the 50th place, no reward and to be 
among the top 25 was not attainable so the challenging and attainable band was to be 
between the 25 -50. The group remuneration manager elaborated on that:
“ We believe that we do not have a chance with the top quarter of the FTSE 100 because it 
includes the Telecomes companies. What would we do with Vodafone or Orange, We’re 
in a mature market, Our executives know that the top level of bonuses is not available.
Secondly, the group remuneration manager drew some expectations for the employees’ 
reaction to unattainable targets:
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“They certainly will not work to achieve it because they would say, we know for fact that 
we can't achieve it so why should we bother, we'll do what we think is right. The whole 
process then be a dispute because whatever you do on this performance measures type 
system, you've got to get everyone to buy in to the process”.
The remuneration system in United Utilities aimed -as mentioned earlier- to align 
interests not to create dispute. Therefore, an RPE scheme with unattainable targets 
would be against the objectives of the remuneration programme. A participant in the 
questionnaire enquiry recorded that he/she would get very de-motivated due to target 
difficulty.
Among the issues related to the targets in RPE scheme in United Utilities, were including 
non-financial targets and assessing TSR as a performance measure.
Measurements under RPE:
The non-financial objectives under RPE scheme
United Utilities was concerned with some non-financial issues such as quality, efficiency, 
commitment to the community, customer care and meeting service standards. 
Nevertheless, these non-financial aspects were not included in the RPE system. The 
group remuneration manager mentioned that the notion had been discussed in the 
company before, but it was decided that it was not the time to apply it.
In can be argued that the group remuneration manager adopted “an extreme”
interpretation for “non financial measurements” to mean environmental objectives 
although it can be understood as the “non-financial aspects of any job” such as quality, 
keeping time, innovation and creativity. However, the chief executive reported (The 
annual report 1998) that improving performance should be through efficiency, reducing 
costs and approaching new markets.
Argument about TSR
The interviewee put forward an argument about TSR and good management by 
debating:
“Suppose we were the most profitable utility company in UK, would this make us the most
popular? Probably not. In fact, some companies with the highest TSR, in certain
circumstances may have the poorest management because somebody comes in and says: that 
company is worth a lot more, I’m going to buy it. Then the company’s share price is going to 
rocket, so the TSR, and I get big rewards.
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The remuneration manager’s reservation on TSR was not the only one which he invoked 
about the application of RPE in United Utilities, but he developed an argument about the 
long-term consequences of RPE.
Reservations on RPE
The remuneration manager concluded his dissatisfaction with the long-term incentives 
plan for executives in United Utilities after 2 years experience with it. The sources of this 
attitude was not the outcome of the plan or what the company experienced with it but 
the essence of the scheme itself as he explained:
“I don’t think the long-term plan is quite as serious as people think it is. I have some doubts 
that these plans are achieving their objectives, the objective is high, reward according to the 
performance of the company. The simple objective is very hard to achieve meaningfully, fairly 
because a lot of it is high profile, political service and you can’t be that simple. This is so 
much an element of form of bonuses at the most senior level in the UK as much as any 
performance measure is profit target. I’m not convinced by the long term plan because I think 
people are saying it’s more related to performance than the mere granted share options is. It 
could be, but there are other ways to make share options more performance related. The 
problem -I think- is getting a true measure of performance. OK, if  it is a stable market, 
one could argue that TSR might be right.
The interviewee’s concern about the measurements is supported by the questionnaire 
survey in United Utilities -presented in part two of this chapter- where the respondents 
placed importance on performance measurements more than on targets or reward. The 
measurements were observed with relation to many issues e.g. measuring the non- 
financial aspects of the work, business strategy, environment, type of market, 
controllability and the debate about market measures. Targets were only related to 
attainability while the form of reward was related to the preferences of the different 
managerial levels. Therefore, the performance measurements were observed to be more 
problematic in reality than the other items of RPE.
Although a participant in the questionnaire enquiry recorded that RPE would focus the 
effort on business targets, two other participants considered RPE as very unfair with 
poor management and introducing competitiveness into team environment would 
undermine group spirit. Moreover, a project manager sent back to the researcher a page 
of a funny “cartoon” story about tough management (copy exists in Appendix D-3).
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Varying the form of reward under RPE
Varying the form of reward was discussed with the group remuneration manager and he 
argued that
“My view is this, if  I give you £1 as your wage, you'll get 55p. I would ask, would you be 
happy if  I make your 55p, 70p, 90p £1.50? it’s one of my objectives to try to maximise the 
benefits for the individual. I can say the £1 will be £1.50 in 3 years, are you still interested? 
One says I’ll take the £1 because I need food, the other says I’ll wait. For example, we 
provide medical coverage free (it costs me £300 a year), this is valuable to someone, but not 
to the rest. Some prefers tokens from Debenhams. We give people the right to make a 
choice. We try not to give immediate cash but something more valuable. The complication 
with this is, the communication to the staff and getting them to understand and trust in 
some cases.
Different forms o f rewards for different managerial levels;
The group remuneration manager debated that different managerial levels could have 
different preferences, for a number of reasons:
Certain people prefer shares because it’s more tax efficient. But the other problem is, you 
should first satisfy basic needs. We pay somebody the minimum wages (e.g. £3.50 per hour) 
so if you’re expecting them to contribute, there is no chance. You’ll have these (restrictions) 
in the organisation. So remuneration arrangement should be tailored.
This point is consistent with the questionnaire data where different forms of pay (cash, 
shares, holidays, post retirement benefits,...etc) gained different approval (as presented 
in part two in this chapter). Furthermore, the respondents added other preferable forms 
of rewards such as telephones and cars.
The following part is an exploration of the context of applying RPE and the performance 
management generally in United Utilities, as could be inferred from the data available.
The context of RPE
Exploring the context of RPE will include issues such as the business environment 
(stability of markets, the Far East crises), business culture, how the employees see 
themselves and whether individuals influence performance.
Business Environment
The group remuneration manager predicted that perceiving the difficulty of a target 
would be affected by the nature of the market. He suspected what the people assumed,
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that some targets were attainable because a lot of markets were fairly stable and certain. 
In his view:
It’s not as stable as people believe. Secondly, those people are intensively in the private 
competitive market. We are relatively fairly stable and more on the water side but less in 
electricity side. On one side the water and electricity distribution, the market is a kind of 
regulated and monopolistic, in the middle, telecom and the supply of electricity with a 
competitive situation in the environment and that is high-volume, low-margin business and lots 
of the same on the electricity side. Gas and telecom are highly competitive environment. The 
company is looking -as well as the international market- to grow.
Circumstances in the different markets affect performance, example o f Asia crises: 
United Utilities used TSR as a performance measure in RPE. TSR might be affected by 
many market factors. For example, the market could be generally down, the FTSE 100 
might be generally down but -quite often- different things happen in different sectors. 
The Far East crises badly affected financial institutions in the FTSE. That was an effect 
on the reference group and hence on RPE. The company has some operations in 
Malaysia but the influence of the crises is not the same as it is on the whole financial 
world.
Factors that should be considered regarding RPE:
The following factors were extracted from the comments on the questionnaire as to what 
should be considered when RPE is investigated:
Business objectives achievement - individual objectives achievement- fairness- impact of 
inflation
Design o f RPE
Clear + measurable targets- ability to achieve targets- performance feedback- recognition 
of fairness by employees Fair achievable stretch targets - consistency - delivering of 
produces to schedule- customer satisfaction
Skills and abilities level - effectiveness- comparable jobs in related industries 
The level of reward - the circumstances surrounding the level of performance - 
Fairness- simplicity - transparency 
Evaluation of like/ similar jobs
Experience - inpossible to generalise roles even with title/job description 
Fairness- Fairness- Fairness- Fairness-
Against RPE:
- individuals when the overall business performance may be poor - impact on those 
individuals (probably 50%) who are below average.
- Disagree with RPE, targets must be individual
NOT, as performance should be considered against company + individual goals 
NOT, by comparing against other individuals, co -operative teams work 
Culture would BE DAMAGED by RPE
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(8.3) Part Three 
Comparison between Egyptian and English data
The following table summaries the questionnaire data of the Egyptian companies 
collectively, individually, and classified into sectors, compared to the English data. It 
should be mentioned that variables in the table are those that were significantly correlated 
to RPE at confidence level 95% (unless otherwise stated).
Table (8-6) Comparison- The Questionnaire data
Variable Private
sector
Public sector
Trade co.
Dairy co. Steel co. All Eg. data United
Utilities
Accepting
RPE
45.7 44.5 38.1 57.1 45.1 42.2
Objectives 
RPE satisfy
money money money money-
esteem*
money doingoutstanding
work-money-
recognition
R P E  d e s is n
Preferable
peers
same 
industry- 
top 100
same region- 
same company
same company 
-industry 
- top 100*
same company
-industry-
region
same company 
industry- 
region
top 100 
same region
Measures Non Financial 
- financial
Financial Non Financial 
- financial
Non Financial 
- financial
Non Financial 
- financial
none
Accounting-
market*
Accounting* Accounting 
- market*
N/A Accounting Market*
Rewards Cash- shares Cash- post 
retirement
Cash- shares Cash-shares-
holiday*
Cash- shares- 
better work 
condi tions- 
post
retirement
benefits-
none
* P= .10
Comparison between United Utilities and Dairy
In this section, the questionnaire data of Dairy company in Egypt and United Utilities in 
England, will be compared on the bases that, the two companies applied RPE and both 
belong to the private sector. Also, the number of questionnaires collected for each 
company was relatively close (21 for Dairy and 26 for United Utilities).
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Although both companies used RPE to reward top management, T test of differences 
shows that there was a significant difference between approving RPE in Dairy and in 
United Utilities. The mean was 6.9 for Dairy and 6.1 for United Utilities and the median 
was 7 and 6 respectively for RPE which was a combination of 2 variables; motivation 
and monitoring. The mean and median of United Utilities indicated a tendency to a 
neutral view towards RPE, whereas the response of Dairy participants left this neutral 
position and moved towards approving RPE. When examining the individual components 
of RPE, between the two groups, the data revealed that the respondents of Dairy scored 
higher than those of United Utilities’ in approving the motivational and monitoring roles 
of RPE.
However, in United Utilities, the correlation coefficient showed a link between RPE and 
doing outstanding work, while in Dairy the association was between RPE and esteem. In 
United Utilities, respondents sought money as an objective from work generally but 
when they were asked if RPE could provide money, recognition or both, the approval 
was limited for the three (26.9%, 15.4%, and 19.2%). Nevertheless, these observations 
were significantly correlated to RPE which can be read as: United Utilities' respondents 
agreed -to a limited degree- that RPE could provide money and recognition and RPE 
would be strongly accepted for this ability.
As for the contingents of RPE, T test for variance showed no significant differences (at 
p=.05 or p= .10) between Dairy and United Utilities regarding the preferable peer 
group/s but there were significant differences between the two groups in terms of 
preferring the financial measures (where the mean was 3.6 and 1 respectively). These 
means represent a tendency to accept the financial measures in Dairy and an obvious 
rejection in United Utilities although both companies applied RPE using financial 
measures. However, there was more rejection to them in United Utilities (30.7% 
comparing to 61.9% in Dairy) while the non-financial measures were highly preferable in 
both (92.3% to 85.7 in Dairy). The marketing manager and the managing director in 
Dairy explained that the financial aspects can not be ignored in Dairy which sought to 
outperform competitors by providing better products at lower prices. In United Utilities, 
the group remuneration manager indicated that the financial measures currently used in 
RPE schemes were subject to many influences nationally and internationally. For example 
the Asian crisis affected United Utilities’ operations in South Asia, opening the electricity 
market to competition in the UK affected the financial outcomes and hence the financial
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measures of the company. This means that each company’s experience and strategy 
impacted the attitude towards the financial measures. Market measures were specific 
type of financial measures which held significant differences between the two companies. 
United Utilities had more experience with using such measures than Dairy. Nevertheless, 
the respondents of United Utilities disagreed that using market measures could 
encourage competing with performers in other companies whereas, the respondents of 
Dairy were neutral about it.
In terms of the preferred form of reward, T test showed significant differences between 
the two groups regarding receiving the reward in cash and in holidays. The mean of these 
variables, indicated that the respondents of Dairy preferred the cash and holiday forms 
more than the respondents of United Utilities did.
On the agreement side between the two groups, the experience and pattern of RPE in 
United Utilities seems close to that of Dairy company in Egypt where both used two 
groups of peers, one of direct competitors and the other of wider industry. Both used it 
for top management only and measured performance in financial terms only. It might also 
be concluded that the pressure of competition and links to the market (local or 
international) could be behind deciding to use RPE. It also seems that RPE was used for 
top management only in other UK companies that the researcher identified as it was 
used, because that level of management performance could be deduced from the whole 
companies’ performance. However, if RPE was considered for other levels, probably, the 
division performance could be taken as an indicator of the individuals’ performance. Also 
in Dairy and United Utilities, peers from the top 100 companies are preferred, with non- 
financial measures but not varying the form of reward. The situation of the two 
companies tends to suggest that RPE might link to a high salary because of the risk 
involved. This equally implies that the context and environment which is required for 
RPE, is lacked in the public sector in Egypt.
Summary
In United Utilities, two main themes were recognised to affect the performance 
measurement: market circumstances and the measurement system. These circumstances 
included the market domain, type of activity and the existence of “big customers”. The
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measurement system implied: measuring non-financial dimensions and controllability 
over measures.
The questionnaire evidence suggested that RPE was seen as a motivational tool 
through which employees could gain both money and recognition. Under RPE, 
performance was preferred to be measured in both financial (not market based) and 
non-financial terms, be compared to a peer group from the same region and the top 
100 companies. Rewards were preferred in cash, shares and medical coverage. 
However, there are some reservations about using RPE for other than senior 
management and using market measures (although RPE was found to be correlated 
to market measures at p=.10). The interviewee raised doubts about the suitability of 
TSR measures -which the company currently used- in RPE schemes. The major 
problem, which the interviewee saw with RPE, was “measuring performance” more 
than any other issue. Chapter nine discusses the results of the research with relation 
to the accounting literature about performance and the literature of RPE.
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Chapter Nine 
Discussion of the Results
(9.0) Introduction
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 included a report, analyses and commentary on the data of the three 
Egyptian companies and the English company. This was done to fulfil the aim of this 
research. The aim was to investigate the content and context of Relative Performance 
Evaluation (RPE) as a motivational technique within the managerial control system. RPE 
was developed by Holmstrom (1982) in an economic perspective and was modelled 
within the Principal-Agent framework. RPE -in essence- is a mode of benchmarking in 
which rewards are based on a comparison of the performance of an agent with that of 
his/ her peers. In this research, a number of contradictions and gaps have been 
recognised in previous studies of RPE (as detailed in chapters 3 and 4 in this thesis). 
Therefore, it was considered to shift the debate about RPE from the economic ground to 
an accounting ground. This has meant two issues: firstly, it centred the arguments on the 
organisation (with what this implies in terms of examining the individuals’ attitudes, the 
systems and the environment). Secondly it opened the discussion about elements which 
have either been taken for granted before (e.g. RPE could, universally, motivate 
employees) or have been overlooked (e.g. what design, measures, context, individuals 
should RPE involve) as reviewed in chapters 2 and 3. When focusing the research 
arguments, the orientation was to relate them to the main stream debate about 
performance in the accounting literature (discussed in chapter 1). Thus, the investigation 
was focused (chapter 5) on whether RPE could motivate employees, by which design 
(i.e. which peer group/s, performance measures and rewards). Special attention was paid 
to examining the proposed motivational role of RPE under the social comparison theory. 
That theory assumes that comparing the performance of employees to that of their peers, 
would motivate them because it could provide both money and esteem.
In order to carry out this investigation, the research design was a case study research 
(chapter 5). The number of cases was decided so that it allowed an in-depth examination 
and avoided increasing it to the extent that it might lose the depth and approaching the 
survey type of research. It was also thought that what was needed was an approach
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which allowed gathering data about why RPE was used, why not, what pattern, 
rationale, experience and outcomes. Therefore the survey type seemed inappropriate. 
Initially, the wish was to investigate the technique in two environments (Egypt and 
England) and to explore differences. However, access was accidental (as in the case of 
Trade company) and restricted (as with Dairy, Steel and United Utilities). Data were 
collected from the four companies by questionnaire, interviews and internal documents 
(as reported and analysed on different levels in chapters 6, 7 and 8).
This chapter is divided into five parts. Part one records some observations on the control 
practice. Part two is allocated to RPE, its application, potentials and experience. Part 
three discusses the content and components of RPE. Part four deals with the context and 
relevance of RPE. Special concern will be paid to detecting the rationales offered by 
participants for RPE, their expectations and actual experience with this scheme given 
that Dairy company in Egypt and United Utilities in England have been applying it for 
two years. The implications of national culture dimensions (as defined by Hofstede 1984, 
1991) in the two countries and RPE will also be investigated. The work in the this 
discussion will interpret and link the results to the literature of RPE and the wider 
accounting literature of performance. Part five provides a detailed comparison for the 
research arguments, tools, theoretical foundation, empirics and findings to the previous 
studies in RPE (specifically the only case study in RPE by Maher 1987).
(9.1) Part One 
Observations on the control practices
Type o f budget
Before exploring the findings regarding RPE, some observations are made about the 
general control practice in the companies under investigation. First, the budgeting 
practice by Trade showed an example of Hopwood’s (1972) budget constrained style 
with the expected high reliance on accounting measures, whereas with Dairy and Steel it 
had a rather profit conscious style with more use of non-financial measures. Furthermore, 
The practice of Dairy and Trade imply what Hopwood (1972) referred to as “the bottom 
drawer phenomenon” where upper- level managers use the budget for motivational 
purposes while keeping another realistic set of numbers for planning in the "bottom 
drawer" of their desks. Steel did not follow this policy, instead, the company motivated
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employees by announcing that last year’s achievement will be the minimum for this year’s 
target (chapter 6, p. 154).
Assessing the circumstances o f performance
The data of Trade (The maintenance engineer- Appendix C-3 p. 61) showed that staff 
felt disappointed with the current financial difficulties which the company suffered 
especially because they considered that they worked hard with poor facilities, 
discouraging policies and low pay. The Follow-up assistant manager argued that "if the 
impact o f governmental interference was removed from performance measures, it would 
show that we achieve better than the year before, in spite o f the continuous losses" 
(chapter 6, p. 148). This invitation for assessing the circumstances around performance 
when evaluating staffs work was recognised in the literature by Kren and Munter (1995). 
They found evidence on this prediction in their study when a manager explained that 
" while his performance was not as good as others, but it has improved than the previous 
year and with regard to the chaotic environment which they worked in, that was 
outstanding!"
Responsibility about decisions and performance evaluation
Data of the Trade, provided an example on lack of allocating responsibility about 
decisions to those who had taken those decisions (as reported in Appendix C-3, p. 60). 
The influence of such behaviour was that, it destroyed the responsibility accounting 
principle and caused disappointment between employees particularly when this affected 
their evaluation and rewards as in the severe case of Trade. The Assistant of Follow-up 
Manager confirmed that they “were not responsible for the governmental decisions o f 
importing farming machines from Eastern European countries which led to losses” 
(chapter 6, p. 148). Nevertheless, the outcome of these decisions made them miss their 
rewards.
For such patterns, Ezzamel (1987) considered it a starting point in divisional 
performance measuring system to split responsibility about decisions between divisional 
managers and central managers. Thus, the former handled operating decisions whereas 
the latter took strategic decisions otherwise, sup-optimal divisionalised performance 
would result. The practice of Trade contradicted Ezzamel’s suggestion as there was no
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split of responsibility about the different decisions between the managerial levels. This 
pattern stemmed from the culture of the public sector in Egypt that included central 
decision making and no existence of delegation of authority. On the other hand, this 
managerial behaviour also related to the lack of risk taking, therefore, every manager or 
officer wished to protect himself/ herself by keeping all the authority - if  possible- in his/ 
her hands.
Impact o f divisions’ interdependence on Performance
Ezzamel (1987) reports that the empirical results about the impact of divisional 
interdependence on performance are neither comprehensive nor conclusive. The data in 
this research were in line with this view as in some practices divisional interdependence 
had supported and enhanced performance (e.g. in Steel) and in other, it caused an 
obstacle to performance (e.g. Trade). In Trade, the Importing Officer gave that example 
(Appendix C-3, p. 70) when his colleagues in finance returned the documents of paying 
the foreign supplier many times and how this caused him problems with that supplier. In 
his view, colleagues in other departments did not co-operate with him as should be.
In Dairy, the Marketing Manager marked such behaviour (Appendix C-3, p. 69) when 
the electricity generator stopped for two days and hence the production decreased and 
could not be compensated till two months after. He argued that if production department 
had alternative plans to handle situations like this, they could have responded more 
quickly and more efficiently to it.
While the examples above represent negative impacts of divisions' interdependence on 
performance, examples from Steel provided a positive impact. As The Operations 
Manager in Steel highlights (Appendix C-3, p. 70) the company's policy was to shift 
engineers between the different sites and jobs to trigger their abilities and to exchange 
experience. Under that routine, an engineer had to exchange his expertise with his 
successor.
TQM and non financial measures
The data of Steel (chapter7, p. 194) showed that Total Quality program was a genuine 
feature of the company. This feature along with the emphasised use of non-financial
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measures, seeking creative proposals from all levels and teamwork pattern were 
consistent with the results of Ittner and Larker (1995). Ittner and Larker (1995) reported 
that, “with more TQM, greater emphasis was placed on team work and non-financial 
performance measures, more frequent provision o f quality information to all levels and 
greater use o f "bottom up" data gathering. Besides, with more TQM, external 
benchmarking on products, processes and services is more frequent and strategic 
information is broadly more frequent”. The benchmarking practice was reported by 
Steel (chapter 6, p. 158) as well, where the company was compared to international steel 
producers for total production and some processes and items of costs.
The choice o f strategy and the choice o f performance measures
Regarding the type of strategy which each of the four companies was adopting, it could 
be identified that Trade -because of the current financial losses and overdrawn- had what 
Govanderajan and Gupta (1985) called "harvest" strategy. That is, it concentrated on 
maximising cash flow in the short term and exclusively used financial measures only to 
measure performance. In contrast, because of the stable and strong position and 
expansion policies of United Utilities as well as Dairy and Steel, they could have been 
applying a build strategy (i.e. increase market share). Examples on that were in the 
Marketing Manager’s statement about the expansion and growth of Dairy which is built 
on providing better quality, services and less prices (chapter 6, p. 149), also the new 
projects of Steel to increase exporting (Appendix C-l, p.33). This was accompanied by a 
combination of financial and non-financial measures for performance. Sometime, these 
companies put even more emphasis on non-financial measures, like in Dairy where the 
marketing manager saw creativity as the way to outperform competitors and achieve the 
growth policy. In Steel, quality was an essential element to support the company in the 
exporting contracts to the international arena.
These practices were consistent with Govindarajan and Gupta (1985). Their proposition 
was that business unit strategy might affect the choice of accounting measures in 
performance evaluation. The evidence of their study suggested that following a build 
strategy (i.e. increase market share) -as in United Utilities, Dairy and Steel- required 
improvements in long term performance; then accounting measures which were short­
term oriented, would be inappropriate. Alternately, measures for new product 
development, sales growth or personal development would be more effective. In
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contrast, under a harvest strategy (i.e. maximise cash flow) -as in Trade- reliance on 
accounting measures (such as cost control, profit margins and cash flow) would be more 
effective.
Low pay in the public sector and the decline in performance
As presented in table (7-8) (in chapter 7, p. 192), in the three Egyptian companies, the 
lowest pay level existed in the public sector (Trade). This -with other issues- raised the 
disappointment of the employees there, as the Head of Follow-up Division reported 
(chapter 7, p. 193): “we work under pressure, one might do the work o f two, with poor 
facilities and much lower pay than colleagues in other companies”. The same comment 
was given by other respondents in Trade and was added to the reasons behind the poor 
performance. This observation was consistent with Chow (1983). Chow (1983) used the 
term “pay fairness” to describe employees’ perception of pay schemes. He argues that if 
employees are not rewarded “fairly” and can not do anything to change that, their 
performance will decline.
The effect o f how employees saw themselves and their company on their performance 
There was quite difference in the way in which the participants from the three companies 
saw themselves and their companies and on their relationship to the company. As 
reported in chapter 7(p. 186, 187) and in chapter 8 (p. 206), the participants of Steel felt 
proud to belong to a successful company which was the number one steel producer in the 
Middle East and they talked about the company as "we are". They linked that to their 
commitment to the company by working flexible hours as much as the work needed. In 
Dairy, the good salary and supportive work environment promoted creativity and 
support to company's goals as the Marketing manager reported (chapter 6, p. 149). In 
Trade, frustration and disappointment with the current financial problems which resulted 
from outsider decisions, coloured the participants' views about the company and led 
them to deny responsibility for the results. However, in United Utilities, some tensions 
was shown in the respondents comments (chapter 8, p. 219) related mainly to the bigger 
pay to top management regardless the actual performance of the company.
These different patterns were consistent with Merchant and Manzoni (1989) who argue 
that managers who feel good about themselves and their organisations seem to be more 
likely to be highly energised and willing to take prudent risks.
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Targets o f the best performers
Dairy company was one of three companies which dominated the dairy products market 
in Egypt, Steel was the biggest local and regional steel producer in the Middle East 
whereas United Utilities was one of the FTSE 100 in UK. A common feature among the 
three was that they had growth and expansion strategies into national, regional and 
international domains. Dairy aimed to increase its market share (chapter 6, p. 148) by 
outperforming competitors by producing the same product with lower price, better 
quality and services. Steel had on going projects to increase the amount and type of 
products (Appendix C-l, page 33) and through increasing the ratio of utilised capacity. 
Therefore, Steel company monitored its processes and costs against international 
producers. United Utilities was looking to enhance its market share in the UK market 
and in the international operations.
These patterns were consistent with Allan (1995) who predicted that the best performers 
could always have their own challenge. These could be new and motivating challenges 
such as, creativity, controlling costs more and innovation or more generally “competing 
with themselves” to maintain setting on the top and make it difficult for anyone else to 
beat them.
The link between stock options and performance
The Group Remuneration and Pensions Director of United Utilities had reservations 
about the company's share options scheme (chapter 8, p. 217). He noted that ushare 
options allowed individual directors to get shares and make loads o f money without a 
link to how those managers were handling the company’s performance”. Therefore, the 
company -like others- moved to a mixture of long-term incentives and share options 
plans. This point contradicts with Merchant and Manzoni (1989). They argued that any 
of the reward forms could be linked with any performance measure or combination of 
measures that can be used to distinguish good from mediocre or poor performance. The 
contradiction is that, share options plan in United Utilities -according to the Group 
Remuneration and Pensions Director- did not distinguish poor performance from poor 
performance. Moreover, it allowed managers to collect money regardless of the 
company’s performance.
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Gaps in Pay
A feature which was stressed by the participants in Trade and United Utilities, was the 
gap in pay between top management and other managerial levels in the company and 
gaps in pay compared to employees in other companies (in Trade only). Kaplan and 
Atkinson (1998- page 682) mentioned such disappointment as they argued that 
individuals must believe that the organisation’s compensation policies were equitable. 
For example, rewarding senior executives with multimillion dollar bonuses while 
rewarding assembly- line workers with bonuses with a maximum potential of several 
hundred dollars will create an environment or culture in the organisation that only senior 
members are valued by the organisation.
(9.2) Part Two
RPE: its application, potential and experience
Applying RPE: facts and attitudes
Regarding RPE, the results of this research show average support for it as a motivational 
and monitoring technique in two of the four companies under investigation (chapter 6, 
p.144, 151,159 and chapter 7 p. 204). The companies' situation regarding using RPE or 
not and the participants' accepting it or not, are summarised in the following table:
Table (9-1) Summary of the companies' using RPE and employees' accepting it
RPE Accepted
No Yes
No Trade (public) Steel (Joint venture)
Yes United Utilities and None
Dairy (both private)
The table shows that RPE was used but not accepted by the participants from Dairy 
company but not applied and rejected by the participants of Trade company. However, 
the scheme was not implemented but welcomed by participants of Steel company 
(chapter 7, p. 169) and used but not accepted by the representatives of United Utilities 
(chapter 8, p.204 and 222). The purpose of this section is to discuss why it was used, 
welcomed or rejected in each company. However, the first issue to be discussed is the 
potential of RPE.
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Why RPE, Why not?
The 1999 annual report of United Utilities stated that the objectives of remuneration 
policy in the company were to align interests between shareholders to managers and keep 
in line with pay practices in the industry. The group remuneration manager in United 
Utilities added that RPE was used for top management to engage them in the 
competitive environment of the business. Competition that Dairy was exposed to has also 
been behind developing the RPE comparative performance reward scheme. In Steel, the 
internal divisions comparison was a strong practice, regular, used for all departments and 
divisions and welcomed by employees. This fact along with the lack of local steel 
counterparts and the incomparability of remuneration between Steel and international 
companies seemed to be the reasons for not applying RPE. Trade was heavily affected by 
governmental interference, low salary, high tendency to avoid responsibilities and risk 
which resulted in not applying RPE. Also in Trade, the personnel policies were organised 
by law that did not include performance comparisons internally or externally. The 
governance of law and the lack of empowerment of those who managed the public units 
-especially when related to pay- made it more difficult to negotiate the introducing of a 
scheme like RPE. It may be noted that the law for public sector employees lacks 
performance comparisons because it was developed during the central economy era in 
the 1960’s in Egypt where socialist culture averted competition and outperforming 
others, specifically when money was involved. Under that culture outperforming was 
seen as taking more than colleagues therefore, achievement, ambition and initiatives were 
discouraged (El Kahal 1998).
Is it Motivating, Monitoring ?
The results of the questionnaire and the interview enquiry - in both the Egyptian and the 
UK companies under investigation- revealed that employees would -generally- perceive 
RPE as a motivational technique rather than a monitoring technique. The agreement on 
the motivational ability of RPE was consistent with Fredrickson (1992) and the social 
comparison literature (Young 1985, Ferris & Mitchell 1987) about the importance and 
influences of “ the others” on the individual’s behaviour. The interviewees (chapter 6, 
p. 161) justified this by denying the monitoring ability of RPE, as performance was a joint 
product of many inputs. Therefore a question about how “managerial effort” could be 
separated and monitored by RPE would arise. However, comparing performance to 
peers in other companies, was not the only version of RPE that has been perceived by 
participants in this research. In Trade, Dairy and Steel, the participants suggested that 
internal comparisons could be considered as a version of RPE especially for middle 
management (chapter 7, p. 177). In United Utilities, the group remuneration manager 
suggested that comparing performance to service standards as another version of RPE. 
The proposed reference groups (colleagues or service standards) were seen to play the 
same role as other performers in motivating, monitoring and filtering performance.
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The data of Dairy, Steel and United Utilities seemed consistent with Emmanuel et.al. 
(1990) in that the motivational impact of performance- related rewards might be reduced 
according to the degree of risk involved. Moreover, the data showed the direction of the 
impact, in those companies as the risk had a positive effect on employees and motivated 
them to work harder. In Trade company, risk had an opposite impact where the 
participants’ rewards based on RPE were too risky for them to accept, given that they 
already received low pay. This suggests that Emmanuel's argument could be moderated 
by the level of pay that the employee would receive (other than the reward in question).
 by Which Mechanism?
Fredrickson (1992) operationalised the mechanism of social pressure in this way: by 
competing with other performers under RPE, individuals seek to gain money and esteem. 
The results of this research predicted that the power behind the motivational role of RPE 
was its ability to trigger the employees’ desire to gain money but not esteem. This did 
not support the social comparison theory’s expectations. This result might be interpreted 
thus; the participants aspired to gain money -generally- via work and they believed they 
could get it through RPE. Employees also inspired esteem but not through RPE but 
through other channels. For Dairy, the respondents of the questionnaire recorded their 
being proud to work for a successful company with a good place in the market. In Steel 
the participants reported being happy to work for company number “1” in producing 
steel in the Middle East and for serving the community by providing a product which 
used to be subject to crisis in supply. In United Utilities, it was part of the company’s 
culture to build up esteem and competition values among employees. However, the 
degree to which the employees would continue to respond to an RPE package positively 
for money, as argued -in chapters three and four- was contingent on the content and 
context of using it.
The rationale for using RPE
In Dairy, RPE was introduced to engage the top management (hence the company) in 
competition in the dairy market in Egypt so as to support the company’s long-term 
growth strategy. In United Utilities, RPE was introduced as a tool to align the interests 
of managers with those of shareholders [as Antle and Smith (1986) assumed RPE could 
do that]. While this "market embedded" orientation was from the standpoint of the 
"designers of the system" when they established it. However, the appraisees' actual 
attitude -as expressed by the participants in this research- provided a different view 
regarding market-based measures. The questionnaire data showed that United Utilities' 
respondents were against using market measures in RPE while Dairy respondents were 
neutral about it. This issue will be discussed latter within the "content" section of RPE.
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RPE; market- based or accounting based
The Managing Director of Dairy company, justified the advantages of the accounting 
based measures as they represented the managers’ performance and there were 
professional guidelines about how to calculate them from “The Egyptian Institute of 
Chartered Accountants and Auditors”. Using these measures (by following the 
guidelines) made the performance of Dairy and its selected peer group meaningfully 
comparable. This practice of Dairy contradicts the argument by Baber et. al., (1996) that 
building rewards on accounting measures might imply some risk because management 
enjoys an element of discretion in choosing among financial reporting alternatives, and 
therefore, accounting numbers can be manipulated. Moreover, arbitrary accounting rules 
can distort accounting profits as meaningful indicators of economic returns. The data of 
Dairy showed that the existence of guidelines and verifying whether companies applied 
them or not -through the auditing process- helped to minimise arbitrary and individual 
choice between the accounting policies. The consistency of the accounting bases upon 
which performance in used, would be particularly important in the case of RPE because 
of the various rewards which are decided according to the performance comparison.
United Utilities measured the performance under RPE by Total Shareholders’ Return 
(TSR) which was a market-based measure which includes dividends to shareholders. 
This measure was consistent with the purposes of RPE package in United Utilities that 
included to “aligning interests between shareholders and top management”. That is, the 
more the top management delivered to shareholders -compared to other companies- the 
more it would be rewarded.
How RPE was perceived: an accountability mode or a responsibility mode
Three points could be noted regarding what was perceived as “Relative Performance 
Evaluation”. First: the perception differed between the appraisees and the appraisers. 
Second: the data predict that the term “Relative” should not be interpreted -exclusively- 
to mean “corresponding to peers in other companies” because all performance 
evaluations reflect relative performance and the difference lies in the basis of relativity. 
The basis can be the budget, plans, past, colleagues in other divisions, departments or 
performers in other firms. Matching performance to the budget and the past are used in 
the four companies, comparing to colleagues in other divisions is used in Dairy and Steel, 
task group in United Utilities whereas a comparison with peers in other companies is 
used in Dairy and United Utilities. Third, the noticeable difference in the perception of 
RPE between the appraisees and appraisers stemmed from how each party drew a 
distinction between “accountability” and “responsibility”. “Responsibility accounting”
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defined as reporting the revenues and/or costs under the control of a specific unit 
manager [Kaplan 1994 (a)] and hence stresses the notion of controllability.
According to these definitions, accountability is wider than responsibility and includes it; 
also both are built on the idea of controllability. According to the orientation of this 
research which emphasises controllability and attainability, it could be concluded that 
RPE is a mode of accountability.
The data suggested that employees adopted the concept of “responsibility” for 
performance, with a fundamental emphasis on the “controllability” consideration, 
especially with RPE which included money. On that basis, the employees of Dairy and 
United Utilities refused to have RPE built on financial market measures and on the 
unattainable targets. The company’s point of view in RPE was concerned with 
“accountability” rather than "controllability". For example, the managing director of 
Dairy company argued that:
Top management has qualifications and experiences different from the other managerial levels. 
On the other hand, the market in Egypt in open, it is quite possible to know about your 
competitors who share the market, competition, and regulations. Hence, I believe it is the 
responsibility of the top management to handle these competitors and to be evaluated 
accordingly.
Under RPE schemes, Dairy and United Utilities held the employees “accountable for” 
competing with top peers in the industry or nation-wide, whereas the employees consider 
themselves "responsible only for" what can be attained.
What experience with RPE?
Since the establishment stage, Dairy considered its competitors’ performance and match 
its progress against them. Therefore, introducing the RPE scheme two years ago was 
considered to be an extension of that. The Managing Director of Dairy reported that the 
package had been effective in monitoring performance relative to competitors and that 
sustained the company’s plans of gradual growth.
The data from United Utilities showed that managers -including those who were 
rewarded under RPE- and the group remuneration manager had many reservations about 
the scheme as detailed in chapter five. For example, some respondents commented 
(chapter 8, page 219-220):
“Pay- for - performance” schemes have de-motivated employees,
“Senior management “take a bigger slice of the cake” whatever company performance is; 
“Senior management ensure they get their “snouts in the trough” whatever happens, middle 
management are rewarded for enforcement and act as soundproofing from what is expected by 
the junior staff.
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The remuneration manager summarises his overall view about the long-term incentive 
scheme:
It is not as effective in tying reward to performance as was expected.
Performance measurements are the big problem.
(9.3) Part Three 
The content of RPE
I: Peers
was it influential?
Under RPE in the four companies, the comparative base was influential regarding the 
response to the package (chapter 5, part 1, 2). Whether or not the peer group could 
affect RPE has not been addressed before in the literature of RPE. However, Antle and 
Smith (1986) found a relationship between industry (not market) performance and the 
performance of the employees and their rewards. In this research a question had been 
raised about how employees would perceive different peers (e.g. from the same 
company, same region, the same industry or the top 100 companies nation- wide) in 
terms of difficulty to compete with and the impact of this on RPE. The research result 
could not be compared to Antle and Smith (1986)’s because they used two measures for 
peers to investigate the impact of controllability which related to each type of measure. 
Antle and Smith (1986) did not aim to address or interpret the perception of different 
peers in terms of difficulty.
Did target difficulty affect RPE?
In the first instance, this research has contributed towards covering the gap recognised 
by Chow et.al. (1983) that there is a need to test the impact of job tightness and 
compensation on performance, on different managerial tasks and with non-financial 
motivation (e.g. social esteem).
The preferable peers by participants in the four companies seemed to reflect the 
implications of real practice, type of activity and level of aspiration. The definition of 
“target difficulty” which is used in this research is that Merchants and Manzoni (1989). 
They defined it by the gap between the actual and the planned level of performance as 
estimated by the respondents. Peers which were currently used and which the 
participants preferable are presented in the table below:
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Table (9-2) Currently used and preferably used Peers
The company Current comparison group preferable comparison group and its difficulty
Trade none peers from same company (easy attainable)- 
same region (difficult but attainable)
Dairy a group of dairy and food 
producers
peers from same industry (difficult but attainable) -  
the top 100 (equally difficult but attainable or 
extremely difficult and barely attainable) with 
total unattainable > total attainable
Steel none peers from the top 100 (difficult but attainable) - 
same industry (difficult but attainable)-
All Egypt data peers from same company (easy attainable)- 
same industry (equally difficult but attainable or 
extremely difficult and barely attainable) with 
unattainability > attainability- same region 
(extremely difficult and barely attainable)
United Utilities FTSE 100 + utilities 
within the FTSE
peers from same company (easy attainable)- 
same industry (equally difficult but attainable or 
extremely difficult and barely attainable) with 
total attainable > total unattainable
The pattern of the Egyptian data and that of United Utilities regarding the difficulty with 
different peers, showed a movement from what the respondent saw “attainable” to a 
“more difficult and more challenging” target level. This result was consistent with the 
debate in the accounting literature about target difficulty (Merchant and Manzoni 1989, 
Homgren 1987, Otley 1987) as discussed in the first chapter of this thesis. The data 
sustained the argument that the target should be difficult enough to challenge employees 
but should be attainable at the same time otherwise it would de-motivate them. This 
result might be interpreted using the line of reasoning of Tosi et. al. (1994) where they 
concluded that the monitoring level could enhance performance to a certain limit, after 
which, more monitoring would result in de-motivation. In this research the same 
reasoning seems applicable on the impact of the target’s difficulty on motivation and 
hence on performance under RPE schemes.
Such an interpretation could be based on the mechanism of money and esteem by which, 
RPE was suggested (Fredrickson 1992) to motivate employees. In that respect, three 
phases could be reckoned. Phase (1): as the accounting literature and the data suggested, 
with a challenging and attainable target, performance would improve because employees 
would be willing, strive and likely to obtain money and esteem, here both money and 
esteem drives work in motivating employees. In phase (2) a more difficult but still 
attainable target, might defy employees’ willingness and endeavour to improve 
performance and to gain money and esteem. In phase (3) a more difficult target might be 
seen as “unfair” and de-motivating. This might decrease performance and consequently 
their rewards of money and esteem. In the latter case -specifically with data predicting
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that employees would respond to RPE mainly to gain money- missing a target and hence 
rewards, could depress performance. At this stage it seems that only money works. This 
conclusion is consistent with Janakirman et. al., (1992) argument that the relationship 
between pay and relative performance is not linear.
The preferred peers
Dairy’s response was consistent with the notion of moving from the attainable to the 
more challenging goals, so participants chose: the same industry then the top 100 and 
smaller approval was given to peers from the same region and the same company. The 
advanced position of preferring a peer group from the top 100 companies, was 
inconsistent with the research argument. This result could be interpreted by a high level 
of aspiration and accepting risk which were planted in the company’s culture. On the 
industry level, Dairy was one of three dairy companies which dominated the local 
market. This probably justifies why peers from the same industry were the most favoured 
where the company was at the top. As the managing director mentioned, the 
management spread the information about the company’s advanced position in the 
market and sought employees' support for improving it even more. This might make the 
employees enthusiastic and inspired to compete with the top 100 companies nation-wide. 
Ezzamel and Hart (1987) reviewed Stedry’s research in the 1960’s where the latter 
found that when targets are set on higher levels the result were either very good or very 
poor depending on aspiration. Therefore, Dairy results might be explained by both the 
high aspiration of employees coincident with the high salary level (as the marketing 
manager reports- chapter 6, p 150). However, this result was inconsistent with Merchant 
and Manzoni (1989) who found that US managers set highly achievable targets to 
increase the expected bonuses, protect their creditability and increase operating 
flexibility.
The Steel case was inconsistent with the research arguments and expectations because 
the more difficult target (top 100) was preferred first then the less difficult (same 
industry). This result might be explained by the circumstances of Steel. With regard to 
the steel industry in Egypt, the Steel Company was the biggest steel producer in the 
Middle East in terms of size of operations, turnover, profits such that, there was no local 
equivalent to it in these terms nor in terms of the modern technology it used. 
Nevertheless, some respondents commented that they preferred to be compared to the 
heavy machine producers or the best companies in the private sectors. However, the 
regression of peers on RPE was non-significant in Steel at confidence level 95%, so the 
peer item was not likely to influence an RPE package, should it be used by the Steel 
Company (Chapter 6, p. 159).
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II: The perform ance Measures
Why were performance measures financial only and not influential on RPE in Trade? 
The performance measures were found to have an influence on RPE in Dairy, Steel and 
United Utilities (not Trade) where both financial and non-financial measures were used. 
Trade’s participants preferred their performance to be measured in financial terms only. 
There could be some reasons for this result. Firstly, it was the actual practice in Trade 
under the “Unified Accounting System” where it was neither the intention nor within the 
power of the employees to change it. Secondly, respondents saw the financial measures 
relevant to the company’s activity as a retailer which bought goods to sell without doing 
any further transmission (chapter 7, p i85). Aspects like quality, creativity,...etc were 
seen more related to manufacturing activity. A1 Bahimani’s findings (1993) in his survey 
on the British manufacturers were in line with this perception. The participants in A1 
Bahimani (1993) reported that under new technologies, there was a need to measure new 
aspects of work such as effectiveness of delivery, meeting time schedules (e.g. under JIT 
systems), flexibility and response to the market. However, A1 Bahimani did not address 
(and consequently did not deny) the importance of non-financial measures in service 
industry. On the other hand, financial measures and non-financial ones were not mutually 
exclusive in any activity, as the Production Controller in Steel company recorded 
(chapter 6, p 162).
Why performance measures were influential and non-financial preferred in the others:
In Dairy, Steel and United Utilities, performance measures were seen as influential and 
the non-financial measures within RPE system received overwhelming support. It is 
worth mentioning here that, an argument about widening the scope of measurements 
under RPE has not been introduced before in the debate about RPE. However, non- 
financial measures have frequently been discussed in debates about performance 
measures in the accounting literature.
In this sense, the data of Dairy, Steel and United Utilities were consistent with the 
accounting literature which pointed out many defects in the financial measures. For 
example, they were considered irrelevant, obsolete, too late, too aggregated, unrelated to 
strategic objectives (Tatikonda et. al. 1998, Ezzamel and Hart 1986, Kapalan 1984, 
Emmanuel et.al. 1990, Al Bahimani 1993, 1994) and led Kaplan and Norton (1992) to 
introduce the “Balanced Score Cards”. Also, the results agreed with Scott and Tiessen 
(1999) in that performance was positively associated with the variety and 
comprehensiveness of measures. Furthermore, the result was consistent with Al 
Bahimani’s survey (1993, 1994) on the manufacturing companies in the UK, where the
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non-financial measures were considered more relevant when competition and 
technological developments existed.
It could also be argued that the non-financial indicators might be able to measure “the 
process of performing” (i.e. how is it in terms of quality, meeting time schedule, 
reflecting the consequences of a decision within its span of time). On the other hand, 
financial indicators tend to measure “the results of performing”. This interpretation 
agrees with Kren and Munter (1995) where they argue that compensation system should 
be designed such that quality of decision-making forms the basis of performance 
evaluation.
Why market measures were rejected under RPE:
The frequencies of preferring market measures in the questionnaire and the interviewees' 
observations revealed a substantial agreement by the participants from the four 
companies against using market- based measures to measure and assess performance 
because of lack of the controllability and representativeness of these measures. This 
indication becomes stronger with RPE when basing rewards on performance 
comparisons. This was found to be the case even in United Utilities which applies RPE in 
the long-term incentive plan and uses market measures to indicate performance. The 
participants in the enquiry from United Utilities reported dissatisfaction with market 
measures.
The same result has been recognised by Merchant, Chow and Wu (1995) where 
Taiwanese managers believed that the stock market was not greatly concerned with the 
financial reports of the companies; and dealing in stock was decided not upon 
companies’ profitability but on other issues like companies’ assets. Therefore, Merchant, 
Chow and Wu (1995) reported that Taiwanese managers tended not to use stock- 
market based rewards.
II: The rewards
The research results showed inconsistent indications about the preferred form of reward 
under RPE. First, there was no evidence that diversifying the form of the reward under 
RPE would encourage the employees to respond to the package because it would satisfy 
different needs for different employees as Vancil (1979) anticipated and as Merchant and 
Riccaboni (1990) found in Fiat company. Ezzamel and Willmott (1998) found in the 
cases of six companies that they investigated that the lack of promotion opportunities^ 
for shop floor workers- was perceived as a problem in motivation. Therefore, efforts 
were made to broaden the remuneration package by augmenting the financial rewards 
with non- financial 'incentives' e.g. empowerment, job rotations, broadening job 
boundaries, better health and safety, training, etc. Ezzamel and Willmott (1998) 
commented that, to the extent that these schemes were deemed to be effective, their
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success was arguably attributable to labour market conditions as to using non-financial 
incentives.
The first observation about the results is the dominance of the preference for cash 
rewards in the four companies. The differences appeared from the second preference 
form onwards as the following table respectively shows:
Table (9-3) The order of preferable rewards in each company
The company The order of preferable rewards
Trade cash- work conditions - shares
Dairy cash -shares- post retirement benefits and work conditions
Steel cash -shares- holidays
United Utilities cash -shares- post retirement benefits and medical coverage
The high salary and tendency to accept risk might explain the advanced rank of shares in 
Dairy, Steel and United Utilities. On the contrary, low salaries, the sectional culture and 
the individuals’ risk aversion along with poor working conditions could be behind the 
order of preference in Trade. The appearance of holidays in Steel, was a reflection of the 
current practice. United Utilities’ pattern seemed closer to Dairy’s than to any other 
company under investigation. However, companies like Dairy -and more especially Steel- 
provided different types of pay among which was what Vancil (1979) classified as: 
power, opportunities to provide new ideas and to obtain the management’s approval to 
apply it.
RPE reward in shares and taxes
The data of United Utilities (chapter 8, p. 217) revealed that managers were allowed to 
collect part of the short-term incentive plan and the long-term plan (the RPE version 
which the company applied) in shares for tax purposes. This practice was consistent with 
the argument of Kaplan and Atkinson (1998) about rewards in shares and taxes. While 
they debated that no single bonus incentive plan dominates all other plans for all 
companies, many plans target to reduce taxes for the company and for the managers such 
as the stock options.
(9.4) Part Four 
The context and relevance of RPE
How has the contingency framework enhanced this research?
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One of the potential merits of this research was to study RPE within a contingency 
framework. The questionnaire (97 usable in total) and interviews (16) showed that 
contingency was effective in framing a “content” and a “context” for RPE. The statistics 
showed different approval for the various arguments in the different companies (Trade, 
Dairy, Steel, United Utilities), sectors (private, public) and environments (Egypt, 
England). The design of the case studies aimed to explore these differences. This design, 
not only provided answers to the research questions, but also identified other influential 
variables. Among these variables were: the ownership type, organisational facilities, 
management practices e.g. encouraging creativity, type of leadership, ...culture, level of 
pay, employees perception of the control system, implications of market and national 
culture. This section will examine these variables which the contingency framework 
revealed.
Ownership: Public sector vs. private sector
The first issue that the contingency framework revealed was the differences between the 
public and private sector patterns of control. As the previous chapter showed, the 
environment of the public sector in Egypt did not seem consistent with RPE for many 
reasons (as mentioned in the previous chapters e.g., lack of motivating employees or 
feeding competition between them, poor facilitates, low salaries, and constraining red 
tape). Furthermore, the objectives from maintaining state-owned companies did not 
appear to be consistent with the idea1 notion of RPE. The researcher would argue that 
the lack of consistency between the public sector’s environment and RPE requirements 
stemmed from lack of awareness of and aiming to motivate employees in the public 
sector and the poor facilities available to achieve any goal (even the budget). It was not 
necessarily running public companies for social, political and economic purposes rather 
than profit which led to leaving RPE, because not-for-profit organisations such as 
charities might require their employees to compete with other charities in serving 
clients/or achieving their goals. Rather, it was the centrally planned economy’s culture 
which disregarded motivating and feeding ambition which ultimately resulted in an 
attitude to avoid risk (the belief is: there is always a governmental procedure to follow, 
El Kahal 1998).
However, governmental interference would still distort RPE if the parent company -for 
example- drove the public company to compete with other companies (whatever they 
-were) on a specific target-(profit,-revenue, amount-of sales,^etc)-and in the meantime 
imposed specific sources of supply, procedures for doing the work, the employment 
policy on the company. Such "imposed alternatives" might not be the relevant choices to 
achieve the target. This case of Trade was consistent with what Ezzamel and Hart (1987, 
p 351) report that, in situations of task interdependence, whether of a facilitative or
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hindering nature, uncontrollability over performance is positively correlated with work- 
related tension.
Enis (1993) did not find evidence on whether and how ownership amends the outcome- 
compensation relationship within agency theory. He reviewed Arya’s results (1991) the 
less risk- neutral the principal is, the more likely risk to be shared with agents through 
outcome- compensation plans. However, Enis (1993) predicts that managers of closely- 
held firms encounter greater monitoring than managers of publicly traded firms and 
bonus plans would be used for tax reduction rather than motivating.
In United Utilities, the ownership has a different implication, all the objectives of the 
design of remuneration packages were to align the interests of managers to the interests 
of shareholders and to stay in line with pay practices in the industry/ market as stated in 
the annual reports 1998. With RPE -particularly- the group remuneration manager 
mentioned that major institutional shareholders suggested that two peer groups (the 
FTSE 100 without the utilities companies and the utilities companies within the FTSE 
100) should be used to provide more meaningful comparison and to be competitive in the 
utilities industry. In Steel, TQM, job for life, tying the employees to the company are 
obvious applications of the Japanese management style (Chen 1995).
Competition in the market and adopting RPE
The research findings suggested that in Dairy and United Utilities, the competition 
helped in the companies' adopting RPE whereas in Steel, it led to a version of RPE based 
on internal comparison. This observation was consistent with Maher’s (1987) where he 
found in a Conglomerate corporation in the USA that RPE was used to include 
competition and industry performance in the performance evaluation process. This 
observation was also consistent with the debate by DeFond and Park (1999), Dye 
(1992). Furnas (1992) argued that RPE's usefulness increases when the competition in 
the market increased because RPE would identify and replace the poor management 
[DeFond and Park (1999)]. RPE relates to strategic advantages (Furnas, 1992) and 
would encourage investment in risky decisions (Dye 1992).
RPE and the feedback about competition
Yong, Fisher and Lindquist (1993) concluded -from a laboratory investigation- that 
groups which received feedback (whether they are ahead or behind) other groups, tended 
to produce more, due to the social learning and motivation associated with the sign of 
feedback. Thus, the level of competition could be motivating for some work groups but 
not for others and organisations have to consider how competition might affect overall 
performance.
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These research findings might be seen as an extension of Young’s findings which 
stressed that exposing employees to competition through performance comparisons, 
could increase performance within limits. It is suggested that these limits are what have 
been debated in this research as "target’s difficulty". Overall, this research’s results in this 
point seem to be in line with Young et.al.’s (1993).
Importance o f Location
The participants of Trade identified the importance of "the location" for sales centres. 
Some branches are easily accessible by customers, with an ample space for displaying, 
storing and serving the large machinery that the company deals in. These site implications 
are expected to be influential on the profitability of the branch. An example is given by a 
branch, situated near to the expanding "6th October Industrial City” outside Cairo where 
the branch is near to a variety of factories (the customers) and the main road between 
Cairo and Suez harbour (where imported machines might arrive). Participants consider 
that such branches are just lucky to be there. This observation is consistent with the 
study of Moon and Fitzgerald (1996) on the performance measurement in TNT delivery 
firm. Again, staff of TNT identified some branches near specific customers and on main 
roads luckier and more able to make profits than other branches which do not have the 
same privilege. In line with this point, Norweb electricity company before being taken 
over by United Utilities, used to apply RPE by comparing its managers to counterparts in 
the Regional Electricity Companies as a preferred benchmarking. The implication of this 
for RPE is: location is an important issue in selecting peers for retail companies.
Pay level
As explained in chapter seven (p. 192), the remuneration level was higher in the private 
sector in Egypt than in the public sector. Kantor and Richardson (1993) report that 
salaries in the private sector in Egypt tend to be double that of the public sector. This 
gap has resulted -so they argue- because of the government's job guarantee policy for all 
college graduates which has done little more than lead to an overstaffed public sector 
with low wages that reflects the supply and demand of public sector labour. Although the 
government has abandoned this commitment with the movement towards the free market 
in the 1980's, the contemporary divergence in pay was a result of the previous
 commitment. Unlike the situation in Egypt, White (1997) reported that pay was relatively
consistent between the two sectors in the UK.
Two points emerge from the level of pay and RPE:
First: RPE reward is risky because it is based on competition with other performers
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and this is consistent with its mechanism as a motivational tool and equally suggests that 
individuals who would be motivated and rewarded by RPE should have achieved 
adequate satisfaction for their basic needs where a guaranteed base salary represented an 
uncertainty filter (Chow et. al 1994). This might explain why RPE was used for senior 
management only in the UK and in Egypt and why it was not used in the environment 
with low salary in Trade public company. Secondly, Merchant and Manzoni (1989) 
found that, the motivational power of reward-on performance depends on the percentage 
of pay that is at risk. This predicts that; if the entire remuneration (or most of it) is 
guaranteed, it will not have any motivational ability and if it is totally based on 
performance (such as in commissions in selling insurance policies), it might be too risky 
and hence de-motivating as well. Therefore, a balance should be kept between the two 
extremes. The remuneration package in United Utilities and Dairy -along with other UK 
companies- revealed that rewards based on RPE represented a small portion (8-12%) of 
the pay packages of the entitled individuals (Company Reporting publications 1994- 
1999). On the other hand as the Marketing Manager highlighted (chapter 6, p. 150 ) the 
salaries were in Dairy among the highest, this made any incentives had little to do with 
motivating employees. This was consistent with the argument of Merchant and Manzoni 
(1989) above because the amount of remuneration which is at risk -i.e. the reward- was 
too small compared to the secured pay (i.e. the salary).
Organisational Culture:
Bourn and Ezzamel (1986) conceptualise organisational culture in two ways: either as an 
independent external variable or dependent internal variable. As an external independent 
variable, it can be used to explain similarities and differences in the attitudes of managers 
of different countries. In this research, this is referred to as "national culture". As a 
dependent internal variable, it refers to the socio-cultural qualities which the 
organisations develop and which are shared by the members of each organisation. As 
discussed in chapter seven, two different organisational cultures could be identified in the 
Egyptian companies: "public sector's culture" and "private sector's culture".
A noticeable feature in the two sector's culture is the diverse effects of divisions' 
dependence on performance. In Steel, it has a positive reflection where co-operation is 
one of the job requirements and staff is accountable for it in the semi-annual review. In 
contrast, a negative impact was recorded in Trade. This was because it adopted a 
restricting red tape, a tendency to avoid risk and responsibility, hence there was a lack of 
understanding and co-operation between staff in the same department and in different 
departments. The importance of this factor is that it might affect the performance that 
would be compared to peers. However, RPE seems to lead to competition between 
performers "in other companies" and in order to do that effectively, corporate culture
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should emphasise co-operation between the colleagues and co-workers in the same 
company.
Corporate strategy and RPE
Data showed that performance comparisons -internally and externally- and the use of 
RPE were related to a growth or expansion strategy as was the case with Dairy, Steel 
and United Utilities. These companies paid more attention to market influences. A similar 
observation was made by Maher (1987).
Governmental Policies and National Implications in Egypt
The following issues relate to governmental policies and national features were 
recognised in Egyptian data:
• Expanding towards the desert: Establishing businesses in the new industrial zones (6 
all over the country) is supported and encouraged by the government. Demirsar 
(1998) considers the development of free zones as a vital component of Egypt’s 
effort to strengthen its private sector, attract foreign investment, create jobs and ease 
pressure on the Nile valley. Companies investing in a free zone receive a lifetime 
exemption from customs duties, sales, corporate and other taxes.
The implications of this on businesses (such as Dairy, which operates in 6th October 
industrial zone,) are that they would perform more effectively and efficiently than the 
companies in the old/overcrowded locations, with better utilities, flow of transport 
and delivery and the new accommodation welcomed by employees.
• Moving towards a free market: The issuance of The Investment Law in 1983 aimed 
to attract private capital, joint ventures and the foreign investments into Egypt. This 
has happened within a wider movement from the centrally planned economy that has 
dominated since the 1960’s to be replaced -gradually- by the free market since mid 
1970's. This has opened up the business environment (such as in Dairy and Steel and 
even Trade) in Egypt to local and international competition and these streams have 
affected the companies and increased the need for working more effectively and 
creatively.
• Emerging active securities market: This has increased the individuals’ awareness, 
attitude to investment in financial securities which in turn affect employees’ accepting 
and preferring shares as a form of reward.
• Pilgrimage trips in the reward packages: It is a common practice by both public and 
private companies in Egypt which is welcomed by employees. The arrangements 
include securing a visa, booking hotels and preparing guidance. While it is not
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expected that an employee receives this type of reward often (annually for example), 
the practice itself is regular by companies.
Relevance of RPE
RPE for whom: (a) Which managerial level
The UK practice of RPE as revealed in the “Company Reporting Publications” -reviewed 
in chapter three and four of the thesis- along with United Utilities company and similarly 
Dairy company in Egypt, all use RPE to reward top management only. Maher’s (1987) 
findings report RPE for top management in 2, and for division managers in 3 of the 5 
corporations which he examined in the USA. The study has also reported that RPE was 
used for setting targets for the divisions and more surprisingly, Maher’s observation that 
there was no difficulty in getting information about the performance of similar divisions 
in other companies. The latter point has been raised by many participants in this research 
as an obstacle in front of applying RPE on middle management or generally non-top 
level. Shih (1998) predicts that a corporate target would be achieved, if the individual 
targets for sub-units could be achieved.
(b) Which personal characteristics:
From the literature reviewed and the data collected, it can be predicted that RPE would 
motivate individuals who are on a high salary and risk-taking.
(9.5) RPE and National Culture
Firstly, note that the questionnaire and interviews of this research did not include an 
explicit and targeted investigation for the implications of national culture on controls 
generally or on RPE specifically. Instead, the statement which is made in this section, 
builts on the framework of Hofstede (1984, 1991) and the reported scores of Egypt and 
England with regard to the four dimensions of national culture which he studied. This 
was adopted along with the line of analysis of Chew, Kato and Shields (1994) who did a 
similar study for the cultural differences in controls and RPE between Japanese and 
American subjects. The researcher classified some of the interviews' data within 
Hofstede's framework (page 245).
Studying cultural issues explicitly was beyond the limits of this study for many reasons. 
Firstly, because debating the construct of culture was complicated and would need an in- 
depth case study to examine it properly. It was believed that gaining access for data to 
do such a study would not be possible. However, similarity and dissimilarity in practices
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of RPE and controls in Egypt and England were highlighted not from national cultural 
perspective but from a contextual perspective. This suggested the need for a following 
research which would include substantial examination of culture issues with regard to 
control. The second reason for not including cultural implications in the investigation, 
was because the literature of culture in social science was outside the researcher’s 
academic background. Therefore, it was thought that getting a grasp of that literature 
enough to allow her to involve in that debate, would need time far beyond what was 
available to do this research. Thirdly culture implications to control were far more 
complicated than what was thought. One observation on that from that data is the culture 
in Steel company. Being a joint venture with Japanese partners, Steel was planting and 
encouraging many elements of the Japanese working culture such as more collectivism, 
more risk taking and more creativity compared to the other Egyptian companies in the 
study (chapter 8, p. 191 and 194). This example raises a question whether or not national 
culture is something changeable and in the one country, there could be many work 
cultures. This suggests that a next study should be done to examine these issues.
Chew, Kato and Shields (1994) found weak support for national culture impact on using/ 
preferring RPE in an examination between USA and Japanese subjects. Following their 
study, the dimensions of national culture [Hofstede (1984, 1991)] related to controls are 
summarised in table (9-4) below:
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Table (9-4) Dimensions of national culture and controls
Control item Operative national dimension The relative country score 
(Hofsdte 1984)
Planning
Participation Power distance Egypt > UK
Goal difficulty Uncertainty avoidance Egypt > UK
Masculinity Egypt > UK
Evaluation
Controllability filters Uncertainty avoidance Egypt > UK
RPE Uncertainty avoidance Egypt > UK
Individualism UK > Egypt
Masculinity * Egypt >UK
Rewarding
Team based rewards Individualism UK > Egypt
Pre-set pay Individualism UK > Egypt
Uncertainty avoidance Egypt > UK
Masculinity Egypt > UK
Source: Chew, Kato and Shields (1994) page 338. 
* Added to Chow’s analysis.
First, the researcher would argue that if national culture impacts controls and RPE, it is 
not the only variable which affects it at any given time. For example, uncertainty 
avoidance is not the only reason for accepting a specific level of goal difficulty as, the 
level of pay is another determinant.
As table (9-4) above shows there was generally more participation in planning by 
employees in the UK culture represented by United Utilities rather than in the Egyptian 
culture represented by Trade and Dairy companies (but not Steel). This seems to be a 
reflection of more power distance between managerial levels in the latter environment. 
The culture’s tendency to be coloured by masculinity in the two countries seems to be 
the reasons for accepting challenging targets. However, the higher score for Egypt might 
interpret why participants - in Dairy and Steel- preferred to compete with top 100 
companies which were assumed to be the most difficult targets. However, the higher 
tendency to avoid risk in Egypt than in England, could explain why the most preferable 
peer group to compete with in Trade was peers from the same region and same 
company. Also in Dairy, they used a group of food and dairy producers to compare to 
when they applied RPE. This was unlike United Utilities which chose the FTSE 100. 
Although risk avoidance was higher in the Egyptian culture than the UK according to 
Hofsetde (1984, 1991), Egyptian companies tended not to filter risk from performance 
measures by external comparisons but probably more by internal comparisons. RPE 
might be found more in the UK environment because of higher attitude to accept risk
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than in Egypt. Masculinity in the two countries allowed the use of performance- related 
rewards whereas individualism in the two countries leads to applying RPE to individuals 
not to work groups as the Japanese was reported to do (Chow et. al. 1994).
In terms of remuneration practices, there is no evidence that the difference in 
individualism between the two countries affected the unit to be rewarded (i.e. 
individuals). However, it could be argued that, although under RPE -in Dairy company 
and United Utilities- managers were rewarded individually, the bases for calculating each 
manager’s reward was a "collective" measure because it was a "company performance" 
measure. In Steel company, some incentives which were based on division and group 
work, have been mentioned. It could be argued that the general economic conditions and 
standard of living in Egypt -not the culture dimensions- led to determining the biggest 
portion of remuneration as a base salary and not the changing reward.
These observations about national culture and reward systems are consistent with a 
similar- but wider- study by Schuler and Rogovsky (1998). The latter study found a 
relationship between compensation practices and the dimensions of national culture. 
Firstly, Schuler and Rogovsky (1998) concluded that countries with high levels of 
uncertainty avoidance may have to offer more certainty in compensation systems, e.g. 
seniority- based or skill- based systems. Secondly the use of individual incentive schemes 
were advisable for countries with higher levels of individualism. Thirdly, share options 
and stock- ownership plans may be better matched in countries with higher levels of 
individualism and lower levels of uncertainty avoidance and power distance. Fourthly, in 
countries with high masculinity, there was less use of flexible benefits, workplace child­
care programmes.
(9.6) Part five
Comparison with the Literature of RPE
* * * # * * * # # # # # * * * * * #
This section provides a multi- level comparison between the research (arguments, tools 
and results) and first: the previous studies of RPE, second: the only case study in RPE 
(Maher 1987). Table (9-5) summaries the differences between the research questions, 
methods and results in the previous studies and this research.
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Table (9-5) Comparison between this research and the previous literature of RPE
The study Research
Method
Basic Questions Kind of 
support 
to RPE
Results of each study
1-Holmstrom
1982
Theoretical
presentation
-Are the agents paid as to 
their performance compared 
to peers?
strong
support
-optimal sharing rule depends 
on agent’s action and his 
peers’
-peers group filters risk from 
agent’s performance.
2-Magee&
Kunckel
1984
-Empirical
using
published
data
-Holmstrom’s -what aspects 
of the peer group could affect 
the comparison?
-Are there differences 
between industries in 
practising the RPE?
inconsistent
results
-In some firms there was a 
relation between rewarding 
and industry performance 
varying in nature and power.
3-Antle& 
Smith 1986
-Empirical
using
published
data
-Holmstrom’s
-Who are the peers (industry 
or market)
-How RPE is implemented
-inconsistent
results
-Some relation between 
industry (not market) 
performance and employees' 
performance.
-filtering risk.
4- Choudhury 
1986
-Theoretical
debate
-what are the impacts of 
controllability on 
management accounting 
generally and RPE 
particularly
qualified.
result
Maintain controllability as a 
principle in responsibility 
accounting depends on the 
circumstances of the firm. 
-RPE imposes risk on risk 
averse managers.
-RPE is a better indicator of 
effort if  group cohesiveness is 
low
5-Maher
1987
-Case study -Is and how RPE 
implemented 
-How organisation’s 
characteristics affect RPE..
strong in 
some firms 
but not 
others
-in general, there is a support 
for the RPE but with 
differences in interfirm, 
intrafirm, measures, 
characteristics and uses.
6-Gibbons
&Murphy
1990
-Empirical
using
published
data
-Holmstrom’s
-What influence can peers
have.
-Does RPE affect agents' 
turnover
strong
support
-executives are paid (in basic 
or total) as to their 
performance and that of their 
peers.
-RPE filters risk.
-RPE's costs benefits affect its u 
-RPE affects turnover of 
employees
7-Chow & 
Haddad 1991
-Experiment -What is the influence of 
RPE on selecting projects 
and under different degrees of 
uncertainty.
qualified
result
-If supported by other studies, 
RPE could encourage agents 
to invest in risky projects 
under high uncertainty
8-Fredrickson
1992
-Experiment -Holmstrom’s
-What are the effects of the
degree of uncertainty.
strong
support
-effort increases under RPE as 
uncertainty increases 
-filtering risk
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9-Dye 1992 -Empirical
using
published
data
- What is the influence of 
RPE on selecting projects and 
on the principal’s utility.
inconsistent
results
-RPE could encourage agents 
to invest in projects where 
their relative performance is 
higher as to their information 
about
investments, number of 
projects competitors and 
talents.
10- Lambert
et.al
1993
-Empirical 
using data 
from a 
consultancy 
firm
what is the ability of 
tournament, managerial 
power and agency theories to 
explain the observed 
compensation data
New role 
for RPE 
in
promotion
organisational incentives are 
likely charectristised by a 
combination of tournament & 
managerial power 
- RPE can be used to justify 
promotions
11- Conyon & 
Gregg 1994
-Empirical
using
published
data
-Are executives paid on 
comparative performance 
- what is the importance of 
competition and take over 
on conditioning executives 
pay
-supported 
with some 
measures 
but not 
others
RPE is taken into account 
when determining pay with 
sales growth but not with 
shareholders return.
- Reduced union presence & 
expansion through take over 
(not heading a subsidiary) 
increases executives’ pay
12- Dopuch & 
Gupta 97
-Survey 
on costs in 
schools
-how to extend RPE to 
benchmark performance 
standards
strong
support
The activities can be more
economically
achieved by implementing
relative performance- based
benchmarking
DeFond & 
Park (1999)
-Empirical
using
published
data
• Whether RPE is useful in 
CEO dismissal decisions in 
more competitive 
industries.
strong
support
• Frequency of CEO turnover 
is greater in highly 
competitive industries. 
•RPE-based accounting 
management (compare to 
firm specific) accounting 
management are more closely 
associated to CEO turnover in 
high competition industries.
This research -case studies 
in 4
companies
Contingency enquiry:
How would employees 
respond to RPE under 
different peers, performance 
measures and forms of 
reward
-which context relevant for 
RPE
mixed
results
-employees would increase 
their performance under RPE 
if  peers are challenging but 
attainable, performance is 
measured financially and non 
financially
but no impact of varying 
rewards.
-RPE would be used in a 
competitive environment, 
supportive management, 
expansion strategy + 
for employees on high salary 
and risk taking
The comparison could be traced following five different threads: the research arguments, 
framework, design, empirics and findings. These threads are presented respectively in 
this section.
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In terms of research arguments
As detailed in chapters two and three of this thesis, the previous research in RPE 
depended on different measures for performance, different peer groups and different 
packages of rewards and those studies got mixed and contradictory results. Nevertheless, 
that literature accepted -unquestioningly- the assumption that RPE would motivate 
employees. Also no question was raised as to whether or not the performance measures, 
peers or rewards could have a role in getting those mixed results. An attempt has been 
made in this research to fill this gap. In order to find out the main themes to investigate, 
RPE was considered for analysis as a control system (chapter one, section three). This 
provided an opportunity to study the potential of RPE (the motivational ability), the 
content (peers, measures and rewards) and the context (individual and organisational) of 
RPE.
This line of enquiry helps to obtain a better understanding of RPE by raising new 
arguments around it and analysing it within a complementary perspective (which looks at 
RPE as a control system) to articulate the arguments. Also by linking the whole debate 
to the wider and continuous debate about performance, in the accounting literature.
In terms of framework
The previous literature of RPE was framed within the principal- agent framework and the 
set of assumptions about each of them (e.g. being rational, self- interest, driven by 
economic utility only,...etc) and the assumptions about the relationship between the two 
parties (e.g information asymmetry, goal conflict,...). In chapter three of this thesis, 
some contradictions between these assumptions and those of RPE were identified. This 
raised a doubt as to the suitability of agency theory as a framework of analysing RPE. 
The influence which this adoption held is that, under agency theory, RPE was assumed - 
implicitly- to be a tool for aligning the interests of agents to principals. This assumption 
has not been tested by collecting data or watching behaviour to examine whether 
individuals -under RPE- are rational, self interested, seek economic utility only and 
whether RPE could align the conflict of objectives between managers and owners. 
However, as discussed in chapter four, agency theory ignores the impact of environment 
on organisations and issues like competition, strategy and employees' judgement and
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response to performance measures and targets. When these arguments are raised in the 
debate, the agency framework would be narrow. Alternatively, contingency theory - 
along with the desire to relate the debate about RPE to the wider domain of performance 
measurements- opened up arguments about the employees’ behaviour and response to 
RPE and RPE as a control system.
In terms of research design
As table (7-3) shows, the previous studies in RPE depended mainly on testing the 
published data of performance and rewards (with two exceptions, two studies of 
experiments and one case study). The Academy of Management stated in the call for 
paper for its conference about Pay and Firm Performance in 1996, that using published 
data (solely American) has limited the scope of analysis where not many variables have 
been examined. The data from that source are aggregated, archival, collected and 
classified to serve many purposes. Furthermore, that source would not allow an 
exploration of employees’ attitudes, nor would it help in detecting the "other variables" 
that could influence the phenomenon.
Also, the previous literature used data of different companies and industries together 
and this did not highlight the/ impacts of the companies and individuals involved. 
Therefore, the research design of this study depended on case study approach with an in- 
depth investigation into the company, individual, sector and market implications on the 
debate about RPE.
In terms of empirics
The evidence presented in the previous research of RPE (except for the case study of 
Maher), was confined to measurements and observations of a limited number of variables 
(either when the work depended on data collected from databases or on experiments). 
Other variables were ignored or neutralised because of the restricted sources of data.
In this research, the case studies were built upon data from different sources (companies’ 
reports and internal documents, interviews and questionnaire material). The comments 
on the questionnaire and the interviews -specifically- have provided more than mere
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answers to the research questions. These two particular sources draw attention to 
variables of influence on the debate, other than what had been initially examined.
The various sources helped to construct an account of each company’s policy regarding 
the control system and the performance management and another account of its 
experience with those systems. The data also provided an account of the individuals’ 
attitudes towards RPE and the performance systems.
The scope of analysis -unlike the previous research which handled the data as one set and 
used only correlation and regression- included multi levels of analyses. This included 
analysing the data of each company. The Egyptian data was grouped in two sectors 
(public and private) for individual presentation and a comparison, and all this data was 
compared to English data. Furthermore, the Egyptian data together and English data 
each was discriminated by attitude towards RPE (i.e. those who agreed on, did not agree 
on and those who had a neutral towards RPE) and differences were explored.
In addition to differentiating the level of analysis, different statistical tools were used 
including: frequencies, correlation, regression, ANOVA and T test.
In terms of findings
In this research, some arguments have been shared with the previous studies of RPE, 
nonetheless, different results, interpretations and explanations have been reached. First, 
the evidence in this research suggests that RPE is the least desirable and used evaluation 
technique. Nevertheless, the idea behind using RPE was not to share risk between 
managers and owners as Holmstrom (1982) proposed, but to motivate employees as 
Fredrickson (1992) suggested. Secondly, some relationship between RPE and peers from 
the same industry was found in Dairy and United Utilities companies as Antle and Smith 
(1986) discovered, however, there is evidence that RPE was correlated to using 
securities market measures. The latter relationship was rejected in Antle and Smith 
(1986) study because of uncontrollability. Choudhury (1986) was also involved in the 
debate about RPE and controllability and concluded -in his theoretical discussion- that 
maintaining controllability depended on the company’s circumstances. The findings of 
this research are consistent with Choudhury’s; for example, in Trade public company, 
controllability was dismissed so that the state could achieve goals other than economic 
ones (e.g. political, social,...etc). Being privately owned, Dairy, Steel and United
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Utilities did not face the same situation as Trade where the state interfered in the 
company’s decision about targets,...etc. However, while Dairy, Steel and United Utilities 
maintained their control over their decisions -relatively- their respondents reported lack 
of control over movements of share price and market- based measures generally. Thus, 
this research suggests that controllability is an influential issue on the employees’ 
acceptance and response to RPE. Moreover, the findings agree with Choudhury’s that 
RPE increases risk especially risk of income as participant interpreted it.
Gibbons and Murphy (1990) mentioned the argument about peer influence on RPE, but 
did not articulate nor discuss it clearly. In this research, the evidence suggests that the 
choice of the peer group could affect the employees’ response to RPE according to how 
they would perceive their peers in terms of difficulty in competing with them. If 
employees perceive the peer group as a challenging target, this could motivate them as 
long as it is also attainable. Thirdly, the evidence suggests that the drive behind 
employees’ accepting RPE is to gain money only, not money and esteem as Fredrickson 
(1992) predicted.
(9.7) Comparison with Maher’s case study in RPE
Table (9-6) provides a comparison between this research and the only case study in the 
literature of RPE, that undertaken by Maher (1987):
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Table (9-6) A  Comparison between this research and the case study of Maher (1987)
Aspect of comparison Maher’s case study (1987) This research
Perspective agency contingency
Sources of arguments Unanswered questioned by 
Antle and Smith (1986)
-Gaps in the literature of RPE 
-Relate RPE to the wider accounting 
literature of performance 
-Complications in UK practice of 
RPE not addressed before
Assumptions The use of RPE can increase 
the efficiency of contracting 
between principals and agents 
(where there is information 
asymmetry between them). 
This occurs by taking into 
account the performance of 
the peers who share the same 
risk with the agents
RPE could motivate employees to 
improve performance if  they perceive 
the peer group as a challenging but 
attainable target, if  performance is 
measured financially and non 
financially and if different types of 
rewards are used.
Mode of study Exploratory case study with 
broad questions
Exploratory case study with specific 
questions
Questions How firms implement RPE? 
What circumstances give rise 
to the use of RPE for 
divisional managers?
Is RPE motivating?
How the choice of peers, measures 
and rewards affect the response to 
RPE?
Tools of collecting data Data collected by interviews 
and companies reports
Questionnaire, interviews and 
companies records and reports
Empirics Five large companies in USA 
belong to different industries 
(e.g. restaurants, heavy 
machine, airspace, tires,...) 
were investigated
Three companies in Egypt with 
different size, ownership nature and 
activities and a multi utilities group 
belonged to the FTSE 100 in England 
have been investigated
Results -RPE used to evaluate division 
managers in less diverse and 
less centralised companies. - 
RPE was used for setting 
plans
-The responses to RPE depended on 
selecting attainable targets, using 
financial (accounting not market) and 
non financial measures.
-RPE used in the UK company and 
one of the three Egyptian companies 
for top management only due to 
capital market influences 
-Ownership, competition and level of 
pay affect the use of RPE
The purpose of Maher’s research was to investigate whether and how companies use 
RPE to appraise divisional performance. The main questions of the study were: how the 
comparison group is determined, what characteristics of firms and contracts give rise to 
RPE in some cases and not in others, can RPE be used with various managerial divisions 
or is it limited to the top management. Maher used a case study method of five firms
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relatively large, publicly traded with manufacturing type of activities. Maher’s findings 
are generally consistent with his expectations that division managers of diverse, 
decentralised companies are evaluated relative to industry peers because of information 
asymmetry between them and their top management. The unexpected results which he 
detected were using RPE for setting divisional targets and using it in a very diverse 
company but that was due to strategic purposes other than to filter risk.
Unlike Maher’s findings, in this research, RPE was used to evaluate and reward - 
exclusively- the performance of top management. The idea was to engage them in the 
market rather than to motivate them, monitor their effort or filter risk from the 
performance measures. The diversity element has not been investigated nor recognised in 
this research although United Utilities is a group of four companies which work in a 
variety of activities (all utilities) and local and international markets. Similar to Maher’s 
findings, division comparisons -and whole company comparison in Steel- were used in 
the Egyptian companies especially in the private sector.
Summary
This chapter discussed the arguments raised about RPE within a contingent perspective 
rather than the universal agency perspective which dominated the previous research. 
RPE was used in some companies but not welcomed (as in Dairy and United Utilities), 
not used but welcomed (in Steel) and not used and rejected in others (Trade). RPE was 
applied and welcomed in Dairy company as a vehicle to handle competition whereas in 
Steel company (which is a joint venture) it was not applied but welcomed for learning 
purposes and a route to promotion. United Utilities used it to align interest between 
managers and shareholders. In Trade, (public sector) it was not used and rejected 
because of governmental interference, lack of facilities, poor salary, restricting red- tape 
and tendency to avoid responsibility and risk. Dairy and Steel and United Utilities were 
exposed to competition, provided high salaries, facilities and supportive leadership. 
These variables appeared to be behind the support for RPE. The findings suggest that 
three of the four research arguments have been supported: target difficulty, including 
non-financial measures, non use of market measures (because of issues of lack of 
control) but no support could be recognised for diversifying rewards.
The findings of this research were consistent with the wider accounting literature about 
the impact of target difficulty, including financial and non-financial measures but not 
varying the form of rewards. The research findings were also not consistent with 
Fredrickson's (1992) that employees would respond to RPE to gain both money and 
esteem. The results also disagree with Maher's (1987) that RPE -as defined in this 
research- was welcomed by middle management or below. Chapter ten summaries the 
key findings, outline the research's contribution, limitations and future work.
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Chapter Ten
Conclusions, Limitations and Future work
(10.1) Summary
This study was an investigation of the performance measurements’ debate within 
contingency theory using a case study method. In particular, this research questioned 
how managers perceive and respond to performance systems and what variables might 
affect that response. In part I (chapter 4), live arguments were developed in relation to 
the design of RPE and the consequent motivation and these arguments were the bases 
for exploring performance practices, outcomes and how they were related. The 
discussion in part I, focused mainly on identifying the theoretical framework using insight 
gained from three themes: performance measures and evaluation, rewards and 
motivation. That discussion led to moving the debate from an agency theory perspective 
to a contingency theory one. This shift allowed not only to examine further arguments in 
the debate about RPE -beyond those introduced in agency theory- but also permitted to 
explore the characteristics of the individuals and the organisations which might apply 
RPE successfully. Furthermore, The investigation within contingency framework 
introduced variables (such as ownership nature, level of pay, influence of stock market 
and organisational culture) which could affect the potential of RPE. The case studies 
from the four companies showed the importance of these variables in RPE's performing 
its proposed role in motivation.
The study was focused (part I, chapter 5) on a series of critical analyses of the literature 
(part I, chapter 3) and reports about practice (part I, chapter 4). Different issues about 
remunerating practices were reviewed in professional reports [e.g. The Greenbury 
Effects (1995), After Greenbury: Developments in Company Policy and Practice (1996) 
and After Greenbury: Incentive Schemes (1996)] issued by the consultancy firm Coopers 
and Lybrand. This source made it possible to choose and to focus the arguments because 
it highlighted that in reality, there have been issues of concern to practitioners but were 
overlooked in the literature.
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The fieldwork was carried out after centring the arguments in order to investigate the 
performance measures’ practices and employees’ attitudes towards them. 
Complementary tools for collecting data were in this research including a questionnaire, 
interviews and internal documents and internet material. The interviews focused on 
examining the current performance measures, evaluation and reward practices, the 
rationale behind them, the importance of each one relative to the other, how they related 
to the company’s position and strategy. In parallel, the enquiry was extended by a 
questionnaire to examine further questions and propositions concentrated particularly 
around relative performance evaluation "RPE" (chapter 6). This strategy was chosen in 
order to gain a wider view of how RPE -as one of the evaluation and reward techniques- 
may fit into the wider domain of performance measures and with the other components 
of that system. Moreover, moving from the general to the specific; was thought to help 
in understanding and explaining specific issues with RPE. The research was designed on 
an exploratory case study basis to explore RPE practices and managers’ attitudes to it in 
Egypt and England (chapter 4). Twenty companies were identified and approached in the 
UK but access was offered in only one company. In Egypt, there was no information 
about which companies applied rewards on performance comparisons, therefore, the 
research objective were broadened to include, exploring the performance management 
practice system, whether or not RPE is applied and why/ how, for whom, in what 
circumstances and what factors affect it.
Three companies were approached in Egypt but access was successful with only three. 
The data were planned to be collected by using interviews, questionnaires and 
documents. The basic idea of the integration of the two instruments was that the 
limitations/deficiencies of one method would be compensated for by the complementary 
of the others. For example, a questionnaire could be efficient in generating large 
amounts of data for statistical analysis, the major limitations for it might be that it might 
lack depth or interactive dialogue which would produce in-an-depth view about the 
argument. It was thought that the latter target was thought to be fulfilled by a face-to- 
face interview. The complementary tools were consistent with the case study approach 
which allowed the researcher to deal with a variety of evidence (Ch.4)
(10.2) Contingency framework of the research
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The literature suggests that the contingency framework is particularly useful when 
exploring the context of a phenomenon of interest (Otley 1980, Hartely 1994, Scapens 
1986). In this research, data tools such as the questionnaire, included questions about 
“other variables that should be considered when RPE is sought”; the interviews provided 
details which explained the reasons behind what the questionnaire responses suggest.
The contingency framework broadened the scope of enquiry and introduced further 
variables and arguments into the debate about RPE. The case studies material provided 
evidence on the importance of these arguments (Part II, chapters 6,7 and 8) in enhancing 
the potential of RPE. However, the study did not measure the outcome of using RPE 
taking into account the new variables, basically because it was not one of the objectives 
of this research and probably because it was not measurable as well. It is argued that this 
research developed a contingent outline of RPE. The enquiry provided a framework for 
"what RPE can do", "for whom" and "in which environment" as discussed in chapter 9. It 
revealed that in order that RPE might motivate employees to work harder, employees 
should perceive the peer group as being a challenging but attainable target, their 
performance be measured in both financial and non-financial basis and the financial part 
be in accounting rather than market measures. Furthermore, the field work suggested 
that RPE would be relevant for an environment with involvement in competition, stock 
market, allowing individuals' to take responsibility and providing high salaries. RPE as 
based on comparisons with peers in other companies might be applicable to top 
management only. However, comparisons with colleagues in the same company and 
service standards could be another version of RPE suitable for other managerial levels.
Given that the essence of RPE was a "benchmarking" process, it could be argued that the 
research provided guidelines for this process. The research suggested that fairness/ 
attainability of target, controllability and representativeness of performance measures, 
security of basic pay and support of management were essential features for an 
acceptable and motivating benchmarking.
(10.3) The key Findings and the research contribution
From the empirical evidence in the case studies (Chapter 6 and 7), it appeared that RPE 
was more complicated than what the literature addressed; especially when the universal
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view of analysis was adopted. Complications emerged when the investigation extended 
inside the company.
In this research, it was found on the facts’ side that; RPE was the least used and preferred 
evaluation and reward technique in the four companies under investigation. RPE was 
applied in Dairy company in Egypt and in United Utilities in the UK only. In these two 
companies, RPE -based on financial model- was used to reward top management only. 
However in the four companies, comparing performance to the budget was the first and 
most common evaluation criterion and the sole basis in Trade. In Dairy and Steel, a 
comparison of divisions’ performance -internally- was a regular part of the control 
system.
On the attitudes' side, different directions could be identified as follows: (a) RPE was 
acceptable to top management in the companies which were exposed to capital market 
influences, (b) The technique did not align interests between managers and owners. 
Although United Utilities explicitly and Dairy implicitly stated that they use RPE for that 
purpose, managers -in the two companies- did not give their agreement or consent to 
RPE. Instead, many reservations were recorded as shown in chapters 6, 7 and 8. 
Managers seemed merely to comply with the package, (c) RPE was perceived to be 
irrelevant to the companies with financial difficulties and lack of autonomy such as Trade 
company, (d) The relationship between motivation and performance was influenced by 
other variables (e.g. the employees' perception of target difficulty and attitude towards 
risk, performance measures, rewards, competition and ownership), (e) National culture 
did not affect employees accepting RPE or how companies implement RPE. Instead, 
influences of capital market and competition were similar in the two different cultures 
(England and Egypt).
Secondly: In RPE, performance measures were a crucial element for the performance 
evaluation process especially for the manufacturing companies (Dairy, Steel and United 
Utilities) whereas controllability was the vital issue for Trade because currently 
participants from Trade showed dissatisfaction with governmental interference in targets, 
policies and procedures. As A1 Bahimani (1993) concluded -from his survey on British 
manufacturing companies- that there were many defects associated with the financial 
measurement which were seen to be less relevant for a hi-tech environment. There was a
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need for indicators which could measure new aspects of performance such as: meeting­
time schedule, quality and response to market.
The participants of the manufacturing firms (Dairy and Steel) placed great importance on 
the performance measurements’ attributes such as comprehensiveness and time- relation. 
This might not be a reflection of the type of activity (manufacturing rather than services) 
but could be an impact of the competition and market to which the companies were 
exposed.
Thirdly: there was no evidence that varying the rewards (to be in cash-shares-holiday) 
would have improved the response to RPE with limited variation, cash virtually 
dominating the preferences.
Fourth: There were other variables in the practices of performance management and RPE 
which had been overlooked in the literature of RPE. Among these variables are the 
impacts of competition, the exposure to the market, the type of ownership and culture. 
United Utilities and Dairy applied RPE as a result of facing competition and market 
influences. Consequently the two companies were concerned to monitor themselves 
against competitors and held top management responsible for managing this competition 
and being rewarded accordingly. Steel was exposed to competition in the international 
market of steel products. This international domain plus lack of a local equivalent made it 
difficult for Steel to apply RPE as a rewarding technique to its employees because of the 
difficulties in comparing remuneration across countries and currencies. However, the 
benchmarking element of RPE was not totally absent from Steel. The company was 
compared to international steel producers also some divisions or cost items were 
compared to international producers in Germany or Japan.
Fifth: In addition to competition, both sets of data in Egypt and the UK -either for 
individual companies or aggregated in sectors (private sector vs. public sector) or taken 
nationally- suggested that corporate culture, sectoral culture and type of ownership 
would affect RPE. It was found that the environment, values and circumstances of the 
public sector in Egypt (detailed in Chapter 6) which featured low pay, poor facilities, 
lack of autonomy, power, initiatives and motivation was appropriate for RPE. In 
contrast, the private sector environment in Egypt and the UK -as inferred from United
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Utilities’ case- with high pay, employee's taking responsibilities, autonomy, power, 
encouraging motivation and initiatives all seem to be relevant to applying RPE.
Sixth: While the previous literature defined RPE by referring to top management only 
and did not question its relevance to other managerial levels, the UK practice of RPE 
implied that it was applicable to top management only. This research predicated that the 
core idea of RPE could apply to all managerial levels but in different forms. For example, 
the basis for comparison could be "other companies" for the senior level because this 
level would be responsible for the overall performance (i.e. the company) but that should 
differ for different managerial level. For middle management and below, comparison with 
"internal" peers such as other divisions in the company was more acceptable.
Seventh: In the sense stated in “sixth” above, all performance management is relative to 
different bases. Influences of market/industry and competition seem to push the relativity 
towards external units generally, whereas the managerial level (specially the lower) 
forces it back to a comparison with internal divisions. It seems that I started with a 
normative view and ended with a contingent one. This research began with an 
expectation that the elements of RPE might affect the employees’ response to it. More 
specifically, the research arguments were built up on the assumptions that, in order that 
employees’ be motivated by RPE, the peer group should represent a challenging but 
attainable target, the performance should be measured in both financial (but not market- 
based) and non financial terms and varying reward. The research -instead- concluded 
with a contingent framework, while the peer group and performance measures were 
found to be influential on the employees’ response as previously predicted, this was not 
universally valid. RPE could be used in an environment where there were external 
influences from the market and competition and internally, RPE would need a supportive 
organisational environment which encouraged competition between the employees and 
supportive leadership. In such circumstances, the essence of RPE -i.e. the idea of 
comparing employees’ performance to that of other performers- could apply on different 
managerial levels using different basis for the comparison (i.e. different reference group).
Different elements of contribution could be identified in this research with relation to the 
methodology, covering gaps in the literature, and links to the accounting literature.
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Regarding the methodology and method, various themes could be recognised: (1) The 
theoretical debate in this study provides identified the limitation of agency theory as a 
framework for investigating RPE. (2) The discussion in this research and the evidence 
supported the relevance of contingency framework for the research arguments which 
constitutes a shift from the previously dominating agency framework. Contingency was 
used as a bridge for the case studies and provided more complex framework for 
examining RPE than agency theory. For example, it allowed an examination of many 
arguments about RPE such as its motivational power, the employees and designers’ 
perception and experience with it.
(3) The research fulfilled the invitations of academic bodies such as the Academy of 
Management in its call for papers for its conference about pay and firm performance in 
1996. The Academy called for innovative methods of research in this area and a 
departure from the conventional ways which depended on archival data, also sought 
multi disciplinary research (rather than the economic dominance) and a cross cultures 
(rather than the overwhelming USA studies) modes of studies. This research depended 
on case studies approach and collected data from subjects who are directly involved in 
the phenomenon -by questionnaire and interviews- rather than using published data as 
previous studies did. This duality of methods compensated the weaknesses of each if 
applying individually. Correlation provided the causality relationships between the 
variables.
The debate while purposely kept within the accounting domain, the nature of the topic 
and studying motivations and social comparison theory led to extending the origins to 
psychology and some industrial relations literature (e.g. the study of Gibbons and 
Murphy 1990 published in Industrial and Labour Review). Furthermore, conducting the 
case studies in Egypt and England allowed a chance to report and explore RPE which 
was developed in western (Anglo- Saxon) culture, in other culture, and in different 
sectoral cultures in that environment (e.g. the private sector and the public sector’s 
culture). Also, the research introduced such practices -which rarely exposed to the 
international domain- with reflections of the history, implications, individuals’ perceptions 
and attitudes and the economic and political backgrounds from which these practices 
emerged.
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(4) Regarding links to the wider accounting literature of performance measurements and 
evaluation, this line of enquiry led to firstly, looking at RPE as a control system and this 
formed the thread by which the research arguments were linked together. Secondly, that 
raised new issues about RPE such as the difficulty of the peer group, performance 
measurement (financial or non-financial) and the suitability of various rewards to various 
employees (5) Taking the debate about RPE inside the organisations enriched the 
discussion by new elements such as the impacts of employees’ attitudes towards controls, 
organisational culture and strategy on RPE.
(6) The research covered some gaps in the literature of RPE by focusing the debate on 
two specific areas: the content and the context of RPE. This included exploration for the 
individual, organisational and environmental domain within which RPE might function 
effectively. Thus -unlike the previous literature- it examined the argument which used to 
be taken for granted that RPE would motivate employees. This research questioned the 
ability and mechanism by which RPE might do that. (7) The investigation examined RPE 
beneath CEO level and whether there could be different versions of it for the different 
levels, while the previous literature exclusively allocated RPE for top management 
without asking why? and why not for other levels? (8) The research examined the 
noticeable practice of RPE in the UK which was built on market measures. The debate 
included investigation for the implications of stock market on the potential and prospect 
of the technique and on the mechanism of it. (9) Unlike previous studies, the evidence in 
this research gathered the views of the appraisers who design and administer the system 
and the appraisees who are evaluated and rewarded under this system. Both had their 
own expectations, experience and view in the system and its outcome.
(10.4) Research Limitations
The findings of this research should be interpreted within the following limitations: First, 
the use of contingency theory as a framework could draw some limitations on the 
research and its outcomes. Given that the contingency framework was criticised because 
the conceptualisation and measurements of the key variables need great theoretical and 
empirical attention. It might also lack the precision in defining contingent factors, mis- 
specification of parameters and the problems relate to the number of variables included, 
the interaction between these variables and the difficulty to collect the amount of data 
required to measure these variables.
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The epistemology of case studies was also different from that of the positivistic research 
in form of a survey for example. The epistemology of case studies which was used in this 
research allowed the employers and employees -who were social actors- to "provide" the 
evidence of the developed knowledge about RPE. Also, the process of designing the 
research tools and interpreting the results was affected by the research’s choices. A 
positivistic research in a survey form, would have allowed lesser impact of personal 
actors on the data and the research. That is, a survey and working on published data 
would have used numbers as measures for performance and rewards to investigate the 
relationships between performance comparisons and RPE (as explained in the alternative 
programmes in ch. 5). When numbers were used as measurements, this would differ from 
using perceptual measurements -from the subjects- as happened under the case study 
approach.
However, the case studies design was a compromise. That is, because it was not the 
custom of the Egyptian companies to disclose managerial remuneration, objectives, 
amount, bases or regulations in its annual reports, this restricted the opportunity to 
identify the Egyptian companies that used RPE. This was partially handled by targeting 
companies that were known to the researcher to be involved in national or international 
competition, on the premise that they might be applying RPE. However, access was 
accidental to the Egyptian companies.
Secondly, while in the UK, the researcher identified companies which used RPE but only 
limited access was granted from one of them (United Utilities pic). Access to United 
Utilities was restricted especially with the interviews and with the number of 
questionnaires in Steel company. The researcher was aware of the dangers of drawing a 
picture about each company on the bases of that limited evidence. However, it was 
hoped that the use of many tools, e.g. the interviews and the documentary sources would 
compensate -to  a degree- for the weakness of the small questionnaire sample for those 
two companies.
Given that the number of questionnaires of Dairy, Steel and United Utilities - 
individually- was less than 30, this constitute a particular limitation on the importance of 
the regression results of these companies. However, the regression results were 
interesting in that, they produced statistically significant relationships (such as in Dairy 
company page 151 and Steel page 159) although they stemmed from vary small samples.
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Thirdly, examining the implications of national culture on the research argument was not 
explicitly included in the research instruments (the questionnaire and the interviews). 
While the researcher depended on the framework of Hofestede (1984, 1991) like many 
studies, there is the risk that the observations made from the data to fit within that 
framework were given from the participants in a specific context and not regarding 
national culture investigation.
Fourthly, due to the time and resources constraints, many points have been left without 
examination e.g. impact of RPE on group’s co-operation, the roles of RPE in planning, 
monitoring or filtering risk, impacts of power, time, personal characteristics and 
“valuation” of non cash reward, e.g. shares, post retirement benefits.
In methodological terms, the researcher is aware of the debate about deficiencies in the 
case study approach, mainly lack of generalisability. The researcher would follow 
streams which emphasise that generalisability was not targeted in the case study 
approach. That is because this approach justifies itself on the grounds of providing an in- 
depth investigation rather than generalisability (Hartey 1994, Otley and Berry 1994).
(10.5) Future work
There are many directions for extending this study. An extension to the theoretical line of 
the study, the contingent outline of RPE which was developed in this study, could be 
examined on other sets of data, from other industries and in other environments, to 
support or modify the framework. It would also be important to discover more about the 
organisational context of RPE.
The case study method could also enrich our understanding of RPE in many aspects such 
as providing an in-depth examination of different arguments about RPE, and 
performance management. An example of these aspects could be the impact of 
managers’ being rewarded on RPE on their investment decisions which was examined in 
experiment by Chow and Haddad (1991), and ended with a call for further investigation 
for the same point. The case study for this point could provide direct investigation to the 
argument in the real world. It could also explore how and why RPE might affect 
managers when taking investment decision, what factors affect that, what experience and 
rationale behind. A merit of the case study here would be getting feedback from the 
subjects who are directly involved in the phenomenon.
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The case study of Steel company in Egypt suggests that joint venture type of business 
could have specific effects on control practices which would be useful to be examine in 
more detail. Besides, in this research, the distinctive differences in controls of the 
companies with different type of ownership (public, private, joint venture, ...etc) showed 
the importance to explore -in detail-the ownership impacts on controls. The case of 
Steel highlighted that the foreigner partners in the joint venture businesses might cause 
some very recognisable features on the work systems, culture and outcomes. Studying 
the influences of joint ventures on employees, work culture and controls would be an 
interesting piece of work and particularly useful to Egypt, which is hosting joint ventures 
with partners from different countries.
The arguments about RPE need to be examined on bigger sample of data (notice for 
example the limited interviews in United Utilities and the small questionnaire sample of 
Steel). The bigger sample could allow more complex statistical tests and hence inferring 
more relationships, could suggest more/ different variables and hence richer picture 
about the phenomenon.
An extension of this research could be by directly and purposefully examining the impact 
of national culture on the potential of RPE. The enquiry about RPE could also be 
extended to further areas beyond motivation and performance, for example examining 
whether RPE can play a role in identifying the company's competitiveness and relate this 
to the wider issues of strategic management accounting.
Another research might relax the point that employees' actions are assumed to be 
separable under RPE. This could lead to investigating the impact of power which the 
different type of employees enjoy, on the outcome of RPE. Also, still to be addressed - 
directly- the influence of RPE on intrafirm competition if RPE is run between colleagues 
in the same company. This would be particularly important because some respondents 
recorded that RPE might devastate group spirit and co-operation.
Moving from extensions which relate to RPE, this research suggests a need to address 
issues relate to the general performance measurements. Among those, it sounds 
particularly important to discuss how to integrate performance measures, targets and
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rewards with the business strategy. Furthermore, the valuation of non-cash forms of 
reward could be examined and the impact of pay gaps on job tension and employees’ 
dissatisfaction (as observed in Trade company and in United Utilities).
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Appendix (A-l)
A Review of Pay- for- Performance Practices in UK
In October 1994, Pay and Benefits Bulletin number 361 contained the findings of its 
latest review of merit pay systems in operation in 75 organisations. The merit pay 
scheme is the process of linking all or part of employees’ rewards to an assessment of 
their performance at work. It has become an established method of pay setting for 
employees in the UK, especially at managerial level. Pay reviews based wholly or partly 
on merit assessment now make up more than 20 % of all awards recorded on IRS pay 
databank. The following points will sum up the findings of this survey.
Employee group: Managerial staff are still the group most commonly covered by 
merit pay structures, although in 29% of organisations (22 out of 75) the whole 
workforce is eligible for merit payments. Merit systems specifically for manual 
employees remain rare, used by fewer than 10 % of organisations that apply merit to 
selected groups of employees.
AH m erit sy stem sA ll-  merit pay structures, in which employees rewards are 
determined solely by their performance, are used by nearly three quarters of employers 
(55) for at least one group of employees and by more than one in five organisations (16) 
for all employees.
Performance appraisal: Employees’ performance is assessed for merit pay purposes 
by means of an annual appraisal by their immediate superior in nine out of 10 
organisations.
Criteria: The achievement of per- set objectives, and a judgement by the appraiser of 
“whole- job” performance was the most common criteria for assessing performance.
Objectives:. The majority of the respondents said that they introduced the merit pay to 
improve the individual and corporate performance, and these motives are also felt to be 
the most frequent benefits of merit pay once in place and;
Monitoring: Only 53% of organisations (40) with merit pay monitor the distribution 
of awards to check for consistency or to guard against bias. Analysis of the distribution 
according to grade levels is the most common form of monitoring; conducted by nearly 
7 out of 8-organisation (34) which analyse the spread of awards.
Appendix (A-2)
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Summery of Practices of RPE in Some UK Companies
This survey of the practices of RPE by some UK companies is based on The Company 
Reporting Publications (1993-1999) and individual companies reports of 1998 and 
1999.
The professional committees’ recommendation regarding disclosure of directors’ 
emoluments has been that “ separate figures should be given for salary and 
performance- related elements and the basis on which performance is measured should 
be explained”. This has been recommended to be published with the financial reports of 
the company. This supplements the Companies Act 1985 which requires only total 
directors remuneration to be split between services as a director and service of others in 
connection with the management of the company.
The Cadbury report can be seen to consider disclosure of directors’ bonuses (both in 
the form of cash or share- related benefits) is more transparent. The series of Company 
reporting handled many of the items of pay package separately in different issues, for 
example, bonuses in cash, shares options, post retirement benefits ...etc. A remarkable 
portion of pay packages was in form of shares options from different kinds also an 
increasing concern is paid to post retirement benefits in these packages.
Disclosure of this information was almost unheard of prior to Cadbury, and was often 
restricted to larger companies. Most of the RPE applications in the companies come 
under the heading "Long Term Incentive Scheme" LTIP and exclusively applicable to 
the most senior management. It is noticeable that there is a growth in share- related 
bonus awards. Also, results- oriented factors and attaining targets are the most 
commonly disclosed factors in the bonus schemes. In this respect, the (growth) return 
on shares is found to be the most commonly used indicator for performance (no 
clarification of its meaning or basis of calculation was given but theoretically Lambert 
and Larker (1987, p:92) defined it as: total firm's capital gains and dividends divided by 
the stock price at the beginning of the year) Nevertheless, other measures were used.
Performance based pay was a common practice in almost all companies. Different 
kinds of calculation criteria were used. Some companies related pay to the future 
performance (e.g., the growth in earnings in the next 3 years will entitle the director to a 
certain bonus). Others compared it with the performance in a period in the past, with a
target or with “peers” in the industry or the best 100 companies nation-wide. However, 
some companies such as Berkeley group does not disclose the bases for awarding (i.e. 
the criteria for entitlement or amount of reward). Examples of these practices are 
provided below followed by analyses of these practices.
7- National Westminster Bank:
Executive share options are granted to executives upon achieving targets which 
depends on the position of National Westminster Bank among the FTSE 100 
companies. Performance is measured by total shareholder's return. The scheme bands 
are as follows:
* 100% of the annual salary will be awarded in shares if Nat West is in the top 12 
position.
* Between 98% and 25% of the annual salary will be awarded if Nat West is in a 
position between the 13 and 50 position.
* No shares will be awarded for a position below 50th.
National Westminster Bank emphasises that the aim of this plan is to align the interest 
of managers to the interests of shareholders. The bank disclosed in 1999 annual report 
(page 67) that in order to enhance the scheme, it was decided to increase the award to 
1255 of the annual salary.
2- Boots:
Boots adopted RPE reward scheme in form of a long term bonus plan, since 1995. This 
plan is thought to provide a link between the pay of executive directors and the creation 
of value for shareholders. Company's performance is measured over rolling, for 4 years. 
Performance is measured in terms of total shareholder return and assessed relative to a 
peer group of 10 other leading companies which are reviewed before each performance 
cycle to maintain relevance. For the cycle ended 31st March 1999, the peer group was: 
Great Universal Stores, Kingfisher, Marks & Spencer, Reckitt & Colman, J Sainsbury, 
Sears, Smith & Nephew, SmithKline Beecham, Tesco and W H Smith. After the end of 
each performance cycle, one half of any bonus earned is paid in cash. The value of the 
remaining half is converted into an equivalent number of shares of the company.
2- Reuters Holdings PLC:
Shares awarded to each senior executive is determined by dividing an amount between 
50% and 75% of annual salary on the light of comparing Reuters’ total shareholder's
return "TSR" compared to that of the top 100 companies listed in London Stock 
Exchange as rated by the Financial Times. Performance is measured over a three-to five 
years period and TSR is determined based on the internal rate of return from cash flows 
which investors make over the period.
3- Rank Organisation P LC 1999:
In its recent accounts Rank join the growing nucleus of companies whose remuneration 
committees confirm compliance with the recommendations of the Greenbury Code. The 
report states that the exercise of directors share options, granted under 1995 scheme, is 
conditional on growth in normalised earnings per share of at least 3% over the increase 
in the UK retail price index over a three year period. The long term incentive plan 
"LTIP" reward directors with shares valued up to 10% of their salaries should 
normalised earnings per share exceed the increase in the UK retail price index by 3%. 
The reward increases to 100% of the annual salary for a 21% compound real growth 
over the index.
4- Chill
In 1996 the company introduced a long term incentives plan for senior executives and 
executive directors. The aim of this plan stated -in 1998 annual report- is to align the 
efforts of key executives with the company’s objective of creating shareholder value in 
the long term. The LTIP awards are the only form of bonus. Under LTIP, conditional 
awards of shares and cash are made to executive directors (who could receive a 
maximum of 100% of their annual salary) and other executive (who could receive up to 
30% of their annual salary). According to the plan, no part of an award will be released 
unless the percentage change in earnings per share of the company over 4 years period, 
equals or exceeds the percentage change in the Retail Price Index plus 2%. If these 
targets is met, the comparator TSR compared to that of 24 peer group companies in the 
FTSE food producers sector will determine the percentage of the maximum to be 
received by participants.
5-Abbv National
Abby National adopted RPE in a long term incentive plan in 1997 and aimed to enhance 
the link between the reward of executives and the company’s medium and long term 
performance and incorporates challenging performance targets measured over a 3 years
period. The performance targets are based on the share price and dividends performance 
(TSR) of the company relative both to specified financial institutions and to the 
constituents of the FTSE 100 share index. For 1998- 2000 performance period, the 
specified financial institutions are: Bank of Scotland, Barclays, National Westminster 
bank, Lloyds TSB, Royal Bank of Scotland, Legal & General, Prudential, Alliance 7 
Leicester, Halifax, Northern Rock and Woolwich.
According to the scheme, the individuals are conditionally granted share to a maximum 
value of 70% of their basic salary. Half of the awards will be determined by the TSR of 
the company relative to the FTSE 100 index. The other half will be determined relative 
to the specified financial institutions. The two parts of the awards are determined 
separately. For each part, the award will be made in full if the company is ranked in the 
top quartile of the relevant comparator group, 25% of the award will be made if the 
company is ranked at median and pro rata between the two points. For each part, no 
award will be made if the company is below median in the comparison.
6: Bass
Bass started a long term incentives plan in 1994 and aimed to align the interests of 
executive directors and senior executives with those of the shareholders. The plan is 
based on shares rather than cash or benefits. The company compares its total 
shareholder’s return against that of ten competitor companies. The awards are granted as 
follows:
* 12.5% - 50% of the basic annual salary if —> Bass leads the ten companies
* 2.5%-10% of the basic annual salary if —» Bass in the 5th place
* Nothing will be awarded if —» Bass in below the 5th place
7- British Telecommunications PLC
The company is moving away from executive option schemes to a long term 
remuneration plan. That plan allows a provisional allocation of shares which will vest at 
the end of 5 years only if BT’s total shareholder’s return meets a predetermined 
performance target relate to the FT-SE 100 companies. The initial value of the awards is 
between 33% and 100% of the annual salary.
8- Dixons Group PLC
Among the items of the directors remuneration package are performance related share 
options. Ordinary shares of the company could be awarded depending upon the 
company’s total shareholder return over 3 years period relative to a group of leading 
retail companies. For the 3 years ended on May 1998, the company achieved the 3rd 
place among the comparator retailers.
9-Cookson
The company provides executives with share options expressible if the growth in 
earnings per share of the company at least equals the Retail Price Index plus 3% per 
annum over the three-year period.
10- Royal & Sunalliance Insurance
IN 1998, an incentive scheme was approved whereby shares would be granted upon 
meeting specific performance targets over any 3 years. The value of shares equals the 
annual salary multiplied by 1.6. All the following performance targets should be met 
before any shares are released:
* growth in the group TSR must be in the top quartile of a defined group of 112 leading 
US, UK and continental European insurers.
* growth in the group TSR must exceed the UK Retail Price Index "RPI" by 2% per 
annum.
* the group share price must grow by between 3-20% with 20% growth required if the 
100% of the shares are to be vested.
If TSR growth is below the comparator group median or RPI plus 2% is not achieved, 
no shres will vest. Between 30% and 60% of the shares will vest for TSR growth which 
falls outside the top quartile but which is at or above the comparator group median. TSR 
is based on share price and cumulative cash dividends.
The following general observations have been noticed concerning the practice of the 
RPE in the British environment
-Performance -based pay schemes are widely and increasingly used.
-There is an evidential concern of using shares options in the remuneration packages in 
different forms and a good deal of attention paid to the post retirement benefits. 
-Explicitly or implicitly pay of performance schemes is viewed as long-term incentives.
- The valuation of the items of pay (such as shares options and post retirement benefits) 
is among the major problems in accounting for employees’ remuneration.
- There is a strong recommendation for companies to adopt performance based 
incentives and to disclose that in the financial reports by committees like “ The Code of 
Best Practice” by Greenbury Committee (1995) and Cadbury Committee (1992).
These committees encourage detailed disclosure about the items of directors’ pay and its 
bases.
-Growth in the return on share price is the mostly used measure for directors’ 
performance in these plans.
- Different kinds of comparisons are used to build up these incentives. Sometime it is a 
comparison with the results in the past, the results of colleagues, in the sector or 
nationally with the best 100 company (according to the classification of the financial 
Times of the companies in the Security Exchange).
- Although there is a statement from the FASB “Financial Accounting Standards Board” 
about the accounting treatment of the directors’ remuneration, there is still diversity in 
doing that in the practice.
-Firms set targets on different levels of difficulty when planning pay. Basically all 
companies guarantee a basic salary and provide bonuses if a pre- set target has been 
achieved then they move to another level by comparing with previous work or 
colleagues or the industry and finally comes the comparison with the best 100 company.
- There is a monotony and consistency in applying the RPE in some companies, for 
example, Bass started using it in 1994 and continued using it (till 1999 annual reports 
were published), National Westminster Bank has been applying it since 1994, Reuters 
since 1993, Chill since 1996 and Berkeley since 1995.
An analysis of the practices of RPE in the UK companies
Based on the available data about the practices of the RPE by 17 companies belong to 
15 industries, the discussion will follow these points:
- the comparators
- the patterns of applying the RPE
- the factors influence or guide these practices
- the measures of performance that have been used in applying these packages
- the form of paying the RPE’s reward
- the managerial level which is rewarded upon the RPE
- who manage /  design the RPE schemes in these companies.
(1) The comparators
The previous presentation of examples RPE schemes in some UK companies reveals 
that different peers were used as targets that should be achieved before rewards are 
released for example:
-FTSE 100; used by National Westminster Bank, United Utilities, Reuters, BOC, Abby 
National.
- UK Retail Price Index: used by Rank, Cookson, Chill
- A specific group of competitors: used in the application of Boots, Dixons, Bass, 
United
Utilities, Chill, Abby National.
(2) The patterns of applying RPE:
Various patterns of using the RPE, either in deciding who the peers are or in designing 
the package as to a “one level of comparison” or multi levels with multi payments to 
employees. For example, the hotel and restaurants company Bass, measures the total 
shareholder return against that of ten competitor companies ( no details about them are 
given) and the reward goes as follow:
- 12.5% to 50% of the annual salary will be awarded if —» Bass leads the ten companies. 
-2.5% to 10% of the annual salary if —» Bass is in the 5th place
- Nothing will be awarded if —» Bass is below the 5th place.
BOC's application requires that its share price outperform the average of FT-SE 100. 
Cookson group provides executives share options expressible three years after 
satisfying a performance condition, it’s that the earnings per share of the company must 
at least equals the Retail Price Index plus 3% over the three-year period. Reuters 
compare its return on share with the FT-SE 100 before releasing the incentives in form 
of shares.
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When reviewing these practices, it could be concluded that the most commonly used 
reference group is the FT-SE 100, and the objective in these companies not to equalise 
them but outperforming them in most cases.
Taking into account that the FT-SE 100 companies form the “best performers” in the 
nation not the average, it could be concluded that applying the RPE in the UK involved 
on an ambitious plans to trigger managers to work hard. Also the period of time which 
entitles the manager for the reward ranged from 3-5 years which means that the RPE 
was seen as a long term incentive plan and the long term consequences of the decisions 
and performance were taken into consideration when deciding such plans.
Comparing to the literature, these practices are consistent, in some cases the employees 
are rewarded upon the result of the comparison in form of the increase (or decrease) in 
the output and that of the peers. Dye (1992) suggests this form, while in other studies 
(e.g. Magee, Gibbons, Antle) proportionate the output of the employee to the peers’. 
But, what the practice enrich in this topic is setting the targets on a scale, different 
amounts of rewards for different levels of difficulty (achieving a place among the top 10 
companies is rewarded differently from achieving a place among the last 40 companies 
among the top 100). This could be seen as setting targets in different degrees of 
difficulty.
(2) The measures of performance in these practices:
The most common measure for the performance of the employees in these practices is 
the earnings per share or return on shareholder (Boots, Bass, National Westminster 
bank, Royal and Sunalliance insurance, Chill, Abby National and Reuters). That has 
been used by companies belong to different industries. In some companies, the share 
price itself was used (as by Nat West). Berkeley group of construction uses three 
measures: earnings per share, increase in net asset value and share price performance.
In a previous experience reported by Company Reporting Publications, only one 
company discloses the use of financial and non-financial indicators for performance, 
Norweb, the electricity company before it was taken over by United Utilities Company 
(the experience of the latter company is investigated in detail in this research- data 
provided in chapter eight). It used five measures, share price, electricity price, earnings 
per share, controllable costs and customer services. (It was also shown in those 
publications in a broad review for patterns of setting director remuneration that Nuclear 
Power company involve information about safety among its criteria for assessing the
directors’ performance). This use of the financial measures is consistent with the 
literature where the financial measures are considered still dominant for the purpose of 
evaluating performance. It is also consistent with applying this package on the level of 
top management only, which is presumably responsible for the whole work of the 
organisation, which in turn is reflected in the change in the earnings per share.
Another observation regarding the measures is that, the majority of firms measure the 
“growth” or the “movement” or the “increase” in the measure not the measurement in a 
specific point in time. This has been suggested in the literature as well and tested by 
Gibbons and Murphy. The span of time which is taken to trace the growth over range in 
the practice from three to five years and it seems a reasonable period to trace the 
consequences of the decisions upon it.
Only BOC company uses the price share as a performance indicator, this can be 
critically discussed on the ground that if the market value rather than the accounting 
value for the share is used, the employees might not be satisfied by its 
representativeness of their work. The market share price can be seen as it reflects 
actions and factors which are. beyond the control of the employees so they should not be 
held responsible for them and consequently, should not be rewarded upon them.
(3) The objectives from using RPE
Not many factors are disclosed in the publications of company reporting, but building 
rewards on comparisons is confirmed to be only one item in the pay package. However, 
in terms of objectives from using RPE, National Westminster bank states that the 
scheme was established for those who are best placed to maximise shareholders value. 
Boots states that the long term bonus scheme was developed to provide a link between 
the pay of executive directors and the creation of value for shareholders. Dixons records 
that remuneration committee considers it important to include a significant element of 
performance based reward which is designed to develop a longer term alignment 
between the interests of shareholder and its senior management.
The remuneration policy of BOC -a chemicals and health care- is to design the 
remuneration to reward performance and to attract and retain the highest calibre of 
executive. Berkely which works in the construction, discloses that the scheme is 
designed to encourage the directors to increase their contribution to the performance of
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the group, to foster a greater sense of loyalty and to encourage a community of interest 
between the company’s shareholders and its executive directors.
The literature of the RPE has not mentioned the long term nature or impact of the RPE. 
Furthermore, the different objectives which the practitioners show from applying the 
RPE such as retaining high quality of employees, helping in goal congruence and 
increase loyalty are new enhancement by the practice to the technique.
f4) The form of paving RPE’s Reward:
In almost all the companies that use the RPE, they pay it in form of shares, subject to 
some restrictions. However, Boots, Chill and United Utilities award it in cash and 
shares. According to the literature - and consistently with the actual practices- this 
should suite the top management. But a question arises when the package is applied on 
other levels.
(5) To Whom the RPE* reward is applied:
In contrast to the theory where the RPE can be applied on all managerial levels, in 
practice it is used for the top management only.
In all the companies, it is used for the directors or the executives.
It is aimed in this research to investigate why this is the case.
(6) Who manage the RPE schemes?
In all the companies, a committee of non-executives or a pay and remuneration 
committee manages the RPE.
^ V p p C U U i A  V.-U-  J. )  H i t  p i U U i  ^ u o j u u u m m v
Effects of the relative performance evaluation: A questionnaire
- All the questions should be answered on a scale of five points rang from: strongly agree to 
strongly disagree unless else specified.
Part One: Introductory section:
Information about the respondent:
- Post Held:........... S ? ^ ....X {:.........................................................................
- Job description: -cost centre 1 1
-profit centre 1-^ 1
-investment centre □
- To what extent do you take part in designing the remuneration systems in your company.
-totally absent □  -consulted about it £31 participate in designing it (3
Part Two: General background about the svstem of evaluating performance in the company:
1- The performance of the employees in your company is evaluated according to:
- meeting the budget yes no |— \
- meeting targets yes   I no (— |
- comparing with the performance in the past yes no |— |
- comparing with the performance of peers, competitors yes [33] no
- others, please specify............................................................................................................ .
2- Could you rank those criteria according to your preference (acceptance).
- the first:.......... ! , * * « ■ > * • « • • • • • • • • • «  J- - * i . r T r m » # _ « a y » » « r » » » w   . ........... ..
-the second:........... tf........................................ ...................................................................... ...
-the th i rd:..................................... .... is./.!. . >Sr.... ^ r. ..^ r-YS-..
-the forth:.................................  -v...*..................<X............................................... s •U r
3- Do you use the relative performance.evaluation “RPE*’ to build incentive plans.
[ The RPE means rewarding upon the performance compared to the performance of peers]. .
yes □  no [^Zl
4- Do you think rewarding upon the relative performance can help in:
strongly not strongly
agree agree -^ specified disagree disagree 
-motivating the employees to work hard. 1—J E_I I— I I— I 1 I
- indicate the real effort of the employees. I 1 CZH I > 1 1
- others, please specify:.................................................................................................................
5-Do you think employees (or yourself) are interested to be seen -by colleagues, peers, 
competitors- as hardworking people. j— | |— | |— [ |— | \f~PC
6- What are the objectives which you seek from work:
(please tick as appropriate)
- money □ □ □ E f □
- gaining esteem □ □ □ e i □
- doing something outstanding □ □ □ E l □
- Others, please specify □ □ □ □ □
7- Do you expect to continue to give that importance.to each item.
EZZT□ □ □ □
□ □ □ □ □
□ □ □ □ ezT
□ □ □ □ □
□ □ □ □ □
□ □ □ U2r EZJ
8-Do you think rewarding on the RPE holds some social appreciation to you. f
□  □  □  □  □
9-If (8) is yes, do you accept your reward to be tied to your relative performance.
□  □ □ □ □ □
?10- Which one would you prefer more: getting a reward in form of money or the medal of the 
worker of the year.
Money 
Medal
11- When you accept the RPE, do you seek to achieve:
( please tick as appropriate)
- Social recognition
- More money through competition
- Both
12-Do you think that employees would be interested that the others know how they do in their 
work, for example through the union’s publications or the industry bulletin.
□  □  GZ1 □  □
13- Do you know your peers, competitors and the best performer in the field.
y e s (Zl no □
14- If (1$  is no, would you (or the employee) be interested to know.
□  □  □  □  □
15- Do you think it would be useful if employees have been aware that their jobs are dependent on 
their companies ability to compete effectively.
□  □  □  □  EZ
16-What factors affect the design and implementation of the RPE.
1 -...........................................................      ........
2  - .7 L & & .. . .L L csL itt, M )
3 -...................................................................................................................................................
4 -.................... ................................................................................................................................
17- Do you apply the RPE on:
-cost centres yes 1 1 no rz^ T
-profit centres yes £ □  no VZPf
-investment centres yes I I no |— |
18- If the above is “no”, could you please explain why. _
19-Do you use the RPE for: ' ' " ~  3  A.O*
-Top management yes £ □  no I 1 ?
-Middle management 
-Division management 
-Shop floor
20-If the answer on one of the above is “no” could you please explain why.
□ □
yes □ no □
yes EZT no □
yes C 3 no □
* Kvm^
21-If (19) is “yes”, are there any difference in the patterns used for the different levels. * .
Please specify.....
 T ^U aM j ..:. ...........................
22-How do you implement the RPE, 
a- on a scale ( different levels of targets) yes c a T
b- only one target. yes |—--j
23- Does the type of work, diversity of the task activities encourage the use of the RPE.
yes e r  no □
24 -Do you think that your peers should belong to:
1 -the same company
2_ -companies in the same region
3 - the same industry 
- nationwide
5 * - the best 100 company in the UK
25- Can you rank the previous peers according to the difficulty to compete with.
-the first.........J.....................................................................................................
-the second.... ir....................................................................................................
-the third........3....................................................................................................
-the forth ...................................................................................................
-the fifth .5................................................................................... ...............
□  □  □  . □  e r□  □  c d  c d  e r
CD CD CD C3 s
□  c d  c d  ^  d -
c d  c d  □  c d  □
no c dno j— j
26- When you use the RPE, do you compare the performance with:
- the average of the peers yes I 1 no 1 I
- the best performer among the peers yes £ 21' no I— I
27- Do you think those peers as stated in (24), constitute gradually more and more difficult targets 
to compete with. j— j |— | )—\ CCT |— 1
28- Do you find it encouraging to you if the system moves from one level of difficulty to another,
gradually- □  □  □  □  E T
29- Which one of those peers do you consider a “fair” or “attainable.
  .........
30- How do you react to the existence of the “others” in the evaluation system, 
would you be interested to:
a-achieve the amount of outcome which they achieve. d l  CD CZD I— I 1— Ib- would you be interested to follow their ways of work. CZU I— I CD CD I—Ic-both (a) and (b). CD CD I—I CD CD
31-Have you experienced the RPE before. yes fDPI no_I__J
32- If the above is yes: - have you been informed about your peers yes I3^T
no |— |
- have you participated in selecting the peers yes CD
no £ 2
33- How long did you continue to be satisfied about the system, why.
J4- uo you tninK your woric is wen expressea m:
- financial terms [ such as: cost, profit,...] 1 I I— I I— I dTJ
- non financial terms [ produced units, time, quality,..] d l  d l  d l  d U  L
35- Do you think the financial measures meet the following aspects as indicators to your work:___
-comprehensiveness dH Cdl I— I O '  I— I
-controllability dU  d l  d U  I— I
-quality/accuracy 1 I \s^l j—- d  I— I I— 1
- time span dU  d l  O f  Cd] I— I
36- What is the importance of the following aspects of your work which you like to be reflected in 
the RPE process:
<■ -innovation
- customer services 
5" -quality
y* -developing new products 
y  -new markets
-investing in new industries 
3" -efficiency of material management 
y  -reducing cost 
j -  -meeting budget
y  -meeting the profit and other financial targets.
37-Have you experienced financial and non financial measures for your work. yes
no □
38- If yes, was it encouraging to you to accept and support the RPE that the system included non 
financial measures to your work.
IZT o  □  o  □
39-Have you been evaluated before by market measures. [ Please note: market measures are 
measures contain items determined by the market transactions in the shares of the company].
yes £ □  no
40- If yes, please give details.
41- If no, do you think market measures reflect your work satisfactorily.
d 3  S T  □  □  C3
42- If you have been rewarded on the RPE, have your work been measured by:
(a) accounting measures only. yes no |— |
(b) market and accounting measures. yes [— j no |— |
43- Do you think using accounting measures (rather than) market measures would encourage 
competing with others and using the RPE. j— j \ZZ\2.'/ d U  |— 1 |— j
44- Which of the following measures reflect more the actions which are under your control when 
they measure your performance: (please tick as appropriate)
- accounting measures
- market measures. j—-j
45-When implementing the RPE, do you see that performance should be measured in:
- static amounts in specific point of time. Cdl d ]  d l  I I 1 1
- the change in the measure over a period of time. dU  dU  I I EdT I 1
46- What is the length of time which you prefer the measure to cover.
-  ....................................................................
-  I f -47- What accounting choices are there when applying the RPE. , a i -I"
..................................................................................   SflsL T ......
............................... ~ s ± d .. . .2 ~ .£ ± .L . .: : . .........................................................................................
48-Which of the following measures would you select when implementing the RPE:
(tick where appropriate)
-return on common stock 
-return on assets 
-return on equity 
-amount of sales 
-growth of return 
-growth of sales 
-cash flow.
□
1 3
O
1 3
3
E l
49-How are remuneration and incentives planned in your company.
_ ................................................................................................................................................................  i...................................................................
  ..........
Z -  S < £ tJ
  i z i i z z
50-Do you accept some items to be paid to you in non immediate cash form (e.g stock options, 
deferred pay,...). j— j 1— I 1— 1 1— I
51- Do you prefer the reward on RPE to be paid to you in cash after the evaluation’s result.
□  □  □  □
52- What is the importance of each of the following pay items to you:
-cash 
-shares .
-deferred pay (such as post retirement benefits )
-holiday and welfare 
-better working conditions.
53- Have you been paid upon the RPE.
54-If (53) is yes, a- How have you been paid: -cash
-shares
- others
b- Was that satisfying to you. 
c- Why....................................
□ □ □ □ E T
□ □ □ tm 3
n □ [ 3 □ HU
□ d z t □ □ n
□ □ ( 3 □ □
yes E 2 no □
yes 1 3 no □
□ □contribution □ □
□ □
yes \s2S no EZJ
d- Do you think it would be helpful if the pay package contained more various items to 
encourage the use of RPE.
I 1 1 1 L.- l HZT" 1 I
55- If (53) is no, do you think designing pay package to contain various items (cash, shares,...) 
could be encouraging to the use of the RPE.
□  □  □  □  n
56-How much importance do you prefer to be allocated to the reward upon the RPE among the 
other pay items. I I I I I I I I I I
Appendix (B-2) The questionnaire used in Egypt Field work
Questionnaire of the field work of a Ph.D 
Titled: “Effects of Relative Performance Evaluation”
By: Afaf M Ali
Assistant lecturer of Accounting, Faculty of Commerce- Cairo University
Introductory section:
-Post Held
- Job description: -cost centre 1 3
-profit centre HZ]
-investment centre □
- To what extent do you take part in designing the remuneration systems in your company.
-totally absent -consulted about it participate in designing it [ [
Part One: Perspectives of Relative Performance Evaluation System:
1- The performance of the employees in your company is evaluated according to: 
Rank
- meeting the budget yes
- meeting targets yes
- comparing with the performance in the past yes
- comparing with the performance of peers, competitors ye:
- others, please specify......................................................................
1 3 no 3  C□ no 3  H□ no 3  Csl=l no 3  C
2- Could you rank those criteria according to your preference in the space provided above.
3-Is your performance being compared to the performance of other employees in similar jobs in 
other companies.
□  HZ
yes no
4- if the answer on (3) is yes, do you get any rewards upon comparing your performance and the 
performance of employees in other companies. q—| yes [—j no
5- Do you think rewarding upon the relative performance can help in:
strongly not stronglyagree agree specified disagree disagree-motivating the employees to work hard. 3 3 3 3 3- indicate the real effort of the employees. 3 3 3 3 3-others, please specify:
6- What are the objectives which you seek from work: (please tick as appropriate)
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strongly not strongly
agree agree specified disagree disagree
d l □ d ] d l dd d l d l d l dd ] d d J d l d
6- What are the objectives which you seek from work: (please tick as appropriate)
-money
-gaining esteem
-doing something outstanding
-others, please specify..........
7-What factors affect the design and implementation of the RPE.
1-     ..........
2-  .............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
3-........................................................................................  
4 -................................................................................................
8- Do you use the RPE for :
-Top management yes
-Middle management yes
-Division management yes
-Shop floor yes
9- If (8) is “yes”, are there any difference in the patterns used for the different levels. 
Please specify
d nod nod nod no
□d
□
□
10-How do you implement the RPE , 
a- on a scale ( different levels of targets) yes d l  nnl I
b- only one target. yes d l  no d ]
11- Do you think that your peers should belong to:
strongly not strongly Rank
agree agree specified disagree disagree 1 1-the same company d d d d d-companies in the same region d d d d d I_ __ 1- the same industry d d d d d 1____ 11 .....1- nation wide d d d d d- the best 100 company in the UK d d d d d i ,-others, please specify,,
12- Could you please rank the previous peers according to the difficulty to compete with in the space 
provided above.
“the avarage” performance of this group, 
or “the best performer” in this group
strongly not strongly
agree agree specified disagree disagree
□  d  O d d  d  d  d  d  d
14- Do you think your work is well expressed in:
strongly not strongly
agree agree specified disagree disagree 
-financial terms [ such as: cost, profit,...] □□ |— | |— | i— i |— |
-non financial terms [time, quality, accuracy] |— [
15- Do you think the financial measures meet the following aspects as indicators to your work:
-comprehensive: i.e they reflect the different aspects of your work.
strongly not strongly
agree agree specified disagree disagree
d  d  d  d  d
-controllable: i.e they reflect actions and decisions you take them.
strongly not strongly
agree agree specified disagree disagree
□ □ d d d
- time related: i.e they represent the consequences of your decision through time.
strongly not strongly
agree agree specified disagree disagree
d □ d d d
strongly not strongly
agree agree specified disagree disagree
-accurate:
□ □ d d d
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16- What is the importance of the following aspects of your work which you like to be reflected in 
the RPE process:
strongly not strongly
agree agree specified disagree disagree
-innovation CZ3 CZ3 □ [=□-customer services □ n □ EZT CZJ- quality □ □ □ □ □-developing new products □ □ □ □ □-investing in new markets □ □ □ □ □-investing in new industries □ □ □ □ □-efficiency in material managmenet □ □ □ □ □-reducing costs □ □ □ □ IZ3-meeting targets EZT EZJ □ □ O
17- Do you think that using non financial measures (in addition to the financial measures) would 
encourage the use of the reward system upon relative performance:
strongly not strongly
agree agree specified disagree disagree
O  O  O  O  CZ3
18-Have you been evaluated before by market measures. [ Please note: market measures are 
measures contain items determined by the market transactions in the shares of the company].
yes £—j no □
19- Do you think market measures reflect your work satisfactorily.
strongly 
agree agree
n  □
not
specified
□
strongly 
disagree disagree
□  □
20- Which of the following measures reflect more the actions which are under your control when 
they measure your performance: (please tick as appropriate)
- accounting measures
- market measures.
strongly 
agree agree
□  □□  □
not strongly
specified disagree disagree
□  □  □□  HU □
21- Do you think using accounting measures (rather than) market measures would encourage 
competing with others and using the RPE.
strongly not strongly
agree agree specified disagree disagree
□  □  □  □  □
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22- What is the length of time which you prefer the measure to cover.
23- How are remuneration and incentives planned in your company.
24- How would you prefer to collect your rewards on RPE:
strongly not strongly
agree agree specified disagree disagree
-cash □ □ □ □ □-shares 1=3 1=3 = 3 □ [=□-deferred pay (e.g post retirement benefits ) □ □ □ [=1 □-holiday and welfare CD □ CD 1=3 1=3-others, please specify
25- If you are receiving a reward upon relative performance, would you prefer to receive it in: 
(please tick as appropriate)
-cash E 5
-shares *— *
-post retirement benefits I— I
-other forms, please specify
26- Do you think designing pay package to contain various items (cash, shares,...) could be 
encouraging to the use of the RPE. strongly not strongly
agree agree specified disagree disagree
□  1=3 □  = 3  □
Appendix (B-3) The questionnaire used in England Field work
Sheffield  Hallam University 
School of Financial Studies and Law
Research Project
Effects of the Relative Performance Evaluation
Introductory section; 
-Post Held..........................................................................
- How long have you worked for United Utilities (or the pre decided companies).
- Job description:
-manage a cost centre I I -manage a profit centre f I -manage an investment
centre
- Do you participate in designing the remuneration systems in your company.
-yes |_ j  -no j—-j -consulted about it |— |
Part One:
Perspectives of Relative Performance Evaluation System:
l.a- Is the performance of the employees in your company evaluated by matching against:
(please tick)
yes no Rank
- the budget □ □ 1 .□
- the targets (if different from budget) □ □ 1" '7 1
- the performance in the past year □ □ 1, ...1
- the performance of colleagues in the company O □ r:. i
- the performance of peers in other companies □ EZ3 i i
- others, please specify.
l.b- Could you please rank those bases in the order from the most fair (rank 1) to the least fair 
(rank 5) in the space provided above.
2- Are you rewarded upon relative performance evaluation “RPE”.
[ Please note: The RPE means rewarding an employee upon his/her performance compared to the 
performance of his/her peers]. yes |— | no |— |
3- Do you think rewards upon the relative performance would:
strongly agree agree not specified disagree strongly disagree
-motivate employees.
-reveal the employees’ effort, 
-others, please specify.........
EZ3
□
□
C=3
cm
O
4.a- To what extent do you seek the following from your work?
strongly not not stronglydesirable desirable specified desirable not desin
-money O cm cm cm cm
-gaining esteem □ cm cm cm cm
-doing something outstanding cm cm cm cm cm
-personal satisfaction cm cm cm cm cm
-promotion □ cm cm cm cm
-others, please specify..........
4.b- Which of the objectives in (4.a) is satisfied currently by your company’s pay system, please 
tick in the box to the right above.
5- Which of the following objectives do you agree that RPE would satisfy:
strongly agree agree not specified disagree strongly disagree
- Social recognition cm □ 0 cm cm- More money through competition cm cm cm cm cm- Both O cm cm cm cm
Part Two:
The elements of a RPE system:
I: Targets:
6-What factors -do you think- should be considered when establishing an RPE system?
1     ...............
2...................................................................................................................................................
 3..................................................... ..............................................................................................
 4............................................................... ......................................................................... ..........
7- In your company, is RPE used for rewarding:
yes no I do not know
-Senior management cm cm □-Middle management cm 'em cm-Junior management im cm □-Shop floor cm cm cm
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8.a -If the answer on one of the above is “no” could you please explain why?
8.b -If the answer on more than one of the items in (7) is “yes”, are there any difference in the 
RPE patterns used for the different levels.
yes no C 3  I don not know I— I
Please explain..........................................................................................................................................
8.c -Which level (or levels) of management mentioned in (7), should be rewarded by RPE in 
your view?.............................................................................................................................................
9- Does the RPE scheme in your company provide: (please tick on either a Of b)
a -many rewards for many targets. I I
Or b -only one reward for one target |— |
10- For an RPE scheme, to what extent do you agree that the comparison group should belong 
to:
strongly agree agree not specified disagree strongly disagree
a -within the same company cm cm cm cm cm
b -companies in the same region □ cm im cm cm
c -companies in the same industry cm cm cm cm cm
d -the best 100 companies in the UK cm cm cm cm cm
e -others (please specify)......... ...........
11-Could you please rank the following groups according to the difficulty to compete with:
easy and difficult extremely difficult too difficult
attainable but attainable and barely attainable and unfair
a -within the same company ^ cm cm cm
b- companies in the same region Cm cm cm cm
c- companies in the same industry cm cm cm
d -the best 100 companies in the UK Cm cm cm cm
e -Your choice in (e) above i— I cm cm cm
26
12- To what extent do you agree with the following possible reactions if what you consider 
"unfair” assessment criteria are used in the system:
strongly agree agree not specified disagree strongly disagree
a- continue to respond positively. □ □ □ □
b- negotiate changes in the system. c n [=□ □ □ □
c- ignore the system. □ □ □ □ □
d- work against the system. □ □ □ □ □
e-others, please indicate
II: Performance Measurements:
13- What is the length of time which you prefer the performance measure to cover.
-one month CZ3 -3 months □  -6 months CZ3 -1 year CZ1
14- For an RPE scheme do you think your work would be well expressed in:
strongly not strongly
agree agree specified disagree disagree
-financial terms [such as cost, profit,...] only. □ □ □ □ □-financial and non financial terms [quality, time...]. |— | □ □ □ □
15- To what extent -do you think- the financial measures and the non financial measures would 
hold the following features as indicators of your work:
strongly
agree
agree not
specified
disagree strongly
disagree
Comprehensive:(i.e reflect the different aspects of your work)
-financial 
-non financial
Controllable:
(i.e they reflect actions and decisions you take)
-financial 
-non financial
Time related:
(i.e they represent the consequences of your 
decision through time)
-financial 
-non financial
Accurate:
-financial 
-non financial
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16- Which of the following performance measures is currently used and which you prefer to be 
used to indicate your work under an RPE system . Please mark with a tick.
Currently used Preferable to be
used
-Market related measures:
-securities market measures □□ I I
-products & services market measures □  i i
-factors (supplies) market measures □□ 1 I
-Financial related measures:
- meeting budget I I
-profit I I
-sales revenue □
-cost reduction □
-accounting measures CZ3 i i
( e.g return on shareholder, return on investment)
-Operating measures:
-creativity and innovation. I I
-customer services d ]
-quality I I
-developing new markets I I
-human resources development I 1
.-efficiency I I
-others, please indicate.................................................................................. ..............................
Ill: Market measures vs. accounting measures:
17- Have you been evaluated before by:
- securities’ market measures (such as share price). |— | yes |— | no
- accounting measures (such as profit, return on shareholder). yes |— | no
18- In the RPE, would you prefer your work to be measured by:
(a) accounting measures. strongly agree agree not specified disagree strongly disagree
□  □  O  CZ1 [=□
Or (b)securities’ market measures: strongly agree agree not specified disagree strongly disagree
□  CZ3 □  O  O
19- To what extent do you agree that you have sufficient control on the following measures:
strongly agree agree not specified disagree strongly disagree
- accounting measures. □  dH dU dU I— I
- securities’ market measures. td l  d ]  d 3  [=□ CD
20- Do you think using market measures would encourage competing with performers in 
other companies.
strongly agree agree not specified disagree strongly disagree
U 3 n n  n n  n n  n n
IV: The reward form:
21.a- Could you please tick which of the following items is provided in your remuneration 
package?
-cash
-shares '— ^
-post retirement benefits I
- holiday
-medical coverage ^
-better working conditions ^CZ3
-others, please specify.................................................................................... ....... .......
21.b- Are you satisfied with this package?
strongly agree agree not specified disagree strongly disagree
□  □  □ □ ! = □
21.c- Could you please indicate why?
22- Under an RPE scheme, how would you prefer to receive your rewards:
strongly preferable not not strongly not
-cash
preferable□ □ specified preferable□ preferable□
-shares □ □ □ □ □
-post retirement benefits □ □ □ □ □
CZ3 □ □ □ □-holiday
-medical coverage n □ □ □ □
-better working conditions. □ □ O [=□ n n
-others, please specify........
23- What percentage do you give for the importance of each of the RPE elements below (as a 
portion of % 100):
-the comparison group 
-the performance measures 
-the form of reward
Total 96100
Thank you for completing this questionnaire, please send it in the envelop enclosed. 
Please write here any comments you wish to record regarding this inquiry.
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Appendix (B-4)
The interviews’ guide 
G e n e r a l B a c k g r o u n d
About the respondent:
1)Job title
2)Job description
About the company:
1) Could you please provide a profile of the company’s foundation date, capital, 
ownership, geographical location/s, organisational structure, activities and products.
Part One: The control system:
Section One: The Planning Process
-Could you please tell me about the process of setting a plan/ budget in your company? 
-what time span does it cover?
-who participates?
-who revises it and approves it?
-how structured, divided?
-Does it put on multi levels?
-What factors are taken into account ?
-what is the rational behind that?
-Do you look at the previous performance, the other companies’ performance, the 
general trends in the market, the previous performance,...others, please state?
-Do you include financial and non financial targets, please explain and give examples? 
what is the relative importance of each?
-Do you plan the targets o to be achievable (by ordinary effort from the employees), 
attainable (i.e. can be achievable but with an effort level higher than the previous one), 
challenging (this is a level of achievement more difficult than the previous one).
-How do you know about the employees’ identification and classification of these 
categories?
Section two: Measuring Performance
-what measures do you use to indicate performance of employees? why, for who?
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-do you identify the performance of the employees separately from the performance of 
the divisions, departments or the firm?
-what span of time these measures usually cover?
-who reports about the performance, the performers, the head of each department or a 
specific department “Follow up department” for example?
-Who is/are responsible for reviewing the reported performance (i.e the 
implementation of the plan)?
-what are your/the employees perception (reaction) to these measures?
-do you use both financial (e.g cost, profit, loss, sales revenue,...) and non financial (e.g 
quality, flexibility, accuracy, creativity,...) measures to measure the employees 
performance? why/ why not?
-what features you/ the employees seek in the performance indexes (e.g being accurate, 
controllable, representative,...)
-are these features provided in the financial indexes? in the non financial indexes? 
Section Three: The Performance Evaluation System:
-what criteria do you/ your company use to evaluate performance? for who? why?
-what factors are involved?
-how do appraisees/ appraisers perceive these criteria?
-what assessment criteria you consider: fair, what is attainable, what is challenging and 
what is unfair.
-what criteria you think the employees respond most to?
Section Four: The Rewarding system:
-please describe the reward system in your company?
-what bases do you use for awarding incentives and rewards:- meeting the targets 
adapting to inflation -outperforming competitors -committing to governmental or 
industrial regulations- others...
-which bases are used for who? in what form, when awarded.
-do you have various forms of pay (shares, holidays,...)?
-do you think different employees have the same preference to the pay forms?
Part Two: The Relative Performance Evaluation
The following section is a description of an evaluation and pay scheme introduced in 
the literature as Relative performance evaluation "RPE", it is a remuneration package 
builds rewards upon the performance of an employee relative to a peer group. The 
investigation about RPE covers its elements as a control system and the potentials of 
this system.
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-do you have any kind of rewards built on the employees’ performance compared to 
that of their peers’, why, why not, for what managerial level, what performance 
measures you use, what pay forms you use?
-what rational behind used/ not using it?
-what do you expect to achieve from this rewarding scheme?
-if yes, could you please describe how.
-what is the rational behind these choices.
-what factors you take into account when you do that comparison.
-do you think the type of ownership would affect the implementation of RPE? why?
-do you think the company’s strategy would affect RPE? why?
-do you think working in a very competitive market would encourage the use of RPE 
or working in a relatively less competitive market? why?
-do you use a scale of targets with RPE or one target only?
-if you take RPE as a control system, would you consider the comparison group as a 
"target with a specific of difficulty"?
-if yes, what level of difficulty you consider: fair- what is attainable- what is 
challenging- what is unfair? Please give examples.
-what is your reaction to this control system which ties a pay item to your comparative 
performance?
-what is your reaction to the reference group to which you will be matched and 
rewarded?
-do you think RPE is a challenging system? to what extent? why?
-With RPE, would you respond more positively if your work is measured by both 
financial and non financial terms? why, why not?
-what features you prefer to be there in the measurements when your pay is given upon 
your relative performance?
-do the financial measures hold the above? do the non financial measures hold them? 
-do you use share price as a performance measures? why, why not?
-would you think that measuring performance on market indexes will encourage 
competition among the companies? why, why not?
-Within the financial set of measures, would you prefer your performance to be 
measured by accounting measures or market measures?
-what influence on your pay will it make if your work is represented by accounting 
measures or by market measures?
-do you think it would make a difference if RPE’s reward is paid to all the entitled 
people on cash basis only or on various types (e.g shares, holidays, deferred pay,...?
Appendix (B-5): Introduction letter from Cairo University used in the field work in 
Egypt
CAIRO UNIVERSITY
Faculty of Commerce
Dear Manager:
Kind regards
This is to introduce Miss Afaf Mubarak Mohamed Ali who is an assistant lecturer of 
accounting at Cairo University- Faculty of Commerce in Bani Suef Branch. She is 
currently preparing a Ph.D registered under the title "Effects of Relative Performance 
Evaluation".
The research requires a field work which should be undertaken by the enclosed 
questionnaire along with exploring the experience of the companies -in the selected 
sample- regarding the systems of measuring, evaluating and comparing performance. 
Therefore, the researcher is looking forward to get some feedback from different 
managerial levels about setting targets; budgets; measuring, evaluating and rewarding 
performance. She would examine these systems as they are designed and applied and 
she decided the sample size to include 50 participants from different managerial levels.
The researcher seeks to receive your support and co-operation in this investigation and 
we would be grateful if you provide such a valuable assistance.
Do accept our greatest respect and appreciation
Dean
Kashif
Prof. Dr. Mohamed Mahmoud Al- 
3/9/97
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Appendix (B-6): Introduction letter from the researcher used in the field work in Egypt
CAIRO UNIVERSITY
Faculty of Commerce
Dear Manager:
Kind regards
Miss Afaf Mubarak Mohamed Ali is an assistant lecturer of accounting at Cairo 
University- Faculty of Commerce in Bani Suef Branch. She is currently preparing a 
doctorate research about the role of the accounting system in measuring, evaluating and 
rewarding performance.
The researcher is looking forward to getting some feedback from you about the 
accounting system in your company in terms of:
- setting targets
- measuring performance
- evaluating performance
- rewarding performance
The researcher emphases that the data which will be collected will be used for academic 
purposes only and will not be released -under any circumstances- for any other use, 
confidentiality will be secured.
The researcher appreciates that you have many demands on your time, but she believes 
that your assistance would largely enhance the investigation.
The researcher takes this opportunity to express the greatest thankfulness and 
appreciation for your sincere co-operation, wishing you all the best.
The researcher
Afaf Mubarak Mohamed Ali 
3/9/97
Appendix (B-7): Introduction letter from the researcher used in the field work in 
England
Sheffield Hallam University
Ref: AAli/DC Direct line: 0114 225 5257
2 nd Sep. 1998 Fax: 0114 225 5331
Re: A questionnaire for collecting data for a Ph.D research
Dear Sir/Madam
This is an investigation for the Ph.D research which I am currently preparing at Sheffield Hallam 
University. The research is about rewards on performance comparisons. We have come across some 
information which shows that United Utilities has a rich experience with performance management 
systems
The enclosed questionnaire has been designed to collect some data about the practice of the above in 
reality, more specifically about:
-setting targets 
-performance measures 
-reward, system
It is particularly emphasised here that the data will be used for academic purposes only and will not 
be released- under any circumstances- for any other use. Confidentiality will be secured.
I appreciate that there are many demands on your time, but the more complete response I get, 
the better I will be able to draw, a picture about the practice of these schemes. I have enclosed a 
postage paid envelope if you would kindly send your reply in.
If you have any queries, please do not hesitate to contact me on the number above.
I do thank you in advance for your concern and look forward to hearing from you.
Best wishes
Yours sincerely
Afaf Ali
Researcher in management accounting
School o f Financial Studies and Law
Business and Information Technology Centre
City Campus Sheffield SI 1WB UK
Telephone + 44 (0) 114 225 5555 Fax +44 (0) 114 225 5331
Appendix (C-l) Basic background about Steel company from the internet
Source (http://163.121.10.47/PROJECTS/Steel/) in 20/11/97 
Name of Project: Megamod Direct Reduction Plant
Location: Alexandria National Iron & Steel Co. S.A.E. (ANSDK) an integrated 
steel company that is profitable and well managed. It is located 
at Dikhelia, Alexandria, Egypt.
Background
1- In 1982, ANSDK was incorporated with technical and financial 
assistance from a Japanese consortium, and the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC), to meet some of Egypt’s needs for 
steel reinforcing bars (rebars), for the construction industry.
It has and continues to benefit from the strong technical support 
of its Japanese partners, and the consultancy arrangement it has 
with the British Steel Corporation.
2- The Company was'set up under Investment Law 43 of 1974 (later 
replaced by law 230 of 1989) as a joint venture company among 
Egyptian public sector industrial and financial companies, a 
Japanese Consortium composed of Nippon Kokan, Kobe Steel and Toyo 
Menka Kaisha (renamed Tomen), and the EFC. In 1994, the Company 
increased its capital to partly finance a major expansion.
ANSDK’s employees and the IFC subscribed to this capital increase 
which raised ANSDK’s private sector ownership from 13 % to 28 %.
Recent share sales by public sector shareholders have further 
increased private sector participation to around 36%.
3- The Company was originally designed as an integrated rebar 
plant with a nominal output of 745,000 metric tons per year 
(tpy). It uses the Midrex Direct Reduction Iron process (DRI), to 
produce the major portion of its iron needs, with imported iron 
ore pellets and domestic natural gas as the reducing agent. This 
coupled with the electric arc furnace, continuous casting and 
modem bar and rod mills, proved to be the best alternative for 
Egypt. Indeed, locally available natural gas in nearby Abu Qir 
field, and the high cost of imported steel scrap: made the DRI 
route more cost effective than conventional scrap based electric 
arc furnace steel making. This resulted in an internationally 
competitive operation with attractive financial returns.
[ImagejProject Description
The project entails the increase of production capacity from 1.6 
million tpy of DRI, by adding a third Midrex Direct Reduction 
Plant (MDRP) of 1,000,000 tpy nominal capacity. The project also 
includes a new water system, a bigger dust collection system, as 
well as some additional iron ore storage and handling facilities 
at the mineral jetty. ANSDK will also modify the yard piping for 
various effluents, the incoming natural gas station, the incoming 
and back-up electric power facilities and the flare stack.
[Image] Objectives
To shield the Egyptian market from price fluctuations of 
expensive imported steel scrap, a DRI substitute, and save
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substantially on Egyptian production cost of rebars & steel 
products.
[Image]Justification
Market surveys conducted by respected Egyptian and International 
bodies, have shown that there is an annual increase in demand for 
steel products in Egypt, that is projected to increase by 
5785,000 tpy by year 2005.
This project will enable ANSDK, using its proven competitive 
advantages, to supply some of this increased demand, by adding 
another 1,000,000 tpy of DRI. It will increase its production 
capacity of 1.6  million tpy to 2.6 million tpy o f DRI.
[ImagejBeneficiaries
Egyptian steel industry, ANSDK, local and regional markets in the 
Middle East and North Africa.
[ImagejPartners: Existing shareholder and public subscription. 
[ImagejEstimated Cost: U.S. $320 million 
[ImagejDuration: 5 Years
[ImagejProject Status: The study phase is completed.
PmagejProject requires: Equity participation /  financing or co-financing. 
[Image]Availability of Feasibility Studies: Available
[Image]Sponsor Key Contact
Eng. Ibrahim Salem Mohamadain 
Chairman & Managing Director,
ANSDK.
Phone: (203) 4332220 / 4332300 F a x : (203) 4332667 
E-mail: Ansdk@ritsecl.com.eg 
Postal Address 
P.O.Bag Alex - Egypt.
Project No.: 2
Name of Project: Flat Products
Location: Under consideration
Background
According to the market study by Egitalic prepared in September 
1992, and updated in October 1994, the annual demand of flat 
steel products was 580,000 tons in 1991, and is projected to 
reach 1,383,000 tons by the year 2002. This demand includes 
hot-rolled products, cold rolled products, galvanized products, 
and tin plates as shown in Table 1.
Table 1
(xlOOO tones/y)
Products Demand Yr. 2002
Hot rolled products 624,000
Cold rolled products 355,000
Galvanized products 128,000
Tin plate 276,000
Total 1,383,000
Products exceeding local consumption can be exported to the 
neighboring countries of the Middle East Therefore, the plant 
must be internationally competitive and capable of producing high 
quality-products at low cost.
[ImagejProject Description
The proposed flat steel product plant is a modem compact plant 
that starts with the direct reduction plant as follows
Direct Reduction Plant Megamod x 1
Steel making plant
Electric arc furnace 
Ladle furnace 
Continuous slab caster
Rolling mill
Hot strip mill 
Pickling fine 
Reverse cold mill 
Combination mill 
Tandem cold mill 
Electrolytic cleaning line 
Annealing furnaces 
Two stand temper mill
Coating line
Galvanizing line x 1
Coil preparation line x 1
Electrolytic tinning line* x 1
*(to be added at a later stage)
After the running-in period, the capacity of the plant will reach 
annually one million metric tones of slabs, and about 920,000 mt 
of finished products. This will consist of hot-rolled coils, cold 
rolled coils and sheets, and galvanized products.
[Image] Objectives
The objective of the project is to enable ANSDK to become a
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Background
According to the market study by Egitalic prepared in September 
1992, and updated in October 1994, the annual demand of flat 
steel products was 580,000 tons in 1991, and is projected to 
reach 1,383,000 tons by the year 2002. This demand includes 
hot-rolled products, cold rolled products, galvanized products, 
and tin plates as shown in Table 1.
Table 1
(xlOOO tones/y)
Products Demand Yr. 2002
Hot rolled products 624,000
Cold rolled products 355,000 
Galvanized products 128,000
Tin plate 276,000
Total 1,383,000
Products exceeding local consumption can be exported to the 
neighboring countries of the Middle East Therefore, the plant 
must be internationally competitive and capable of producing high 
quality-products at low cost.
[ImageJProject Description
The proposed flat steel product plant is a modem compact plant 
that starts with the direct reduction plant as follows
Direct Reduction Plant Megamod x 1
Steel making plant
Electric arc furnace 120t x 2
Ladle furnace 120t x 2
Continuous slab caster 1 strand x 1
Rolling mill
Hot strip mill 
Pickling fine 
Reverse cold mill 
Combination mill 
Tandem cold mill 
Electrolytic cleaning line 
Annealing furnaces 
Two stand temper mill
Coating line
Galvanizing line x 1
Coil preparation line x 1
Electrolytic tinning line* x 1
*(to be added at a later stage)
After the running-in period, the capacity of the plant will reach 
annually one million metric tones of slabs, and about 920,000 mt 
of finished products. This will consist of hot-rolled coils, cold 
rolled coils and sheets, and galvanized products.
[Image] Objectives
xl
x l
x l
xl
x l
x l
xl
The objective o f the project is to enable ANSDK to become a 
competitive international producer, of a wide range of high 
quality low cost flat steel products, to satisfy local and 
regional requirements.
[ImagejJustification
To meet the projected increase in demand for flat steel products 
in the Egyptian market and those of neighboring countries, and 
the ability o f ANSDK to produce these products at competitive 
prices.
[Image]B eneficiaries
* Local market (Egypt).
* Adjacent markets of North African and Middle Eastern countries. 
[ImagejPartners
Existing steel producers, and public subscription.
[ImagejEstimated Cost
U.S. $1,170 million..
[Image]Duration
5 Years.
[ImagejProject Status
Study stage. •
[ImagejProject requires
Joint venture - Equity participation /  Financing or Co-financing 
/  Transfer of technology.
[ImagejAvailability o f Feasibility Studies
Pre-feasibility study is available
[ImagejSponsor Key Contact
Eng. Ibrahim Salem Mohamadain 
Chairman & Managing Director,
ANSDK
Phone: (203)4332220 / 4332300 Fax : (203)4332667 
E-mail: Ansdk@ritsecl.com.eg 
Postal Address 
P.O.Bag Alex - Egypt.
Appendix (C-2)
A Detailed presentation of analyses of all Egypt questionnaire data
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Data collection by a questionnaire: methods and analysis:
The data collection in Egypt has consisted of doing interviews and distributing a 
questionnaire.
This chapter will include the following the questionnaire survey in the three companies.
It should be pointed out here that the chapter will confine to presenting the analyses and a 
separate chapter will be allocated to discussing and interpreting these findings.
The Questionnaire Data
Measures and Coding:
The coding system for the attitude questions in the questionnaire were on a 5 points Likhart
scales range from strongly agrees to strongly disagree. The highest score 5 was allocated to
“strongly agree” , 4 for agree, 3 for neutral, 2 for disagree and 1 for strongly disagree. If a 
question is not answered, it is scored 0. The fact questions were asked to be answered on a 
yes or no scale. Yes was translated into 2 and no was given 1. Where ranking was sought, 
the rank was used as the code of the question. The significance level that has been chosen 
to do the statistical analyses is %95.
A variable has been created to represent “response to RPE” which is the sum of answers 
about: money and esteem as derives for behaviour and motivating and monitoring as 
proposed roles of RPE. The reason behind choosing the first two is that Fredrickson 1992 
considered them the fuel of employee’s response to RPE.
Data Analyses
This section includes the following points:
* Preparing the data for analysing
* Deciding the analyses to do
* Analysing the data: Descriptive analyses and association and variation analyses
Preparing data for analysis:
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The collected data were recorded and a folder has been established for the documents 
of each company. It included a brief profile about the company, a copy of the 
answered questionnaires, a complete transcript of the interviews, any internal 
documents has been given by the company (e.g annual reports, organisational 
structure).
Deciding the statistical analyses:
Three groups of analytical tools have been considered:
• Descriptive statistics (frequencies, central tendency and variation techniques)
• Correlation, regression, Chi- square and ANOVA analyses
The statistical correlation has been used in this research to explore possible relationships 
between RPE and the contingents under investigation: the peers, measures and rewards. 
Correlation techniques are widely used as measurements of the direction and strength of 
association between pairs of variables. An important point to be recorded here is that, it will 
be assumed that all correlation’s are linear because of the small sample size which might 
suggest linearity. The correlation technique which has been used is Spearman Rank 
correlation. The reason behind this choice is that, the data collected represents answers on a 
5 points Likahrt scale (i.e the value of any variable here is in fact a “rank” given by the 
respondent). Three pieces of information are given by this technique: (1) the direction 
(positive or negative) of the correlation, (2)its strength and (3) the statistical significance of 
each correlation which enables examining whether the correlation can be accepted or not on 
the light of the decided confidence interval (which is 95% in this research).
In order to determine whether to accept the correlation level and to classify the various
levels of it, the statistics text books refer to “the critical values of correlation” (Becker and
Harnett 1987, Lentner 1979) depending on the sample size. Because the sample size of the 
whole data is: 72 cases, then the critical values of correlation at .05 significance level are:
Below .191 variables are not probable to be correlated.
Between .191 and .393 variables are not unlikely to be correlated (and this will be
the first level for accepting a correlation). 
Between .393 and .585 variables have a moderate correlation.
Between .585 and .776 variables have strong correlation.
Between .776 and 1 variables have a very strong correlation.
In order to support the analysis, Spearman’s correlation was accompanied by a Chi- square 
test. Chi- square is a designed to test whether or not two variables are independent (Becker 
and Harnett 1987). The null hypothesis is variables are independent. The test for this 
hypothesis determines the goodness of fit between a set of observed frequencies and a set of 
expected frequencies. The observed frequencies are those presented in the cells. The Chi- 
square program to match a “theoretical distribution” calculates the expected frequencies. 
Then Chi- square test compares the two frequencies. If the two sets of frequencies are fairly 
close, then the null hypothesis of independence should be accepted and the vice versa. Chi- 
square test in SPSS package has many models (Pearson, Liklihood Ratio and Mantel- 
Haenszel). The latter will be adopted in this research because it is the only Chi - square test 
for ordinal data (i.e rank data) which is the type of data of this research. Chi -square test in 
SPSS
Provides these frequencies and the significance level. Again, the resulted significance level 
will be used to determine whether or not the variables are dependent. If the significance
Building on the result of Spearman test, if it approves a correlation between variables, the 
analysis is integrated by a regression model. There has been a double objective behind using 
the regression, first to extract “Multiple R” which indicates the amount of influence which a 
set of variables practises on the dependent variable. Second: The regression produces the “R 
square” The Determination Coefficient which describes the percentage of variability in the 
dependent variable due to the independent variables.
. The regression also produces T test, the significance of T, F and the significance of F 
(upon which the regression is decided whether to accept or reject on the light of the 
confidence interval in this research). If the significance of F is < .05, then the regression is 
significant and Multiple R represents the amount of influence practised by a variable (or a 
group of variables) on the dependent variable.
The one -way ANOVA test examines hypotheses about two or more population means, for 
example the response to RPE in the various managerial levels. It focuses on testing 
variability in data sets (Becker and Harnett 1987). The result is induced by comparing the 
statistical significance resulted with each ANOVA test and the statistical significance 
decided for this research (i.e 5%). If the statistical significance of an ANOVA test is < .05, 
there is a significant difference among the samples (companies or managerial levels) about 
the variable and the vise vers.
Section One: Descriptive Statistics:
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Various statistical analyses were carried via SPSS, including central tendencies of variables, 
variability and frequency distribution. Table (6-1) report the responses of 71 participants in 
the investigation in 3 companies regarding the existence of RPE, the relative significance to 
peer groups, the preference of financial measures in one hand and both financial and non 
financial on the other hand, the satisfaction of market measures of performance and the 
preferable form of reward in the overall sample. Each analysis has been carried out as to 
companies and managerial levels.
I: Facts: The existence of peers’ comparisons, RPE and m arket m easures - by 
company
The results in table (6-1) shows that:
1. Two companies of the three report performance comparisons to peers but only one builds 
an RPE scheme (as defined in this research) on them.
2. One company discloses that they held performance comparisons with peers but not use 
this as basis for rewards.
3. No company records an experience with using market measures to indicate employees’ 
performance. '
Table (6-1): Facts: The existence of peers’ comparisons, RPE and market measures - by 
company
Company’s name peers’
comparisons
using
RPE
using market 
measures
Total company’s 
respondents
Trade Co no no no 36
Dairy Products Co yes yes no 21
Steel Co yes no no 14
II: A ttitudes: Towards RPE, performance measures and rew ard form - by 
company
Four descriptive techniques were used to describe the investigated contingents of RPE 
(targets, measures and reward). These techniques are: (1) mean, (2) standard deviation 
These measures have been calculated for each company individually and for the whole 
companies together shown in table (6.2.1) and summarised below:
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Table (6-2.1)
Attitudes about RPE, performance measures and reward form - All companies
measure response to 
RPE
target
difficulty & 
RPE?
non financial 
&RPE
market 
measures 
& RPE
rewards 
& RPE
Points of agreeing on* 45.1 57.74 77.5 28.1 64.8
Mean 3.61 3.97 3.85 2.5 3.49
Median 3.5 4.5 4 3 4
Std. Dev. 1.677 3.06 1.137 1.53 1.144
Variance 2.812 9.412 1.29 2.36 1.31
Coefficient of variation % 1.28 .42 2.98 1.05 2.66
* (% of those who agree and those who strongly agree to the total respondents).
1- The first point to be noticed is that, RPE (as measured in this study) has been supported 
by 45.1% of the total, respondents which suggest a tendency to accept RPE as an evaluating 
and motivating technique.
difficulty (as measured by the sum of difficulty to compete with peers from the same 
company + region + industry + top 100) was accepted by 57.74% of the respondents 
comparing to 77.5 % for measuring performance both in financial and non financial 
measures within an RPE scheme. Nevertheless, only 28.1% preferred the use of market 
measures in RPE whereas 64.8% agreed that varying the form of reward would enhance the 
use of RPE. Data are homogenous for all variables where the coefficient of variance [ 
(average/ variance)* 100%] is less than 10% for all variables.
The summary of this main points is: The respondents -on average- accepted RPE. 
Respondents provided different approval for the components of RPE where they firstly 
non financial performance measures then varying the form of reward and target 
difficulty. Respondents disapprove using market measures in RPE.
2- Regarding the roles of RPE, 67.6% of respondents agreed that RPE could motivate but 
47.9% saw it as a monitoring tool. The objectives which respondent sought from work 
were: to gain money (74.7%), 31 % to do creative work and 19.7% to gain esteem as the 
following table details:
Table (6.2.2): The roles of RPE and the behaviour’s derives
measure Roles of RPE: Objectives from work:
motivating monitoring money esteem creativity
Points of agreeing on*: 67,6 47.9 74.7 19.7 31
Mean 3.5352 3.2817 3.5634 2.9821 2.9333
Median 3.5352 3.0000 4.0000 3.0000 3.0000
Std. Dev. 1.2169 3.2817 1.3388 .7259 .9892
Variance 1.4809 1.8052 1.7924 .5269 .9785
Coefficient of variation % 2.388 1.8181 2.09 5.657 2.997
* (% of number of respondents who agree and strongly agree to total number of response)
The general conclusion of this point is: Employees would respond to RPE because 
they accept it as a motivating tool (but not a monitoring technique) through which they 
seek to make money from competing with others rather than to gain esteem or creativity.
Factors to be considered with RPE:
The Manager of Purchasing Farming Machines in Trade company recorded that, some 
factors should be examined when considering RPE schemes such as: achieving the 
department’s objectives, measuring the various aspects of performance (e.g quality, 
time, co-operation). Also the Customers’ Accounts Manager considered, companies 
should have control upon their decisions (i.e the decisions should be intrinsic), they 
should not be imposed from any external forces upon the firm. Middle and lower 
management paid concern to the operational side of RPE as the Exporting for Local 
Suppliers’ Officer issues like similarity in companies’ operations, location, financial 
situations and the employees’ jobs, work load, experience and work environment 
(participation, ...etc) should be investigated. The Inspection Officer and Foreign 
Suppliers' Administrator, who participated in the questionnaire enquiry, recommended 
that RPE be held intrafirm among departments and divisions because they would be 
sharing the same work environment. However, The Follow-up Assistant Manager raised 
some suspicion about RPE as he argued firstly, the whole point of benchmarking and 
competing with other companies applied on the financially healthy companies not those 
who struggled to overcome losses and have difficulty achieving their own targets. 
Secondly, in operational terms, how could a firm get information about the performance 
of employees different in other companies? How could similarity in the bases for 
measuring be secured while each company used different measures to monitor that 
performance. That was not the case for top management's because the company's 
performance could be taken as a surrogate for top management's performance. 
Similarity in measuring companies' performances could be secured by a minimum
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compliance to the professional standards. Therefore, RPE -by definition- seemed 
applicable to top management only.
3- There have been further enquiries about each one of the components of RPE. As an 
introductory question about target difficulty, attitudes to compete with the best or the 
average of the comparison group was raised then which peers were preferred to compete 
with [details in table (6.2.3)].
Table (6.2.3) Target’s difficulty and RPE
measure scalmg targets: comparing to: preferred per group:
one many best average same company industry region top 100
agreeing on the item* 12.7 40.8 45.1 66.2 62 39.4 46.5 36.6
Mean 1.197 .6056 3.352 3.0282 3.4366 2.5070 3.0000 2.5352
Median 1.000 .0000 4.000 3.0000 4.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000
Std. Dev. .7676 .7067 2.007 1.6731 1.5922 1.9189 1.6388 1.7634
Variance .5891 .4994 4.031 2.7992 2.5352 3.6821 2.6857 3.1095
Coefficient of Variation 2.032 1.21 .831 1.081 1.355 .681 1.11 .815
* (% of number of respondents who agree and strongly agree to total number of response)
The survey showed that 45.1% of the respondents preferred to be compared to the best 
among the reference group comparing to 66.2% for the average. Data are homogenous for 
all variables. This gives an early speculation that the respondents were cautious when their 
rewards were tied to their comparative performance. This was supported by another 
evidence in the same line that is choosing peers. For all participants in the three Egyptian 
companies together, 62% preferred a comparison group from the same company, 46.5% for 
a comparison group from the same industry, 39.4% for a group from the same region and 
36.6 % for a group of competitors from the top 100 company nation- wide.
The order of preferring peer groups are: peers from the same company- peers from the same 
industry - peers from the same region and peers from the top 100 company in the country. 
ANOVA test shows a significant difference among the three companies regarding 
preferring peers from the same region and from top 100 (at confidence level 95%). The 
frequency of those peers in each company showed below:
1This was a “tick” question, if the respondent chooses “one target” he/she ticks it and this is coded 1 and the 
same for scale of targets and if any/ all of them are not answered this coded 0.
Preferring peers from the same region and top 100
the peer group Trade co. Dairy co. Steel co.
peers from the same region 65.6 14.3 35.7
peers from the top 100 company 38.9 19.1 57
Trade respondents provide the biggest acceptance for peers from the same region because 
of the importance which they place on the location and other retailers who work in the same 
geographical area. This reasons did not exist for Dairy and Steel. On the other hand, peers 
from top 100 company nation-wide were of appeal to Steel participants only because Steel 
was not only among the top companies in Egypt but number "1" in the Middle East in 
producing Steel and alone captured 50% of the local supply of steel and iron products in 
Egypt.
The following table presents the degree of difficulty which the participants attached to each 
peer group:
Peer group Peers from 
the same company
Peers from 
the same region
Peers from 
the same industry
Peers from
top 100 companies
Peers best 
described as
Easy attainable 
47.9%
Easy or difficult 
but attainable 
25.4%
Difficult but attainable 
42.3%
extremely difficult and 
barely attainable 
or too difficult and unfair 
21.1%
For all Egypt data, 47.9% of the respondents classified competing with peers from the 
same company as "easy attainable target" whereas competing with peers from the same 
region was described as equally (25.4%) easy attainable or difficult but attainable. Peers 
from the same industry was best described as difficult but attainable target by 42.3% 
while peers from the top 100 companies were considered equally (21.1%) extremely 
difficult and barely attainable or too difficult and unfair. ANOVA test for variance 
showed a significant difference among the three companies in the degree of difficulty 
which was seen of competing with peers from the same region only. The frequency 
reveals that the participants of Trade classified competing with peers from the same 
region as "difficult but attainable" while participants of both Dairy and Steel considered 
it "too difficult and unfair".
Participants preferred to compete with peers from the same company because they saw 
that as an easy attainable target and with peers from the same industry which was 
classified as difficult but attainable target. Competing with peers from the same region 
was the last preferable peers and was ranked as either easy or difficult but attainable.
4- The second item in the RPE technique which has been examined as a contingent on the 
perception to the technique is the performance measurements, results shown in table (6.2.4). 
The issues that have been explored here are:
- preferring financial measures only vs. financial and non financial measures,
- the features which are preferred to be in the performance indicators,
- whether a given samples of non financial measures would be welcomed within an RPE 
system and
- the preferable time span of measures.
4.1- Regarding the respondents’ acceptance of the financial and non financial measures the 
survey indicates that 67.6% approved the financial indicators only comparing to 77.5% 
approved a combined system of both financial and non financial indicators to measure their 
performance. The mean scored 3.66 for financial measures and 3.85 for non financial 
measures and an equal median of 4 "which is a the code of "agree" resulted. Data were 
homogenous for the two variables. ANOVA test for differences showed no significant 
differences among the three companies regarding these two variables.
4.2- Regarding the desirable features of the performance measures, being accurate was the 
most important feature supported by 69% comparing to 47.9% for controllable, 42.3% for 
comprehensive and for being time related. Whether the financial measures enjoy any/ these 
features more, less or the same as the non financial measures has been explored by 
correlation tools later.
4.3- The next item in the analysis was whether employees would prefer their performance to 
be measured by one or more of a given set of non financial measures. For the whole 
sample, innovation was supported by 97.2 in the first place followed by customer service 
with 90.1%, achieving budget 78.9%, developing new markets 66.2%, quality 63.4%, 
making a good use of the recourses 57.7% and finally reducing costs 35.2%. The ranking of 
those measures (in terms of respondents’ preference) is:
Innovation - customer service- achieving budget - developing new markets- quality - good 
use of the resources- reducing cost.
ANOVA shows a significant difference between the respondents of three companies only in 
preferring making a good use of the resources (at 95%). The frequencies indicate that 85% 
of the participants of Steel preferred making a good use of resources to be used to measure 
their performance, comparing to 61% of participants of Trade and only 33% of participants 
of Dairy.
4.5- As a concluding inquiry about the performance measures and their impact on RPE, the 
participants were asked whether using non financial measures in addition to the financial 
measures could enhance RPE system, 71.9% answered that it could.
The conclusion of investigating the performance measures and RPE shows that: Under 
RPE financial measures received an equal approval from respondents (70%) as a 
combined system of financial and non financial measures. Accuracy was the most 
desirable feature in the performance measures. Innovation and customer service were the 
most preferable measures. There was no dominating preferable time span of the 
measures (semi annually and quarterly measures received equal support 32.8%). The use 
of non financial measures in addition to the financial was thoughts by respondents to 
enhance RPE.
5- The securities market measures have been examined as a specific type of financial 
measures. Table (6.2.5) below presents the descriptive of the inquiry about this item . 
Regarding the use of market measures to indicate the employees’ performance, 5.6% of the 
total respondents reported that they had an experience with market measures. There was a 
low degree of satisfaction of these measures (19.7% of the whole sample). The reason that 
has been tested as a potential cause of this dissatisfaction was “uncontrollability”. In spite of 
the criticisms which were oriented to the accounting measures in the literature (Kapaln 
1984, Ezzaml 1986, Emmanuel 1990 ,...etc), 62% of the respondents recorded that the 
accounting measures were controllable comparing to 28.1 % for market measures. Also 
35.2% of respondents agreed that market measures might enhance RPE. Data are 
homogenous for all variables where the coefficient of variance [ (average/ variance)* 
100%] was less than 10% for all variables.
Table (6.2.5): RPE and the market measures
measure Fact: use 
market measures
Satisfaction of 
market measures
Controllability over measures 
accounting m , market m
RPE and 
market measures
points of 
agreeing
5.6% 19.7% 62% 28.1 % 35.2%
Mean 1.19 2.28 3.46 2.53 3.04
Median 1 2 4 3 3
Std. Dev. .476 1.32 1.27 1.53 1.23
Variance .226 1.7 1.6 2.36 1.72
Coefficient of 
Variation
5.2 1.34 2.16 1.07 1.76
6- The last item in the survey of the components of RPE is how the reward should be paid.
Table (6.2.6) provides descriptive of these points.
Table (6.2.6) RPE and the form of reward
measure Preferred form of rewards under RPE:
cash shares post-retirement holiday work
pay conditions
RPE& varying 
the form 
of rewards
approval 81.7 49.3 38 46.5 40.8 64.8
Mean 4.01 2.85 2.45 3.014 4.08 3.49
Median 4 3 3 3 3 4
Std. Dev. 1.31 1.63 1.68 1.57 1.918 .135
Variance 1.72 2.66 2.85 2.47 3.68 1.31
Coefficient of 
Variation
2.33 1.07 .85 1.22 1.108 2.66
There was a dominating preference for receiving RPE rewards in cash 81.7%, followed by 
49.3% for shares, 46.5% for holiday, 40.8% work conditions and post retirement pay 38 %. 
The figure below highlight the position of each item to the others. 64.8% of respondents 
thought that varying the form reward might encourage the response to RPE. Data are 
homogenous for all variables.
Section Two: Association and Variation Statistics 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
This section will present the details of statistical analyses that have been undertaken to 
trace the association among the variables and the variation among the companies and the 
managerial levels. It should be noticed that the analyses will be carried out on the whole 
sample of data. Also, the presentation will start from the correlation, if evident, the 
regression will draw the shape of the relationship among the variables. Following that, one - 
way ANOVA will be used to test whether there are significant differences among the 
companies and the managerial levels regarding each variable. Chi- square will be used to 
support the former test.
Applying These Tests on the Data:
Presenting the various tests undertaken on data will follow the line of inquiry of this 
research. The arguments will be divided into:
I: The perspective of RPE:
This will include test for association between goals from work, RPE and managerial levels.
EE: The contingents of RPE:
This will examine the arguments about target level in a group, the performance measures in 
another group, the market measures as a special case of measures in a third group and 
finally the reward form in a group.
Part (2-1): The perspectives o f RPE
Correlation:
The test includes studying the correlation between RPE and goals from work (getting 
money, esteem, practising creativity) appears in table (6.3.1). It should be noticed that, 
correlation should be interpreted as positive unless otherwise specified and the confidence 
level is 95% unless otherwise indicated. According to statistics’ books (e.g Becker and 
Harnett 1987, Lentner 1979 the critical values of correlation at .05 significance level for a 
sample of 72 cases is .191. Therefore, the following classification is drawn to identify the 
correlation coefficient for the whole sample:
Below .191 variables are not probable to be correlated.
Between .191 and .393 variables are not unlikely to be correlated (and this will be
the first level for accepting a correlation). 
Between .393 and .585 variables have a moderate correlation.
Between .585 and .776 variables have strong correlation.
Between .776 and 1 variables have a very strong correlation.
For the individual companies, the critical values of correlation are: in Trade company (with
number of participants in the inquiry = 36) is .279. That is, a correlation below .279 is
unlikely at confidence level 95%. For the Dairy products company, the critical value for a 
number of participants = 21 is: .368, any correlation coefficient below this would be 
unlikely at confidence level 95%. The Steel company participates by 14 respondents in the 
survey and this makes the critical value .425
Regression:
Expanding the test about RPE and its potentials, because correlation has proved a relationship 
between RPE and objectives from work and with behaviour derives. The outputs of the 
regression model includes the following:
Multiple R: measures the influence of the set of independent variables on the deponent 
variable.
R Square: is the determination coefficient which shows the % of change in the
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dependent variable due to a unit change in the independent set of variables.
B: is the regression coefficient which predicts the amount (and direction) of change in 
the dependent variable due to a unit of change in the independent variable.
Beta: can be used to classify the independent variables according to each’s influence 
on the dependent variable.
Significance of F: points at the model's fit. If F is < .05, the regression is significance
at 95% confidence level and the vice versa.
Significance of T: provides the significance of each independent variable 
individually if > .05 and the vice versa.
Correlation and regression of RPE and its perspective
Table (6.3.1) Spearman coefficient for RPE and objectives from work
Variable Correlation with RPE
Objectives from work:
money moderate sig.
esteem weak non sig.
creativity weak non sig.
Ownership/sector weak non sig.
managerial level weak non sig.
The correlation shows that for the whole sample, it was absolutely sure (p=.000) that RPE 
was would trigger the employees’ desire to gain money (but not esteem or creativity). It 
seems that the mechanism of RPE and competing with others, feeds only the inclination to 
gain money but was not approved to enhance the employees’ tendency to do creative work. 
In other words, employees are not likely to compete with others -under RPE- to do creative 
work or to gain esteem but they would compete with others to gain money. For the whole 
data, RPE was not significantly (at 95% nor at 90%) correlated to the type of sector to 
which companies belonged (e.g private or public sector) or to the managerial level. The 
regression of money on RPE for the whole data was significant.
Regression coefficients of RPE and money
The regression’s parameters
RPE and objectives from work: 
money
B .739
Beta .502
Multiple R .502
R square .252
significance of F .000
The table above shows that 73% of the change of RPE is due to the change of money as an 
objective from work. The model is absolutely significant.
ANOVA test of differences shows among managerial levels concerning creativity as 
objectives from work. The table below presents the frequencies, which shows these 
differences.
Table (6.3.4)
Frequencies of the creativity and the managerial levels
variable Position “1” “2” “3”
Managerial levels
Top & Middle management creativity money esteem
Division management & Shop floor money esteem creativity
The table indicates that for the whole data, participants from top management and middle 
management placed creativity in the first position then money and esteem. The lower 
managerial levels including division managers and shop floor workers put money in the first 
place followed by esteem and creativity. It should be highlighted here that the distribution 
of the number of participants from each managerial level and the organisational culture 
have probably caused this result. To clarify, the following table reviews the distribution of 
the number of participants from each managerial level in each company.
the company % of number of participants in each managerial level to total participants from the company 
shop floor division manager department manager senior management
Trade 19.4 44.4 22.2 11.1
Dairy 23.8 47.6 14.2 14.2
Steel 35.7 42.8 21.4 0
The companies which encouraged creativity were Dairy and Steel. As table (6-3-4) earlier 
shows, the participants from middle management gave a full support for creativity as the 
first objective from work. However, those represented the biggest percentage of participants 
in the three companies. Following that, the second biggest number of participants in Dairy 
and Steel came from the shop floor level and those ranked creativity in the third position 
(after money and esteem).
The summary o f RPE’s potential is: there was a significant correlation between RPE and 
money. For the whole data, there is no difference among sectors, companies or 
managerial levels regarding RPE or objectives from work. The only exception is a 
difference among managerial levels regarding creativity where it was the first objective 
from work for top management, the second for middle and division management and the 
third for the shop floor workers.
Part (2-2) The contingents o f RPE 
First: RPE Target’s difficulty and different peers
The investigation started by checking correlation between the response to RPE, target 
difficulty variable and the various peers. Table (6.3.1) below shows that, for the whole data 
and the individual companies, there is a significant correlation between target difficulty and 
RPE in one hand and RPE and all peer groups on the other hand. The correlation results for 
the whole sample and the individual companies are presented in the table below.
Table (6.3.1) Spearman Coefficients of RPE and various peers and difficulty of
those peers
variable
Correlation between RPE and the different peers: 
peers from the same company
Correlation
coefficiecnts
.23**
correlation for 
the whole data
likely significant
peers from the same region .25** likely significant
peers from the same industry .22** likely significant
peers from top 100 companies .11 weak non sig.
RPE & target’s difficulty # .24** likely significant
Difficulty to compete with peers from the same company .35** moderate significant
Difficulty to compete with peers from the same region .21 likely significant*
Difficulty to compete with peers from the same industry .17 weak non sig.
Difficulty to compete peers from top 100 companies .05 weak non sig.
#  target difficult is measured by the sum of the responses about difficulty to compete with the different 
peers under investigation.
** p=.05
*p=.10
A primary observation here is, in contrast to the literature about target’s difficulty and the 
arguments of this research the correlation shows that, peers from the same region (then 
peers from the same company) had the biggest correlation coefficient and the most 
significant correlation. That influence might have been shifted to the whole sample from 
Trade company (where peers from the same company and the same region are the most 
preferable peers and the participants of Trade are 51% of the total respondents).
Regression:
The multiple regression is going to be used to provide the shape of the relationship and its 
determents between RPE and the preferable peers and their difficulty respectively. Table 
(6.3.2) provides the regression outputs.
Table (6.3.2) Regression coefficients between RPE and the preferable peers
Variable B Beta significance Classification
of T
Peers:
from the same company .207 .186 .136 non significant individual impact
from the same region .201 .228 .06 significant individual impact*
from the same industry .007 .077 .53 non significant individual impact
Multiple R .33
R square .11
significance of F .05 regression is significant
* sig. atp=.10
The regression model predicts that peers were responsible for 33% of the change in RPE 
and that peers from the same region was the group which led and caused this effect for the 
whole peers on RPE. The model was statistically significant at p= .05. It should be
mentioned here that including "peers from the top 100 company" -which was non 
significantly correlated to RPE- turned the regression model to be non significant at p=.05.
The impact of the set of variables of difficulty to compete with peers on RPE along with the 
impact of the individual items in that set is presented in the following regression:
Table (6.3.3) Regression of difficulty of various peers on RPE
Variable B Beta significance 
of T
Classification
difficulty to compete with 
peers from the same company
•74 .41 .002 significance impact
Multiple R .418
R square .175
significance of F .002 significant impact of the whole group
The table shows that the difficulty which respondents associated to compete with peers 
from the same company was responsible for 74% of the changes in RPE. That was a 
significant impact and whenever this variable changes by one unit, this causes change 41 % 
in RPE. It should be noticed that this regression is about the "difficulty to compete with 
peers from the same company only" which was the only type of difficulty that was 
significantly correlated to RPE. When the regression was applied to the difficulties of four 
types of peers, the regression model was found non significant.
On the other hand, ANOVA test for the whole data provides no evidence on significant 
differences among the managerial levels regarding the different peers under investigation 
nor the difficulty related to those peers at confidence level of 95%. The only exception was 
that there was differences regarding the difficulty to compare to peers from the same region 
at 90%. Also, there are significant differences among companies regarding preferring peers 
from the same region, top 100 and difficulty to compete with peers from the same region. 
Table (6.3.4) below shows the frequencies.
Table (6.3.4) Frequencies of peers and difficulties- By company
variable Frequency*
Trade Dairy Steel
comparing with peers from the same region 65.6 14.3 35.7
comparing to peers from the top 100 companies 38.9 19.1 57
☆ difficulty to compete with 
peers from the same region
difficult but 
attainable
too difficult 
and unfair
too difficult and 
unfair
*% of those who agree and strongly agree to total respondents in the company.
☆ as described by respondents
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Reasons for these differences have been discussed in chapter 6 (Cases of the individual 
companies).
The conclusion about RPE and peers and the difficulty associated to each of them can be 
summarised as:
There was found a significant correlation between RPE and prefering to be compared 
to peers from the same company, region and industry. Also RPE was found signifcantly 
correlated to the difficulty which the respondents allocated to peers from the same region. 
There are some differences between companies -but not managerial levels- regarding 
these issues.
Second: RPE and th e  p erfo rm an ce  m easurem ents
Spearman correlation shows that there was a significant correlation between RPE and the 
financial measures of performance and non financial measures. This correlation is stronger 
with the financial measures of performance. The observations about market and accounting 
measures will be handled in a following section in this report.
Table (6.3.6) Spearman correlation between RPE & the financial, non financial 
measures, accounting and market measures
variable correlation coefficients with RPE classification of correlation with RPE
financial measures - .34** moderate significant
non financial measures .22** likely significant
** p= .05
The data collected by interviews in Trade company suggest that financial measures 
(accounting only) were the sole measures in use currently in the company. The 
questionnaire data of Trade showed a higher preference to financial measures. That might 
have impacted the whole sample because the participants of Trade were almost half of the 
total participants. Whereas both the practice and the employees* attitude in Dairy and Steel - 
as explored in the interviews- showed that both the financial (basically accounting and some 
market types) and the non financial measures were used and the latter were particularly 
welcomed.
In order to review the relationship of the performance measures on RPE, the regression 
model has been applied. Table (6.3.7) provides the details of the regression.
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Table (6.3.7) The outputs of the regression of the performance measures
on RPE for the whole data
variable B Beta significance 
of T
Classification
Financial measures .53 .36 .003 significant impact
non Financial measures .26 .18 .123 non significant impact
Multiple R .44
R Square .20
Significance of F .001 strongly significant
The regression shows that the performance measures group of variables was responsible for 
44% of the changes in RPE and that was a significant impact. Meanwhile, the individual 
variables within the group practised different roles. The financial measures made the 
biggest contribution (36% of the group’s impact) and the only contribution which was 
individually significant. Non financial measures had a lower portion (18%) and non 
significant impact on RPE. The overall effect of the whole model was significant at p= .05.
One- way ANOVA test showed no differences among managerial levels or companies 
regarding their preference financial and non financial measures or regarding the 
respondents' view in controllability over market measures.
RPE and the features of performance measures
In order to deepen our understanding around the impact of the performance measures on 
RPE, some features of performance measures have been examined with relation to financial 
measures. These features included: comprehensiveness, accuracy, controllability and time 
related. Following is the correlation table between these features and the financial measures 
in one hand and between these features and RPE on the other hand.
Table (6.3.9)
Spearman correlation between RPE and the features of performance measures
variable correlation with measures financial correlation with RPE
accuracy m oderate significant moderate significant
comprehensiveness negative weak, non significant weak, non significant
controllability likely significant likely significant
time related likely sig.* likely sig.*
*p=.10
The correlation suggests that preferring financial performance measures had significant, 
likely to moderate association to their being accurate, controllable and time related. The 
regression predicts a significant model for this relationship. The same strength and direction 
of the associations with these features extended to RPE. RPE was found significantly 
correlated to the financial measures’ being accurate, controllable and time related and the 
regression of these relationships was absolutely significant.
It should also be mentioned that Spearman correlation showed a likely and significant 
correlation between financial and non financial measures.
ANOVA shows no significant differences among companies regarding any of these 
features. Nevertheless, there was a significant difference among managerial levels regarding 
controllability of the measurements only. The frequencies showed that 17% of the lower 
management participants preferred controllability as a feature in performance measures 
comparing to 46% of division managers, 78% of departments, managers and 62% of the 
senior management in the whole sample.
The conclusion of the investigation about the measurements under RPE could be:
There was a significant likely correlation between using financial measures and RPE, 
stronger for the non financial measures. Both types of measures together were 
responsible for a moderate but very significant portion of the changes in RPE. There 
were no differences among companies or managerial levels regarding the preference of 
financial and non financial measures. Accuracy and controllability are the most 
preferable features to exist in the measurements.
RPE and a sample of non financial measures:
The following table provides the correlation between RPE and some non financial 
measures. The participants in the inquiry were asked to disclose to what extent the existence 
of these measures in the RPE system would improve it.
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Table (6.3.13) Spearman coefficient between RPE and some non financial measures
Variable correlation for the whole data
innovation likely, significant
customer services unlikely and non sig.
achieving budget likely, significant
quality unlikely and non sig.
developing new markets unlikely and non sig.
good use of the resources likely, significant
reduce cost moderate significant
For the whole data, the correlation test showed significant association between RPE and 
cost reduction then making a good use of resources, innovation and achieving budget. It 
should be noticed that three of these four measures represented financial type of measures 
while only innovation was non financial. The regression of these sample of measures -led 
by "making a good use of resources- had a significant impact on RPE.
Table (6.3.10) The outputs of the regression of a sample of performance measures on RPE
variable B Beta significance 
of T
Classification
achieving budget .134 .149 .229 non significant influence
good use of the resources .186 .261 .041 significant influence
reduce cost .076 .096 .468 non significant influence
innovation .311 .149 .215 non significant influence
Multiple R .44
R Square • 19
Significance of F .009 very significant influence for the group
As ANOVA test predicted that at 95% confidence interval, there were no significant 
differences among managerial levels or companies regarding the sample of measures under 
investigation but for making a good use of the resources. Following is a presentation of the 
frequencies of supporting that measure in each of the three companies where the highest 
support for measuring “good use of the resources” is given by the respondents from Steel 
company, the second largest support is in Trade then Dairy.
company Trade Dairy Steel
% of support 61.1 33.3 85.7
RPE and market measures: 
Fact:
The question about whether or not companies use -in reality- stock market measures to 
assess employees’ performance had received a negative answer from most of the subjects. 
5.7% recorded that they actually had an experience with market measures but only 19.7% of 
the whole sample reported they would be satisfied with them and 28% of the total 
respondents approved that such measures would be controllable.
As the argument about the impact of using market measures on the employees’ response to 
RPE was founded on the lack of controllability in the literature (Antel and Smith 1987) the 
correlation was used to test this proposition. This will be done compared to controllability 
over accounting measures. Table (6.3.17) presents the correlation coefficients.
Table (3.6.17) Spearman coefficients of correlation between RPE,
market & accounting measures and controllability- the whole data
variable classification of correlation
with satisfaction with market
measures
classification of correlation 
with RPE
fact of using 
market measures
weak, non significant weak, non significant
measures’
controllability
likely significant* moderate, absolutely 
significant**
accounting
measures’
controllability
very weak, non significant moderate significant**
market measures 
controllability
weak, non significant weak, non significant
satisfaction of 
market measures
negative weak, non significant
** p=.05 *p=.10
The following observations could be made:
(1) There was a weak, unlikely and non significant correlation between the fact of using 
market measures and the satisfaction which the employees might hold for these measures. 
In other words, the positive correlation coefficient of this relationship suggested that the 
more employees were satisfied with market measures, the more these measures were used, 
but the lack of significance calls for genralising that there was a weak evidence on that in 
the data.
(2) It was probable (at confidence level 90%) that a correlation might exist between 
employees’ satisfaction of market measures and their general attitude towards measures 
controllability. That is, it was likely that employees might feel satisfied with market 
measures because in general they were concerned with performance measures to be 
controllable. Chi- square test supported this association as well.
(3) The weak and non significant correlation coefficient between market measures’ 
controllability and the satisfaction which the employees might perceive towards the market 
measures, prevents from claiming that the more controllable market measures were, the 
more employees could feel satisfied with these measures. The latter point was indicated by 
the positive correlation coefficient.
This unexpected result should be view on the light of the number of supporters from each 
managerial level. Market measures’ controllability has been agreed on by 28.1% of the 
whole sample, confronted by 19.7% disapproval, 33.3% were neutral and 18.3% did not 
answer. The following table presents the % of participants in each level (to total 
participants of the level) who were satisfied with stock market measures and those who saw 
such measures, controllable.
Managerial level % satisfied with 
market measures
% saw market 
measures controllable
total number of participants 
in this level
shop floor 5.8 11.7 17
division manager 31.2 31.2 32
department director 7.1 42.8 14
senior management 25 25 8
total number of participants 71
The table shows that 31.2 % of participants in the division managers level (comparing to 
25% of senior management) were satisfied with stock market measures and consistently 
agreed they were controllable. The trouble appeared in the shop floor level and the directors 
level, 5.8% of the shop floor participants (comparing to 7.1 of directors) were satisfied with 
stock market measures, nevertheless, onlyll.7% of them (comparing to 42.8% of directors) 
saw these measures were controllable. This would probably suggest that the majority of the 
shop floor participants and directors were dissatisfied with market measures for reasons 
other than lack of controllability.
(4) There was no significant correlation between RPE and satisfaction with market 
measures or between the fact of using market measures and market measures controllability.
In order to follow the shape of the relationship between: RPE and accounting measures 
controllability the regression has been made as shown in table (6.3.18).
Table (6.3.18) Regression outputs of RPE and accounting measures controllability
variable B Beta significance of T Classification
accounting measures controllability .34 .27 .02 significant impact
Multiple R .27
R Square .07
Significance of F .02 significant impact
Regression predicts that accounting measures’ controllability is responsible for 34% of the 
change in RPE and that this is significant at confidence level 95%. It should be noticed that 
when controllability of market measures was included in the regression -in addition to 
controllability of accounting measures- the model was still significant due to a significant 
influence from the accounting measures’controllability only.
ANOVA showed that, there were significant differences among managerial levels -or 
companies- regarding satisfaction with market measure, controllability over accounting or 
market measure. The only exception that ANOVA pointed at, was a significant difference 
regarding their participants’ view of controllability over accounting measures only. The 
following table indicates these differences in terms of frequencies.
Frequencies of participants’ controllability over accounting measures in the three companies
variable Frequencies of agreeing in:
Trade Dairy Steel
controllability over 
accounting measures.
69.4 42.9 71.4
*% of those who agree and strongly agree to total respondents in the company.
The high support from Trade respondents was consistent with the participants’ attitude and 
experience which favored accounting measures -as detailed in chapter 6- as an influence of 
the state on the company. Also the company was committed to apply what was called "The 
Unified Accounting System" in book keeping and financial reporting. Steel’s respondents 
reported that they should keep a balance between the quality and specifications of the 
production and the cost of that product as detailed in chapter 6.
Spearman correlation showed no significant correlation between preferring a/specific peer 
group and controlling accounting or market measures.
The conclusion o f the inquiry about the effect of using market measures and RPE is:
There was no significant correlation between RPE and the fact o f using market 
measures, market measures’ controllability or satisfaction with market measures. The 
significant association exists between RPE and accounting measures’ controllability.
Third: RPE and the reward form:
The last argument this research was about the/impact of varying the reward forms on the 
response to RPE. Spearman correlation proved that, among the various forms of reward, 
there is a possible significant correlation between RPE and shares. Tables (6.3.21) 
summarise the correlation coefficients.
Table (6.3.21) Spearman coefficient of RPE and various forms of rewards
variable correlation for whole data
cash moderate significant**
shares likely significant**
post retirement benefits likely significant*
holiday weak non significant
work conditions likely significant**
** p =.05 *p= .10
The correlation shows a significant possible correlation between RPE and paying the 
reward in cash, shares or better work condition. The regression shows that the group of 
rewards in cash, shares, post retirement benefits, holiday and work conditions could have a 
significant impact on RPE as detailed in the following table:
Table (6.3.22) The regression of various rewards on RPE
variable B Beta significance of T Classification
rewards in cash .25 .192 .126 non significant impact
rewards in shares .126 .121 .398 non significant impact
post retirement benefits .162 .164 .196 non significant impact
holiday .015 .015 .912 non significant impact
better work conditions .197 .227 .059 significant impact
Multiple R .45
R Square .20
Significance ofF .01 significant impact
ANOVA showed no differences managerial levels regarding the various forms. However, 
there were some significant differences among companies in participants' preferring shares,
post retirement benefits and holidays. The following table shows the frequencies which 
indicate these differences:
Variable % of number of respondents who agree to total 
respondents of the company:
Trade Dairy Steel
RPE rewards:
in shares 38.9 52.4 71.4
post retirement benefits 25 52.4 50
holiday 30.6 76.7 67.1
The conclusion of the argument about varying the foim of reward and the response to 
RPE is:
There was a possible positive correlation between RPE and paying the reward in 
cash, shares and work conditions. The reward group had a significant impact at 
confidence level 95%. There were differences among companies (but not managerial 
levels) regarding shares, post retirement benefits and holidays.
Varying the form of reward and the response to RPE:
The questionnaire contained a concluding question about whether or not varying the form of 
reward will encourage RPE. The frequencies of answering this question showed that 64.8% 
of the total respondents supported the argument and the median is 3.4 (which just departed 
the neutral position moving towards the agree position). No differences could be identified 
by ANOVA between the managerial levels or the companies regarding this argument.
The conclusion of this point is: There is a general agreement among companies and 
managerial levels that varying the form of paying rewards would enhance RPE.
Appendix (C-3)
Analysis of the interview’s data about the control system
in the three Egyptian companies
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
The aim of this section, is to report, analysis and commentary on the control system in the 
three Egyptian companies as extracted from the interview data. A comparison line of 
analysis will be pursued, therefore, what is similar, dissimilar in the companies’ patterns, 
experiences and rationales will be investigated.
Part One: The control system
I: Planning
A degree of similarity could be recognised among the three companies in setting targets. 
The similarity points could be summarised in:
• employees participation in planning
• the planning process
• modifying the budget
• perception of target in terms of difficulty
• using the budget for planning and motivating with different tools
However, A number of dissimilarity aspects in planning could also be marked such as:
• setting targets in financial and non financial terms,
• commitment to the target’s figure,
• who is leading the budget and who follows up its implementation.
These points will be detailed below.
Similarity in Planning Practices:
Employees participation in planning:
It was a common practice by the three companies that different departments provided
estimations about their future performance. Although that was the general rule, the degree
to which the various levels and departments participated, differed in each company. Each 
company has its own policies and guidelines with relation to how much participation is
practised. In Trade the Follow-up manager stated that participation was restricted by the 
rules of mnning public sector and the overall goals which the parent company set to them. 
The managing director of Dairy indicated that the building a plan depended largely on the 
staff participation especially with new proposals. In Steel, the head of Galvanisation 
division in the Steel company reported:
I participate in setting targets through determining the existing capacities in the 
factory. The different departments usually give estimation of the maximum output they can 
achieve. For example, if senior management knows that the present utilisation of the factories is 
90%, they ask us: what are the opportunities of increasing this ratio to 95% and what investments 
would be needed. We study and investigate possibilities such as: can we rise the operation ratio 
or the performance, the efficiency, ..etc and a sort of survey and analysis take place.
Modifying the plan:
The three companies shared'the practice of revising the plan semi- annually on the light of 
their actual performance in the first half of it and the current circumstances. The new target 
figures guided the performance in the second half of the fiscal year.
Perception o f target in terms of difficulty:
Participants from the three company reported their satisfaction with the level of 
difficulty of the targets set in their companies (with a reservation in Trade). The head 
of Galvanising division in Steel showed an attitude of accepting risk by accepting high 
levels of targets but he did not describe them as “too difficult or unfair” but he stated:
I do not remember that we ever had a target which we felt disappointed by, or we felt 
it is too difficult to attain. Sometimes we have really tough targets, difficult yes, but we 
do not feel it is hopeless. Instead, we say, OK, we will desperately try and will see by 31 
Dec. (the close of the financial year) what we achieved. Then the figure usually is not at 
the reasonable level, it is very higher and this is natural. If it is a “reasonable” figure, this 
means you can do it, so why it will be a target
The managing director in Steel company highlighted another point in handling targets 
difficulty:
We pay due attention to the "fairness" of the objective and the main guarantee for it is via 
employees' participation in setting estimations. That is, the objective stems from the 
individuals who will take the responsibility of achieving it so they commit themselves to it.
However, the importing officer in Trade company argued that:
I do not think there is a huge difficulty in the planned targets but this does not mean that 
they are surely achievable. In fact these targets need a huge effort to be achieved given the 
problems we have in the public sector.
Using the budget fo r  planning and motivating with different tools
While the three companies used the budget basically and firstly for planning purposes, 
they also used it as a motivational tool in different ways. In Trade and Dairy (as the 
Follow-up Manager in Trade and the Marketing Manager in Dairy) indicated, two levels 
of budgets are planned: the most likely achievable one was used for planning purposes. 
That plan was risen by 20% and used for motivating purposes. The idea in the two 
companies was to challenge the employees and to secure the attainability of the most 
likely attainable budget.
Dissimilarities in Planning Practices:
Different corporate objectives
The three companies have different corporate objectives, Steel aimed to become a 
competitive international producer, of a wide range of high quality low cost flat steel 
products, to satisfy local and regional requirements (as stated in the company’s new projects 
of Flat Production and Direct Reduction- details in Appendix C-l). The corporate 
objectives of Dairy (as stated by the managing director) was to increase the market share 
through gradual expansion with high quality, low price products. The goals of Trade (as 
explained by the head of Follow- up division) was to retrieve the previous position as a 
leading company in the market of importing and exporting heavy machine.
The leading activity in planning:
In Trade and Dairy company, the leading activity in planning was sales department and in 
steel company, the focus was on the production activity therefore, it leads the budgeting 
process and the other activities (such as purchase, maintenance, finance, sales) followed. 
This pointed at the centre of attention and the nature of activity and market it worked in. 
Trade company was a retailer which bought goods (mainly from foreign suppliers and 
sometimes from local producers) centrally in Cairo and distributed all over the country 
without any conversion operation taking place on it. Therefore, sales was the dominating 
activity. Dairy was a manufacturing company which dealt in products with a short 
production cycle and a high capability to adapt to the market demand. This suggests that the 
company probably needs to control the sales side of operation. Both Trade and Dairy 
faced strong competition in the Egyptian market. Unlike Steel which manufactured 
"durable" products and has the biggest share of steel and iron supplying in the Egyptian 
market. Also the market studies by specialised agencies proved that the company had a high 
likelihood to enhance its national, regional and international market share (as the Operations
Manager stated). All those reasons suggested that the company used production as a starting 
point in setting plans.
Who is administering the budget
In Trade company, the Follow -up division manager mentioned that the Finance department 
was responsible for administering and pursuing the process of implementing the budget 
whereas in Dairy company, the marketing manager revealed that his department took over 
this job. In Steel company, the Operations Manager indicated that Quality Control division 
which was a part of the Production Control department took this responsibility.
This difference was a reflection of the orientation and main concern in each company. In 
the public sector in Egypt -to which Trade belonged- budget is stressed as a control tool 
"money in and money out" therefore, it was handled by a division under the Finance 
department. For the Dairy product, the main concern was still oriented into the marketing 
activity which initiated profits. Then the marketing department directly administered the 
budget. In Steel manufacturing company, the production, its control and quality were at 
the core of the attention and hence the production control department contained the process 
of administrating the budget.
Commitment to the target figure and flexibility in achieving it:
The Follow- up Manager in Trade company illustrated that the ultimate target for the 
company was set in form of a surplus figure (a profit) towards which staff should be 
committed. In the main time, the company’s policy allowed some flexibility in how to 
achieve that target (i.e what services and goods should be sold, when, at what terms,...). 
Although the budget contained details of the types and amount of equipment and services 
that should be sold, if -for any reason- the plan faced some difficulties in reality, the 
management could change the sales mix in order not to miss the target. An example has 
been given by the Follow -up manager assistant:
The company has involved in some transactions with some Soviet countries in 
importing tractors, hydraulic machines and other farming machine. We have 
received complaints from our customers about some of these equipment Brazil 
Consequently, the company decided to change the suppliers and got other brands 
from Japan, and Germany.
Such practice was not adopted by Steel or Dairy companies because of the more accuracy in 
forecasting in the two companies (as mentioned by the Managing Director in Dairy and 
Operations Manager in Steel). Also Steel -being a manufacturer in a highly complicated 
industry- might find changing the production schedule, not easy because of the time, 
planning and probably investments it might need.
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Setting targets in financial or financial and non financial terms:
In Trade company -and consistent with the performance measures in use- goals were set in 
financial terms only (i.e surplus figure). This practice was justified by Head of Follow -up:
We do not explicitly put non financial targets in our plan (for example quality). We are 
committed to setting targets in financial teims only. Nevertheless, we have post-selling 
service fixing, maintenance and repair services but these are part of the selling contract 
We also do not put targets like marketing in new areas, selling new goods, we already 
market all over the country. Ultimately all these aspects (e.g quality, customer service,...) 
should have a financial echo, so they are ways to achieve an objective (which is the profit 
target)
However, in Dairy and Steel targets are set in both financial and non financial terms.
II: Measures
Similarity
• Divisions’Performance interdependence
• No distinction between Manager’s performance and company’s performance 
Dissimilarity
The dissimilarity side between the three companies include:
• Using financial and non financial measures
• The emphasised importance of quality and safety in Dairy and Steel
• Governmental intervention
Similarity
Divisions’ Performance interdependence:
A feature that was mentioned by participants in the enquiry in the three companies was 
the impact of other divisions on their performance but participants of company had 
different experience. In Dairy, the Marketing Manager explained:
The performance of other departments affect the performance of the marketing 
department. I have an example on that. Once the electric (governmental) generator and the 
cable which feed one of our factories has burned so the factory completely stopped for 2 
days. The negative effect of this accident extended for over 2 months till we managed to 
get rid of its impacts. It is an open market and the production department could not 
compensate the shortage in production which resulted from this accident If the production 
department has planned to cope with such hazards, the production would not have stopped 
completely for 2 days.
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Also the head of Delivery to the Northern Region in Dairy agreed on this argument and 
pointed at its consequences:
Time is important to my work but my work gets affected by the work of my 
colleagues in other departments. For example the production department, when I come 
to load a van, the commodities should be ready to be raised to the van. If there is any 
delay from the production department or the storage people, this will impact my whole 
day. The first thing I am being accountable for, is meeting the time schedule of delivery.
the Importing Officer in Trade gave example of the lack of co-operation which he 
experienced and affected his work:
I need my colleagues co- operation. For examples, once colleagues in another 
department returned the documents upon which we pay the foreign supplier many times 
asking different for alterations every time. They mean to protect themselves when it 
comes to accountability. I appreciate their concern, a mistake might cause thousands of 
pounds but over-protection makes my job takes too much time and effort to be done. 
My question is: why do not they state all what they want once.
The operations engineer in Steel company highlights a different experience with 
colleagues co- operation:
The company often shift engineers among the different sites and jobs both to trigger 
their abilities to innovate and create and to make a good use of the accumulated 
expertise of the staff. Under this system, every engineer has to provide assistance to his 
successor. We are judged about co-operation with each other.
No distinction between Manager’s performance and company’s performance:
The participants in the enquiry did not report that it was a practice that the company 
split the performance of the manager from the performance of the individual. The head 
of Follow -up division in Trade ‘s point of view was that it was too complicated and not 
economic.
Although there was no exception of that in the Dairy and Steel companies, that practice 
was justified by the Managing Director of Dairy on the basis that top management was 
responsible for the overall work in the company and it delegated authorities to other 
managerial levels but it did not give up the responsibility about the total work.
Market measures:
The interview data indicate the fact that market measures (such as share price) were not 
used in any of the three companies. Also the interviewees in the three companies shared
an attitude against market measures as performance indicators for different reasons but 
the major reason was lack of controllability. As the head of Galvanising division in 
Steel company gave the example about a high rise followed by a sharp fall in his 
company’s share price (in one week) with no relation to management or company’s 
performance (chapter 6, page 154).
Another reason was highlighted by the maintenance engineer from Trade company:
I do not welcome the proposal that my performance be measured by the share price 
or any securities index. My company has achieved losses in the last three years (about £m 
21 in the last year alone) and is over drawn from banks about £ m 40 while I work hard and 
am not responsible for the reasons or policies which led to these losses and to the collapse 
of the share price, then why should my performance be evaluated referring to it? It (the 
share price) does not represent my performance, my performance is represented by 
technical and financial measures as I explained.
Apparently, the interviewees agree on rejecting market measures as indicators of their 
performance mainly because they think they do not practice control on them. In their 
view, changes in securities’ prices depended on dealers’ speculations, amount of 
transactions, movements in the international securities exchange and the regulations 
which organised dealing in securities in Cairo exchange rather than reflecting changes 
in their performance.
Dissimilarity
Financial and non financial measures:
In Trade -and in consistency with setting targets in financial terms only- performance was 
measured in financial terms only for all departments. That was considered quite suitable for 
a retail company sought profit from all departments including service department. The 
assistant of Follow-up Manager suggested another reason that from the parent company’s 
stance, this practice could facilitate the comparing different subsidiaries and comparing 
different activities of the company. Especially with the fact that the company contained an 
assortment of activities such as distribution, constmction, repair and maintenance and 
reclaiming. This was unlike the financial indicators which were calculated under the 
“unified” accounting system of the public sector’s companies. Nevertheless, still in Trade 
staff considered that some aspects of their work should be better expressed in non financial 
terms as the importing officer argued in the company's section (chapter 6, page 139)
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In Dairy and Steel company, both financial and non financial measures were used, 
believed to be equally important (as the Galvanisation manager gave evidence in Steel's 
section in chapter6, page 154) and welcomed by employees in various managerial 
levels(chapter 6, page 151 and 153). In the two companies, creativity and quality are 
critical issues for many implications indicated below.
The importance o f quality and safety in Dairy and Steel:
In Dairy company the Managing director emphasised the importance of keeping high 
standards of product safety. This stemmed from the fact that the company dealt in food 
products and any mistake might affect customer’s health and demolished the company’s 
reputation. Moreover, the company’s policy in expansion rested upon outperforming 
competitors in quality and price.
In Steel, The Operations Manager indicated that the importance of safety had various 
roots. First, because of the huge investment and the number of employees existed in one 
spot and the company's location near Alexandria harbour and on an important platform 
between Alexandria and Al- Amerya city which was one of its newly established 
extensions, as the operations manager indicated:
Three years ago the escalator which carries the raw material from ships to us and carries our 
production to the harbour melted and bended down because of a fire. Then there was a fear 
from the council and local community from using the road underneath it.
Governmental intervention:
An important feature that has been associated to Trade company (rather than Steel and 
Dairy companies) and affected measuring performance was the governmental 
intervention in the company's goals and systems examples on that are provided in Trade 
company's section (chapter 6, page 139). This feature has been noticed in the public 
sector only because of the state controlled the company's capital and the management
III: Evaluations
This section will report and analysis the bases of evaluate performance as used in the 
three companies and some observations on these practices and experiences.
Bases of performance evaluation:
Similar bases
1. Comparing to the budget:
In the three companies, the basic evaluation criterion is comparing performance to the 
budget and this is the first (and the sole in Trade) basis for evaluating (and hence 
rewarding as will be explained later). In Trade, the Follow- up department implemented 
this comparison for divisions and reported monthly any deviation from targets to 
provide a chance for them to compensate and catch the target.
In Dairy, the Marketing Department took this responsibility with a close follow- up to 
the work of the sales representatives where their work was checked weekly. In Steel 
company, each division had to report monthly to the Production Control division how 
much it achieved (explaining the cost, quality, defect units, cost, time, any problems) 
and the deviations from the plan. A Copy of this report was also sent to the top 
management.
2. Comparing to the past:
The three companies paid concern in looking at the performance trends over time. 
Therefore, comparing performance to the past was a shared pattern by the three 
companies but it was not used for remunerating employees in any of them. Steel and 
Dairy placed a special attention on the performance trends over time because of the 
implications which it provided to guide the expansion and growth strategies. After 6 
moths of implementing a budget, Trade looked at the actual performance in that half a 
year and adjusted budget estimations for the rest of the year accordingly. Tracing the 
performance over time was also important to the parent company of Trade.
Dissimilar bases
1. Comparing to other divisions or departments in the company:
In both Steel and Dairy companies, one of the basic control practices was the internal 
comparisons between the departments and divisions. The comparison terms included 
achieving the division’s plan, creativity and quality of work. However, Dairy company 
provided rewards to employees according to these comparisons but Steel did not. This 
type of comparisons was welcomed as a motivational tool and seen as helpful and fair 
by the employees (Head of Delivery service to Northern Region, Marking Manager and
Managing Director in Dairy and Production Controller and Galvanisation Manger in 
Steel). In trade, these comparisons did not exist because employees’ evaluation and 
rewarding were done under the "Law of Public Sector’s Workers" which did not include 
such comparisons. However, the Importing Officer sought:
I wish we compare performance between departments and divisions who share the 
same environment and work under the same system. In such a case, differences would be 
meaningful and reflects distinctive efforts. I believe any outstanding performance should 
be framed and inspired by other workers.
2. Comparing to other organisations:
Dairy and Steel companies practised comparing the company’s performance to other 
companies' performance but with different orientation and for different reasons. Both 
companies looked at their performance relative to peers' for purpose of planning and 
monitoring their position in the market. Nevertheless, Dairy compared its performance 
to the performance of a group of food and dairy producers in the Egyptian market. It 
aimed from that to reward top management (this is the RPE practice in Dairy which will 
be discussed in detail a following section of this report). Steel compared its performance 
to international steel producers' in order to observe its position and explore possibilities 
to expand in the international market. Steel did not set rewards to employees on this 
comparison. Although Trade did not hold any type of these comparisons but the parent 
company matched Trade to sister companies in the public foreign trade sector. 
Regrettably, there were no data available about the parent company’s practice.
A point that should be noticed here is that, Dairy company was doing this external 
comparison irregularly whereas Steel run this monitoring process with international 
competitors regularly.
Observations on the evaluation practices: 
a) How individual's performance was assessed:
Steel company run two different types of evaluations: evaluation for divisions and 
evaluation for employees. Regarding the division, it was compared to its plan (and the 
employees are rewarded accordingly) and to other divisions. The main theme in these 
comparisons was that unit of measurement was the division or the department itself. 
Regarding individuals, Steel had an assessment technique whereby unit of appraisal was 
“the employee". That process was refereed to as ‘The semi- annual review” which The 
head of Galvanising division explained:
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For the person himself, various aspects are assessed and he is being rewarded accordingly. 
We have a semi- annual review done by the employee’s direct manager. The bases of this 
evaluation are: 60% for the technical performance (including quality and time spent to do the 
job), 10% for being punctual, 10% for any developments, creativity he produces, 10% for his 
behaviour with others (colleagues, managers,...) and 10% for his behaviour with colleagues 
in other departments. Employees are ranked on this evaluation on a normal distribution even 
if it is strict and restricting for us, we do not depart from it and if we do, we might relax in 
applying it by on 1 or 2 people not more and I am convinced by this system. However, our 
ranking is reviewed by the "Administration Affairs" department where they double check the 
ranking they are entitled to amend it
c) The experience with modes of evaluation:
One point related to the expectation from follow up work, was suggested by the 
assistant of the Follow-up Manager in Trade:
Follow up should not stop at measuring deviations, it should extend to investigate the 
reasons behind deviations, who is responsible for them and the responsible person.should 
be accounted for that.
Steel company had an experience that should be mentioned with the duration of 
performance review. The company was used to do an annual review for performance 
once a year. Near the end of the fiscal year and because each department would be 
willing to catch the targets, there was a huge pressure on the staff and the machines. Of 
course, the bigger the gap between the goal and the actual performance was, the more 
frustration and burden on the staff and the machines were. That was used to be followed 
by a number of machine breakdown and heavy requisite of holidays. Therefore, the 
company decided to do the performance review quarterly instead of annually. Then, the 
gap that should be recovered was relatively small and both staff and machine did not 
suffer from fatigue.
IV: Reward
The practice of pay and remuneration in the three companies has some similar points for 
example;
• having variety of items
• the rewards mainly based on meeting the targets
• Common experience of the non monetary rewards
Nonetheless, there are differences in remuneration practices between the three companies 
in:
• level of pay,
• existence of fines,
• preferable form of rewards
• employees’ satisfaction of the remuneration system.
The following section will discuss the pay and reward practices, the similarity and 
dissimilarity points and possible influence on employees’ satisfaction.
Similarity in remuneration practices:
Variety of components and forms o f pay
There is a degree of agreement among the three companies in varying the content of the 
remuneration package. All compensation schemes in the three companies contain: basic 
salary, rewards on meeting targets, regular increase in pay to amend the impact of inflation 
and rewards for extra ordinary efforts.
In Trade, cash was the sole form of rewards paid to employees in all levels. An exception of 
this general rule was', some non financial privileges provided to top management members 
such as cars, holidays by the seaside in properties owned by the firm. These privileges were 
neither related to achievement, nor exercised a regularly. Dairy and Steel paid employees in 
all levels, in a variety of forms such as cash, shares, cars, medical services, welfare, 
accommodation and holidays. This was a regular practice with a distinctive feature in Steel, 
where training and study opportunities were facilitated for staff in different levels locally 
and abroad.
Meeting target is the first criterion fo r rewarding:
In Trade, Dairy and Steel, employees were entitled to rewards when target was met and 
that was the sole criterion for rewarding in Trade. If more than the target was achieved, a 
proportional reward was offered. Therefore this part was called “the changeable pay”. The 
time of achieving the target had some influence as well. In Trade which was a public 
company with low pay, when the missed part of a target was recovered, the related reward 
could be collected while in Dairy and Steel, when a target is missed, the related reward was 
not retrievable.
Common experience of the non monetary rewards
The Managing Director in Dairy mentioned that an extra-ordinary achievement or 
creative proposal was acknowledged by the company. He believed that facilitating 
promotion for merits among the young staff to get higher positions was particularly
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encouraging. Similarly, the Importing Officer in Trade reports that he and his colleagues 
was impressed when the chairman of the board of directors sent a "Thank You" letter to 
one of their colleagues for his extra ordinary effort.
Dissimilarity in remuneration practices:
Level of pay and rewards:
A general but important observation regarding the level of pay as it appeared from the 
internal documents which have been made available to the researcher. The lowest average 
of pay in the three companies was in Trade while in Dairy was about twice as big as the 
average annual salary in Trade. The average in Steel which reaches about 3 folds average in 
Trade and one and a half fold of Dairy. This was a general feature in the public sector where 
wages are remarkably lower than the wages in the private sector (as stated by Follow up 
assistant Manager in Trade, Marketing Manager in Dairy and Galvanisation Manager in 
Steel who worked in a public company before joining Steel). Therefore, the details and 
implications of this point will be discussed in the comparison between public and private 
sector chapter 7, p: 184).
Preferable form of rewards:
There was a general tendency among the interviewees -who belong to different managerial 
levels- to prefer receiving rewards in cash in the first stand. As The Importing Officer in 
Trade stated:
Generally and not related to RPE, Cash is better. There is no point that the company buys 
shares on my behalf or pay for a holiday and decides this as part of my remuneration package.
One exception was the Production Control Officer who approved varying the form of 
reward and voted for shares.
Employees*satisfaction with the remuneration in the three companies:
Apart from the cautious view of the participants of Trade and their comments explained 
earlier, the participants from Dairy and Steel expressed their satisfaction towards the pay 
package both in amount and content. The Marketing Manager in Dairy ranked remuneration 
there as one of the best in Egypt and the Galvanising division described as being very good 
and quite satisfying.
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Appendix (C-4)
Some information about the Dairy company's competitors
Business Information in Egypt:
http://www.caho96.gov.eg/binyS webdbc.exe/summit/company/'htx/&. business/result l.htx?
1) Halwani Brothers
http://www.cairo96.gov.eg/bin/Swebdbc.exe/summit/company/hix/&:'business/result2.htx?&d_id=595
Commercial Name: Halwani Brothers
Address: B3, Area 163/164,10th of Ramadan City
Phone:015369520-530-540-525
Fax: 015/369510
E-mail address:
Saleh Kamei
Public/Private company: Private 
Member of: Food 
Type: Manufacturer
Field(s) of Activity: Food and Kindred Products (Processed)
Product(s)/Services(s):
Sausage, Smoked Products, Burgers
2) Juhayna Company For Milk Industries
http://www.cairo96.gov.eg/bin/Swebdbc.exe/summit/company/htx/&.'business/Tesult2.htx?&dJid=698
Commercial Name: Juhayna
Address: 6th of October City : 1st Zone Part 40
Phone:
Fax: 02/3461230 - 011/330363 
E-mail address:
Chairmen Engineer Safwan Ahmed Sabet
Public/Private company: Private 
Member of: Food 
Type: Manufacturer
Field(s) of Activity: Food and Kindred Products (Processed)
Product(s)/Services(s):
Milk & Juice Production, Cheese
3) International Dairy & Foods Company (Milky Land)
http://www.cairo96.gov.eg/bin/$webdbc.exe/summit/company/htx/&/business/resuIt2.htx?&d_id=608
Commercial Name: Milky Land
Address: 111,ThawraSt., Heliopolis
Phone:4174871-2906986
Fax: 2905237
E-mail address:
Public/Private company: Private 
Member of: Food
- B \ -
Type: Manufacturer
Fieid(s) of Activity: Food and Kindred Products (Processed)
Product(s)/Services(s):
Full Range of Dairy Products & Juices Long Life Milk, Milk Shake, Yogurt
4) United Food Products
http://w\vw.cairo96.gov.eg/bin/5webdbc.exe/summit/company/htx/&/business/result2.htx?&d_id=594
Commercial Name: Alloaloaa 
Address: Industrial Zone, Ismalia 
Phone: 064325002,325001 
Fax: 064325002 
E-mail address:
Public/Private company: Private 
Member of: Food 
Type: Manufacturer 
Field(s) of Activity:
Food and Kindred Products (Processed)
Product(s)/Services(s):
Comed Beef, Canned Beef, Canned Fish 
Canned beans, Canned Vegetables, Juice
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Performance M anagement - Guidelines for Managers and Staff
United Utilities is committed to help people achieve their potential and gain recognition 
for their contributions to the organisation. We recognise that good leadership is about 
giving clarity about what needs to be achieved and helping people understand what they 
need to do differently in order to deliver high performance. The guidelines provide a way 
to help leaders enhance their role in this regard and improve the performance of their 
teams through meaningful constructive feedback on performance. It gives us all a way to 
assess our contribution, plan for improvement in a focused way and understand how we 
are rewarded for our efforts over the year.
Two new Group policies are being introduced in order to achieve this. For all staff a 
Performance Management interview will be scheduled during April/May each year and 
a Learning Review undertaken in October. The Learning Review will lead to the 
development of an individual Learning Plan which will identify learning activities to be 
undertaken during the next year to>
* improve your current level of performance against agreed objectives, and
* gain the level of experience and competence to work in different roles to help you 
progress to meet your career aspirations.
Further information on the Learning Review will be issued during the summer of 1997. 
Performance Management Review
Your Performance Management Review should take place no later than 31 May 1997.
The process is designed for Directors in the Group Corporate Centre to be able to 
reward performance through the July salary review within overall budgetary 
constraints. The process is ..designed to increase the amount of information which is 
shared. You should receive constructive feedback on your performance and you can 
discuss with your manager their view of how your performance impacts on the 
Directorate’s overall ability to achieve its business goals.
The Review should be based on two areas:-
• a discussion of your performance during 1996/97 against objectives.
• the setting of suitable individual or team objectives for 1997/98.
Review of Objectives for 1996/97
If you had a clear set of objectives set then the discussion should focus on a review of 
your performance against those objectives. However, many staff will not have had 
specific personal or team objectives set for the 1996/97 financial year - if this applies to 
you then the discussion should concentrate on a general review of your performance
over the year, concentrating on any specific tasks and goals that have been important 
to your role and that of your Directorate.
Preview of Objectives for 1997/98
Directors will firstly define the key goals and priorities for their Directorates for the year 
based on the overall plan for the Group Corporate Centre. These overall goals can be 
translated into objectives as appropriate. Please note that there is no standard format for 
the number and style of these objectives. They should, however, be>
♦ Specific
♦ Measurable
♦ Attainable
♦ Relevant
♦ Time Related
The objectives can be either individual or team based, or a combination of the two and can 
either be on an annual basis or for a shorter period, depending which is appropriate. In 
either case, however, there should be regular reviews during the year to check progress 
and to ensure that the objectives are still meeting appropriate business targets. If necessary 
new or revised objectives can be set during the year.
It is particularly important that you have a very clear understanding of your 
objectives for the forthcoming year and how success against them will be measured. 
Remember that next year’s Performance Review discussion will be based on your 
performance against these objectives.
Performance Rating
The Performance Review discussion will lead to a performance rating in line with the 
following framework.
Excellent - Outstanding performance significantly exceeding job requirements in all 
respects and at all times.
Very Good - Consistently meets the normal requirements of the job in the majority of 
areas. The only improvements that could reasonably be expected are of a minor nature.
Good - Consistently meets the normal requirements of the job with performance 
exceeding those requirements in a number of areas. Some improvements could 
reasonably be expected.
Satisfactory - Meets the normal requirements of the job but there will be areas where 
performance could be significantly improved.
Unsatisfactory - Constant guidance required and performance significantly below job 
requirements in many areas.
Performance ratings will then be used to reward performance as part of the annual salary
review in July.
Performance Management Forms
A simple, revised form has been prepared to record the outcome of your Performance
Review and is also attached to the exchange message. There are 3 pages:-
1. Provides a brief record of your post and the Performance Rating.
2. Allows for a review o f Personal Objectives for 1996/97 where appropriate.
3. Gives space for a summary of the outcome of the discussion and allows space for you 
and your second level manager to comment. In addition there is a space to allow the 
identification of any urgent training and development needs which need to be addressed 
before the Learning Review in the Autumn.
Copies of completed Performance management forms will be kept on file in the Group HR
Department.
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SUMMARY OF PERFORMANCE
OVERALL PERFORMANCE RATING U
(Please tick appropriate box)
DEVELOPMENT
What immediate training and development needs have been identified in the discussion which 
need action before the Annual Learning Review in the autumn?
EMPLOYEE’S STATEMENT
SECOND LEVEL MANAGER’S STATEMENT
Manager’s Signature_____________________________ Date
THINKING THE BUSINESS
• Analytical Thinking
Breaks things down into components, looks at all angles, weighs up implications, 
calculates risks.
• Calculates risks in terms of costs and benefits.
• Anticipates problems and identifies issues correctly.
• Analyses data using a variety of tools and techniques.
Analyses data in a methodical way.
• Considers possible implications of decisions before acting.
• Looks at the disadvantages as well as the advantages of a proposal.
• Creativity
Introduces original approaches or adapts existing ones to meet new situations.
• Breaks deadlock situations via original thoughts or ideas.
• Recognises innovative and creative solutions and builds on them.
• Is rarely satisfied with the first idea, consistently looking for new and better ways of
doing things.
• Identifies several possible explanations for a situation.
• Modifies existing ways of working to fit changing requirements.
• Is willing to try to pilot ideas/ways of working.
• Strategic Vision
Long term future thinking, develops a long-term 'game-plan’ to guide operational decision 
making.
• Recognises key issues in complex situations, making appropriate links between items.
• Links day to day activities to a longer term strategic vision.
• Questions basic premises and assumptions.
• Builds on past experiences to develop new ideas.
• Translates the longer term perspective into practical working plans.
• Views issues in a wider context.
• Business Curiosity
Has an up to date knowledge of trends and developments in the broader business 
environment.
• Aware of the impact of external influences on the business eg regulatory, political 
environmental
• Knowledgeable about the financial and business markets in which the Company 
operates
• ~ Understands the commercial constraints under which the Company operates
• Keeps up to date vrith new business practices and methods
• Initiates networking and constantly seeks opportunities to influence, share knowledge 
and understanding
• Planning
Systematically sets out short and long term goals and establishes priorities.
• Develops effective plans which deliver high performance
• Sets challenging but realistic long and short term goals
• Establishes and constantly reviews deadlines and targets
• Able to establish priorities
• Thinks ahead and anticipates problems
ACHIEVING THROUGH SELF
• Flexibility
Changes viewpoint/behaviour and makes plans in the light of changing circumstances or 
new evidence.
• Adjusts their style to meet the needs of the situation.
• Sees the merits of differing positions or opposing viewpoints
• Relishes change
• Identifies which areas are open for debate and which are not. Identifies issues and 
possible solutions.
• Responds positively when asked to change plans/goals.
• Keeps working effectively if the targets/resources have to change.
• Stability Under Pressure
Handles pressure and recovers quickly from setbacks.
• Uses alternative ploys to reach goals in the face of difficulties.
• Refuses to acc’ept that a solution cannot be found.
Maintains a high level of energy/drive until the goal is attained.
Keeps trying to achieve despite hitches, has a positive “can do” attitude.
• Actively looks for ways round difficulties.
• Does not get frustrated in the face of obstacles.
• Initiative
Takes the first step. Spots things that need to be done and does them before needing to be 
asked.
• Takes calculated risks.
• Pushes for change to improve business performance.
• Identifies issues and possible solutions.
• Tries a new way of doing a job because it might be better than the traditional method.
• Self starting rather than passively accepting.
• Does not need to be asked to tackle problems/issues.
• Self Development
Adopts an approach to continually improving self and work methods.
• Reflects on experiences to identify why things have happened.
• Draws conclusions on reflections and identifies learning points.
• Takes responsibility for own development.
• Looks for opportunities on the job to learn and develop new skills/knowledge.
• Assimilates and applies new job related information.
• Demonstrates a willingness to try out new ways of working.
• Independence
Takes actions based on own convictions rather than a desire to please others.
• Is not easily swayed
• Demonstrates self confidence
• Is willing to question organisational decisions
• Is prepared to express unpopular opinions whilst knowing when to back off
• Expresses opinions openly
• Personal Organisation
Adopts an organised approach to work and interactions with others.
Organises own work area so that information is readily accessible.
• Addresses issues in a logical methodical manner according to priority.
• Makes lists of things to be achieved each day/week.
Keeps diary up to date, avoids double bookings.
• Goes into meetings well prepared having read any necessary papers.
ACHIEVING THROUGH OTHERS
• Oral Communication
Speaks clearly and concisely in a way which is appropriate to the receiver.
• Speaks clearly, fluently and to the point
• Able to hold an audience’s attention, both in group and one-to-one situations
• When appropriate uses questioning to clarify understanding and notes key facts
• Adjusts level of language to suit the audience
• Listens actively and demonstrates understanding
• Written Communication
Produces written communications which are clear, fluent, concise and readily 
understandable by the intended recipient(s)
• Produces clear and succinct written communications
• Able to precis and simplify complex and technical issues '
• Able to pitch material at the right level for the audience
• Avoids jargon, produces well structured material which is clear.
• Developing Others
Helps people to help themselves. Balances support and honest feedback.
• Consciously acts as a role model for others skill development.
• Ensures opportunities are available or created to reinforce/develop new skills.
• Gives people control of their own work and holds them accountable for output.
• Helps people construct reasonable/realistic development plans.
• Provides constructive feedback and support.
• Regularly reviews development plans with individuals.
„  ~a l  ~• Influencing
Analyses where others are coming from and behaves accordingly to change their minds.
• Uses different approaches to persuade different people.
Tests out ideas/information informally.
• Analyses positions people are likely to take and acts accordingly.
• Actively influences the course of a conversation in their favour.
• Attempts to balance the needs of all parties.
• Listens and confers with individuals/groups or customers.
• Empathy
Sees things from others perspective. Senses feelings and hidden agendas.
• Draws sensitive inferences about others’ emotional state or way of thinking.
• Accurately judges other peoples thoughts or feelings.
• Thinks through situations from other peoples perspectives.
• Actively shows interest.
• Asks appropriate questions to clarify understanding.
• Tries to anticipate hidden agendas before going into meetings.
• Teamworking
Acts in a way that helps the team achieve its objectives.
• Recognises and builds on group dynamics.
Encourages and supports a sense of purpose or unity in the team.
• Gets to know what makes other people in the team tick.
• Ensures that all members of the group contribute to the process.
• Gives credit to staff rather than taking all the glory.
• Talks through what is worrying people and offers appropriate reassurance.
ACHIEVING STAKEHOLDER EXPECTATIONS
• Stakeholder Focus
Fully understands the importance of balancing the needs of stakeholders within acceptable 
costs to the organisation.
• Identifies and continually keeps abreast of changing stakeholder needs.
• Actively seeks out stakeholder feedback.
• Identifies the cost benefits of alternative strategies to support stakeholders.
• Monitors performance and makes adjustment to improve where possible.
• Responds to stakeholder queries/complaints professionally and positively.
• Quality Focus
Gives attention to quality and shows concern about improving standards.
• Sets high standards of performance for him/herself and others
• Develops and improves quality systems to enhance services to stakeholders__________
• Continually adopts a questioning approach to his/her duties
• Seeks to improve business processes through comparison to best in class
• Does more than the minimum required -
• Ensures attention to detail
Understands the commercial realities which drive the business
• Focuses on the financial effects of business decisions
• Works within agreed budgets
• Achieves the cost effective use of resources
• Proactively seeks profitable business opportunities
• Results Focus
Leads conversations and discussions to achieve an outcome.
• Sets stretching but realistic targets and ensures that they are met.
• Initiates actions to achieve results, proactive in style.
• Constantly reminds people of goals.
• Establishes ways of monitoring progress against personal objectives.
• Clearly expresses the desired outcome.
• Has contingency measures when things go wrong/not according to plan.
United Utilities
CONFIDENTIAL
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NAME
Period of Review
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REVTEW OF PERSONAL OBJECTIVES 1996/97
OBJECTIVE COMMENTS ACHIEVED
YES/NO
•
Additional Comments:
Appendix (D-2)
A Detailed presentation of analyses of United Utilities’ questionnaire data
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This report will include the following points:
* Preparing the data for analysing
* Deciding the analyses to do
* Analysing the data: Descriptive analyses and association and variation analyses 
Preparing data for analysis:
The first point to be mentioned here is that, an aggregate measure for RPE has been 
created in order to do the data analysis.
The measure is: RPE = The motivational role of RPE + The monitoring role of RPE.
The reason behind this summation is that, these are the functions which have been 
proposed in the literature for RPE and the core issue of the technique could be traced 
through them. Also, The empirical evidence suggest that motivation and monitoring have 
been correlated in all companies.
Generally, the practice which has been adopted in the first part of the field work has been 
replicated here. The collected data were kept in a file for the company. It included a brief 
profile about the company, a copy of the answered questionnaires, a complete transcript 
of the interviews, any internal documents has been given by the company (e.g annual 
reports, organisational structure). It has been decided in early stages of the research that 
data will be analysed by SPSS statistical package. According to the requirements of 
SPSS, data had to be coded. Firstly, the questionnaire variables were abbreviated and each 
item assigned that abbreviation for the whole sample. For example: ffpe: the fact that the 
company uses RPE. Secondly, another code number was assigned to each question which 
represent the answer for that question e.g code number 4 means the respondent “agrees” 
on the argument. More than a copy of United Utilities data -either the hard copy or the 
electronic copy- have been kept in separate locations.
Deciding the statistical analyses:
Again, the same procedures used in the first part of the field work, has been repeated here, 
where three groups of analyticaLtools have been considered: . _ _______________ ____
* Descriptive statistics (frequencies, central tendency and variation techniques) 
Correlation, regression, Chi- square and ANOVA analyses
In order to determine whether to accept the correlation level and to classify the various 
levels of it, the statistics text books refer to “the critical values of correlation” (Becker and 
Harnett 1987, Lentner 1979) depending on the sample size. Because the sample size of the 
whole data is: 26 cases, then the critical values of correlation at .05 significance level is 
.36 as the minimum level of accepted/ likely correlation. Spearman correlation for ordinal 
data was used along with the regression, and ANOVA test to trace differences among 
managerial levels regarding any of the issues in concern.
S ection  O ne: D escrip tive  S ta tis tics of The  potentia ls and con text o f RPE
000000000000000000000000000000000
Various statistical analyses were carried via SPSS, including central tendencies of 
variables, variability and frequency distribution. Table (7-1) report the responses of 26 
participants from United Utilities group regarding the existence of RPE, the relative 
significance of comparing to peer groups, preferring financial measures in one hand and 
both financial and non financial on the other hand, satisfying with market measures and 
preferring a/ specific form of reward.
I: Facts: The existence of peers’ comparisons, RPE and market m easures - 
Table (6.1.1) summarises the key data about the facts of United Utilities’ comparing 
employees performance to performers in other companies, rewarding employees 
according to that comparison, using accounting measures and/ or market measures to 
indicate performance and the components of remuneration packages as described by 
employees who participated in the investigation.
Table (6-1-1): Facts: The existence of peers’ comparisons, RPE and market measures
variable % of agreeing to 
the total respondents
comparing performance to peers 3.8
using RPE 23.1
using accounting measures 15.4
using market measures 3.8
remuneration package: 
cash 96.2
shares 46.2
post retirement benefits 61.5
holiday 76.9 "
medical coverage 69.2
better working conditions 26.9
Total number of respondents 26
II: Attitudes: Towards RPE, performance measures and reward
The employees’ attitudes towards the potentials of RPE, the performance indicators and 
the form of reward that should be used under an RPE scheme.
Four descriptive techniques were used to describe the investigated contingents of RPE 
(targets, measures and reward). These techniques are: (1) mean, (2) standard deviation, (3) 
the standard error of mean2 (4) variance3 and (5) coefficient of variation4 These measures 
have been calculated for each company individually and for the whole companies together 
shown in table (6.1.3) and summarised below:
Table (6-1.2): Attitudes about RPE, its roles, performance measures and reward form
measure RPE Roles of RPE: 
motivation monitoring
Points f  agreeing 42.2 57.7 53.8
Mean 3 3.11 3.07
Median 3 4 4
Std Dev of mean 2.3 1.52 1.23
S td D ev o f error .47 .298 .241
Variance 2 2.1 1.5
Coefficient of variation .67 1.48 2.04
The table shows that 42.2% of the respondents approved RPE as amotivational and 
monitoring tool. The mean and median did not show strong approval as they were around 
“3” which was the code of “not specified” point of view, unlike the obvious support for 
the motivational and the monitoring roles of RPE.
The potentials of RPE and the employees’ objectives from work
After investigating about RPE and its roles, the employees’ objectives from work was 
examined. A range of objectives has been introduced into discussion includes: making 
money, gaining esteem, doing outstanding work, self satisfaction and getting promoted 
and others. What the respondents were seeking from work is presented in figure (6.1) 
below:
1. money 2. esteem 3. doing outstanding work 4. personal satisfaction 5. promotion
The standard error of mean shows how much the mean varies from sample to sample in the same population. It is the standard 
deviation of the distribution of all possible means when samples of the same size are repeatedly taken from the same distribution.
A measure of dispersion around the mean, equals the squared deviations around the mean divided by the number of cases minus 1.
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Objectives from work
1 2 3 4 5objectives
Table (6.2.2) showed that money gained a full approval, personal satisfaction 96.1%, 
doing outstanding work and promotion each got 80.8% and esteem was approved by 
76.9%. The median showed an agreement on these objectives, turnes to strong agreement 
for personal satisfaction.
Nevertheless, the coefficient of variation highlights that data were not homogenous about 
these objectives except for “doing outstanding work”, other that that, the coefficient was 
more than 10% indicating non homogeneity. The correlation between being motivated 
through RPE and these objectives will be explored later with the other types of analatical 
statistics.
Table (6.2.2) Respondents’ objectives from work
measure money esteem outstanding satisfaction promotion
Points of agreeing on3: 100% 76.9% 80.8% 96.1% 80.8%
Mean: 4.38 3.96 4.12 4.73 4
Median 4 4 4 5 4
Std Dev of mean .496 .539 .764 .326 .55
Std Dev of error .097 .108 .153 .064 .112
Variance .246 .290 .583 .106 .303
coefficient of variation 17.8 13.65 7.2 44.6 13.33
A point which could be highlighted from these data is the high importance which 
participants placed on money and -oppositely- the least importance the respondents gave 
to esteem. The literature suggests that employees would respond to RPE and compete with 
peers to gain the reward and esteem. Here, a question arises about the mechanism by
4 A measure shows whether the data are homogenous or not. It equals: (average/ variance) * 100%. When the measure is 
less than 10% this means the data are homogenous.
5 as a % to the total response to the item.
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which RPE would motivate employees to compete, if those employees show a primary 
lack of concern in esteem.
Therefore, an investigation about whether RPE could provide money, esteem or both was 
included in the questionnaire and the answers on it as follows:
Table (6.2.2): The roles of RPE and the mechanism of motivation
measure behaviour derives
money recognition both money +
recognition
% of agree 26.9 15.4 19.2
Mean 2.59 2.22 2.78
Median 2 2 3
Std Dev of mean 1.18 1.02 1.18
Std Dev of error .251 .217 .271
Variance 1.39 1.041 1.39
coefficient of variation 1.86 2.13 2
First, each of the three arguments about whether RPE could provide: money only, esteem 
only or both money and esteem, could gain approval more than a third of the respondents. 
Second, the biggest portion of respondents voted for the ability of RPE to provide money 
only (26.9%) while 19.2% saw it could provide both money and esteem comparing to 
15.4% considered RPE would be able to provide esteem only. This result was backed up 
with the average answer as represented by the median ranges between 2 “disagree” and 3 
“not specified”. Data were homogenous for all variables where the coefficient of 
variation was below 10%. This suggests that respondents considered that competing with 
peers through RPE was a weak mechanism for making money only, providing esteem 
only or providing both money and esteem.
Figure (6.1) below provides the employees’ response about whether or not their objectives 
from work are being satisfied currently by the company’s remuneration system comparing 
to what was desired from these objectives.
1. money 2. esteem 3. doing outstanding work 4. personal satisfaction 5. promotion 
H |desired , Hl^prrcntly satisfied
Objectives from work as desired and as  
currently satisfied
1 0 0   r - i ------------------------  — ----------------
The figure above shows that there was a big gap between what was required and what was 
provided. For example money and personal satisfaction were required by 100% and 
96.1% of the respondents, but reported to be currently satisfied by 61.5% and 34.6% of 
the respondents respectively. Doing something outstanding was desired by 80.8% and 
reported to be currently satisfied by 42.3%. Gaining esteem and getting promoted were 
sought by around 80% of the participants but around 30% reported that the company’s 
system satisfied these needs currently.
The general conclusion of this point is: Employees would respond to RPE because it 
was approved as a motivating and a monitoring technique. In doing so, respondents 
sought to gain money rather than esteem.
The peer group:
There have been contingent factors under investigation and the first element of them was 
the peers group. There were two issues relate to the peer group subject to investigation, 
firstly, the preferable peer group to compete with, secondly, the perceived difficulty of 
each group. Table (6.2.5) summarises the respondents' preference of peers.
Table (6.2.5) The preferable peers
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measure Peer group belongs to the:
same company same region same industry top 100
Points of agreeing on6: 76.9% 11.5% 61.1% 26.9%
Mean 4.18 2.3 3.65 2.79
Median 4 2 4 2
Std Dev of mean 1.006 .864 1.22 1.13
Std Dev of error .215 .1933 .256 .248
Variance 1.013 .747 1.51 1.29
coefficient o f variation 4.12 3.078 2.41 2.16
The table shows that preferring a comparison group from the same company was 
supported by 76.9% of the respondents, 61.6% for a comparison group from the same 
industry, 11.5% for a group from the same region while 26.9 % for a group of competitors 
amongst the top 100 company nation- wide. What is worthy observing here is that, peers 
from the top 100 companies was preferred by only 11.5% of the respondents, although 
United Utilities used the FTSE 100 as a reference group for her RPE scheme for top 
management. That category of employees who were rewarded on RPE, were represented 
by 5 participants in this research. This might suggest that the design of this item in the 
policy was not widely welcomed across the company.
Another observation is that, taking the median as the average for the ordinal data, it would 
appear that, respondents accepted a peer group from the same company and same industry 
only. The overall differences of employees' preference of peers is shown in the diagram 
below.
1. Peers from same company 2. Peers from same industry
3.JPeers from same region______ 4. Peers from top 100______
Preferable peers
100
A possible reason behind this attitude, was the employees’ perception to each peer group in terms 
of difficulty, that has been investigated. How the respondents classified difficulty and attainability 
of different peer groups is highlighted in table (6.2.6) below.
Table (6.2.6) Respondents’ perception of peers in terms of difficulty and attainability
the peer group 
from the;
Attainable categories:
easy difficult total
attainable attainable attainable
unattainable categories: 
extremely difficult too difficult 
+barelv attainable unfair
best description for 
the peer group on 
individual category
same company 30.8 30.8 61.6 7.7 3.8 easy or difficult 
but attainable
same region 7.7 11.5 19.2 26.9 30.8 too difficult, unfair
same industry 7.7 34.6 42.3 34.6 3.8 either difficult 
but attainable 
or extremely difficult 
and barely attainable
top 100 3.8 26.9 30.7 11.5 34.6 too difficult, unfair
As shown in the table, 61.6% of the respondents believed that comparing with peers from the 
same company was either easy or difficult but in both cases attainable and that was the biggest 
support to a peer group. Competing with peers from the same region or from the top 100 
companies under RPE was seen too difficult and unfair 9by 30.8% and 34.6% respectively). Peers 
from the same industry was equally described to be either difficult but attainable or extremely 
difficult and barely attainable (by 34.6%), however, a total of 42.3% described it as 
attainable, comparing to a total o f 38.4% considered it unattainable. The point to be 
observed here is that, United Utilities used FTSE 100 as a comparison group for its RPE 
scheme. Nevertheless, that comparison group was described by participants in the enquiry 
to be "too difficult and unfair", this raises some doubt about the acceptability which that 
evaluation scheme held in the company.
The inquiry has been complemented by a question about the possible reaction/s which the 
respondent might take if the system was using what he/ she considered “unfair” 
assessment criteria. The biggest support (69.2%) was given to negotiate changes in the 
system, the average -as indicated by the median “4”- also showed an “agree” type of 
answer. Data are homogenous for all options where the coefficient of variation was below 
10%.
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Table (6.2.7) Employees’ reaction to “unfair” assessment criteria
measure continue
positively
negotiate
changes
ignore 
the system
work against 
the system
Points of agreeing on7: 26.9 73.1 26.9 38.4
Mean 2.37 4.08 2.87 2.8
Median 2 4 3 3
Std Dev of mean 1.209 .7173 1.03 1.19
Std Dev of error .246 .1464 .2112 .243
Variance 1.462 .514 1.071 1.418
coefficient of variation 1.62 7.93 2.67 1.97
The financial and  non financial measures:
The second item in the RPE technique which has been examined as a contingent the 
employees’ attitudes towards the financial only and financial and non financial measures. 
Results shown in table (6.2.8). The issues that have been explored here are:
- the preference to financial measures only veers financial and non financial measures,
- the features which are preferred to be in the performance indicators, .
- whether a given samples of measures would be welcomed within an RPE system and
- the preferable time span of measures. The following figure summarise the support of the 
financial and non financial measures.
1. Preferring financial only 2. Preferring financial and non financial
Preferring Financial only vs. Financial and 
non financial m easurse «
74%
As the figure above indicates that 30.7% supported the financial measures only while 
92.3% approved a combined system of both financial and non financial measures to be 
used under an RPE scheme. However, the average answer -taken from the median- shows 
that respondents did not agree on the use of financial only measure to indicate their
7 as a % to the total response to the item.
performance (the median is “2” which was disagree). The median for using both financial 
and non financial indicators was “4” which was a code for "agree".
2- The inquiry extended to the employees’ perception of the existence of some features in 
the financial measures in one hand and the non financial measures on the other hand. The 
support was generally in favour of the non financial indicators as shown in table (2.6.8) 
below.
Table (6.2.8) Respondents’ feedback on the existence of some feature in the
financial and non financial measures.
Measures Preferable measures 
F only F+ non F
Features of measures:
comprehensive controllable 
F nonF F nonF
time- related 
F nonF
accurate 
F nonF
points to agreeing 30.7 92.3 26.9 73.1 30.8 76.9 61.5 61.5 53.9 65.4
Mean 2.9 4.32 3.33 4.2 3.85 4.18 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.9
Median 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Std Dev of mean 1.3 1.39 1.39 .935 1.31 1.006 1.07 1.18 1.23 1.08
Std Dev of error .283 .303 .303 .199 .287 .214 .233 .251 .268 .236
Variance 1.82 1.93 1.93 .874 1.72 1.013 1.14 1.39 1.514 1.22
coefficient of variation 1.59 2.23 1.72 4.8 2.23 4.12 3.42 2.73 2.44 3.19
On a comparative level, the table shows that the participants gave more weight to non 
financial measures over the financial measures, in being: comprehensive, controllable and 
accurate whereas both types of measures were equal in being time related. On individual 
level, non financial measures were described to be first controllable, then comprehensive, 
accurate and finally time related while the financial measures were seen by respondents 
firstly to be time- related, then accurate, controllable and finally comprehensive. For all 
variables, data are consistent and homogenous because the coefficient of variation is less 
than 10%. The following diagram summarises these patterns.
Features of performance measures 
80 v ..........................................................................
o -I---------------------- 1---------------------- 1---------------------- i
1 2  3 4
Features
1. comprehensive 2. controllable 3. time-related 4. accurate 
 financial measures www««Non financial measures
The general conclusion from this part might be:
Respondents preferred their performance to be measured in both financial and non 
financial terms under RPE system rather than in financial terms only. Non financial 
performance measures outperformed the financial measures in being seen by 
respondents as: controllable, comprehensive,, accurate and time -related.
3- The next item in the analysis was whether the respondents’ performance is currently 
measured by any/ of a given sample of measures and whether these variables are 
preferable to be used under an RPE system or not. Table (6.2.10) shows what currently 
used and preferably used measures. This might help in recognising the gap between what 
is preferable and what is available regarding the performance measures and also would 
draw the attention to the measures which would be of concern to the employees under an 
RPE system.
Table (6.2.10) The preference and availability of various measures
measure market related measures: 
securities products factors
Financial related measures
budget profit revenue cost accounting ratios
currently
used
3.8 15.4 0 80.8 53.8 26.9 38.5 15.4
preferable 3.8 23.1 3.8 42.3 34.6 11.5 19.2 15.4
Operating
measures
creativity customer
care
quality new
markets
HRD efficiency
currently
used
26.9 50 65.4 19.2 30.8 57.7
preferable 34.6 50 50 26.9 26.9 34.6
Table (6.2.10) shows that both the preference and the actual use of market related 
measures is the lower than the other types of measures, (the financial related and the 
operational measures). The most preferable measures -respectively- are: meeting budget, 
quality, efficiency, profit and customer service. This suggest that in reality, employees 
believe that meeting target is the best measure for their performance and 80% of the 
respondents agree on that. From the non- financial operational measures, quality and 
efficiency and customer services are the most measures which employees consider 
reflective to their work.
Regarding the currently used measures, 50% of the respondents report that, customer 
service and quality are currently used and below that level of support comes meeting 
budget where 42% of the respondent suggest it is used.
A comparative review between what is preferable and what is actually used reveal that: 
only customer service measure meets the expectation of the respondents (as it is preferable 
by 50% of the respondents and reported to be used by 50% of the respondents as well). 
After customer service comes quality which is preferable by 65% but reported to be 
actually used by 50% only, then profit preferable by 53% and usable by 34%, efficiency 
preferable by 57% but usable by 34% and finally the most preferable measure is meeting 
target seems to be attached to a big gap in employees expectations where 80% prefer it 
whereas only 42% report its use.
The summary of this section is that,
There was an approval of financial and operational measures in United Utilities but not 
for any typeufthe investigated the performance measures market measures. Also, there 
was a gap between in the employees’ expectations and in United Utilities. The gap
varied from a small gap with customer service, quality to a big gap with the profit 
measures and this gap increased to constitute almost 50% with the budget measure.
4- Concerning the time span of measures, 53.8% preferred an annual measures, 42.3% for 
semi annual measures and 3.8% suggested quarterly measured. No response has been 
given to a monthly monitoring of performance for the purpose of evaluating and 
rewarding performance.
The Securities Market Measures:
The securities market measures have been examined as a specific type of financial 
measures. The issues that have been addressed included: whether or not the company 
actually use market measures to indicate performance, the degree of satisfaction which 
employees held for these measures, to what extent these measures are considered 
controllable by employees (comparing to the accounting measures) and if the use of these 
measures would encourage the response to RPE. Table (6.2.11) presents the descriptive of 
the inquiry about this item.
A primarily question was asked about whether the respondents had an actual experience of 
being monitored by accounting measures and/ or market measures. Table (6.2.11) presents 
both the respondents experience and preference of accounting and market measures.
measure the fact of using measures: 
accounting market
preferable measures: 
accounting market
approval 50 7.7 50 7.7
mean 1.5 1.08 3.2 2.17
median 2* 1 4 2
Std dev of mean .509 .282 1.208 1.02
Std dev of error .104 .058 .242 .215
variance .259 .080 1.46 1.059
coefficient of variation 5.79 13.5 2.19 2.049
* That was a question about "fact" so it was coded: "2" for yes, "1" for no and ”0” for no answer.
As the table shows, 38.4% of the respondents was monitored by accounting measures (and 
50% preferred these measures to be used in RPE) comparing to 7.7% had an experience 
with market measures and equally preferred these measures to be used in RPE. It should 
be noticed here that the median reflected acceptance of accounting measures and a 
rejection for market measures.
That is, market measures were reported to be to be - limitdly - used and preferred to be 
used under an RPE system in United Utilities whereas, accounting measures were used
and preferred to be used by half of the respondents. The data about: the fact of being 
monitored by accounting measures/ market measures, preferring accounting measures or 
market measures under an RPE are represented in the diagram below.
] Accounting measures
Accounting and market measures as used and
as preferred
Accounting end nrcrket meas ures
The argument about controllability of accounting and market measures was examined in 
this enquiry. Table (6.2.12) summarises the data about the controllability over the 
accounting measures and the market measures and the whether the use of market measures 
would enhance RPE.
Table (6.2.12) The controllability over accounting and market measures 
and the impact of using market measures on RPE
measures Controllability over measures: 
accounting market The use of market measures enhance response to RPE
approval 38.4 7.7 34.6
mean 2.84 1.73 2.76
median 2 1 3
Std dev of mean 1.344 .964 1.2
Std dev of error .269 .201 .24
variance 1.807 .929 1.44
coefficient of variation 1.57 1.86 1.91
Although United Utilities used RPE to reward top management, when doing so, the 
company used return on shareholders as a performance measure and the reference group 
was the FTSE 100. This practice clearly rested on market implications, nevertheless, the 
participants disapproved that such market-based indicators would be controllable
measures. Relatively, respondents saw accounting measures to be more controllable than 
market measures currently in use in United Utilities for RPE scheme. Only 34.6% of total 
respondents agreed that using market measures would enhance an RPE system.
The data about the preferable measures (accounting or market) and its controllability are 
represented in the figure below.
Accounting and market measures as used and as preferred and 
the controllability over each.
100
1 2
Acc. Market measures and contrdlability
The summary o f the debate about measurements is: Respondents preferred non 
financial measures more than the financial ones, however, no set of measures was 
mutually exclusive to the other, then respondents favoured a measurement system 
which used both to monitor their performance. In the financial group, respondents 
obviously voted for the accounting measures more than market measures because the 
latter lacked controllability.
The Form of Reward:
The last item in the survey of the components of RPE is how the reward should be paid. 
Here the investigation included: a description of the actual pay package which the 
respondents received, the degree of satisfaction which they felt towards each item, the 
preferred RPE form of reward and the impact of varying the form of reward on the 
response to RPE. The following figure summarises the data of the preferred forms of 
rewards and the current components of the reward packages as reported by respondents:
remuneration items as currently provided 
and as prefered under RPE
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Rew ard items
1. cash 2. shares 3. post retirement benefits
4. holiday 5. medical coverage 6. better working conditions 
SI = Series of items as actually provided 
S2= Series as preferable under RPE
The figure shows that the preferable rewards were overwhelmingly dominated by cash 
(88.5% of total respondents), followed by shares (65.4%), medical coverage and post 
retirement benefits 50% each while holidays and better work conditions were the least to 
be supported (42.3% each). Respondents described that their remuneration package 
in United Utilities to include the following items: Cash (96.2%), holiday (76.9%)), 
medical coverage (69.2%), post retirement benefits (61.5%), shares (46.2%) and finally 
work conditions (26.9%).
The two data of the two streams reveals two issues: (1) there was a difference in the 
relative positions of the items (comparing to each other) and (2) there was a gap between 
how much was an item preferred and how much it was provided.
Regarding the difference in the relative positions of items to each other, the difference was 
created by "shares" and "holidays". Respondents reported that shares was their second 
preferable item, while what occurred was that shares was in the fifth place in the 
remuneration package, while holidays occupied the second place. Also, in terms of 
amount, althoughcashwas the first'preterable and the first provided item, data showed 
that it was provided more than wanted, the same as holidays, medical coverage and post
retirement benefits. While shares and better work conditions were provided less than 
wanted.
It should be mentioned here that, the interview data about the reward system in United 
Utilities revealed that the company paid RPE rewards in two forms together: cash and 
shares. Given that only senior management -with few number of staff- were entitled to 
RPE scheme in the company, and only 5 of those individuals participated in this 
investigation, therefore, this might be a reason behind the relative late position of shares in 
the currently provided list of items. Regarding the satisfaction of the remuneration 
package, 69.2% of the total respondents recorded they were satisfied with the current pay 
systems in United Utilities. The mean and the median as detailed in the table below 
supported these findings.
Table (6.2.14) The preferable form of RPE reward
measure Preferable pay package:
cash shares post-retirement holiday medical better work
coverage conditions
approval 88.5 65.4 50 42.3 50 42.3
mean 4.66 4.09 3.65 3.36 3.545 3.4
median 5 4 4 3.5 4 4
Std dev of mean .565 .944 1.089 1.17 1.184 .905
Std dev of error .115 .206 .244 .251 .252 .208
variance .319 .89 1.18 1.38 1.403 .819
coefficient of 
variation
14.6 4.59 3.09 2.43 2.52 4.15
There is a dominating preference for receiving rewards in cash (88.5%), moderate support 
for shares (65.4) and average support for medical coverage and post retirement benefits. 
The holidays and better working conditions presented below average support.
The importance which the respondents would give to each element in an RPE system (i.e 
the peer group, the performance measures and the form of reward) differed from an item 
to another. Table (6,2.15) summarises the data about this. It is worthy mentioning here 
that, respondents were asked to give a percentage -as a portion of 100%- to each item of 
the three. The items were then proportionate to each other according to the amount of 
importance given. For example, in Questionnaire 4, the respondent gave:
The comparison group 20%
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The performance measures 60%
The form of reward 20%
These answers have been translated into: 2: 6: 2 respectively.
Table (6.2.15) % of importance of the various items of RPE scheme
measure % of importance of 
the peer group
% of importance of 
performance 
measures
% of importance of 
reward form
Total 52.7 101.2 65.7
Mean 2.7 4.6 3.1
Std Dev 1.48 1.92 1.87
The table shows that the order of the items of the RPE system in terms of importance is: 
the performance measures, reward from and the peer group (the average importance 
respectively is: 46%, 31% and 27%) and the comparison is shown in the diagram below:
% of importance of items in RPE
2
46%
1. Peers 2. performance mesaures 3. rewards
This suggests that, unlike the theoretical assumption in this research where there is an 
implicit priority given to the arguments around the influence of the comparison group, 
then the performance measures and finally the form of reward, the sample of employees 
who participated in the investigation -and 19% of them are being rewarded under an RPE 
scheme, show another ranking of these variables which reflect their own concern.
Hence, the theoretical assumption in this research suggests that the ranking of RPE 
elements is:
the peer group, the performance measures and the form of paying reward
but the evidence from the field work suggests the order of these variables to be:
the performance measures, the form of paying the reward and the peer group.
The evidence collected through interviews with the group manager of compensation and 
pension in United Utilities agrees with the ranking given by the respondents in the 
questionnaire survey. A following chapter will discuss the data collected by the 
interviews.
S ection  Two: Assoc ia tion  and Varia tion  S tatistics
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This section will present the details of statistical analyses that have been undertaken. 
Firstly more than a technique will be used to trace the association among the variables 
and, secondly more than a technique will be implemented to draw the variation among the 
companies and the managerial levels. It should be noticed that the analyses will be carried 
out on the whole sample of data. Also, the presentation will start from the correlation, if 
evident, the regression will draw the shape of the relationship among the variables. 
Following that, one -way ANOVA will be used to test whether there are significant 
differences among the companies and the managerial levels regarding each variable. Chi- 
square will be used to support the former test.
Applying These Tests on the Data:
Presenting the various tests undertaken on data will follow the line of inquiry of this 
research. The arguments will be divided into:
I: The perspective of RPE:
This will include test for the proposed roles of RPE, the behaviour derives which it 
triggers and the suitability to managerial levels.
II: The contingents of RPE:
This will examine the arguments about target level in a group, the performance measures 
in another group, the market measures as a special case of measures in a third group and 
finally the reward form in a group.
Section One: The perspective of RPE
Correlation:
The test includes studying the correlation between employees’ response to RPE in one 
hand and the objectives from work which individuals generally seek to satisfy (e.g getting 
money, esteem, doing outstanding work, personal satisfaction and promotion) on the other 
hand. This is will also be integrated by a test for the association between the motivational 
and monitoring roles of RPE and the needs which RPE was theoretically proposed to 
satisfy (i.e gaining money through competition, gaining social recognition as seen as a 
hard working person or both). The idea behind the last inquiry is not only tracing the 
relationship between the two major variables but also testing the relative importance of 
each need. That is: would employees response to RPE in order to gain money or/ more to/ 
than to gain social recognition, the likelihood that employees might be concerned to gain 
money and recognition together through RPE will also be explored. It should be 
highlighted here that the critical value of correlation for the sample sized 26 is .36 and 
the classification of the correlation coefficient would be:
Below .36 is a weak association (i.e items unlikely associated)
Between .36 and .52 is likely association 
Between .52 and .68 is moderate correlation 
Between .68 and .84 is a strong association 
Between .84 and 1 is a very strong correlation
It should be recognised that, in all tables which present statistics in this report:
1. % of agree = % of respondents who agree and strongly agree to total respondents
2. correlation are calculated between a variable and RPE by Spearman correlation coefficient
3 sig** = p= .05
4. sig* = p=. 10
5. all correlation relationships should be assumed positive unless otherwise specified
Table (6.3.1) Spearman coefficient for RPE, behaviour derives and RPE roles
variable RPE
Objectives from work: 
money weak non sig
esteem weak non sig
doing outstanding work likely sig*
personal satisfaction negative weak non sig
promotion weak non sig
Objectives from work which RPE could 
satisfy
money moderate sig**
social recognition moderate sig**
both money and social recognition moderate sig**
* the correlation coefficient is .31 and the significant level is: 67c
Concerning RPE:
The Correlation:
Table (6.3.1) presents that, among the objectives from work, RPE was correlated to doing 
outstanding work only. This was a combined effect of motivation and monitoring being 
individually almost correlated with doing outstanding work. The lack of correlation 
between RPE and money and esteem (although they were targeted by 100% and 76.9% of 
the respondents respectively) suggests that: employees targeted money and esteem 
generally from work but they did not see that RPE could provide these items. Chi- square 
test supports this result as well, where there was no evidence on significant dependence (at 
p= .05) between RPE and the objectives from work except for with “doing outstanding 
work” where the distribution of RPE could be dependent on the distribution of “doing 
outstanding work”.
On the other hand, RPE was moderately and significantly correlated to all the objectives 
which it was proposed to satisfy (i.e gaining money, esteem and both money and esteem). 
This predicted that if employees respond to RPE, they would seek to gain firstly both 
money and esteem, secondly to gain money only and thirdly to gain esteem only. Chi- 
square test provided another evidence" to this finding as it showed a significant 
dependency between the distribution .of RPE and the distribution of: the employees’ desire 
to gain money through competition, to gain social recognition and to gain both money and 
■-—social recognition througlrRPE. The sliaperofnhe- relationships which the correlation 
suggests are traced by multiple regression as follows.
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Regression:
Expanding the test about RPE and its potentials, because correlation has proved a relationship 
between RPE and objectives from work and with behaviour derives. The outputs of the 
regression model includes the following:
Multiple R: measures the influence of the set of independent variables on the deponent 
variable.
R Square: is the determination coefficient which shows the % of change in the
dependent variable due to a unit change in the independent set of variables.
B: is the regression coefficient which predicts the amount (and direction) of change in 
the dependent variable due to a unit of change in the independent variable.
Beta: can be used to classify the independent variables according to each’s influence 
on the dependent variable.
Significance of F: points at the model’s fit. If F is < .05, the regression is significance
at 95% confidence level and the vice versa.
Significance of T: provides the significance of each independent variable 
individually if > .05 and the vice versa.
The following table summarises the regression analysis for the relationship between RPE 
and objectives from work and the needs which RPE satisfies.
Regression coefficients for RPE and objectives from work
When the regression for RPE and all objectives from work was done, the resulting model 
was non significant. Therefore, the regression was done for RPE and doing outstanding 
work only which was shown above to have a likely significant association, the results are 
shown in the table below:
Table (6.3.2) Regression coefficients for RPE and doing outstanding work
Variable B Beta significance 
of T
Classification
Objectives from work: 
doing outstanding work .95 .33 .10 significant individual impact at 90%
Multiple R 33
Rsquare 11
significance of F .10 regression is significant at confidence level 90%
The regression predicts that regarding RPE and the employees’ desire to do outstanding 
work, 33% of the influence in the first is due to the latter. The model was significant at 
confidence level of 90%.
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Regarding the behaviours’ derives which RPE was proposed to trigger i.e money and 
recognition, the following regression provides the details of the influence.
Regression of RPE and the objectives which it can satisfy
Variable B Beta significance 
of T
Classification
RPR provides recognition .393 .168 .597 non sig. individual impact
RPE provides money 1.35 .734 .07 sig. individual impact at 90%
RPE provides both money and recognition -.54 -.219 .57 non sig. individual impact
Multiple R .68
R square .47
significance of F .04 regression is significant at 95%
The table showed 68% of the influence on RPE was practised by the employees’ 
inclination to gain money, esteem and both money and esteem. The individual 
contribution by each item was not significant at 95% but the interactive effect of the three 
items together was significantly influential on RPE at 95% confidence interval.
ANOVA test shows no differences among managerial levels regarding RPE, its 
motivational and monitoring roles. However, there are significant differences among 
managerial levels regarding promotion as objectives from work. Following are the 
frequencies.
Various degrees of support from managerial levels to '’promotion" as a goal from w ork
measure Managerial levels
middle top executives
% of approval to total participants in that level 50% 85% 100%
total participants in each level 2 16 8
total participants 26
Given that 92% of the participants in this research belonged to the top management level 
(managers, corporate managers or executives), and only 8% individuals (2 out of 26 ) 
represented lower management, it might not be surprising that there was low support from 
the middle management to the inclination to get promoted. That is, this result might 
partially stemmed from the limited number of respondents from the lower managerial 
levels. Therefore, caution should be taken in developing any conclusions from this point. 
Another point to show here is that, there was a difference between the extent to which 
employees sought money and esteem and the degree to which they excepted RPE to 
satisfy these objectives. The differences are presented in the figures below.
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The two diagrams show that the respondents desire to gain money and esteem was higher 
than their expectation about what can RPE provide with this respect.
Section Two: The contingents of RPE
The contingents which were investigated in this research included: peer group, 
performance measurements and rewards. Each of those items will be analysed in 
this part.
I: RPE and the different peers
In this section, the correlation and regression of various relationships will be-explored 
including:
• RPE and the preferable peers
• RPE and the perceived difficulty to compete with the different peers
• The preferable peers and the perceived difficulty to compete with those peers
• The perceived difficulty to compete with t peers and the reactions to that difficulties 
First: RPE and the preferable peers
Spearman correlations between RPE and the preferable peer group and the difficulty of 
each peer group are presented in the table below.
Table (6.3.7) Spearman correlation coefficients of RPE and the preferable peers
variable RPE
The preferable peers belong to: 
same company 
same industry 
same region 
top 100 company
weak non sig 
weak non sig 
moderate and sig** 
moderate and sig**
* *p= .05
Regarding the various peer groups, the table showed that there was a moderate significant 
correlation between RPE and peers from the same region. This likelihood increased with 
peers from the top 100 companies. This suggested under RPE, employees would likely be 
motivated to spend more effort when the comparison group belonged firstly to the top 100 
companies, then to companies in the same region. This is consistent with the actual 
practice of United Utilities which uses RPE to reward senior managers by comparing 
performance to the performance of the FTSE 100. Also this shows that the employees in 
United Utilities might have a high level of aspiration.
R egression:
When the regression model was applied for RPE and all the peer groups, and for RPE and 
only peers from the same region and the top 100 companies, both models were significant. 
Following are the details of the regression of RPE and all the peer groups:
Table (6.3.2) Regression coefficients between RPE and the preferable peers
Variable B Beta significance Classification
of T
Peers: from the same company 1.94 .319 .122 non significant individual impact
from the same region -.246 -.097 .72 non significant individual impact
from the same industry -.746 -.422 .07 significant individual impact*
from top 100 companies 1.89 .98 .005 significant individual impact**
Multiple R .79 -
R square .626
significance of F .004 regression is significant**
The regression shows that the peers set-of variables -led by-peers-from-top -100-eompanies- 
was responsible for 79% of the change in RPE. The model was significant at p= .05. The 
parameters of the correlation shows that, there was a combined effect of two variables was
generated mainly by the top 100 companies which participated by the biggest 
contribution in this model (as Beta = .68 and the relationship was significant). ANOVA 
test predicts that there were no difference among the managerial levels regarding the 
preferable peer group. This shows a general tendency of agreement among the managerial 
levels.
Second: RPE and the difficulty related to each peer group:
Spearman correlation coefficients for RPE and the difficulty which participants allocated 
to competing with each peer group, revealed non significant associations, as the following 
table presents.
variable Correlation to RPE
The difficulty of each peer group: 
difficulty of peers from the same company 
difficulty of peers from the same region 
difficulty of peers from the same industry 
difficulty of peers from the top 100
moderate sig** 
weak non sig 
unlikely, sig at 90%* 
moderate sig**
* correlation coefficient was = .29. p= .10
Table (6.3.7) above shows a correlation which was moderate in strength, significant in 
type between’RPE and difficulty to compete with peers from the same company and the 
top 100 companies. This means, the more difficult the competition with peers from the 
same company and the top 100 companies, the more RPE would be motivating to 
employees. The regression was significant at 95% and the details in the table below.
Table (6.3.3) Regression of difficulty of various peers on RPE
Variable B Beta significance Classification
of T
difficulty to compete with peers from:
the same company 1.043 .388 .09 significance impact at 90%
the same industry -.461 -.150 .54 non significant
top 100 companies 1.024 .452 .07 significance impact at 90%
Multiple R _ .605
R square .367
significance of F .05 significant impact of the whole group
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Employees' reactions and target's difficulty:
The following table presents the correlation between possible reactions to target difficulty 
and the difficulty which participants associated to each target.
Correlation between target difficulty and reactions to that difficulty
Types of difficulty Employees’reactions to difficult targets:
continue to respond positively negotiate changes ignore the system work against the
system
difficulty to compete with 
peers from same company
weak non significant weak non 
significant
weak non 
significant
negative likely 
sig*
difficulty to compete with 
peers from same region
likely significant** negative likely 
significant**
negative weak 
non significant
negative weak 
non significant
difficulty to compete with 
peers from same industry
0 negative weak 
non significant
negative weak 
non significant
negative weak 
non significant
difficulty to compete with 
peers from top 100 
companies
weak non significant negative weak 
non significant
negative weak 
non significant
0
** p= .05 * p= .10
Table shows that weak and non significant correlation at p= .05 between all possible actions and 
the different degrees of difficulty with two exception. First, to continue to respond positively 
had a positive correlation with the difficulty to compete with peers from the same region, this 
correlation turned to be negative and significant when the action was to negotiating changes in 
the system . This meant that, the more difficult it was to compete with peers from the same 
region, the more possible that employees would continue to respond positively and less likely 
that they would negotiate changes in the system. The likelihood of that was 95%. Secondly, 
there was a negative likely correlation between difficulty to compete with peers from the same 
company and working against the system. This meant that the more difficult it was to compete 
with peers from the same company, the less likely that employees would react by working 
against the system. That likelihood of that relationship was 90%. These two points together 
sustain the previous finding that peers from the same company and the same region were the 
preferable type of competitors to the participants from United Utilities.
II: RPE and the performance measurements
In this section, three main themes will be examined: first; the relationship between RPE 
and using financial measures in one hand and the financial and non financial measures 
together.
Second, it will be explored to what extent the financial measures enjoyed the features of 
performance measures in the respondents’ view and the relationship between the features 
of financial measures and RPE. Third, the previous arguments will be analysed with 
relation to non financial measures.
I: RPE and using financial measures only vs. financial and non financial measures
Spearman correlation did not show a significant correlation between RPE and preferring 
financial measures only nor preferring both the financial and non financial measures. 
However, the correlation shows a likely significant correlation between preferring the 
financial only measures and preferring both financial and non financial in the control 
system. It was an interesting result that the correlation reached a moderate level 
(coefficient .49) and was significant at confidence level of 90%. The regression of this 
relationship was also significant and Multiple R = .46.
2. Preferring financial measures only, the features of financial measures and RPE
Table (6.3.10) shows the correlation between preferring financial measures, features of 
financial measures and RPE.
Table (6.3.6) Spearman correlation between preferring financial measures only, 
features of measures and RPE
Features of financial 
measures
Correlation with:
Preferring financial measures RPE
Comprehensive moderate sig** weak non sig
Controllable likely sig* (at p= .06%) weak non sig
Accurate weak non sig weak non sig
Time -related likely sig** likely, sig (at p= .08)
Spearman correlation predicts that there were a moderate and significant correlation 
between preferring financial measures and those measures’ being comprehensive, with a 
less correlation coefficient for being controllable and time related, although still 
significantly likely at 90%. This suggested that respondents of United Utilities preferred 
financial measures because they saw them comprehensive, controllable and time related.
With regard to RPE, there was no significant relationship (at 90%) between RPE and any 
of the features of financial measures. The only correlation which was near to the critical
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value of correlation was between RPE and financial measures’ time - related. The positive, 
almost likely correlation suggested that the response to RPE might increase when 
financial measures were used because they were seen as time - related indicators. This 
association has a likelihood of 92%.
3. Preferring both financial and non financial measures, the features of financial 
and non financial measures and RPE
The following table provides the correlation between preferring both financial and non 
financial measures to be used in RPE and the features of each type of these measures in 
one hand and RPE on the other hand:
Correlation between preferring both financial and non financial measures, the features of 
each type and RPE
Features of 
measures
Preferring both financial 
and non financial measures
RPE
comprehensive: 
financial 
non financial
weak non sig. 
moderate sig.**
weak non sig. 
weak non sig.
controllable: 
financial 
non financial
likely sig.* 
moderate sig.**
weak non sig. 
weak non sig.
accurate: 
financial 
non financial
likely sig.* 
likely sig.*
weak non sig. 
weak non sig.
time related: 
financial 
non financial
moderate sig.* 
weak non sig.
likely sig.* 
weak non sig.
*p=.10
The correlation also suggested that preferring both financial and non financial measures 
was because the non financial side was seen: individually comprehensive, controllable 
whereas the financial side was considered time related type of measures. Non of the two 
sets of measures were judged to be accurate (at a confidence level 90%). However, both 
were reported to be likely accurate at confidence level 90%. RPE had weak non 
significant associations with the features of the two types of measures at 90%. 
Nevertheless, the regression model of preferring both financial and non financial 
measures and the features which each type enjoyed -individually- was significant and non 
financial measures’ controllability had the only significanUndtividual impact on preferring 
both financial and non financial measures.
RPE and the Securities market measures:
The securities market measures have been investigated as a specific type of financial measures. 
The analyses of data about this debate starts by Spearman correlation and provides results which 
might be contradictory with the theoretical assumption. The following table presents the 
correlations.
Correlation between RPE, preferring accounting/ market measures and controllability over these 
measures
Preferring accounting or market 
measures and their controllability
Correlation to RPE correlation to Preferring:
accounting measures market measures
preferring accounting measures weak non significant 1 likely significant*
preferring market measures likely significant* likely significant* 1
accounting measures’ controllable weak non significant strong, absolutely sig** weak non significant
market measures’ controllable likely significant** likely significant** strong, absolutely sig**
** p= .05 *p=.10
A number of observations could be made from the table above. Firstly, there was no significant 
correlation between RPE and respondents’ preferring accounting measures at 95%. However, 
there might be a correlation between RPE and preferring market measures, the correlation 
coefficient w,as .27 with a probability p= .10 while the critical value of correlation for the 
sample in hand was .36. accounting measures or controllability of market measures. The 
regression was non significant for that relationship. Secondly, RPE was holding a positive, 
likely and significant association to controllability over market measures. This suggested that, 
the more controllable market measures were, the better motivating RPE could be. However, the 
regression models of RPE and market measures’ controllability individually and with accounting 
measures’ controllability, both were non significant at 90% and 95%.
Thirdly, regarding controllability over measures and preferring specific measures’, Spearman 
correlation indicated that there was a strong and absolutely significant correlation between 
controllability over accounting measures and preferring accounting measures and the same with 
controllability and preferring market measures. It meant that the more controllable accounting 
and market measures were, the more likely that employees would prefer them to be used in RPE 
schemes. This relationship is absolutely significant (100% confidence) in the data. A point of 
consistency in the data should be recognised here, because earlier, data revealed that there were 
a likely to moderate correlation between controllability over financial and non financial 
— measures and preferring each ef-these-mcasurcs:-That- suggested-ihen that, controllability over 
measures was one of the reasons because of which, respondents preferred a specific type of 
measures. —
Preferring specific measures (accounting or market) and preferring specific peer group
The debate extends further in this point to discuss if there is any possible correlation between 
preferring accounting or market measures, the controllability related to each all in one hand and 
employees’ preferring specific peer group to compete with. For example, would employees 
prefer accounting measures if they are compared internally with peers from the same company? 
The following table provides the correlation coefficients:
Correlation between peers, preferring accounting/ market measures and
Preferring accounting or market 
measures and preferable peers
Correlation to Preferring 
accounting measures
Correlation to Preferring 
market measures
peers from the same company negative weak non sig. negative weak non sig.
peers from the same region negative weak non sig. weak non sig.
peers from the same industry likely significant* weak non sig.
peers from top 100 companies weak non sig. likely significant**
** p= .05 * p= .10
The correlation above shows a likely significant association between preferring to compete with 
a peer group from the top 100 companies and preferring to be measured by market measures. 
This points at a consistency of the orientation of the respondents because it meant that, if an 
external, market- related peer group was used, the performance was sought to be measured by 
market- related measures as well, accounting measures were preferred when the comparison 
was held with a peer group from the same industry where the correlation coefficient is (.31) near 
the critical value (.36) and the probability of this is .07.
HI: RPE and the form of reward
The inquiry was directed to an investigate whether the respondents would prefer to receive the 
RPE reward in cash, shares, holiday,...etc. This question was assumed to provide a direct 
measure for the preferable form of reward under an RPE scheme and also it examined whether 
varying the form of reward might impact on RPE. The following table displays the correlation 
between preferring a specific type of reward and RPE and managerial level.
Correlation between RPE, managerial levels and preferable form of reward
measure Correlation with RPE Correlation with managerial level
RPE in cash weak non sig weak non sig
RPE in shares negative weak non sig weak non sig
RPE post retirement benefits negative weak non sig weak non sig
RPE in holiday weak non sig Likely and sig*
RPE in medical coverage weak non sig weak non sig
RPE in better work conditions negative weak non sig weak non sig
* p= .059
The table shows that there was no significant correlation between RPE and receiving the RPE 
reward in a specific form. Chi- square test supported this result where the distribution of RPE 
was found significantly independent on any of the distributions of the preferable form of 
reward. This indicated that, the form of reward was not an influential item in the debate around 
RPE.
Receiving the RPE reward in form of holidays was the only form which has a likely and 
significant correlation with managerial level. The positive correlation here suggested that, the 
higher the managerial level was, the more employees would tend to prefer RPE reward in form 
of holidays but the regression model of this relationship was non significant at p= .05. 
Considering the relationship between RPE and the satisfaction with remuneration package {if 
any} and thfe managerial levels, Spearman correlation predicts no significant correlation 
between employees’ feeling satisfied or non satisfied and RPE, nor between managerial level 
and the satisfaction with remuneration package.
This leads to a conclusion that: for United Utilities data, RPE was influenced by 
the peers only and neither the financial or non financial measures nor the form 
of rewards had associations to it.
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Copy of a "Cartoon" received with the questionnaire of a respondent of United Utilities. vP
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